Supreme Court:Whether the court should release accused on anticipatory bail if his custody is not required for recovery of documents involved in the crime?

In the recent judgment in the case of Pradip N. Sharma (supra), this Court in para 18 has observed as under:

"18. However, considering the nature of the allegations and the fact that the matter is to be investigated primarily based on documentary evidence, the Court is inclined to grant the relief of anticipatory bail to the Appellant. The offences alleged pertain to the exercise of administrative discretion in the passing of an order rather than direct physical involvement in any overt criminal act requiring custodial interrogation. The prosecution has not demonstrated any necessity for the custodial interrogation of the Appellant beyond scrutiny of official records, which can be done without placing him in detention. Additionally, the Appellant has expressed his willingness to cooperate with the investigation, and no material has been placed before this Court to suggest that he has evaded or obstructed the investigation in any manner. Furthermore, it is well-settled that anticipatory bail can be granted where custodial interrogation is not essential, particularly in cases where the allegations hinge on official records and the presence of the Accused can be secured without pre-trial detention. {Para 16}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 2294 of 2026

Decided On: 30.04.2026

Pawan Khera Vs. State of Assam

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.K. Maheshwari and A.S. Chandurkar, JJ.

 Citation: 2026 INSC 437, MANU/SC/0428/2026

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Bombay HC: Under which circumstances, custodial interrogation of accused is not required?

Perused the recitals of the FIR from which it reveals that there was a dispute between both the families on account of the boundary of the plot. The appellants have already filed an application as far as the encroachment is concerned which is under the consideration. As far as the allegations are concerned, appellant No.1 allegedly assaulted the informant and her husband by fist and kick blows on chest whereas there is no specific allegation against appellant No.2 but his presence is mentioned. Considering the role attributed to the present appellants, immediate custodial interrogation is not required as nothing is to be seized from them.  {Para 7}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Criminal Appeal No. 570 of 2024

Decided On: 24.03.2025

Prajwal and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Urmila S. Joshi-Phalke, J.

Citation: 2025:BHC-NAG:3184,MANU/MH/1912/2025,2025(3) Bom CR (CRI) 94.

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Supreme court: S.161 CrPC Statement Of Accused Implicating Co-Accused Cannot Be Considered At Stage Of Regular Or Anticipatory Bail

 From the above exposition of law, the following emerges:—

(i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first information report, can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C., as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra).

(ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C., would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or may be exculpatory in nature.

(iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it amounts to confession.

(iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively. In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another co-accused.

(v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another co-accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co-accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the stage of trial, where (1) the confession itself was relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co-accused and; (4) both the accused persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence.

(vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not “evidence” in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused, provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled.

(vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so would militate against the general principle, that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario whatsoever.

(viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the Cr. P.C., and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or reexamination of such accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused, implicates another co-accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused, as there can be no credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an accused implicating another co-accused, more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the co-accused, the same cannot be tested by cross-examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration a statement of one accused person against another co-accused as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), i.e., ‘when a person admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other co-accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement’.

(ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. stands on a completely different footing from a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature, its more in the form of a confession or admission rather than a statement, and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the Cr. P.C.. However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another accused person cannot be looked into by the courts, as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr. P.C., and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra).

(x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. for the purpose of anticipatory or regular bail, the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness or an accused person, or likely to be an accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations where a person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. may not be an accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still ongoing, it is more likely for a person who was originally a witness to happen to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he is not named in the first information report, without first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be relied upon up until such person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner. {Para 53}

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.)

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7532 of 2025

P. Krishna Mohan Reddy  Vs State of Andhra Pradesh 

Decided on May 16, 2025.

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1157.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Whether the court should release accused on anticipatory bail if prosecution against him was instituted due to Political vendetta?

To some extent, the petitioners could be said to have made out a prima facie case of political bias or mala fides but that by itself is not sufficient to grant anticipatory bail overlooking the other prima facie materials on record. Political vendetta or bias if any is one of the relevant considerations while considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The courts should keep one thing in mind, more particularly, while considering the plea of anticipatory bail that when two groups of rival political parties are at war which may ultimately lead to litigations, more particularly, criminal prosecutions there is bound to be some element of political bias or vendetta involved in the same. However, political vendetta by itself is not sufficient for the grant of anticipatory bail. The courts should not just look into the aspect of political vendetta and ignore the other materials on record constituting a prima facie case as alleged by the State. It is only when the court is convinced more than prima facie that the allegations are frivolous and baseless, that the court may bring into the element of political vendetta into consideration for the purpose of considering the plea of anticipatory bail. The frivolity in the entire case that the court may look into should be attributed to political bias or vendetta. {Para 27}

 In the Supreme Court of India

(Before J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.)

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7532 of 2025

P. Krishna Mohan Reddy  Vs State of Andhra Pradesh 

Decided on May 16, 2025.

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1157.

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Anticipatory Bail, Public Interest, and Corruption: Supreme Court’s New Threshold in P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh

 Introduction

The Supreme Court’s recent judgment in P Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh (SLP (Crl.) Nos. 7532-34 of 2025) marks a significant development in Indian criminal jurisprudence, particularly regarding the grant of anticipatory bail in high-profile corruption cases involving public servants. The Court’s refusal to grant anticipatory bail, despite the petitioners’ cooperation with the investigation and their retired status, introduces a nuanced legal principle prioritizing public interest and the integrity of ongoing investigations over individual liberty in cases of grave economic offences.

Background and Context

The petitioners, former high-ranking public officials, sought anticipatory bail after being implicated in a massive alleged scam concerning the allocation of liquor brands in Andhra Pradesh. The case, registered under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Corruption Act, revolves around allegations of favoritism, manipulation of procurement processes, and kickbacks amounting to over Rs. 3,000 crores.

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Delhi High Court denies anticipatory bail to man booked for sexually harassing minor on Instagram

 

 It is settled law that the custodial interrogation is qualitatively more elicitation oriented than questioning a suspect who is well ensconced with a favourable order under Section 482 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS’) [State v.

Anil Sharma : (1997) 7 SCC 187]. Granting anticipatory bail to

the applicant would undoubtedly impede further investigation.

An order of bail cannot be granted in a routine manner so as to

allow the applicant to use the same as a shield. {Para 15 }

16. This court has perused the case diary and gone through the

statements of the victim, mother of the victim and co-accused -

Sameer. There are materials in the case diary implicating the

applicant in the allegations which the police are investigating.

The allegations against the applicant are of a grave and serious

nature, involving the exploitation and sexual abuse of a minor

girl. The applicant is accused of coercing the victim into

engaging in sexually explicit acts over video calls, recording the

same without her consent, and using these recordings to

blackmail her repeatedly. Such acts not only violate the personal

dignity and privacy of the victim but also constitute serious

offences under the BNS and the POCSO Act.

17. The allegations against the applicant points towards the

exploitation of a child by coercing and blackmailing her for

pornographic purposes. The alleged recording and sharing of

explicit material involving the minor victim is a grave offence.

19. The present case underscores the increasing misuse of

social media and technology to exploit and intimidate vulnerable

individuals, particularly minors. In light of the allegations,

perusal of the statement of the victim and co-accused Sameer,

this Court finds that granting pre-arrest bail would set an

inappropriate precedent and undermine the societal interest in

safeguarding children from such reprehensible acts.

20. The actions of the applicant exemplify the disturbing trend

of exploiting the anonymity and reach of social media platforms

to perpetrate sexual crimes against minors. This Court cannot

ignore the broader societal implications of such acts and the

urgent need to send a strong message against the misuse of

technology.

21. Considering that the present case involves electronic

gadgets and electronic evidence, the task of the Investigating

Agency seems arduous and they need to be given a fair play in

the joints to investigate the matter in the manner they deem

appropriate. The matter requires thorough investigation which

ought not to be curtailed by passing an order granting pre-arrest

bail.

22. The relief of pre-arrest bail is a legal safeguard intended to protect individuals from potential misuse of power of arrest. It plays a crucial tool in preventing harassment and unjust detention of innocent persons. However, the court must carefully balance the individual’s right to liberty with the interests of justice. While the presumption of innocence and the right to liberty are fundamental principles of law, they must be considered in conjunction with the gravity of the offence, its societal impact, and the need for a comprehensive and unobstructed investigation.

23. Considering the material on record, it cannot be held at this stage that the investigation is being carried out with the intention to injure or humiliate the applicant and does not indicate false implication of the applicant. The nature and gravity of allegations are serious. Specific allegations have been made regarding the applicant’s alleged involvement in the commission of the offence.

24. The material presented by the prosecution establishes a prima facie involvement of the applicant. Granting pre-arrest bail to the applicant would undoubtedly impede further investigation.

25. The present application is accordingly dismissed.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  BAIL APPLN. 4440/2024

SAIFUL KHAN  Vs STATE & ANR. 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN

AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral).

Date of Decision: 03rd December, 2024

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Supreme Court: Anticipatory Bail Can't Be Denied On Mere Assertion Of State That Custodial Interrogation Of Accused Is Required

There is no gainsaying that custodial interrogation is one of

the effective modes of investigating into the alleged crime. It is

equally true that just because custodial interrogation is not

required that by itself may also not be a ground to release an

accused on anticipatory bail if the offences are of a serious

nature. However, a mere assertion on the part of the State while

opposing the plea for anticipatory bail that custodial interrogation is required would not be sufficient. The State would have to show or indicate more than prima facie why the custodial interrogation of the accused is required for the purpose of investigation. {Para 12}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.9949/2023)

ASHOK KUMAR Vs STATE OF UNION TERRITORY CHANDIGARH 

Dated: MARCH 01, 2024.

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Whether accused can make conversation with his lawyer during interrogation by police?

We may, however, at this stage refer to another decision of this Court in D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal MANU/SC/0157/1997 : (1997) 1 SCC 416. In this case, the Court, extensively considered the issues of arrest or detention in the backdrop of Articles 21, 22 and 32 of the Constitution and made a number of directions to be followed as preventive measures in all cases of arrest or detention till legal provisions are made in that behalf. The direction at serial number 10 in paragraph 35 is as follows:

(10). The arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation.

28. Strictly speaking the aforesaid direction does not apply to the case of the Respondent, because he being on bail cannot be described as an arrestee. But, it is stated on behalf of the Respondent that he suffers from heart disease and on going to the DRI office, in pursuance to the summons issued by the authorities, he had suffered a heart attack. It is also alleged that his brother was subjected to torture and the Respondent himself was threatened with third degree methods. The medical condition of the Respondent was accepted by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge and that forms one of the grounds for grant of anticipatory bail to him. Taking a cue, therefore, from the direction made in DK Basu and having regard to the special facts and circumstances of the case, we deem it appropriate to direct that the interrogation of the Respondent may be held within the sight of his advocate or any other person duly authorized by him. The advocate or the person authorized by the Respondent may watch the proceedings from a distance or from beyond a glass partition but he will not be within the hearing distance and it will not be open to the Respondent to have consultations with him in course of the interrogation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1266 of 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 628 of 2008)

Decided On: 05.07.2011

Senior Intelligence Officer

Vs.

Jugal Kishore Samra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Aftab Alam and R.M. Lodha, JJ.

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Whether suspect can claim that he should be interrogated in presence of his lawyer?

 We do not find any force in the arguments of Mr. Salve and Mr. Lalit that if a person is called away from his own house and questioned in the atmosphere of the customs office without the assistance of his lawyer or his friends his constitutional right under Article 21 is violated. The argument proceeds thus: if the person who is used to certain comforts and convenience is asked to come by himself to the Department for answering questions it amounts to mental torture. We are unable to agree. It is true that large majority of persons connected with illegal trade and evasion of taxes and duties are in a position to afford luxuries on lavish scale of which an honest ordinary citizen of this country cannot dream of and they are surrounded by persons similarly involved either directly or indirectly in such pursuits. But that cannot be a ground for holding that he has a constitutional right to claim similar luxuries and company of his choice. Mr. Salve was fair enough not to pursue his argument with reference to the comfort part, but continued to maintain that the appellant is entitled to the company of his choice during the questioning. The purpose of the enquiry under the Customs Act and the other similar statutes will be completely frustrated if the whims of the persons in possession of useful information for the departments are allowed to prevail. For achieving the object of such an enquiry if the appropriate authorities be of the view that such persons should be dissociated from the atmosphere and the company of persons who provide encouragement to them in adopting a non-cooperative attitude to the machineries of law, there cannot be any legitimate objection in depriving them of such company. The relevant provisions of the Constitution in this regard have to be construed in the spirit they were made and the benefits thereunder should not be "expanded" to favour exploiters engaged in tax evasion at the cost of public exchequer. Applying the just, fair and reasonable test' we held that there is no merit in the stand of appellant before us.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 301-302 of 1987

Decided On: 14.05.1992

Poolpandi etc. etc.
Vs.
 Superintendent, Central Excise and others etc. etc.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram: 
L.M. Sharma, J.S. Verma and Yogeshwar Dayal, JJ.

citations: 1992 AIR 1795, 1992 SCR (3) 247

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When cancellation of anticipatory bail is justified?

 In Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of
Maharashtra and others (2011) 1 SCC 694Page 10
, in sub-para (viii) of para 112, this
Court has held as under: -
“(viii) While considering the prayer for grant of
anticipatory bail, a balance has to be struck between two
factors, namely, no prejudice should be caused to the
free, fair and full investigation and there should be
prevention of harassment, humiliation and unjustified
detention of the accused;”

 In Bhadresh Bipinbhai Sheth v. State of Gujarat and
another 52015 (9) SCALE 403
, laying down the principles regarding cancellation of
anticipatory bail in sub paras (vi) and (ix) of para 23, this
Court has observed as under: -
“(vi) It is a settled legal position that the court
which grants the bail also has the power to
cancel it. The discretion of grant or
cancellation of bail can be exercised either at
the instance of the accused, the Public
Prosecutor or the complainant, on finding new
material or circumstances at any point of
time.”

(ix) No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula
can be provided for grant or refusal of
anticipatory bail because all circumstances
and situations of future cannot be clearly
visualized for the grant or refusal of
anticipatory bail. In consonance with
legislative intention, the grant or refusal of
anticipatory bail should necessarily depend on
the facts and circumstances of each case.”
 Having considered the submissions made by learned
counsel for the parties, and after considering the gravity of the
offence, circumstances of the case, particularly, the allegations
of corruption and misappropriation of public funds released
for rural development, and further considering the conduct of
the appellants and the fact that the investigation is held up as
the custodial interrogation of the appellants could not be done
due to the anticipatory bail, we are of the opinion that the
High Court has rightly cancelled the anticipatory bail granted
to the appellants by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon.
Therefore, we are not inclined to disturb the same.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1286-1287 OF 2015
(Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 1753-54 of 2015)

Sudhir  Vs  The State of Maharashtra and another 

Citation;(2016)1SCC146

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Leading Supreme court Judgment No. 3 on grant on anticipatory bail

 Another case to which we would like to refer is the judgment of a

Division Bench of this Court in the case of Siddharam

Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra and Others (2011) 1 SCC 694

. This case lays down an exhaustive commentary of 

Section 438 of the

Code covering, in an erudite fashion, almost all the aspects and in

the process relies upon the aforesaid Constitution Bench

judgment in Gurbaksh Singh's case. In the very first para, the

Court highlighted the conflicting interests which are to be

balanced while taking a decision as to whether bail is to be

granted or not, as is clear from the following observations:

“1. Leave granted. This appeal involves issues

of great public importance pertaining to the

importance of individual's personal liberty and

the society's interest. Society has a vital interest

in grant or refusal of bail because every criminal

offence is the offence against the State. The

order granting or refusing bail must reflect

perfect balance between the conflicting interests,

namely, sanctity of individual liberty and the

interest of the society. The law of bails dovetails

two conflicting interests, namely, on the one

hand, the requirements of shielding society from

the hazards of those committing crimes and

potentiality of repeating the same crime while on

bail and on the other hand, absolute adherence

to the fundamental principle of criminal

jurisprudence regarding presumption of

innocence of an accused until he is found guilty

and the sanctity of individual liberty.”

23. The principles which can be culled out, for the purposes of the

instant case, can be stated as under:

(i) The complaint filed against the accused needs to be thoroughly

examined, including the aspect whether the complainant has filed

a false or frivolous complaint on earlier occasion. The court

should also examine the fact whether there is any family dispute

between the accused and the complainant and the complainant

must be clearly told that if the complaint is found to be false or

frivolous, then strict action will be taken against him in

accordance with law. If the connivance between the complainant

and the investigating officer is established then action be taken

against the investigating officer in accordance with law.

(ii) The gravity of charge and the exact role of the accused must be

properly comprehended. Before arrest, the arresting officer must

record the valid reasons which have led to the arrest of the

accused in the case diary. In exceptional cases, the reasons

could be recorded immediately after the arrest, so that while

dealing with the bail application, the remarks and observations of

the arresting officer can also be properly evaluated by the court.

(iii) It is imperative for the courts to carefully and with meticulous

precision evaluate the facts of the case. The discretion to grant

bail must be exercised on the basis of the available material and

the facts of the particular case. In cases where the court is of the

considered view that the accused has joined the investigation and

he is fully cooperating with the investigating agency and is not

likely to abscond, in that event, custodial interrogation should be

avoided. A great ignominy, humiliation and disgrace is attached

to arrest. Arrest leads to many serious consequences not only for

the accused but for the entire family and at times for the entire

community. Most people do not make any distinction between

arrest at a pre-conviction stage or post-conviction stage.

(iv) There is no justification for reading into Section 438 CrPC the

limitations mentioned in Section 437 CrPC. The plentitude of

Section 438 must be given its full play. There is no requirement

that the accused must make out a “special case” for the exercise

of the power to grant anticipatory bail. This virtually, reduces the

salutary power conferred by Section 438 CrPC to a dead letter. A

person seeking anticipatory bail is still a free man entitled to the

presumption of innocence. He is willing to submit to restraints

and conditions on his freedom, by the acceptance of conditions

which the court may deem fit to impose, in consideration of the

assurance that if arrested, he shall be enlarged on bail.

(v) The proper course of action on an application for anticipatory bail

ought to be that after evaluating the averments and accusations

available on the record if the court is inclined to grant anticipatory

bail then an interim bail be granted and notice be issued to the

Public Prosecutor. After hearing the Public Prosecutor the court

may either reject the anticipatory bail application or confirm the

initial order of granting bail. The court would certainly be entitled

to impose conditions for the grant of anticipatory bail. The Public

Prosecutor or the complainant would be at liberty to move the

same court for cancellation or modifying the conditions of

anticipatory bail at any time if liberty granted by the court is

misused. The anticipatory bail granted by the court should

ordinarily be continued till the trial of the case.

(vi) It is a settled legal position that the court which grants the bail

also has the power to cancel it. The discretion of grant or

cancellation of bail can be exercised either at the instance of the

accused, the Public Prosecutor or the complainant, on finding

new material or circumstances at any point of time.

(vii) In pursuance of the order of the Court of Session or the High

Court, once the accused is released on anticipatory bail by the

trial court, then it would be unreasonable to compel the accused

to surrender before the trial court and again apply for regular bail.

(viii) Discretion vested in the court in all matters should be exercised

with care and circumspection depending upon the facts and

circumstances justifying its exercise. Similarly, the discretion

vested with the court under Section 438 CrPC should also be

exercised with caution and prudence. It is unnecessary to travel

beyond it and subject the wide power and discretion conferred by

the legislature to a rigorous code of self-imposed limitations.

(ix) No inflexible guidelines or straitjacket formula can be provided for

grant or refusal of anticipatory bail because all circumstances and

situations of future cannot be clearly visualised for the grant or

refusal of anticipatory bail. In consonance with legislative

intention, the grant or refusal of anticipatory bail should

necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.

(x) We shall also reproduce para 112 of the judgment wherein the

Court delineated the following factors and parameters that need

to be taken into consideration while dealing with anticipatory bail:

(a) The nature and gravity of the accusation and the exact role of the

accused must be properly comprehended before arrest is made;

(b) The antecedents of the applicant including the fact as to whether

the accused has previously undergone imprisonment on

conviction by a court in respect of any cognizable offence;

(c) The possibility of the applicant to flee from justice;

(d) The possibility of the accused's likelihood to repeat similar or

other offences;

(e) Where the accusations have been made only with the object of

injuring or humiliating the applicant by arresting him or her;

(f) Impact of grant of anticipatory bail particularly in cases of large

magnitude affecting a very large number of people;

(g) The courts must evaluate the entire available material against the

accused very carefully. The court must also clearly comprehend

the exact role of the accused in the case. The cases in which the

accused is implicated with the help of Sections 34 and 149 of the

Penal Code, 1860 the court should consider with even greater

care and caution, because overimplication in the cases is a

matter of common knowledge and concern;

(h) While considering the prayer for grant of anticipatory bail, a

balance has to be struck between two factors, namely, no

prejudice should be caused to free, fair and full investigation, and

there should be prevention of harassment, humiliation and

unjustified detention of the accused;

(i) The Court should consider reasonable apprehension of tampering

of the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant;

(j) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and it is only

the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered in

the matter of grant of bail and in the event of there being some

doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal

course of events, the accused in entitled to an order of bail.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1134-1135 OF 2015

BHADRESH BIPINBHAI SHETH V STATE OF GUJARAT & ANOTHER 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Sikri and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.

Citation;(2016)1 SCC152

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Guidelines of Bombay high court regarding custodial interrogation of accused

 We are of the view that this can be achieved if following

guidelines are followed:
(i) In respect of petty offences, such as cases of chain
snatching under Section 379, 380 of I.P.C. and
similar offences; or where punishment is less than
three years; or where offender has been arrested for
the first time, he may not be interrogated after 10.00
p. m., and only in exceptional circumstances,
interrogation may be undertaken after 10.00 p.m.
(ii) Even in respect of habitual offenders of the same
category, viz. 379, 380 I.P.C., etc. also, as far as
possible, custodial interrogation at night may not be
undertaken.
(iii) Legal aid, apart from being provided to the police
station, shall be provided when remand applications
are filed and the learned Magistrate should ask the
accused whether he requires some legal aid at that
stage and if he shows his inclination of being given
legal aid, the State Government should provide legal
aid and pay adequate fees to such Legal Aid lawyers.
(iv) Custodial interrogation may also be monitored by a
senior police officer from time to time, so that if
there are excessive interrogations, he can stop such
interrogations, at right time. However, the
suggestions given by the Petitioner may be taken

into consideration by the Committee, to be
constituted by the Director General of Police, since
they are experts in the fields and aware of the pros
and cons of this field, they shall make proper
suggestions and frame guidelines.
(v) The Committee shall also be constituted for the
purpose of installation of CCTV cameras and
surveillance system.
(vi) The State shall submit a list of custodial deaths,
which have taken place every month.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION No. 2110 OF 2014

Leonard Xavier Valdaris  Vs.  Officer-in-Charge, Wadala Railway Police Station 


 CORAM : V. M. KANADE, &
 Dr. SHALINI PHANSALKAR-JOSHI, JJ.
 DATE : OCTOBER 21, 2015

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When anticipatory bail can be cancelled by High court?

Though there are two matters before this Court, the
material discussed and the allegations show that in 31 villages
similar irregularities were found. Unless the technical man like
Sectional Officer and Executive Engineer join hands with the
members of the Committee, there is no possibility of
misappropriation of the amount. Whenever there is
misappropriation of the amount and the Government is duped,
that amount needs to be recovered. That amount needs to be
treated as stolen property under section 410 of I.P.C. It cannot be
said in the cases like present one that only on the basis of
record, investigation can be done. The actual role played and the
other persons who had joined hands in creating false record can
be ascertained only after custodial interrogation. Amount of
thousands of crores of this State has been misappropriated and
this could not have happened if the officers like present
respondents had acted honestly. They are certainly benefited
and that money needs to be traced. Such persons are not at all
entitled to any lenient view. All these circumstances need to be
considered by the Criminal Court while using the discretionary
power of granting anticipatory bail. Thus, the relevant material is
not at all considered and the learned Additional Sessions Judge
has committed grave error in granting relief on merits to both
the respondents, Executive Engineer and Sectional Engineer.

This Court has no hesitation to hold that the orders made in their
favour need to be cancelled. Unless there is custodial
interrogation, the investigation will not be effective and it will
not be possible for the investigating agency to complete the
investigation. There is possibility of revealing more material and
more instances of fraud only after the custodial interrogation.


IN THE HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRI.APPLN/4526/2013

RAMESH MANIK PATIL
V/S
THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER

CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE, J.
DATED : 29th January, 2015.

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