Supreme Court: 2018 Amendment To Specific Relief Act Is Not Retrospective

 Specific Relief Act, 1963 - 2018 Amendment - Supreme Court clarified that the 2018 amendment to the Act of 1963, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on October 1, 2018. [Relied on Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd. 2023 1 SCC 355; Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P.) Ktd. V. Katta Sujatha Reddy 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214; Paras 34-38].

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

SLP (C) No. 26848-26849/2018; 

ANNAMALAI Vs VASANTHI AND OTHERS

J.B. PARDIWALA; J., MANOJ MISRA; J.

Author: MANOJ MISRA, J.

Dated: October 29, 2025

Print Page

Bombay HC: Whether the court can decree suit for Specific performance of contract even if there are procedural irregularities regarding admissibility of documents

• The Bombay High Court upheld a decree for specific performance despite procedural irregularities in evidence admission at the trial court level. The court concluded that even if certain documents were excluded, sufficient evidence supported granting specific performance based on the agreement's existence and fulfillment of obligations by the plaintiff.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

First Appeal No. 1841 of 2024

Decided On: 21.02.2025

Yasin Khan and Ors. Vs. Ajit Developers Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sharmila U. Deshmukh, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1001/2025,2025:BHC-AS:8423

Print Page

Supreme court: Under which circumstances the party must pay stamp duty on agreement of sale treating it as Conveyance?

In the instant case, the agreement to sell executed between the Appellant and mother of the Respondent No. 1, specifically states that "this property is in your occupation on rental basis and it will not be part of the sale transaction. After completion of sale transaction, the possession of the said property will be given to you on the ownership basis. This makes it very clear that the suit property was occupied by the Appellant on a rental basis and it would not be a part of the sale transaction. Further, there was a clause, by which, timeline was given for execution of sale deed. Since the possession was admittedly given to the Appellant even before the date of agreement, implying acquisition of possessory rights protected Under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, the same requires payment of proper stamp duty. As indicated above, the agreement to sell includes a Clause stating that physical possession had already been handed over to the Appellant, regardless of the basis of such possession. This satisfies the requirement to treat the instrument as a 'conveyance' within the meaning of Explanation I to Article 25 of Schedule I of Bombay Stamp Act, with only the formality of executing the sale deed remaining. Pertinently, it is to be pointed out that the Appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement to sell against the Respondents; Respondent No. 1 filed a suit seeking eviction of the Appellant from the subject property; and both the suits are pending, which clearly establish the possession of the property by the Appellant. Therefore, the said document is liable for payment of stamp duty at the hands of the Appellant.  {Para 11}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2549 of 2025.

Decided On: 14.02.2025

Ramesh Mishrimal Jain Vs. Avinash Vishwanath Patne and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: R. Mahadevan, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 213, MANU/SC/0218/2025.

Print Page

Supreme Court: What is the duty of executing court while executing decree for specific performance of contract?

The executing court was not clear, both as regards the facts and as to law. On facts, it did not take into account, the real purport of the decree. The relevant portion has already been extracted. The stipulation of two months was for the first Respondent to execute the decree. That stipulation, no doubt, is coupled with the right to receive the balance of consideration. There was nothing on record to indicate that he ever made any effort to collect or demand the balance of consideration from the Petitioner, within that time. The plea of the Petitioner that when he offered the amount, the Respondents refused to receive; remained unrebutted. The first Respondent did not file any rejoinder to the counter-affidavit. As observed in the preceding paragraphs, the executing court did not record any evidence of the parties. Therefore, the finding recorded by the trial court, in this behalf, cannot be sustained. When valuable rights accrued to a party, on account of the suit for specific performance being decreed, they cannot be taken away, on the basis of such an untenable finding.

{Para 17}

18. On the aspect of law, the executing court proceeded as though Section 28 of the Act gets attracted, though it did not mention in so many words. Firstly, the first Respondent himself did not invoke that provision. Secondly, the provision gets attracted only where, (a) the court, which passed the decree, directs the decree-holder to pay the purchaser money (balance of consideration) within a period, stipulated by it, and (b) the decree-holder failed to comply with the direction. It is then, and only then, that the court can consider the feasibility of directing rescission of contract. In the instant case, the time stipulated by the trial court in its decree was for the first Respondent to execute the decree, and not directly for the Petitioner to deposit the amount.

19. There is nothing on record to disclose that the first Respondent has ever made any effort to receive the amount, stipulated in the decree. On the other hand, the plea of the Petitioner that, when he offered to pay the amount, the first Respondent did not receive the same; remained unrebutted. The court must ensure strict compliance with the conditions stipulated in a provision, which has the effect of nullifying a decree. Even where two views are possible on the facts of the case, the one, which would sustain the decree, must be adopted.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 563-566 of 2025.

Decided On: 17.01.2025

Balbir Singh and Ors. Vs. Baldev Singh (D) through His Lrs and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Author: J.B. Pardiwala, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0079/2025.

Print Page

Supreme Court: Relinquishment Of Claims Under S.12(3) For Part Performance Can Be Made At Any Stage Of Litigation, including the appellate stage

Ratio: The Supreme Court clarified that relinquishment under Section 12(3) can be made at any stage of litigation, including the appellate stage. This provision applies when a party cannot perform the entirety of their contractual obligations due to statutory limitations or other causes. The court emphasized that granting partial relief under Section 12(3) is discretionary and depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.

11. The words 'unable to perform' suggest that the Sub-section is applicable only when the party cannot for any reason perform the whole of what he has promised. The inability may arise by any cause whatsoever including any statutory limitations. The inability to perform may arise by-

(i) deficiency in quantity of the subject-matter, or

(ii) variance in quality, or

(iii) defect in title; or

(iv) some legal prohibition; or

(v) other causes.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 25246/2023

Decided On: 08.01.2025

Vijay Prabhu Vs. S.T. Lajapathie and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation: 2025 INSC 52,MANU/SC/0063/2025.

Print Page

Supreme Court: S.53A Transfer Of Property Act Protection Not Available If Person Entered Into Agreement Knowing About Pending Litigation

The High Court also dealt with the submissions raised by the learned Counsel for the Appellant qua the applicability of Section 53A of the TP Act. It is the admitted fact that the Revision Petitioner having the knowledge of the pendency of the suit, had entered into agreement with the father of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 8 and he could not have better and valid right over the rights of the original transferer and in that situation, no recourse could have been taken. {Para 8}

9. The High Court rightly observed that the Courts have uniformly held that the limited rights of the transferee pendent lite on the principle of lis pendens. Such limited rights cannot be stretched to obstruct and resist the full claim of the decree holders to execute the decree in their favour. In fact, the Courts have deprecated such obstruction.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3616/2024

Decided On: 19.03.2025

Raju Naidu Vs. Chenmouga Sundra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sudhanshu Dhulia and P.B. Varale, JJ.

Author: P.B. Varale, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 368,MANU/SC/0366/2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

Print Page

Important highlights of The Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018

 

• The Act sets out the remedies available to parties whose contractual or civil rights have been violated.  The Act sets out two main remedies to a party whose contract has not been performed: (i) the party may ask the court to compel performance of the contract (specific performance); or (ii) the party may seek monetary compensation instead of performance. 

   

• Specific performance: Under the Act, specific performance is a limited right, which may be given by the court at its discretion, in the following circumstances: (i) when monetary compensation is inadequate; or (ii) when monetary compensation cannot be easily ascertained.  The 2018 amendment Act seeks to remove these conditions and permit specific performance by courts as a general rule.  

Print Page

How specific relief amendment Act 2018 has eliminated inadequacy test?

The Specific Relief Act, 1963, required the aggrieved party to satisfy the inadequacy test before granting specific relief. The test was applied to suits for specific performance of contracts and to injunctions for enforcing obligations arising from contracts. The inadequacy test made specific performance an exceptional remedy, as it was granted only when compensation under common law was either not ascertainable or inadequate, and when it was possible for the court to make its decree enforceable.

Print Page

Distinctive features of the suits for rescission and cancellation of instruments under the Specific Relief Act

https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-_NmUW1EWW-fIajHOfStlp3SrwcI6rrd/view?usp=sharing 

Print Page

Can a court reject a plaint U/S 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act if the relief sought cannot be granted under the said Act?

In so far as the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners as to the legal bar to file a suit under Section 38 read with Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, it is to be noted that Specific Relief Act is only an equitable and common relief or remedy and does not deal with any cause of action. Therefore, a plaint cannot be rejected on the ground that the relief sought for in the suit cannot be granted under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. This is more so when an element of fraud on the part of the defendants is also alleged by the plaintiff. 

The averments of the plaint specifically disclose a fraud on the part of the defendants which itself is sufficient cause of action for the plaintiff to maintain a suit. Therefore, I do not agree, with the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that in view of the legal bar under Section 38 read with Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, the suit is not maintainable. Accordingly, I reject the said contention also. {Para 13}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

C.R.P. No. 3928 of 1999 and C.M.P. No. 22015 of 1999

Decided On: 31.01.2001

 K. Thakshinamoorthy Vs.  State Bank of India

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

D. Murugesan, J.

Citation: MANU/TN/0066/2001

Print Page

Whether the amended Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act is prospective or retrospective in operation?

 B. Whether the amended Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act is prospective or retrospective in operation?

45. We do not subscribe to the aforesaid reasoning provided by the High Court for the simple reason that after the 2018 amendment, specific performance, which stood as a discretionary remedy, is not codified as an enforceable right which is not dependent anymore on equitable principles expounded by judges, rather it is founded on satisfaction of the requisite ingredients as provided under the Specific Relief Act. For determination of whether a substituted law is procedural or substantive, reference to the nature of the parent enactment may not be material. Instead, it is the nature of the amendments which determine whether they are in the realm of procedural or substantive law.

48. In any case, the amendment carried out in 2018 was enacted to further bolster adherence to the sanctity of contracts. This approach was radical and created new rights and obligations which did not exist prior to such an amendment. Section 10, after amendment, reads as under:

10. Specific performance in respect of contracts.—The specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in subsection (2) of section 11, section 14 and section 16.

49. This provision, which remained in the realm of the Courts’ discretion, was converted into a mandatory provision, prescribing a power the Courts had to exercise when the ingredients were fulfilled. This was a significant step in the growth of commercial law as the sanctity of contracts was reinforced with parties having to comply with contracts and thereby reducing efficient breaches.

50. Under the preamended Specific Relief Act, one of the major considerations for grant of specific performance was the adequacy of damages under Section 14(1)(a). However, this consideration has now been completely done away with, in order to provide better compensation to the aggrieved party in the form of specific performance.

51. Having come to the conclusion that the 2018 amendment was not a mere procedural enactment, rather it had substantive principles built into its working, this Court cannot hold that such amendments would apply retrospectively.

53. From the aforesaid decision, it is clear that when a substantive law is brought about by amendment, there is no assumption that the same ought to be given retrospective effect. Rather, there is a requirement for the legislature to expressly clarify whether the aforesaid amendments ought to be retrospective or not.

56. In view of the above discussion, we do not have any hesitation in holding that the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act is prospective and cannot apply to those transactions that took place prior to its coming into force.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5822 OF 2022  

Smt. Katta Sujatha Reddy & Anr. Vs Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

Coram: N.V. RAMANA; CJI., KRISHNA MURARI; J., HIMA KOHLI; J. 

Author: KRISHNA MURARI, J.

Dated: AUGUST 25, 2022

Print Page

Can the court refuse to grant specific performance of construction contract after Specific relief amendment Act 2018 if the contract is not precise?

Re. Section 14(1)(b) of Specific Relief Act

55. Though, in the written submissions tendered by the defendant as encapsulating the submissions advanced at the Bar, this contention has not been raised, it was, in fact, argued, and I proceed, therefore, to deal with it.

56. Section 14(1)(b) of the Specific Relief Act completely bars grant of interlocutory relief as sought by the plaintiff, contends Mr. Garg. The provision, as it stands today, reads thus:

“14. Contracts not specifically enforceable. - The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely:—

*****

(b) a contract, the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise;”

57. This, however, is the amended avatar of Section 14. Prior to its amendment by Section 5 of the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018, Section 14 (to the extent relevant) read as under:

“14. Contracts not specifically enforceable.-

(1) The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced, namely:—

(d) a contract the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise.

*****

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a) or clause (c) or clause (d) of sub-section (1), the court may enforce specific performance in the following cases:—

*****

(c) where the suit is for the enforcement of a contract for the construction of any building or the execution of any other work on land:

Provided that the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:—

(i) the building or other work is described in the contract in terms sufficiently precise to enable the court to determine the exact nature of the building or work;

(ii) the plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract and the interest is of such nature that compensation in money for non-performance of the contract is not an adequate relief; and

(iii) the defendant has, in pursuance of the contract, obtained possession of the whole or any part of the land on which the building is to be constructed or other work is to be executed.”

58. Prior to its amendment, therefore, Section 14 required, for specific performance of a contract for the construction of a building, the contract to describe the building “in terms sufficiently precise to enable the courts to determine the exact nature of the building or work”. That requirement is now done away with. Decisions, which have held a contract for construction of a building or other work not to be capable of being enforced by way of specific performance on the ground that the contract is imprecise or vague, relating to causes of action arising during the currency of the pre-amended Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act cannot, therefore, prima facie, constitute valuable precedents, to guide cases arising after Section 14 was amended.

59. Having said that, “a contract, the performance of which involves the performance of a continuous duty which the court cannot supervise” still remains impervious to enforcement by way of specific performance.

24.3. In order to determine the exact nature of the agreement signed between the parties, the intent of the parties has to be construed by reading the agreement as a whole in order to determine whether it is an agreement simpliciter for construction or an agreement that also creates an interest for the builder in the property. Where under a development agreement, the developer has an interest in land, it would be difficult to hold that such an agreement is not capable of being specifically enforced.”

(Italics and underscoring supplied)

73. Where, therefore, as in the present case, the agreement is not merely for development or construction on the property, but also envisages valuable rights enuring, in favour of the developer, in the constructed edifice, the Supreme Court itself holds, unequivocally, that it would be difficult to treat the agreement as incapable of specific performance.

74. The requirement of precision, in the construction contract, as a pre-condition for its enforceability, is relatable to the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii) of the Specific Relief Act. That requirement no longer figures on the statute book, after the amendment of Section 14 by the 2018 Amendment Act. In my prima facie opinion, lack of precision in the construction agreement can no longer be regarded, by itself, as a sufficient disqualification to its enforceability by specific performance. Else, it would be re-introducing, by a side wind, the consideration in the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii), which the legislature has consciously removed from the statute. Such an exercise is necessarily to be eschewed, as it would militate against the legislative intent.

75. The sequitur would, therefore, be that a construction contract can no longer be regarded as incapable of specific performance merely because its terms are imprecise or vague. If, however, owing to such imprecision or vagueness, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court, that would, even now, render the agreement incapable of specific performance by virtue of Section 14(b). For that, however, the Court would have to arrive at a finding that, owing to the imprecision of the agreement, or for any other reason, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court. In the scenario of Section 14 as it exists today, and without the support of the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c) and its various clauses, this would, in almost every case, be arguable at the very least.

76. Prima facie, in view of the above legal position, I am unable to convince myself to hold, prima facie, that the defendant has been able to make out a case of the PDA being incapable of specific performance, by operation of Section 14(b) of the Specific Relief Act, as would justify vacation of the interim direction to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before C. Hari Shankar, J.)

Grovy India Ltd. Vs Balbir Singh

IAs 6433/2020, IA 7643/2020 and CS(COMM) INFRA 1/2020

Decided on October 22, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4783

Print Page

When a party can file suit for rectification of misdescription of immovable property in sale deed?

  He further argues that under Section 26 of the Specific Relief

Act, 1963, only in case of fraud or mutual mistake of the parties,

contract or other instrument in writing, can rectify the instrument.

He points out that in absence of pleadings relating to fraud or

mutual mistake, allowing rectification of sale-deed would be

contrary to the provision of Section 26 of the Specific Relief Act,

1963.

 Section 26, of course, says that it would be open to

a party to institute a suit for correcting the description

of the suit property, but the proviso to Section 26

clearly permits that where a party has not claimed any

such relief in his pleading, the court shall at any stage

of the proceeding allow him to amend the plaint on

such terms as may be just for including such claim.

From a plain reading of the provisions under Section

26 of the Act, there is no reason why the prayer for

amendment of the agreement to correct a part of the

description of the suit property from Chak No. 3 SSM

to Chak No. 3 SLM, later on converted to Chak No. 3

SWM could not be granted. In our view, it is only a

correction or rectification of a part of the description

of the suit property, which cannot involve either the

question of limitation or the change of nature of suit.

In our view, the suit shall remain a suit for specific

performance of the contract for sale and a separate

independent suit is not needed to be filed when the

proviso to Section 26 itself clearly permits either party

to correct or rectify the description of the suit property

not only in the plaint but also in the agreement

itself….”

27. In every sale transaction of land, to avoid further litigation or

any dispute, it is expected that the vendee should verify the title

deeds before entering into the agreement, visit the site and finally

after satisfying all the materials prepare draft sale deed. Therefore, it is not the only duty of vendor but it is the duty of both the parties to the contract for sale of land, to take care while mentioning description of properties in the sale-deed. Thus if there is any mistake in description of properties or boundaries in sale deed the same cannot be said to be a mistake of one party  and not of both  the parties to such contract.

28. In light of conclusion arrived at by this court that this is a

case of misdescription and not a case of mistaken identity and in a case of misdescription of the field Gat number and the boundaries, the boundaries would prevail over field Gat number, it cannot be said that the mistake in the present case is in respect of a matter which is essential to the agreement, therefore, sections 20 of Act 1872, would not apply to the present case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

SECOND APPEAL NO. 121 OF 2005

Sau. Varsha  Sahebrao Deshmukh Vs  Ghanshyam  Madanlal Goenka,

CORAM : ANIL S KILOR J.

DELIVERED ON: 31st JANUARY, 2020

Print Page

Whether the dispute between licensor and licensee will be arbitrable even if the defendant has not filed application U/S 8 of Arbitration Act?

Objection of learned counsel for the plaintiffs that since no application under Section 8 of the Act has been filed by the defendant, hence the plea for rejection of the plaint cannot be accepted, deserves to be rejected in view of the decision of this Court dated 15th January, 2018 in CS (SO) No. 125/2017 Parasramka Holdings Pvt. Ltd. vs. Ambience Pvt. Ltd. and another, wherein this Court held that party invoking the arbitration clause does not have to file a formal application seeking a specific prayer for reference of the dispute to arbitration as long as it raises an objection in the written statement that the present suit is not maintainable in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement.

33. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgments as well as the judgment in Eastern Medikt (supra) and judgments of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench of this Court in Sharad P. Jagtiani (supra), this Court is of the view that the party invoking the arbitration clause does not have to file a formal application seeking a specific prayer for reference of the dispute to arbitration as long as it raises an objection in the written statement that the present suit is not maintainable in view of the arbitration clause in the agreement.

57. In the present case the defendant on the first day of the appearance itself even before filing of the written statement has raised the objection under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and hence this objection cannot be summarily rejected on the ground that no application has been filed by the defendant under Section 8 of the Act.

In view of the discussion above, prima facie the plaintiffs have a right in their favour and interest in land which is more than that of a lessee or at least that of an irrevocable licensee. In MANU/SC/0359/1999 : (1999) 5 SCC 651 Olympus Superstructures vs. Meena Vijay, Supreme Court held that the relief of specific performance of an agreement can be awarded by an arbitrator. Thus if the arbitrator can direct creation of an interest in a property, the arbitrator can also award declaration of the interest of the parties in the property. Further, as held in Booz Allen in paragraph 46, an agreement to sell or an agreement to mortgage does not involved any transfer of right in rem but creates a personal obligation and, therefore, the claim for specific performance will be arbitrable contrary to a mortgage which is a transfer of a right in rem. Moreover, as noted in Vidya Drolia, there is nothing in the Transfer of Property Act or the Specific Relief Act which forbids the rights of the parties being decided by arbitration. The rights of the plaintiffs herein at best governed by the Transfer of Property Act or the Specific Relief Act, or that of an irrevocable licensee under the Easements Act can still be decided in arbitration. Consequently the present suits are not maintainable and the parties may avail the remedy of arbitration.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (COMM) 184/2020, 

Decided On: 21.07.2020

 Dharamvir Khosla  Vs. Asian Hotels (North) Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mukta Gupta, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1394/2020

Print Page

Whether S 14 of specific relief Act as amended in the year 2018 applies to pending suit?

 Taking up for consideration the third question involved in the present case, the 2018 Amendment to the Specific Relief Act, 1963 came into force from October 1, 2018. The suit was undoubtedly filed prior to the commencement of operation of the Amendment Act. However, a question arises as to the relevant date for ascertaining the applicability of the amendment - the date of filing of the suit or the date of passing of the decree. In the event the date of filing of the suit was the relevant date, the 2018 Amendment would not be applicable to the present case.

99. However, the language of Section 14 of the 1963 Act indicates that the relevant date would be the date of passing of the decree, since Section 14(1) commences with the phrase, "The following contracts cannot be specifically enforced ....."

100. The question of enforcement comes only on the date of passing of the decree and not the institution of the suit. If the date of filing of the suit was the relevant date, the language of Section 14(1) would be something akin to: "no suit can be filed for specific performance of the following contracts ...."

101. Hence, the relevant date is the date of passing of the decree. As such, the 2018 Amendment becomes applicable to the present lis, since the amendment came into force during pendency of the suit.

102. Hence, the 2018 Amendment to the 1963 Act is applicable to the present case and the third issue is decided in the affirmative.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

C.O. No. 863 of 2019

Decided On: 17.04.2019

 Church of North India  Vs.  Ashoke Biswas

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

Print Page

Whether the court can decide the pending appeal as per S 20 of specific relief Act amended in the year 2018?

Turning to the facts of the present case, I find that the Principal Act 1963 has been extensively amended by the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act 2018, without any saving clause Sections 10, 14, and 20 of the Principal Act have been repealed and substituted by new Sections 14, 14A, 20, 20A, 20B and 20C as under:

AMENDED SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT 

https://www.lawweb.in/2018/05/short-notes-on-specific-relief-act-part.html

36. Apart from the aforesaid substitution, the Amending Act also amended and inserted/substituted some portion in Sections 6, 15, 16, 19, 21, 25 and 41 of the Principal Act and inserted new Schedule under Section 20-A and Section 41(ha).

37. The scheme of the Act as amended by the Amendment Act 2018 (No. 18 of 2018) that the wider discretion of Courts to grant specific performance and to make specific performance of contract a General Rule than exception subject to certain limited ground has been done away. The discretionary jurisdiction to decree specific performance as provided in the old Section 20 of the Act has been omitted. After the amendment there is no provision under the present Act like the repealed provision of Section 20(1) that the "jurisdiction of Court to decree specific performance" is discretionary, and the Court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so; but the discretion of the Court is not arbitrary but sound and reasonable guided by judicial principles and capable of correction by a Court of appeal. Similarly, after the amendment there is no provision similar to the repealed provision of sub-section 2 of Section 20 providing for cases in which Court may exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. Thus, the amending Act clearly expressed a different intention than the repealed provisions of Section 20. Therefore, the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not be attracted. After amendment, the jurisdiction of the Court is not discretionary to decree specific performance. Consequently, the repealed provisions of Section 20 of the Act would not be available for decision in the present appeal. Question Nos. 3 and 4 are answered accordingly. The benefit of repealed Section 20 of the Act is not available to the defendant-appellant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

First Appeal No. 594 of 2018

Decided On: 03.05.2019

 Mukesh Singh  Vs. Saurabh Chaudhary and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Prakash Kesarwani, J.

Print Page

Whether court can grant injunction U/S 9 of Arbitration Act contrary to provision of Specific relief Act?

The position that emerges from the above authorities is, therefore, that power to grant injunctive relief, under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, has to abide by the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. Injunction which cannot be granted under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, cannot be granted under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, either. Neither can relief be granted, under Section 9, as would amount to specific enforcement of a contract which, by nature, is determinable, in view of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act. The power to grant injunctive relief, under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, is essentially intended to protect the subject matter of the contract, and to avoid frustration of arbitral proceedings which may be initiated with respect thereto. Such relief can be granted only if the three pre-requisites, governing grant of injunctive relief, i.e. existence of a prima facie case, balance of convenience being in favour of the claimant and possibility of irreparable loss that would ensue to the claimant were such relief not granted, stand fully satisfied. Even in cases where a contract is being sought to be terminated, in violation of the terms thereof, if it appears that the party who suffers as a result of such termination could be adequately compensated in terms of money at the stage of final adjudication of the dispute, no injunctive relief, under Section 9 of the 1996 Act, would be granted.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before C. Hari Shankar, J.)

Parsoli Motors Works Private Limited  v. BMW India Private Litmited .

O.M.P. (I) (COMM.) 559/2017

Decided on January 15, 2018, 

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6556

Print Page

SHORT NOTES ON SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT PART 2

Chapter 3 Rectification of instruments

S 26. When instrument may be rectified:-

Sub S 1. When through fraud or mutual mistake of parties,a contract or other instrument in writing does not express real intention of parties, then-

a) either party or his representative in interest may institute a suit to have instrument rectified.

Sub S 2. Court may direct rectification of instrument so as to express that intention,so far as this can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third person in good faith and for value.

Sub S 3. A contract in writing may first be rectified, and then if the party claiming rectification has so prayed in his pleading and the court thinks fit,may be specifically enforced.

Sub S 4. No relief is to be granted unless prayed. If not prayed court can allow amendment to incorporate said prayer.

Print Page

NOTES ON SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT PART 1

[Act 47 of 1963 as amended up to Act 34 of 2019]

S 2 Definition:

(a) Obligation includes every duty enforceable by law.

S 4. Specific relief is to be granted only for enforcing individual civil rights and not for enforcing penal law.

S 5. Recovery of specific immovable property in accordance with CPC-A person entitled to the possession of specific immovable property may recover it in the manner provided by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908).

S 6. Suit by person dispossessed of immovable property:-

—(1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person [through whom he has been in possession or any person] claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.

Ins. by Act 18 of 2018, S. 2 (w.e.f. 1-10-2018).

(2) No suit under this section shall be brought—

(a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or

(b) against the Government.

(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.

(4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suit to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof.

S 7.Recovery of specific movable property in accordance with CPC.

S 10. Cases in which specific performance of contract is enforceable:- 
[The specific performance of a contract shall be enforced by the court subject to the provisions contained in sub-section (2) of Section 11, Section 14 and Section 16.]
Subs. by Act 18 of 2018, S. 3 (w.e.f. 1-10-2018).

Print Page

Whether suit for declaration against municipalities is maintainable without issuing statutory notice?

 Respondent No.1-plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and
permanent injunction. In view of bar of suit for declaration of title in absence
of notice under Section 319 the suit was not maintainable. The Courts below

wrongly held that the suit was perpetual injunction though the respondent
No.1-plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of title and for permanent injunction.
9. Respondent No.1-plaintiff cannot derive advantage of sub Section (3)
of Section 319 which stipulates non-application of the Section 319 when the
suit was instituted under Section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 (old
provision) equivalent to Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and reads
as follows:
“Section 38.Perpetual injunction when granted.-
(1)Subject to the other provisions contained in or referred to
by this Chapter, a perpetual injunction may be granted to
the plaintiff to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in
his favour, whether expressly or by implication.
(2)When any such obligation arises from contract, the Court
shall be guided by the rules and provisions contained in
Chapter-II.
(3)When the defendant invades or threatens to invade the
plaintiff’s right to, or enjoyment of, property, the Court may
grant a perpetual injunction in the following cases, namely:
(a)where the defendant is trustee of the property
for the plaintiff;
(b)where there exists no standard for ascertaining
the actual damage caused, or likely to be causes,
by the invasion;
(c)where the invasion in such , that compensation
in money would not afford adequate relief;
(d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a
multiplicity of judicial proceedings.”
The benefit aforesaid cannot derive by Respondent No.1-plaintiff as the
suit was filed for declaration of title coupled with permanent injunction.
Respondent No.1 having claimed title, the suit cannot be termed to be suit for
perpetual injunction alone.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4454 OF 2014
(arising out of SLP(C)No.30146 of 2012)
NAGAR PALIKA PARISHAD,
MIHONA AND ANR
V
RAMNATH AND ANR.
Citation: 2014(4) ALLMR 405 SC

Print Page