Showing posts with label S 34 of IPC. Show all posts
Showing posts with label S 34 of IPC. Show all posts

Saturday, 11 April 2026

Supreme Court: How criminal antecedents of convict are relevant while deciding his application for suspension of sentence?

 The criminal antecedents of Respondent No. 2 also assume significance. The prosecution has brought on record multiple prior cases registered against him, including offences involving violence and use of arms. Though it has been contended that such cases arose out of political rivalry and have culminated in acquittal, such a contention cannot, at this stage, efface the relevance of antecedents as a factor in assessing the propriety of granting suspension of sentence. {Para 22}

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1864 OF 2026

DHAN JEE PANDEY Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANOTHER 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 349.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Appellate Court Cannot Dilute Liability Of Convict U/S 34 IPC At Interlocutory Stage Due To Absence Of Overt Act

The reliance placed by the High Court on the circumstance that the fatal shot was attributed to a co-accused, while Respondent No. 2 has been convicted with the aid of Section 34 IPC, is wholly misconceived. The doctrine of constructive liability under Section 34 IPC is well settled; where an offence is committed in furtherance of a common intention, each participant is equally liable for the act done in execution thereof. The absence of a specific overt act cannot, at this stage, dilute the culpability of the convict, particularly in the face of a finding of common intention. {Para 19}

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1864 OF 2026

DHAN JEE PANDEY Vs THE STATE OF BIHAR & ANOTHER 

Author: R. MAHADEVAN, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 349

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Friday, 4 July 2025

What is basic concept of constructive liability and vicarious liability as provisions of indian penal code?

 The Indian Penal Code incorporates two important liability principles that hold individuals accountable for crimes committed by others: constructive liability and vicarious liability. While these concepts are closely related and often overlap, they operate under distinct legal frameworks.

Constructive Liability Under IPC

Constructive liability is the principle under which a person may be held liable for the consequences of another person's conduct, even if they did not actively participate in the act. This form of liability is based on the premise that their involvement in the criminal act, whether tacit or open, indirectly contributed to the outcome.

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Monday, 20 January 2025

Supreme Court: When Accused Acted With Common Intention, Punishment Can't Be Reduced Merely Because Injury Inflicted Individually Wasn't Severe

 Merely for the reason that

the injuries inflicted by Accused no.2 (K.B.Vijayakumar)

were less than what was inflicted by Accused no.3

(K.B.Jayakumar @ Suresh) and the injuries were not a

grievous. Conviction under Section 326 cannot be converted

to Section 324. Irrespective of the facts whether the

injuries caused to the injured persons (PW1 & PW7) were

only on the hand, the fact remained that the presence of

Accused no.2 on the spot is as an accomplice of Accused

no.3 and hence, Section 34 of the IPC is clearly made out.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1694/2014

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs  BATTEGOWDA & ORS.

Dated: January 09, 2025.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Common intention U/S 34 of IPC and the pre-meeting of minds can take place at the spur of the moment itself during the course of the incident.

Accused no.2 on the spot is as an accomplice of Accused

no.3 and hence, Section 34 of the IPC is clearly made out.

The case of the defence is that when the Accused Nos.2 & 3

had arrived at the spot, they had no intention to inflict

the nature of injuries on the injured persons. Even if it

is assumed it is true, it cannot be denied that common

intention and the pre-meeting of minds can take place at

the spur of the moment itself during the course of the

incident.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1694/2014

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs  BATTEGOWDA & ORS.

Dated: January 09, 2025.

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Saturday, 28 September 2024

Whether the court can convict accused U/S 302 R/W S 34 of IPC if he was charged U/S 302 R/W S 149 of IPC?

 Be that as it may, the determination of common intention or common object should primarily be within the domain of the trial courts, and at the most the high courts. It should not be the role of this Court to directly adjudicate issues of common intention and common object. This Court has, in a catena of decisions, elaborated on the differences between Section 149 and Section 34, Indian Penal Code; the overlapping nature of Section 149 and Section 34, Indian Penal Code; and when can the offence Under Section 302 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code be changed to Section 302 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. Such decisions do provide suitable guidance for the lower courts to draw from, to reach their conclusions. {Para 21}


22. In this connection, we may refer to paragraph 14 of the decision of this Court in Chittarmal v. State of Rajasthan   MANU/SC/0008/2003 : 2003:INSC:5 : (2003) 2 SCC 266. The relevant excerpt from such decision reads:


14. It is well settled by a catena of decisions that Section 34 as well as Section 149 deal with liability for constructive criminality i.e. vicarious liability of a person for acts of others. Both the Sections deal with combinations of persons who become punishable as sharers in an offence. Thus, they have a certain resemblance and may to some extent overlap. But a clear distinction is made out between common intention and common object in that common intention denotes action concert and necessarily postulates the existence of a prearranged plan implying a prior meeting of the minds, while common object does not necessarily require proof of prior meeting of minds or preconcert. Though there is a substantial difference between the two sections, they also to some extent overlap and it is a question to be determined on the facts of each case whether the charge Under Section 149 overlaps the ground covered by Section 34. Thus, if several persons numbering five or more, do an act and intend to do it, both Section 34 and Section 149 may apply. If the common object does not necessarily involve a common intention, then the substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 might result in prejudice to the Accused and ought not, therefore, to be permitted. But if it does involve a common intention then the substitution of Section 34 for Section 149 must be held to be a formal matter. Whether such recourse can be had or not must depend on the facts of each case. The non-applicability of Section 149 is, therefore, no bar in convicting the Appellants Under Section 302 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code, if the evidence discloses commission of an offence in furtherance of the common intention of them all. 

23. In paragraph 17 of the decision of this Court in Chandra Pratap Singh v. State of M.P.   MANU/SC/1100/2023 : 2023:INSC:887 : (2023) 10 SCC 181, while dealing with conversion of charge from Section 302 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code to Section 302 read with Section 34 thereof, the above passage has been quoted with approval.

24. It would be relevant at this juncture to consider Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On its plain terms, Sub-section (1) of Section 464 clearly indicates that no finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in an appeal, confirmation or revision, a claim of "failure of justice" has been substantiated.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1389 of 2012

Decided On: 25.09.2024

Baljinder Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Dipankar Datta, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1063/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether convict can challenge conviction on the ground of conversion of charge if he fails to prove Failure Of Justice?

 In paragraph 17 of the decision of this Court in Chandra Pratap Singh v. State of M.P.   MANU/SC/1100/2023 : 2023:INSC:887 : (2023) 10 SCC 181, while dealing with conversion of charge from Section 302 read with Section 149, Indian Penal Code to Section 302 read with Section 34 thereof, the above passage has been quoted with approval. {Para 23}

24. It would be relevant at this juncture to consider Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On its plain terms, Sub-section (1) of Section 464 clearly indicates that no finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless, in an appeal, confirmation or revision, a claim of "failure of justice" has been substantiated.

25. Law is well-settled that in order to judge whether a failure of justice has been occasioned, it will be relevant to examine whether the Accused was aware of the basic ingredients of the offence for which he is being convicted and whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him clearly and whether he got a fair chance to defend himself. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision in Dalbir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh   MANU/SC/0320/2004 : 2004:INSC:243 : (2004) 5 SCC 334.

26. Also, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the burden to show that in fact a failure of justice has been occasioned is on the Accused. The decision in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Paras Nath Singh   MANU/SC/0973/2009 : 2009:INSC:669 : (2009) 6 SCC 372 can profitably be referred to in this regard.

27. We have no hesitation to hold that based on the above parameters, the Appellants have fairly and squarely failed in their pursuit to demonstrate any failure of justice, which would impel us to exercise power of the nature contemplated in Sub-section (2) of Section 464, Code of Criminal Procedure. We, therefore, see no reason to uphold the contention advanced on behalf of the Appellants to the contrary.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1389 of 2012

Decided On: 25.09.2024

Baljinder Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Dipankar Datta, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1063/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Under which circumstances prosecution case can not be dismissed for non examination of independent witnesses

 It is also settled law that examination of independent witness is not an indispensable requisite if the testimonies of other witnesses are deemed trustworthy and reliable. Non-examination of any independent witness by the prosecution will not go to the root of the matter affecting the decision of the court, unless other witnesses' testimonies and evidences are scant to establish the guilt of the Accused. {Para 29}

24.3. In Rizwan Khan v. State of Chhattisgarh   MANU/SC/0680/2020 : 2020:INSC:543 : (2020) 9 SCC 627, after referring to the decision of this Court in State of H.P. v. Pardeep Kumar   MANU/SC/0213/2018 : 2018:INSC:166 : (2018) 13 SCC 808, it is observed and held by this Court that the examination of the independent witnesses is not an indispensable requirement and such non-examination is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution case.

(emphasis supplied)

30. It has been rightly pointed out by the Trial Court that the prosecution's case is not that people from the surrounding locality gathered at the time of the incident. In the light of the aforenoted decisions of this Court and upon careful examination of the testimonies of P.W. 3, P.W. 4, and P.W. 5, along with the relevant other evidence on record, the prosecution's case cannot be dismissed solely on the ground of the absence of independent witness.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1389 of 2012

Decided On: 25.09.2024

Baljinder Singh and Ors. Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipankar Datta and Augustine George Masih, JJ.

Author: Dipankar Datta, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1063/2024.

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Sunday, 27 February 2022

Whether the court can convict the accused with the aid of S 34 of IPC if the criminal offence is distinctly remote and unconnected with their common intention?

 Section 34 IPC also uses the expression “act in furtherance of

common intention”. Therefore, in each case when Section 34 is

invoked, it is necessary to examine whether the criminal offence

charged was done in furtherance of the common intention of the

participator. If the criminal offence is distinctly remote and

unconnected with the common intention, Section 34 would not be

applicable. However, if the criminal offence done or performed

was attributable or was primarily connected or was a known or

reasonably possible outcome of the preconcert/contemporaneous

engagement or a manifestation of the mutual consent for carrying

out common purpose, it will fall within the scope and ambit of the

act done in furtherance of common intention. Thus, the word

“furtherance” propounds a wide scope but should not be

expanded beyond the intent and purpose of the statute. Russell

on Crime, (10th edition page 557), while examining the word

“furtherance” had stated that it refers to “the action of helping

forward” and “it indicates some kind of aid or assistance producing

an effect in the future” and that “any act may be regarded as done

in furtherance of the ultimate felony if it is a step intentionally

taken for the purpose of effecting that felony.” An act which is

extraneous to the common intention or is done in opposition to it

and is not required to be done at all for carrying out the common

intention, cannot be said to be in furtherance of common intention

[refer judgment of R.P. Sethi J. in Suresh (supra)]. {Para 19}

20. When we apply the aforesaid principles relating to applicability of Section 34 IPC to the facts of the present case, we feel that Thimmappa and Gopala are entitled to the benefit of doubt on the ground that it cannot be with certainty held that they had common intention, viz. the injuries inflicted by Krishnamurthy on Venkatarama after he had fallen down. They did not participate thereafter by physically assaulting or causing any injury to Venkatarama. They did not facilitate and help Krishnamurthy in the assault he perpetuated. We have no grounds to accept that they could have preconceived the brutal assault by Krishnamurthy who had put his knees on the neck and jumped on the chest of the deceased to cause the injuries resulting in his death. We cannot hold that these two accused could have premeditated the result which ensued when Krishnamurthy behaved and acted in the manner he did. Clearly, they had not joined Krishnamurthy when he had acted and have stood by. There is nothing to indicate that their acts, that is, holding the hands and pulling the legs of the deceased making him fall down, were done in furtherance of the common intention that Krishnamurthy would thereupon put his leg on the neck of the deceased, crushed his chest and fracture the ribs. We would, in favour of the appellants Thimmappa and Gopala, hold that their acts cannot be primarily connected with the violence perpetuated by Krishnamurthy. Given the acts attributed to Thimmappa and Gopala, the assault by Krishnamurthy and the resultant outcome were unexpected. We are also not prepared to hold that these two accused should have known the final outcome, or it was known to them, or it was a reasonably possible outcome of the preconcert/ contemporaneous engagement or a manifestation of mutual consent for carrying out a common purpose. We, therefore, would not hold them guilty for the offence under Section 300 or even Section 299 of the IPC on the ground that they shared common intention as understood on application of Section 34 IPC.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 288 OF 2022


KRISHNAMURTHY @ GUNODU AND OTHERS  Vs STATE OF KARNATAKA .

Author: SANJIV KHANNA, J.

Dated: FEBRUARY 16, 2022.

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Saturday, 10 October 2020

Whether court can convict accused with aid S 34 of IPC even if he has not participated in actual assault to the victim?

 In Surender Chauhan vs. State of Madhya Pradesh,

(2000) 4 SCC 110, it was noticed that absence of a positive

act of assault was not a necessary ingredient to establish

common intention observing :“

11. Under Section 34 a person must be

physically present at the actual

commission of the crime for the purpose of

facilitating or promoting the offence, the

commission of which is the aim of the joint

criminal venture. Such presence of those

who in one way or the other facilitate the

execution of the common design is itself

tantamount to actual participation in the

criminal act. The essence of Section 34 is

simultaneous consensus of the minds of

persons participating in the criminal action

to bring about a particular result. Such

consensus can be developed at the spot

and thereby intended by all of them….”{Para 16}


18. Coming to the facts of the present case, the appellant

no.1 lay in wait along with the other two appellants who were

armed. Appellant no.1 stopped the two deceased who were

returning from the market. The assault commenced after the

deceased had halted. That there was some dispute with

regard to money is apparent from the evidence of the

witnesses. Abdul Barek died on the spot as a result of the

brutal assault. Abdul Motin was injured in the first assault

upon him by appellant no.3, after which he tried to flee.

Appellant no 1 along with the other accused chased him,

caught hold of him near the house of Mamud Ali where he

was brutally assaulted. Abdul Motin was then dragged by the

accused persons to the place where Abdul Barek lay

motionless. To our mind no further evidence is required with

regard to existence of common intention in appellant no.1 to

commit the offence in question. We, therefore, find no reason

to grant any benefit to appellant no.1 on the plea that there is

no role or act of assault attributed to him, denying the

existence of any common intention for that reason.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1401 OF 2012

SUBED ALI AND OTHERS Vs THE STATE OF ASSAM 

Author: NAVIN SINHA, J.

Dated: SEPTEMBER 30, 2020.

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Friday, 7 August 2020

Whether court can convict accused with the aid of S 34 of IPC in place of S 149 of IPC even though no charge was framed U/S 34 of IPC?

Effect of Failure to frame proper charges

39. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy and Ors. MANU/SC/0490/1998 : (1998) 6 SCC 554, this Court considered the issue of failure to frame the proper charges. observing as under:

10. Sub-section (1) of Section 464 of the Code of criminal Procedure 1973 ('the Code', for short) expressly provides that no finding, sentence or order by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any misjoinder of charges, unless in the opinion of the court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-section (2) of the said section lays down the procedure that the court of appeal, confirmation or revision has to follow in case it is of the opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. The other section relevant for our purposes is Section 465 of the Code; and it lays down that no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings, unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. It further provides, inter alia, that in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.
The Court further held that in judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, the court must look to the substance of the matter and not to technicalities, and its main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. In the said case this Court ultimately came to the conclusion that despite the defect in the framing of charges, as no prejudice had been caused to the accused, no interference was required.

40. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0038/1955 : AIR 1956 SC 116, considered the issue of failure to frame charges properly and the conviction of an accused for the offences for which he has not been charged and reached the conclusion as under:

86. ... In such a situation, the absence of a charge under one or other of the various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge, can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out....

87. ... If it is so grave that prejudice will necessarily be implied or imported, it may be described as an illegality. If the seriousness of the omission is of a lesser degree, it will be an irregularity and prejudice by way of failure of justice will have to be established.
41. This Court in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/2515/2005 : (2005) 12 SCC 615, referred to and relied upon its earlier judgments in Willie (William) Slaney (supra) and Thakkidiram Reddy (supra), and held that unless there is a failure of justice and thereby the cause of the accused has been prejudiced, no interference is required if the conviction can be upheld on the evidence led against the accused. The Court should not interfere unless it is established that the accused was in any way prejudiced due to the errors and omissions in framing the charges against him.

A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Ramji Singh v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0632/2001 : (2001) 9 SCC 528; and Sanichar Sahni v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0888/2009 : (2009) 7 SCC 198.

42. There is no bar in law on conviction of the accused with the aid of Section 34 IPC in place of Section 149 IPC if there is evidence on record to show that such accused shared a common intention to commit the crime and no apparent injustice or prejudice is shown to have been caused by application of Section 34 IPC in place of Section 149 IPC. The absence of a charge under one or the other or the various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to be by itself prejudicial to the accused, and before a conviction for the substantive offence without a charge can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out. Such a legal position is bound to be held good in view of the provisions of Sections 215, 216, 218, 221 and 464 of Code of criminal Procedure, 1973. (Vide: Dalip Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0031/1953 : AIR 1953 SC 364; Malhu Yadav and Ors. v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0393/2002 : (2002) 5 SCC 724; Dhaneswar Mahakud and Ors. v. State of Orissa (2009) 9 SCC 307; and Annareddy Sambasiva Reddy and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh MANU/SC/0640/2009 : AIR 2009 SC 2661).

43. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that unless the accused is able to establish that the defect(s) in framing the charge(s) has caused real prejudice to him; that he was not informed as to what was the real case against him; or that he could not defend himself properly, no interference is required on mere technicalities.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1243 of 2007

Decided On: 14.09.2010

 Abdul Sayeed  Vs.    State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P. Sathasivam and B.S. Chauhan, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0702/2010,(2010) 10 SCC 259
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Wednesday, 5 August 2020

Whether court can convict accused U/S 302 of IPC if he was charged U/S 302 of IPC read with S 34 of IPC?

 No doubt the appellant and two others have been charged for an offence Under Section 302 and 201 read with Section 34, namely, common intention to commit the offences and A. 2 and A, 3 were acquitted of the charge Under Section 302/34, I.P.C. and that there is no independent charge Under Section 302, I.P.C. If, from the evidence, it is established that any one of the accused have committed the crime individually, though the other accused were acquitted, even without any independent charge Under Section 302, the individual accused would be convicted Under Section 302, I.P.C. simplicitor. The omission to frame an independent charge Under Section 302, I.P.C. does not vitiate the conviction and sentence Under Section 302, I.P.C.{Para 11}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 386 of 1978

Decided On: 29.08.1990

Kishore Chand  Vs.  State of Himachal Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P.B. Sawant and K. Ramaswamy, JJ.
Citation: (1991) 1 SCC 286, AIR 1990 SC 2140, MANU/SC/0374/1990
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Whether court can convict accused of an offence, U/S 302 of IPC read with S 34 of IPC without charge U/S 34 of IPC?

Legal position as to whether in the absence of charge under Section 34 conviction could be maintained under Section 34 was cleared by the Constitution Bench in While Slaney vs. State of M.P. MANU/SC/0038/1955 : 1956CriLJ291 , where this Court observed at para 86:

"Sections 34 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a common object or a common intention; and the charge is a rolled-up one involving the direct liability and the constructive liability without specifying who are directly liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable.

In such a situation, the absence of a charge under one or other of the various head of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge, can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out. In most of the cases of this kind, evidence is normally given from the outset as to who was primarily responsible for the act which brought about the offence and such evidence is of course relevant."

This was reiterated by the Supreme Court a number of times. We may refer to Dhanna Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0626/1996, where this position is reiterated after referring to the other cases. It held:

"It is, therefore, open to the Court to take recourse to Section 34 of IPC even if the said section was not specifically mentioned in the charge and instead Section 149, IPC has been included. Of course a finding that the assailant concerned had a common intention with the other accused is necessary for resorting to such a course. This view was followed by this Court in later decisions also. (Amar Singh v. State of Haryana MANU/SC/0036/1972 : AIR1973SC221 ; Bhoor Singh v. State of Punjab MANU/SC/0109/1974 : 1974CriLJ929 . The first submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has no merit."
Accordingly it is held that even in the absence of the charge under Section 34 the conviction could be maintained by the courts below:

The counsel for the appellants could not show that any prejudice was caused to either of the accused persons because of the non-framing of charge under Section 34.
15. It is true that the two injuries which proved to be fatal were no specifically attributed to either of the accused. The common intention can be formed at the spot. At time it is difficult to get direct evidence of pre-concert of minds. The common intention can be gathered from the circumstances and the manner in which assault is carried out. The manner in which assault was carried out leaves no manner of doubt in our mind that the appellants had come with the intention to kill the deceased. Their intention was not to cause injuries alone. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9254 of 2001

Decided On: 12.10.2001

 Ramji Singh Vs  State of Bihar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.C. Lahoti and Ashok Bhan, JJ.

 Citation : AIR 2001 SC 3853, MANU/SC/0632/2001,(2001) 9 SCC 528
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Monday, 3 August 2020

Whether accused charged under S 302 of IPC read with S 149 of IPC can be convicted under S 302 of IPC read with S 34 of IPC?

The Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants further urged that Murli had given only one blow and there could not be an intention of committing murder. It has come in the evidence of Dr. Vinod Kumar Dhingra (PW-10) that besides the incised wounds, the deceased also suffered the fracture. What was tried to be argued by the Learned Senior counsel was that Dr. Vinod Kumar Dhingra (PW-10), in his evidence, had stated that the deceased had died on account of asphyxia due to complete incised injury to trachea. The Learned Senior Counsel tried to argued that if this alone was the injury resulting in death, then some advantage should be given to Murli who was merely handling a Lathi. The accused persons, as per the charges, were charged with the offence under Section 302 substantively. In addition to that, all the accused were also charged with the aid of Section 149 IPC. It is obvious that both the appellants had specifically taken part in the assault, their presence was established, their overt acts were also established. It was further established that while Heera had given the blows with the aid of a sharp edged weapon, Murli had assaulted the deceased with Lathi on the head. In that view, both the accused can be convicted. The High Court in the appellate judgment, however, has not discussed any of these aspects and has merely chosen to dismiss the appeal and thereby confirming the conviction ordered by the Trial Court with the aid of Section 149 IPC. That undoubtedly was incorrect. The High Court ought to have given a specific finding. However, the fact remains that these two appellants were found to have inflicted the injuries with sharp edged weapon, as well as, Lathi. They have also been individually charged with the offence under Section 302 IPC. In that view, they were bound to be convicted for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. They came together on the spot, they also gave abuses to the deceased and thereafter, acted along with each other. Therefore, we have no hesitation in upholding the conviction, but not with the aid of Section 149 IPC, but with the aid of Section 34. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1011 of 2005

Decided On: 18.08.2009

 Murli  Vs.  State of Rajasthan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.S. Sirpurkar and Cyriac Joseph, JJ.

Citation : (2009 )9SCC 417,MANU/SC/1470/2009
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Friday, 3 July 2020

Constitutional bench Judgement of Supreme Court on the distinction between irregularity and illegality in Criminal trial

Referring to the contention that the breach of a direct and important provision of the Code cannot be cured but must lead to the quashing of the conviction, Sir John Beaumont observed :-

"....... In their Lordships' opinion, this argument is based on too narrow a view of the operation of section 537. When a trial is conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code (as in N. A. Subramania Iyer's case MANU/PR/0013/1901, the trial is bad, and no question of curing an irregularity arises; but if the trial is conducted substantially in the manner prescribed by the Code, but some irregularity occurs in the course of such conduct, the irregularity can be cured under section 537, and nonetheless so because the irregularity involves, as must nearly always be the case, a breach of one more of the very comprehensive provisions of the Code. The distinction drawn in many of the cases in India between an illegality and an irregularity is one of degree rather than of kind. This view finds support in the decision of their Lordships' Board in Abdul Rahman v. The King-Emperor [1926] L.R. 54 IndAp 96, where failure to comply with section 360 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was held to be cured by sections 535 and 537. The present case falls under section 537, and their Lordships hold the trial valid notwithstanding the breach of section 162".
96. Of course, lack of competency of jurisdiction, absence of a complaint by the proper person or authority specified, want of sanction prescribed as a condition precedent for a prosecution, in short, defects that strike at the very root of jurisdiction stand on a separate footing, and the proceedings taken in disregard or disobedience would be illegal. The difficulty arises only when we have to consider the other provisions in the Code which regulate procedure and which are found in a mandatory form, positive or negative. It is in this class of cases that the distinction becomes important and material. The scope of the decision in Subramania Aiyar's case MANU/PR/0013/1901, has become so circumscribed that it is doubtful if it applies to the generality of cases of omissions and defects that come before the courts, excepting where they bring about the result that the trial was conducted in a manner different from that prescribed by the Code.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 6 of 1955

Decided On: 31.10.1955

Willie Slaney  Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sudhi Ranjan Das, Acting C.J., Vivian Bose, B. Jagannadhadas, Syed Jaffer Imam and N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1956 SC 116,MANU / SC / 0038 / 1955



Authored By : Vivian Bose, N. Chandrasekhara Aiyar, Syed Jaffer Imam

Vivian Bose, J.
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Tuesday, 2 June 2020

Supreme Court: No law that person accompanying principal culprit for minor offence shares common intention for the major offence committed by him

It may be that when some persons start with a pre-arranged plan to commit a minor offence, they may in the course of their committing the minor offence come to an understanding to commit the major offence as well. Such an understanding may appear from the conduct of the persons sought to be made vicariously liable for the act of the principal culprit or from some other incriminatory evidence but the conduct or other evidence must be such as not to leave any room for doubt in that behalf. 15. A criminal court fastening vicarious liability must satisfy itself as to the prior meeting of the minds of the principal culprit and his companions who are sought to be constructively made liable in respect of every act committed by the former. There is no law to our knowledge which lays down that a person accompanying the principal culprit shares his intention in respect of every act which the latter might eventually commit. The existence or otherwise of the common intention depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The intention of the principal offender and his companions to deal with any person who might intervene to stop the quarrel must be apparent from the conduct of the persons accompanying the principal culprit or some other clear and cogent incriminating piece of evidence. In the absence of such material, the companion or companions cannot justifiably be held guilty for every offence committed by the principal offender.” (Emphasis Supplied)

Unless a common intention is established as a matter of necessary inference from the proved circumstances the accused persons will be liable for their individual act and not for the act done by any other person. For an inference of common intention to be drawn for the purposes of Section 34, the evidence and the circumstances of the case should establish, without any room for doubt, that a meeting of minds and a fusion of ideas had taken place amongst the different accused and in prosecution of it, the overt acts of the accused persons flowed out as if in obedience to the command of a single mind. If on the evidence, there is doubt as to the involvement of a particular accused in the common intention, the benefit of doubt should be given to the said accused person. ….”
33. In Girija Shankar v. State of U.P. 2004 (3)SCC 793, this Court made the following observations:
“9. …… In order to bring home the charge of common intention, the prosecution has to establish by evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, that there was plan or meeting of minds of all the accused persons to commit the offence for which they are charged with the aid of Section 34, be it pre-arranged or on the spur of the moment; but it must necessarily be before the commission of the crime.….” (Emphasis supplied)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.57 OF 2013

SONU @ SUNIL  Vs  STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 
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Supreme court lay down tests for determining when a person in possession of the stolen property is the murderer.

In the case of recovery of an article from an accused person when he stands accused of committing offences other than theft also, (in this instance murder), what are the tests:
i. The first thing to be established is that the theft and murder forms part of one transaction. The circumstances may indicate that the theft and murder must have been committed at the same time. But it is not safe to draw the inference that the person in possession of the stolen property was the murderer [See Sanwant Khan (supra)];
ii. The nature of the stolen article;
iii. The manner of its acquisition by the owner;
iv. The nature of evidence about its identification;
v. The manner in which it was dealt with by the accused;
vi. The place and the circumstances of its recovery;
vii. The length of the intervening period;
viii. Ability or otherwise of the accused to explain its possession [See Baiju (supra)].

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.57 OF 2013

SONU @ SUNIL  Vs  STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 

K.M. JOSEPH, J.
Dated:MAY 29, 2020.
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Saturday, 10 August 2019

Whether five or more persons must be brought before court and convicted for proving charge U/S 149 of IPC?

The true legal position in regard to the essential ingredients of an offence specified by s. 149 are not in doubt. Section 149 prescribes for vicarious or constructive criminal liability for all members of an unlawful assembly where an offence is committed by any member of such an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. It would thus be noticed that one of the essential ingredients of section 149 is that the offence must have been committed by any member of an unlawful assembly, and s. 141 makes it clear that it is only where five or more persons constituted an assembly that an unlawful assembly is born, provided, of course; the other requirements of the said section as to the common object of the persons composing that assembly are satisfied. In other words, it is an essential condition of an unlawful assembly that its membership must be five or more.

The argument, therefore, is that as soon as the two Piara Singhs were acquitted, the membership of the assembly was reduced from five to three and that made s. 141 inapplicable which inevitably leads to the result that s. 149 cannot be invoked against the appellants. In our opinion, on the facts of this case, this argument has to be upheld. We have already observed that the point raised by the appellants has to be dealt with on the assumption that only five persons were named in the charge as persons composing the unlawful assembly and evidence led in the course of the trial is confined only to the said five persons. If that be so, as soon as two of the five named persons are acquitted, the assembly must be deemed to have been composed of only three persons and that clearly cannot be regarded as an unlawful assembly.
9. In dealing with the question as to the applicability of s. 149 in such cases, it is necessary to bear in mind the several categories of cases which come before the Criminal Courts for their decision. If five or more persons are named in the charge as composing an unlawful assembly and evidence adduced by the prosecution proves that charge against all of them, that is a very clear case where s. 149 can be invoked. It is, however, not necessary that five or more persons must be convicted before a charge under s. 149 can be successfully brought home to any members of the unlawful assembly. It may be that less than five persons may be charged and convicted under s. 302/149 if the charge is that the persons before the Court along with others named constituted an unlawful assembly; the other persons so named may not be available for trial along with their companions for the reason, for instance, that they have absconded. In such a case, the fact that less than five persons are before the Court does not make section 149 inapplicable for the simple reason that both the charge and the evidence seek to prove that the persons before the court and others number more than five in all and as such, they together constitute an unlawful assembly. Therefore, in order to bring home a charge under s. 149 it is not necessary that five or more persons must necessarily be brought before the court and convicted.

Similarly, less than five persons may be charged under s. 149 if the prosecution case is that the persons before the Court and others numbering in all more than five composed an unlawful assembly, these others being persons not identified and so not named. In such a case, if evidence shows that the persons before the Court along with unidentified and un-named assailants or members composed an unlawful assembly, those before the Court can be convicted under section 149 though the un-named and un-identified persons are not traced and charged.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 186 of 1960

Decided On: 15.03.1962

Mohan Singh  Vs. State of Punjab

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B.P. Sinha, K.N. Wanchoo, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, P.B. Gajendragadkar and V. Balakrishna Eradi, JJ.

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Wednesday, 29 August 2018

Notes on S 34 {S 3(5) of BNS } and S149 IPC{S 190 of BNS }- Principle of constructive liability

S 34 of IPC {S 3(5) of BNS } Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention:-
When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

Object of the section: S 34 of IPC {S 3(5) of BNS } is enacted to meet cases in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of individual members of a party, or to prove exactly what part is played by each of them. The reason why all are deemed to be guilty in such cases is that presence of accomplices gives encouragement, support and protection for the persons actually committing the act.

 S 34 {S 3(5) of BNS }is only a rule of evidence and does not create any substantive offence.
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Sunday, 29 July 2018

Whether accused can be convicted with aid of S 34 of IPC if it is not possible to convict him U/S 149 of IPC?

There cannot be any quarrel about the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments where subtle distinction is drawn between Section 34 and Section 149, Indian Penal Code which deal with 'common intention' and 'common object' respectively. At the same time, it is also clarified that it would depend on the facts of each case as to whether Section 34 or Section 149 of Indian Penal Code or both the provisions are attracted. It is also held that non-applicability of Section 149 Indian Penal Code is no bar in convicting the Accused persons Under Section 302 Indian Penal Code read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, if the evidence discloses commission of offence in furtherance of common intention of them all.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 701, 702, 703-704, 705-706, 707, 708 of 2012 
Decided On: 06.10.2017

Birbal Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and R.K. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 12 SCC 440
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