Showing posts with label construction contract. Show all posts
Showing posts with label construction contract. Show all posts

Sunday, 20 February 2022

Whether the court can grant specific performance of construction contract?

 24.3. In order to determine the exact nature of the agreement

signed between the parties, the intent of the parties has to be

construed by reading the agreement as a whole in order to

determine whether it is an agreement simpliciter for

construction or an agreement that also creates an interest for

the builder in the property. Where under a development

agreement, the developer has an interest in land, it would be

difficult to hold that such an agreement is not capable of

being specifically enforced.”

(Italics and underscoring supplied)

22.7.2 Where, therefore, as in the present case, the agreement is not merely for development or construction on the property, but also envisages valuable rights enuring, in favour of the developer, in the constructed edifice, the Supreme Court itself holds, unequivocally, that it would be difficult to treat the agreement as incapable of specific performance.

22.8 The requirement of precision, in the construction contract, as a pre-condition for its enforceability, is relatable to the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii) of the Specific Relief Act. That requirement no longer figures on the statute book, after the amendment of Section 14 by the 2018 Amendment Act. In my prima facie opinion, lack of precision in the construction agreement can no longer be regarded, by itself, as a sufficient disqualification to its enforceability by specific performance. Else, it would be re-introducing, by a side wind, the consideration in the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii), which the legislature has consciously removed from the statute. Such anexercise is necessarily to be eschewed, as it would militate against the legislative intent.

22.9 The sequitur would, therefore, be that a construction contract can no longer be regarded as incapable of specific performance merely because its terms are imprecise or vague. If, however, owing to such imprecision or vagueness, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court, that would, even now, render the agreement incapable of specific performance by virtue of Section 14(b). For that, however, the Court would have to arrive at a finding that, owing to the imprecision of the agreement, or for any other reason, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court. In the scenario of Section 14 as it exists today, and without the support of the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c) and its various clauses, this would, in almost every case, be arguable at the very least.

22.10 Prima facie, in view of the above legal position, I am unable to convince myself to hold, prima facie, that the defendant has been able to make out a case of the PDA being incapable of specific performance, by operation of Section 14(b) of the Specific Relief Act, as would justify vacation of the interim direction to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Pronounced on: 22nd October, 2021

IAs 6433/2020 & IA 7643/2020 in

CS(COMM) INFRA 1/2020

M/S GROVY INDIA LTD Vs BALBIR SINGH

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Whether court can enforce old contract if new contract is nullity?(Doctrine of Novation)

 Nearly a century and a quarter ago, one finds this clear exposition of the principle of novation, in the judgement of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Nagpur in Ganpat v. Mahadeo  1925 Nag 26 :

“Where the question is whether one party is set free by the

action of the other, the matter for consideration is whether the

acts or conduct of the one do or do not amount to an

intimation of an intention to abandon and altogether to refuse

performance of the contract. The true question is whether the

acts and conduct of the party evince any intention no longer

to be bound by the contract: Mersay Steel and Iron

Company v. Naglir Benzon & Co. 9 A.C. 434 General Bill

Posting Co v. Atkinson (13). The Court requires as clear

evidence of the waiver as of the existence of the contract

itself and will not act upon less: Carolan v. Brabazon (1900)

A.C. 118 = 78 L.J.; C.H. 77=99 L.T. 913 = 25 T.L.R. 173.

What is then required is that an abandonment of the old

agreement, must be clearly made out. There must be clear

and precise evidence of a mutual intention to determine and

abandon the contract: Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram

Kumar Saha [1946] 43 Cal. 700=23 C.L.J. 26 = 30 I.C.

305: 20 C.W.N. 370. Where the intention to substitute a new

contract is frustrated by the fact that the new contract is a

nullity, the original contract may be enforceable: see Har

Chandi Lal v. Sheoraj Singh 3 J & L 200 = 9 Ir. & E. 121.

Much more so, where the agreement itself is a contravention

of the statute and does not ripen into a contract in the legal

sense of the term.”

(Emphasis supplied)

A coordinate Bench of this Court has held, recently in Knowledge

Podium Systems Pvt Ltd v. S.M. Professional Services Pvt Ltd26,

that “a novation takes place only when there is a complete substitution of a new contract in place of the old”.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Pronounced on: 22nd October, 2021

IAs 6433/2020 & IA 7643/2020 in

CS(COMM) INFRA 1/2020

M/S GROVY INDIA LTD Vs BALBIR SINGH

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

Dated: 22.10.2021

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Saturday, 22 January 2022

Can the court refuse to grant specific performance of construction contract after Specific relief amendment Act 2018 if the contract is not precise?

Re. Section 14(1)(b) of Specific Relief Act

55. Though, in the written submissions tendered by the defendant as encapsulating the submissions advanced at the Bar, this contention has not been raised, it was, in fact, argued, and I proceed, therefore, to deal with it.

56. Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act completely bars grant of interlocutory relief as sought by the plaintiff, contends Mr. Garg. The provision, as it stands today, reads thus:

“14. Contracts not specifically enforceable. - The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely:—

*****

(b) a contract, the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise;”

57. This, however, is the amended avatar of Section 14. Prior to its amendment by Section 5 of the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, Section 14 (to the extent relevant) read as under:

“14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.-

(1) The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely:—

(d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise.

*****

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), the court may enforce specific performance in the following cases:—

*****

(c) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract for the construction of any building or the execution of any other work on land:

Provided that the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:—

(i) the building or other work is described in the contract in terms sufficiently precise to enable the court to determine the exact nature of the building or work;

(ii) the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract and the interest is of such nature that compensation in money for non-performance of the contract is not an adequate relief; and

(iii) the defendant has, in pursuance of the contract, obtained possession of the whole or any part of the land on which the building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.”

58. Prior to its amendment, therefore, Section 14 required, for specific performance of a contract for the construction of a building, the contract to describe the building “in terms sufficiently precise to enable the courts to determine the exact nature of the building or work”. That requirement is now done away with. Decisions, which have held a contract for construction of a building or other work not to be capable of being enforced by way of specific performance on the ground that the contract is imprecise or vague, relating to causes of action arising during the currency of the pre-amended Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act cannot, therefore, prima facie, constitute valuable precedents, to guide cases arising after Section 14 was amended.

59. Having said that, “a contract, the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise” still remains impervious to enforcement by way of specific performance.


24.3. In order to determine the exact nature of the agreement signed between the parties, the intent of the parties has to be construed by reading the agreement as a whole in order to determine whether it is an agreement simpliciter for construction or an agreement that also creates an interest for the builder in the property. Where under a development agreement, the developer has an interest in land, it would be difficult to hold that such an agreement is not capable of being specifically enforced.”

(Italics and underscoring supplied)

73. Where, therefore, as in the present case, the agreement is not merely for development or construction on the property, but also envisages valuable rights enuring, in favour of the developer, in the constructed edifice, the Supreme Court itself holds, unequivocally, that it would be difficult to treat the agreement as incapable of specific performance.

74. The requirement of precision, in the construction contract, as a pre-condition for its enforceability, is relatable to the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii) of the Specific Relief Act. That requirement no longer figures on the statute book, after the amendment of Section 14 by the 2018 Amendment Act. In my prima facie opinion, lack of precision in the construction agreement can no longer be regarded, by itself, as a sufficient disqualification to its enforceability by specific performance. Else, it would be re-introducing, by a side wind, the consideration in the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii), which the legislature has consciously removed from the statute. Such an exercise is necessarily to be eschewed, as it would militate against the legislative intent.

75. The sequitur would, therefore, be that a construction contract can no longer be regarded as incapable of specific performance merely because its terms are imprecise or vague. If, however, owing to such imprecision or vagueness, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court, that would, even now, render the agreement incapable of specific performance by virtue of Section 14(b). For that, however, the Court would have to arrive at a finding that, owing to the imprecision of the agreement, or for any other reason, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court. In the scenario of Section 14 as it exists today, and without the support of the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c) and its various clauses, this would, in almost every case, be arguable at the very least.

76. Prima facie, in view of the above legal position, I am unable to convince myself to hold, prima facie, that the defendant has been able to make out a case of the PDA being incapable of specific performance, by operation of Section 14(b) of the Specific Relief Act, as would justify vacation of the interim direction to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before C. Hari Shankar, J.)

Grovy India Ltd. Vs Balbir Singh

IAs 6433/2020, IA 7643/2020 and CS(COMM) INFRA 1/2020

Decided on October 22, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4783

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Friday, 19 June 2015

Supreme court judgment on calculation of damages in case of breach of construction contract

"The discussion covering earlier issues establishes that BSCL was guilty of delays and disruptions. Proceeding from there, the question is whether MII is entitled to an amount on account of increased overhead and loss of profit and additional project management costs? MII states that construction law recognizes that construction contractor incurs two general jobs of costs in the course of its operation; the operating costs that are attributable to a particular project, and costs such as overhead that are expended for the performance of the business as a whole, including t`he particular project. Consequently, construction law recognizes that owner caused delay entitles the contractor to recover from the owner the increased overhead and loss of profit as part of damages. Reference has been made to Hudson's building and Engineering Contracts. Article 8.176-91 pp. 1074-81 (11th edn.), Molly J.B., "A formula for Success". Three formulae have been evolved for computation of a claim for increased overhead and loss of profit due to prolongation of the works : the Hudson Formula; The Emden Formula and Eicheay Formula. Of these three, the Emden Formula is the one widely applied and which has received judicial support in a number of cases."It is not in dispute that MII had examined one Mr. D.J. Parson to prove the said claim. The said witness calculated the increased overhead and loss of profit on the basis of the formula laid down in a manual published by the Mechanical Contractors Association of America entitled 'Change Orders, Overtime, Productivity' commonly known as the Emden Formula. The said formula is said to be widely accepted in construction contracts for computing increased overhead and loss of profit. Mr. D.J. Parson is said to have brought out the additional project management cost at US$1,109,500. We may at this juncture notice the different formulas applicable in this behalf.
(a) Hudson Formula: In Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts, Hudson formula is stated in the following terms:
"Contract head office overhead & x contract sum x period of delay"
Profit percentage contract period In the Hudson formula, the head office overhead percentage is taken from the contract. Although the Hudson formula has received judicial support in many cases, it has been criticized principally because it adopts the head office overhead percentage from the contract as the factor for calculating the costs, and this may bear little or no relation to the actual head office costs of the contractor.
(b) Emden Formula: In Emden's Building Contracts and Practice, the Emden formula is stated in the following terms:
"Head office overhead & profit x Contract sum x period of delay" 100 contract period Using the Emden formula, the head office overhead percentage is arrived at by dividing the total overhead cost and profit of the contractor's organization as a whole by the total turnover. This formula has the advantage of using the contractors actual head office and profit percentage rather than those contained in the contract. This formula has been widely applied and has received judicial support in a number of cases including Norwest Holst Construction Ltd. v. Cooperative Wholesale Society Ltd., decided on 17 February, 1998, Beechwood Development Company (Scotland) Ltd. v. Mitchell, decided on 21 February, 2001 and Harvey Shoplifters Ltd. v. Adi Ltd., decided on 6 March, 2003.
(c) Eichley Formula: The Eichleay formula was evolved in America and derives its name from a case heard by Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, Eichleay Corp. It is applied in the following manner:
Step 1 Contract Billings Total overhead for Overhead allocable Total Billings for contract x contract period = to the contract period Step 2 Allocable overhead Total days of contract = Daily Overhead rate Step 3 Daily Contract Overhead Number of Days Amount of Unabsorbed Rate x of delay = overhead"
This formula is used where it is not possible to prove loss of opportunity and the claim is based on actual cost. It can be seen from the formula that the total head office overheads during the contract period is first determined by comparing the value of work carried out in the contract period for the project with the value of work carried out by the contractor as a whole for the contract period. A share of head office overheads for the contractor is allocated in the same ratio and expressed as a lump sum to the particular contract. The amount of head office overhead allocated to the particular contract is then expressed as a weekly amount by dividing it by the contract period. The period of delay is then multiplied by the weekly amount to give the total sum claimed. The Eichleay formula is regarded by the Federal Circuit Courts of America as the exclusive means for compensating a contractor for overhead expenses.
Before us several American decisions have been referred to by Mr. Dipankar Gupta in aid of his submission that the Emden formula has since been widely accepted by the American courts being Nicon Inc.v. United States, decided on 10 June, 2003 (USCA Fed. Cir.), Gladwynne Construction Company v. Balmimore, decided on 25 September, 2002 and Charles G. William Construction Inc. v. White, 271 F.3d 1055.
We do not intend to delve deep into the matter as it is an accepted position that different formulas can be applied in different circumstances and the question as to whether damages should be computed by taking recourse to one or the other formula, having regard to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, would eminently fall within the domain of the Arbitrator.
If the learned Arbitrator, therefore, applied the Emden Formula in assessing the amount of damages, he cannot be said to have committed an error warranting interference by this Court.

Supreme Court of India

Mcdermott International Inc vs Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors on 12 May, 2006

Bench: B.P. Singh, S.B. Sinha
Read full judgment here; click here
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Thursday, 24 July 2014

Leading Supreme court Judgment on contract drafting and interpretation


How a good contract should be? The Supreme Court gave its observation in the matter titled as M.K. Abraham & Company vs. State of Kerala and Anr., decided on 07.07.2009 ((2009) 7 SCC 636 = AIR 2010 SC 1265) that the agreement should be clear, simple and straight forward. The court further went on to observe that these days with the use of computers and user friendly editing procedures like cut and paste facilities, the text is sourced and added hoping the same to be appropriate to the work to avoid redundancy, confusion, vagueness and inconsistency and to increase efficiency, expedition, reduction of disputes and saving of funds.
The Court further clarified that if a contract consists of a printed form with cyclostyled amendments, typed additions and deletions and handwritten corrections, an endeavour shall be made to give effect to all the provisions. However, in the event of apparent or irreconcilable inconsistency, the following rules of construction, As evolved from the well known maxim of construction that "written, stamped or typed additions, when inconsistent with the printed terms, would normally prevail over the printed terms" and proceeds on the assumption that the printed form contained the original terms, and changes thereto were incorporated by the cyclostyled amendments, followed by changes by type-written additions and lastly the hand written additions, would normally apply:
(i) The cyclostyled amendments will prevail over the printed terms;
(ii) The type-written additions will prevail over the printed terms and cyclostyled amendments;
(iii) Hand written corrections will prevail over the printed terms, cyclostyled amendments and typed written additions."

The printed form contains standardized terms to suit all contracts and situations. It is not drafted with reference to the special features of a specific contract. When such a standard form is used with reference to a specific contract, it becomes necessary to modify the standard/general terms by making additions/alterations/deletions, to provide for the special features of that contract. This is done either by way of an attachment or an annexure to the standard printed form, incorporating the changes, or by carrying out the required additions/alterations/deletions in the standard form itself. Such additions/alterations/deletions are done by typing/stamping/hand. Where the contract has several annexures/attachments, prepared at different points of time, unless a contrary
intention is apparent, the latter in point of time would normally prevail over the earlier in point of time.
The use of multi-layered agreements, with several printed annexures, each with cyclostyled amendments, typed and hand written additions and deletions lead to confusion, uncertainty, delays in execution apart from giving rise to avoidable disputes. Having a contract with different annexures dealing with the same issues with various attachments, in construction contracts (and sometimes insurance contracts) is a nightmare for anyone wanting to understand, implement or enforce them. Complicating contracts with several annexures and attachments with inconsistent, irrelevant, superseded or redundant provisions resulting in creating a lush dispute generating field. It helps greedy and unscrupulous contractors to make bloated imaginary claims.
It enables Rule-Minded or corrupt officers to play havoc with honest and bonafide contractors. The best form of agreement is where all the relevant clauses/terms are incorporated in a single document with several sections dealing with different aspects/subjects, avoiding any overlapping. The difficulty arises if the same subject is dealt with in more than one section or in more than one document. Confusion and difficulties also arise in using certain forms with conditions which were finalized and printed at an earlier point of time and using other sets of conditions which are finalized and printed at different subsequent points of time, without taking care to specify which of the earlier terms were deleted or modified
Supreme Court of India
M.K. Abraham & Co vs State Of Kerala & Anr on 7 July, 2009
Author: R Raveendran
Bench: R.V. Raveendran, J.M. Panchal

Reportable
Citation: AIR2010SC1265, 2010(6)ALT1(SC), 2009 3 AWC(Supp)2803SC, 2009(5)CTC352, JT2009(12)SC612, 2010(1)MhLJ482(SC), 2009(9)SCALE288, (2009)7SCC636, [2009]10SCR395
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