Showing posts with label development agreement. Show all posts
Showing posts with label development agreement. Show all posts

Sunday, 20 February 2022

Whether the court can grant specific performance of construction contract?

 24.3. In order to determine the exact nature of the agreement

signed between the parties, the intent of the parties has to be

construed by reading the agreement as a whole in order to

determine whether it is an agreement simpliciter for

construction or an agreement that also creates an interest for

the builder in the property. Where under a development

agreement, the developer has an interest in land, it would be

difficult to hold that such an agreement is not capable of

being specifically enforced.”

(Italics and underscoring supplied)

22.7.2 Where, therefore, as in the present case, the agreement is not merely for development or construction on the property, but also envisages valuable rights enuring, in favour of the developer, in the constructed edifice, the Supreme Court itself holds, unequivocally, that it would be difficult to treat the agreement as incapable of specific performance.

22.8 The requirement of precision, in the construction contract, as a pre-condition for its enforceability, is relatable to the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii) of the Specific Relief Act. That requirement no longer figures on the statute book, after the amendment of Section 14 by the 2018 Amendment Act. In my prima facie opinion, lack of precision in the construction agreement can no longer be regarded, by itself, as a sufficient disqualification to its enforceability by specific performance. Else, it would be re-introducing, by a side wind, the consideration in the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c)(iii), which the legislature has consciously removed from the statute. Such anexercise is necessarily to be eschewed, as it would militate against the legislative intent.

22.9 The sequitur would, therefore, be that a construction contract can no longer be regarded as incapable of specific performance merely because its terms are imprecise or vague. If, however, owing to such imprecision or vagueness, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court, that would, even now, render the agreement incapable of specific performance by virtue of Section 14(b). For that, however, the Court would have to arrive at a finding that, owing to the imprecision of the agreement, or for any other reason, any direction for specific performance would require continuous supervision by the Court. In the scenario of Section 14 as it exists today, and without the support of the erstwhile Section 14(3)(c) and its various clauses, this would, in almost every case, be arguable at the very least.

22.10 Prima facie, in view of the above legal position, I am unable to convince myself to hold, prima facie, that the defendant has been able to make out a case of the PDA being incapable of specific performance, by operation of Section 14(b) of the Specific Relief Act, as would justify vacation of the interim direction to maintain status quo in respect of the suit property.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Pronounced on: 22nd October, 2021

IAs 6433/2020 & IA 7643/2020 in

CS(COMM) INFRA 1/2020

M/S GROVY INDIA LTD Vs BALBIR SINGH

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Whether court can enforce old contract if new contract is nullity?(Doctrine of Novation)

 Nearly a century and a quarter ago, one finds this clear exposition of the principle of novation, in the judgement of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner at Nagpur in Ganpat v. Mahadeo  1925 Nag 26 :

“Where the question is whether one party is set free by the

action of the other, the matter for consideration is whether the

acts or conduct of the one do or do not amount to an

intimation of an intention to abandon and altogether to refuse

performance of the contract. The true question is whether the

acts and conduct of the party evince any intention no longer

to be bound by the contract: Mersay Steel and Iron

Company v. Naglir Benzon & Co. 9 A.C. 434 General Bill

Posting Co v. Atkinson (13). The Court requires as clear

evidence of the waiver as of the existence of the contract

itself and will not act upon less: Carolan v. Brabazon (1900)

A.C. 118 = 78 L.J.; C.H. 77=99 L.T. 913 = 25 T.L.R. 173.

What is then required is that an abandonment of the old

agreement, must be clearly made out. There must be clear

and precise evidence of a mutual intention to determine and

abandon the contract: Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram

Kumar Saha [1946] 43 Cal. 700=23 C.L.J. 26 = 30 I.C.

305: 20 C.W.N. 370. Where the intention to substitute a new

contract is frustrated by the fact that the new contract is a

nullity, the original contract may be enforceable: see Har

Chandi Lal v. Sheoraj Singh 3 J & L 200 = 9 Ir. & E. 121.

Much more so, where the agreement itself is a contravention

of the statute and does not ripen into a contract in the legal

sense of the term.”

(Emphasis supplied)

A coordinate Bench of this Court has held, recently in Knowledge

Podium Systems Pvt Ltd v. S.M. Professional Services Pvt Ltd26,

that “a novation takes place only when there is a complete substitution of a new contract in place of the old”.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Pronounced on: 22nd October, 2021

IAs 6433/2020 & IA 7643/2020 in

CS(COMM) INFRA 1/2020

M/S GROVY INDIA LTD Vs BALBIR SINGH

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR

Dated: 22.10.2021

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Saturday, 27 March 2021

Can a development agreement signed by the Chairman of Society be binding upon the non-signatory member of society?

This is the point of law raised in opposition. The submission is that the development agreement and its arbitration clause cannot possibly bind a non-signatory, namely, Kondvilkar. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Indowind Energ Ltd v Wescare (I) Ltd & Anr., 2010 5 SCC 306.  but this decision lends no support to the argument in question because this was not a case where one of the parties sought to be bound by the agreement was a member or affiliate of a signatory.

Then in paragraphs 21 and 22, the Court said:

“21.It is to be noted that once the person becomes a member of the Co-operative Society he loses his individuality with the Society and has no independent rights except which is given to him by the statute and bye-laws. Hence, objection raised by the respondent nos.3, 4, 6 and 7 that there is no privity of contact between them and petitioner, is not maintainable.

24.This again was a question of a development agreement between a developer and the society and of some members saying that they were not bound by it, not having signed, and opposing the development. The Division Bench considered a large body of law and the argument that the dispute between the developer and the individual descending member was not arbitrable. In paragraph 18, the Division Bench said that it had no hesitation in taking the view that since the dissenting persons were members of the society and held flats in the society they were bound by the decision of the general body of the society as long as the decision is in force. This puts the matter exactly in perspective; and this is why I noted at the forefront the importance or signifcance of the 2nd Respondent never having even attempted to challenge the general body decision. In Girish Mulchand Mehta the dissenting members had not challenged the decisions of the general body and the Division Bench said that the general body ‘is supreme’ in so far as redevelopment of the property in question or of appointing of the developer is concerned. The overwhelming majority approved the appointment of the developer. These found voice and incorporation in the development agreement, and then the Division Bench said that the decision and acts of the society would bind the dissenting members unless the resolutions were quashed and set aside by a forum of competent jurisdiction.

REPORTABLE

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

ARBITRATION PETITION (L) NO. 108 OF 2021

Chirag Infra Projects Pvt Ltd  Vs Vijay Jwala Coop. Hsg Soc Ltd & Anr


CORAM:

G.S. PATEL, J

DATED: 12th March 2021

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Tuesday, 12 May 2020

Gujarat HC: Suit for specific performance of an agreement for development of a plot of land can not be regarded as a commercial dispute

Therefore, if the dispute falls within any of the clause 2(c) the dispute can be said to be "commercial dispute" for which the Commercial Court would have jurisdiction. It is required to be noted that before the learned Commercial Court the original plaintiff relied upon section 2(c)(i), 2(c)(ii) and 2(c)(xx) of the Commercial Courts Act only. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the original plaintiff has candidly admitted and/or conceded that the case shall not fall within clause 2(c)(i); 2(c)(ii) or 2(c)(xx) of the Commercial Courts Act. It is required to be noted that before the learned Commercial Court it was never the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that case would fall within section 2(c)(vii) of the learned Commercial Court. Despite the above we have considered on merits whether even considering section 2(c)(vii) of the Commercial Courts Act, the dispute between the parties can be said to be "commercial dispute" within the definition of section 2(c) of the Commercial Courts Act or not? Considering section 2(c)(vii), "commercial dispute" means a dispute arising out of the agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce. As observed hereinabove, at the time of filing of the suit and even so pleaded in the plaint, the immovable property/plots the agreements between the parties cannot be said to be agreements relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce. As per the agreement between the party after getting the plots on lease from the GIDC, the same was required to be thereafter developed by the original defendant No. 1 and after providing all infrastructural facilities and sub-plotting it, the same is required to be given to other persons like the original plaintiff. It is the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that as the original defendant No. 1 has failed to provide any infrastructural facilities and develop the plots and therefore, a civil suit for specific performance of the agreement has been filed. There are other alternative prayers also. Therefore, it cannot be said that the agreement is as such relating to immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce. It is the case on behalf of the original plaintiff that as in clause (vii) of section 2(c), the phraseology used is not "actually used" or "being used" and therefore, even if at present the plot is not used and even if it is likely to be used even in future, in that case also, section 2(c)(vii) shall be applicable and therefore, the Commercial Court would have jurisdiction. The aforesaid has no substance. As per the cardinal principle of law while interpreting a particular statute or the provision, the literal and strict interpretation has to be applied. It may be noted that important words used in the relevant provisions are "immovable property used exclusively in trade or commerce". If the submission on behalf of the original plaintiff is accepted in that case it would be adding something in the statute which is not there in the statute, which is not permissible. On plain reading of the relevant clause it is clear that the expression "used" must mean "actually used" or "being used". If the intention of the legislature was to expand the scope, in that case the phraseology used would have been different as for example, "likely to be used" or "to be used". The word "used" denotes "actually used" and it cannot be said to be either "ready for use" or "likely to be used"; or "to be used". Similar view has been taken by the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) in the case of Dineshkumar Gulabchand Agrawal (Supra) and it is observed and held that the word "used" denotes "actually used" and not merely "ready for use". It is reported that SLP against the said decision has been dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

Appeal From Order No. 199 of 2017 and Civil Application No. 8083 of 2017 in Appeal From Order No. 199 of 2017

Decided On: 10.07.2017

 Vasu Healthcare Private Limited  Vs.   Gujarat Akruti TCG Biotch Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M.R. Shah and B.N. Karia, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2017 Guj. 153
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Sunday, 26 April 2020

Leading Supreme Court Judgment on the basic concept of the development agreement and claim for its specific performance

 The requirements to be satisfied by the Plaintiff bringing forth a suit for specific performance have been analysed in Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts8 and in Price v. Strange [1978] 1 Ch. 337 at page 359, where the Rule has been settled that the court will order specific performance of an agreement to build if:

(i) the building work is sufficiently defined by the contract, for example by reference to detailed plans;

(ii) the Plaintiff has a substantial interest in the performance of the contract of such a nature that damages would not compensate him for the Defendant's failure to build; and

(iii) the Defendant is in possession of the land so that the Plaintiff cannot employ another person to build without committing a trespass.

16. The expression "development agreement" has not been defined statutorily. In a sense, it is a catch-all nomenclature which is used to be describe a wide range of agreements which an owner of a property may enter into for development of immovable property. As real estate transactions have grown in complexity, the nature of these agreements has become increasingly intricate. Broadly speaking, (without intending to be exhaustive), development agreements may be of various kinds:

(i) An agreement may envisage that the owner of the immovable property engages someone to carry out the work of construction on the property for monetary consideration. This is a pure construction contract;

(ii) An agreement by which the owner or a person holding other rights in an immovable property grants rights to a third party to carry on development for a monetary consideration payable by the developer to the other. In such a situation, the owner or right holder may in effect create an interest in the property in favour of the developer for a monetary consideration;

(iii) An agreement where the owner or a person holding any other rights in an immovable property grants rights to another person to carry out development. In consideration, the developer has to hand over a part of the constructed area to the owner. The developer is entitled to deal with the balance of the constructed area. In some situations, a society or similar other association is formed and the land is conveyed or leased to the society or association;

(iv) A development agreement may be entered into in a situation where the immovable property is occupied by tenants or other right holders. In some cases, the property may be encroached upon. The developer may take on the entire responsibility to settle with the occupants and to thereafter carry out construction; and

(v) An owner may negotiate with a developer to develop a plot of land which is occupied by slum dwellers and which has been declared as a slum. Alternately, there may be old and dilapidated buildings which are occupied by a number of occupants or tenants. The developer may undertake to rehabilitate the occupants or, as the case may be, the slum dwellers and thereafter share the saleable constructed area with the owner.

When a pure construction contact is entered into, the contractor has no interest in either the land or the construction which is carried out. But in various other categories of development agreements, the developer may have acquired a valuable right either in the property or in the constructed area. The terms of the agreement are crucial in determining whether any interest has been created in the land or in respect of rights in the land in favour of the developer and if so, the nature and extent of the rights.

17. In a construction contract, the contractor has no interest in either the land or the construction carried out on the land. But, in other species of development agreements, the developer may have acquired a valuable right either in the property or the constructed area. There are various incidents of ownership of in respect of an immovable property. Primarily, ownership imports the right of exclusive possession and the enjoyment of the thing owned. The owner in possession of the thing has the right to exclude all others from its possession and enjoyment. The right to ownership of a property carries with it the right to its enjoyment, right to its access and to other beneficial enjoyments incidental to it. (B. Gangadhar v. BG Rajalingam MANU/SC/0212/1996 : (1995) 5 SCC 239 at para 6). Ownership denotes the relationship between a person and an object forming the subject matter of the ownership. It consists of a complex of rights, all of which are rights in rem, being good against the world and not merely against specific persons. There are various rights or incidents of ownership all of which need not necessarily be present in every case. They may include a right to possess, use and enjoy the thing owned; and a right to consume, destroy or alienate it. (Swadesh Ranjan Sinha v. Haradeb Banerjee MANU/SC/0305/1992 : (1991) 4 SCC 572). An essential incident of ownership of land is the right to exploit the development, potential to construct and to deal with the constructed area. In some situations, under a development agreement, an owner may part with such rights to a developer. This in is essence is a parting of some of the incidents of ownership of the immovable property. There could be situations where pursuant to the grant of such rights, the developer has incurred a substantial investment, altered the state of the property and even created third party rights in the property or the construction carried out to be carried out. There could be situations where it is the developer who by his efforts has rendered a property developable by taking steps in law. In development agreements of this nature, where an interest is created in the land or in the development in favour of the developer, it may be difficult to hold that the agreement is not capable of being specifically performed. For example, the developer may have evicted or settled with occupants, got land which was agricultural converted into non-agricultural use, carried out a partial development of the property and pursuant to the rights conferred under the agreement, created third party rights in favour of flat purchasers in the proposed building. In such a situation, if for no fault of the developer, the owner seeks to resile from the agreement and terminates the development agreement, it may be difficult to hold that the developer is not entitled to enforce his rights. This of course is dependent on the terms of the agreement in each case. There cannot be a uniform formula for determining whether an agreement granting development rights can be specifically enforced and it would depend on the nature of the agreement in each case and the rights created under it.

18. In Chheda Housing Development Corporation v. Bibijan Shaikh Farid MANU/MH/0070/2007 : (2007) 3 Mah LJ 402, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court while dealing with the question of whether specific performance should be granted of a development agreement held as follows:

In our opinion from a conspectus of these judgments, what is relevant would be the facts of each case and the agreement under consideration. Agreements considering what is discussed, amongst others, could be:

(a) An Agreement only entrusting construction work to a party for consideration.

(b) An Agreement for entrusting the work of development to a party with added rights to sell the constructed portion to flat purchasers, who would be forming a Co-operative Housing Society to which society, the owner of the land, is obliged to convey the constructed portion as also the land beneath construction on account of statutory requirements.

(c) A normal agreement for sale of an immovable property.

An Agreement of the first type normally is not enforceable as compensation in money is an adequate remedy. An Agreement of the third type would normally be specifically enforceable unless the contrary is proved. A mere agreement for development, which creates no interest in the land would not be specifically enforced.

20. In Ashok Kumar Jaiswal v. Ashim Kumar Kar MANU/WB/0052/2014 : AIR 2014 Cal 92, a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court held that a development agreement with a Clause for conditional sale of the premises in question will also be an agreement for sale subject to certain conditions. While deciding whether a suit at the instance of a developer is maintainable in view of Section 14(3)(c), the Court, inter alia, held that in the absence of a definition of "developer" or "development agreement" the nature of the agreement which is the subject-matter of a suit must be considered in order to determine whether it is an agreement to merely provide construction of a building or whether the developer has obtained a share of, and interest in, the developed property which is the outcome of the agreement, creating a contract for transfer of immovable property. The Full Bench observed thus:

An owner without any funds or the independent resources to construct a new building on such owner's land may engage for such purpose with the consideration for the construction being paid by allocation of a part of the constructed area. There could be several variants of the same basic structure of a development agreement.....

Such agreements are not merely for the construction of any building or for the mere execution of any other work on the land. The developer is not merely a contractor engaged to undertake the construction; the developer is, under the agreement with the owner, promised a part of the constructed premises as owner thereof together with the proportionate area of the land.
The Full Bench held that a right to seek specific performance of a development agreement is not barred either expressly or by necessary implication by the 1963 Act and a broad interpretation should be given to allow an adequate remedy:

...it would be preposterous to say that only the owner can maintain a suit against the developer for enforcing his rights and not vice-versa. If the developer has a right under the contract he must be having a remedy in the form of approaching a forum for appropriate redressal. A question of maintainability of a suit is completely different from the question of whether the suit will succeed or not on the facts of the case and in the light of the applicable law. Section 14(3)(c) of the Act can in no manner be interpreted as debarring a developer from approaching the legal forum for redressal of his grievance.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1129 of 2012

Decided On: 09.10.2018

 Sushil Kumar Agarwal Vs. Meenakshi Sadhu and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Khanwilkar and Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.

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Monday, 19 June 2017

Whether development agreement can be repudiated unilaterally by sending letter?

The above said rulings, in my opinion are not strictly applicable to the facts of this particular case. Because of the simple reason, it is not that plaintiff comes to the court stating that the defendants have repudiated the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney, but it is only stated that they have issued a letter to the plaintiff that they have repudiated but it is not accepted by the plaintiffs with regard to that repudiation, therefore the suit is not filed for specific performance. According to the plaintiffs, for all practical purposes, the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney exists for the enforcement of their rights in the said agreement until and unless the court decides the said repudiation is proper and correct. Therefore, the said letter has to be tested during the course of trial, whether such a letter could have been issued by the defendants or legally the said document can be construed as a cancellation or repudiation of Joint Development Agreement and General Power of Attorney, when the said two documents are coupled with the interest of the plaintiff. Therefore, in my opinion, the above said rulings only applicable. It is not the case of the plaintiff that they have accepted the repudiation letter and based their suit on the basis of the repudiation letter alleging the cause of action arose for the purpose of filing the injunction suit on the basis of such letter. Therefore, this particular point has to be thrashed out during the course of full dressed trial.
14. The Trial Court has also observed and expressed its doubt whether the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney which are registered documents under which the rights have been created in favour of the plaintiff can be easily set at naught by means of issuing a letter and the court has also expressed that it has to be considered by the court during the course of trial. I do not find any strong reasons to deviate from the observation made by the Trial Court
15. In view of the above said circumstances, in the subsistence of Joint Development Agreement and General Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff and that the parties have acted upon those documents and particularly, the plaintiff is allowed to do some improvement on the property and construction activities to be taken up by the plaintiff on the property, the defendant cannot turn back and say that the plaintiff has no right to continue with the said agreements.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
M.F.A. No. 5708/2016 (CPC)
Decided On: 23.01.2017
 C. Vijayakumar and Ors.

Vs.
Cwind-Engure J.V.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.N. Phaneendra, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 karnat 43
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Sunday, 26 July 2015

When developer is not entitled to get specific performance of development agreement?

 That brings us to sum up the result of the above discussion on the
prima facie case on merits of individual stakeholders. Prima facie, it is clear that
Vaidehi has committed breaches of the Society Development Agreement and that
the termination of the Agreement by the Society was legal and proper. Vaidehi
has not made out any case of its readiness and willingness to perform its
obligations under the Society Development Agreement. Vaidehi is not entitled to
specific performance of the Society Development Agreement or restrain the
development of the suit property by the Society or Rustomjee.
            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 961 OF 2013
IN
SUIT NO. 262 OF 2012
Vaidehi Akash Housing Pvt.Ltd. …Applicant / Plaintiff
vs.
New D.N. Nagar Co-op.Housing Society
Union Ltd. & Ors. ...Defendants

                                                                                                                           

 CORAM : S.C. GUPTE, J.

 PRONOUNCED ON : 01 DECEMBER 2014
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)722 Bom
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Friday, 25 July 2014

When development agreement is specifically enforceable?

 From the aforesaid terms of the said Agreement and power given by the Vendors to the Developers, I am prima facie of the view that though the said Agreement is termed as a Development Agreement, it is an agreement whereunder interest is created in favour of the Developers in respect of the suit property which includes the structures thereon. As can be seen from the above, all the rights to develop the property have been given by the Vendors to the Developers. The Vendors have already received the monetary consideration as set out in the said Agreement from the Developers. Except for the premises agreed to be given to the Vendors by the Developers in lieu of the premises used and occupied by them in the said building, the Vendors have given all the rights to the Developers to deal with the tenants in the manner they desire and after providing them with alternate accommodation in the newly constructed building or elsewhere or giving them monetary consideration in lieu of their tenements, the Developer is given full and complete right to sell the flats/units/shops etc. on ownership basis without any interference from the Vendors. The right to decide the elevation of the building, the colour scheme, etc. is also given to the Developers by the Vendors. The Vendors have also agreed that they shall execute the Conveyance Deed/Deed of Transfer in respect of the said property (i.e. the plot of land with buildings thereon) to and in favour of the proposed Society/Condominium of holders of various units/premises. The Vendors have in the said Agreement itself provided that they will be simultaneously executing a POA, inter alia, giving the right to the Developer to construct a new building, accommodate the Vendors and the tenants as agreed and most important to sign and execute the transfer deed/conveyance/assignment to and in favour of the Society/Condominium as well as effect its registration. In the circumstances I am prima facie satisfied that the said Development Agreement is capable of being specifically enforced. I am fortified in my view by the decision of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in (Chheda Housing Development Corporation Vs. Bibijan Shaikh Farid and others) MANU/MH/0070/2007 : 2007 (2) Bom. C.R. 587 (O.S.): 2007(3) Mh.L.J. 402.
                                         

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
IN
NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 2055  OF 2012
SUIT NO. 1963 OF 2012

Shantilal J. Shah Vs Jitendra Sanghavi and others
   
                                 

CORAM :  S. J. KATHAWALLA, J.
DATE:           19   NOVEMBER, 2012
   
Citation: 2013(3)BomCR856,2013(7) ALLMR 112
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Sunday, 15 June 2014

Whether suit for specific performance of development agreement is maintainable?


Section 53A of the said Act would suggest, if a proposed transferee of an immovable property under an agreement for sale is put in possession and continues in possession in part performance of the contract and does some act in furtherance of the contract and is willing to perform the balance part, his possession would be protected and the transferor would be debarred from dispossessing him other than under a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract. The development agreement is also an agreement for sale subject to certain conditions. In short, it is an agreement for conditional sale. 
If we look to Section 202 of the Indian Contract Act 1872, we would find, when the agent had interest in the property under the agency agreement in absence of an express provision the contract could not be terminated to the prejudice of such interest. Section 203 would permit the principal to revoke the authority of his agent subject however; when the agent partly exercised his authority such revocation would not be permissible under Section 204. If we read these three provisions together and try to answer the second query made to us by His Lordship we would find, the Power of Attorney so revoked by the owner should not be looked at in an isolated manner. The Power of Attorney generally issued to the developer, was in continuation of the original agreement for development of the property meaning thereby, the developer who was entrusted to develop the property would be given authority to do further act as per the contract including dealing with the property to the extent permissible under the contract. Hence, the Power of Attorney was nothing but an agency agreement executed in furtherance of the original contract.
If the original contract creates an interest in favour of the developer even if the Power of Attorney is revoked such interest would not evaporate. 
A contract between a developer and an owner would also consist of reciprocal rights and obligations. The developer and the owner would have rights against each other. In my view, it would be preposterous to say that only the owner can maintain a suit against the developer for enforcing his rights and not vice versa. If the developer has a right under the contract he must be having a remedy in the form of approaching a forum for appropriate redressal. This is not to say that th
e developer will necessarily succeed in such a legal action. A question of maintainability of a suit is completely different from the question of whether the suit will succeed or not on the facts of the case and in the light of the applicable law. Section 14 (3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act can in no manner be interpreted as debarring a developer from approaching the legal forum for redressal of his grievance. To that extent, a suit at the instance of a developer is maintainable and not barred by Section 14(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act.

Kolkata High Court (Appellete Side)
Ashok kumar jaiswal vs Ashim Kumar Kar For The on 13 February, 2014
Citation ;AIR 2014 Calcutta 92
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