Supreme Court: Extra Judicial confession of Accused Absolving Himself & Incriminating Co-Accused Not Reliable

 PW3 on the other hand speaks not of a confession but an exculpatory statement made by A1 that it was A2 and A3 who killed the deceased. PW12 and PW14, two other witnesses who spoke of the extra-judicial confession also spoke in tandem with what PW3 stated. The exculpatory statement made absolving himself and accusing the co-accused, by its very nature is unreliable. It cannot be put against the other accused, for no cross examination being provided to them, of the one who made that statement. It cannot also incriminate the person who made the statement since there is no element of confession in the recital as spoken of by three witnesses, as against one.

11. It is also of relevant import that PW8 specifically spoke of a

mob having detained A1 and A2 and PW8 having taken A1 aside

to speak to him, when he made the confession in the presence of

PW3; thus again raising a suspicion of whether PW12 and PW14

were privy to the statement made by A1. The extra-judicial

confession by its very nature being a weak piece of evidence has

not at all been proved in the present case. In any event, the

statement is made when the two accused were detained by a

mob, on the accusation of murder. Obviously, there is

considerable pressure put on the detained persons, who could

have spoken, on undue duress or under threat of violence. In

fact, the records indicate that after arrest, when A1&2 were taken for medical examination, they had injuries on their body, which again cuts at the root of credibility of the statement made; which anyway has doubtful standing as a confession.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No. 2507 of 2026

Papan Sarkar @ Pranab Vs  State of West Bengal

Author: K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 528

Dated: MAY 22, 2026.

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Bombay HC: Whether Demonstration panchnama proved by prosecution is admissible in evidence in criminal trial?

 A similar situation also arose before the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramkishore Bharatsinh Yadav Vs. State of Gujarat and another 2024 SCC OnLine Guj 3121 wherein, it has been observed as under:

“22. It is an admitted fact that at the time of making

confessional statement during the process of pointing out

and demonstration panchnamas, the appellant-accused was

admittedly in the police custody. Moreover, considering the

fact that nothing had been discovered or recovered through

these panchanamas, we are of the opinion that the trial

court, in considering these evidence for convicting the

appellants-accused, has fell in error, since the same is

inadmissible.” {Para 23}

24. To put it all together, a demonstration shown by an accused depicting the manner in which an offence is committed by him is hit by Section 25 of the Act and for the reasons stated above, it is not admissible even under Section 27 of the Act as an exception to Section 25 of the Act.

25. The learned Judge also observed that some part of the

demonstration made by the petitioners which relates to the

subsequent conduct of the petitioners is admissible in evidence

under Section 8 of the Act. No doubt, subsequent conduct of an

accused is relevant if it influences or is influenced by any fact in

issue or relevant fact. However, the learned Judge failed to

consider that the demonstration shown by the petitioners to the

police as to their conduct is admissible against them under Section 8 of the Act only to the extent of its non-confessional portion. Meaning thereby, any evidence showing the conduct of an accused must first overcome the bar created by Section 25 of the Act and only then it can be relied upon under Section 8 of the Act. (See: Bheru Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan  1994 (2) SCC 467 and Aghnoo Nagesia Vs. State of Bihar 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109. In the present case, the entire demonstration panchanama is hit by Section 25 of the Act. Therefore, demonstration made by the petitioners to show the manner in which the offence was committed by them is not admissible under Section 8 of the Act even to show subsequent conduct.

26. To conclude, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has not considered these aspects and erroneously overruled the objection of the petitioners. Therefore, the orders dated 08.10.2024 and 14.11.2024 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Buldhana in Sessions Trial No.24 of 2022 are hereby set aside. The objections of the petitioners are sustained. Accordingly, the petition succeeds.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO.49 OF 2025

 Rahul S/o Kisan Jaybhaye, Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM: M.W. CHANDWANI, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 11.07.2025

Citation: 2025:BHC-NAG:7427

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What is Section 27 of the Evidence Act?

 Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 creates an exception to the general rule that prohibits confessions made by an accused person to police officers while in custody. This section allows for the admissibility of information received from an accused person in police custody if it leads to the discovery of a fact related to the crime.

Text of Section 27

The section reads: "Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved".

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What is difference between Confession and extra judicial confession and It's value?

 Understanding Confession

A confession is "the direct admission of matter or facts of the cases either in the form of a written or oral statement". According to Sir James Stephen, it is defined as "an admission made at any time by a person charged with a crime stating or suggesting the inference that he committed a crime". Essentially, a confession is a statement made by an accused person that suggests or admits their guilt in relation to a criminal offense.

Types of Confessions

Confessions are broadly categorized into two main types: judicial confessions and extra-judicial confessions.

Judicial Confession

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Supreme court: S.161 CrPC Statement Of Accused Implicating Co-Accused Cannot Be Considered At Stage Of Regular Or Anticipatory Bail

 From the above exposition of law, the following emerges:—

(i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first information report, can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C., as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra).

(ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C., would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or may be exculpatory in nature.

(iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it amounts to confession.

(iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act respectively. In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another co-accused.

(v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another co-accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co-accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the stage of trial, where (1) the confession itself was relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co-accused and; (4) both the accused persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence.

(vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not “evidence” in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused, provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled.

(vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so would militate against the general principle, that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario whatsoever.

(viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the Cr. P.C., and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or reexamination of such accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused, implicates another co-accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused, as there can be no credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an accused implicating another co-accused, more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the co-accused, the same cannot be tested by cross-examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against the foundational principle that permits taking into consideration a statement of one accused person against another co-accused as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), i.e., ‘when a person admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other co-accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement’.

(ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. stands on a completely different footing from a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature, its more in the form of a confession or admission rather than a statement, and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of either culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the Cr. P.C.. However, such exculpatory statement insofar as it implicates another accused person cannot be looked into by the courts, as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr. P.C., and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra).

(x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. for the purpose of anticipatory or regular bail, the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness or an accused person, or likely to be an accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations where a person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the Cr. P.C. may not be an accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still ongoing, it is more likely for a person who was originally a witness to happen to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he is not named in the first information report, without first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be relied upon up until such person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner. {Para 53}

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.)

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 7532 of 2025

P. Krishna Mohan Reddy  Vs State of Andhra Pradesh 

Decided on May 16, 2025.

Citation: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1157.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Evidentiary Value of statements obtained by Police under the Indian Evidence Act

 The evidentiary value of statements made to police officers in India is primarily governed by the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, particularly Sections 25, 26, and 27. These sections delineate the circumstances under which statements can be considered admissible in court and the extent to which they can be relied upon.

Section 25: Confessions to Police Officers

Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act explicitly states that no confession made to a police officer shall be proved against an accused. This provision is rooted in the historical context of potential coercion and abuse of power by law enforcement, ensuring that confessions obtained under duress or in custody are inadmissible. 

This section underscores a fundamental principle of criminal justice: protecting individuals from self-incrimination and ensuring that any confession is made voluntarily and without undue influence.

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Whether the court can rely on call details of mobile used in crime if prosecution fails to prove connection between owner of that Sim and custody of accused of that SIM?

  As regards the call data and the ransom calls, we may note that Santosh Jadhav, Assistant Nodal Officer, Reliance Communication, was examined as PW-17 and spoke of the call data of mobile number 8305620342 from which the ransom calls were made. According to him, the SIM card with the said mobile number was given to one Bhuraji, son of Deepu, whose address was House No. 433, Sanjay Gandhi Ward, Tehsil Jabalpur. He produced Bhuraji's 'Customer Application Form' along with his attached Election ID card. These documents were marked as Ex. D6. The call data of 28.03.2013 showed that this SIM card was used on the mobile handset with IMEI No. 358327028551270. He marked in evidence Ex. P35 in that regard. Therefore, the mobile number from which ransom calls were made was in the name of one Bhuraji, s/o. Deepu, and his address was available. However, the police did not even attempt to contact Bhuraji or examine him to find out how and why his SIM card was used for making the ransom calls. Even more startling is the fact that, though PW-17 placed on record actual proof of the allotment of this mobile number to Bhuraji (Ex. D6), no such steps were taken by the police to establish the link between Om Prakash Yadav and mobile number 9993135127, which was attributed to him. PW-15 baldly stated that the said mobile number was allotted to Om Prakash Yadav but did not mark in evidence any document in proof thereof. Surprisingly, he had stated in his deposition that he had brought the certified copy of the application form and the ID used when this SIM card was allotted to the subscriber, Om Prakash Yadav, but the same were not marked. In effect, no palpable connection is established between the said mobile number and Om Prakash Yadav. In the absence of such a tangible link, the call data report (Ex. P31) and the contents thereof are practically useless in establishing the prosecution's case that the ransom calls were made from Om Prakash Yadav's mobile phone handset by inserting Bhuraji's SIM card, with mobile number 8305620342, therein.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 793-794 of 2022 and 795 of 2022

Decided On: 21.09.2023

 Rajesh and Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: : MANU/SC/1040/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme court lays down requirements of valid panchnama as per S 100 of CRPC

  In Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra through CBI, Bombay MANU/SC/0268/2013 : (2013) 13 SCC 1, this Court noted that the primary intention behind the 'panchnama' is to guard against possible tricks and unfair dealings on the part of the officers entrusted with the execution of the search and also to ensure that anything incriminating which may be said to have been found in the premises searched was really found there and was not introduced or planted by the officers of the search party. It was further noted that the legislative intent was to control and check these malpractices of the officers, by making the presence of independent and respectable persons compulsory for search of a place and seizure of an article. It was pointed out that a panchnama can be used as corroborative evidence in the Court when the respectable person who is a witness thereto gives evidence in the Court of law Under Section 157 of the Evidence Act. This Court noted that Section 100(4) to Section 100(8) Code of Criminal Procedure stipulate the procedure with regard to search in the presence of two or more respectable and independent persons, preferably from the same locality, so as to build confidence and a feeling of safety and security amongst the public. The following mandatory conditions were culled out from Section 100 Code of Criminal Procedure for the purposes of a valid panchnama:

(a) All the necessary steps for personal search of officer (Inspecting officer) and panch witnesses should be taken to create confidence in the mind of court as nothing is implanted and true search has been made and things seized were found real.

(b) Search proceedings should be recorded by the I.O. or some other person under the supervision of the panch witnesses.

(c) All the proceedings of the search should be recorded very clearly stating the identity of the place to be searched, all the spaces which are searched and descriptions of all the articles seized, and also, if any sample has been drawn for analysis purpose that should also be stated clearly in the Panchanama.

(d) The I.O. can take the assistance of his subordinates for search of places. If any superior officers are present, they should also sign the Panchanama after the signature of the main I.O.

(e) Place, Name of the police station, Officer rank (I.O.), full particulars of panch witnesses and the time of commencing and ending must be mentioned in the Panchnama.

(f) The panchnama should be attested by the panch witnesses as well as by the concerned IO.

(g) Any overwriting, corrections, and errors in the Panchnama should be attested by the witnesses.

(h) If a search is conducted without warrant of court Under Section 165 of the Code, the I.O. must record reasons and a search memo should be issued.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 793-794 of 2022 and 795 of 2022

Decided On: 21.09.2023

 Rajesh and Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: : MANU/SC/1040/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether Panchnama is admissible In Court Where Witnesses Merely Acted As Attestors And Did Not Disclose How Objects Were Discovered?

  Witnesses to the panchnamas and the seizures acted as mere attestors to the documents and did not disclose in their own words as to how these objects were discovered, i.e., at whose instance and how. Ergo, no lawful validity attaches to these proceedings recorded by the police in the context of collection of all this evidence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 793-794 of 2022 and 795 of 2022

Decided On: 21.09.2023

 Rajesh and Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: : MANU/SC/1040/2023.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Whether the court can rely on discovery at the instance of accused if it was done when he was not accused of any offence and he was not in police custody?

 In the case on hand, though Rajesh Yadav was taken to the police station, be it on 29.03.2013 or even earlier, he could not be said to be in 'police custody' till he was arrested at 18:30 hours on 29.03.2013, as he did not figure as an 'Accused' in the FIR and was not 'Accused of any offence' till his arrest. Therefore, it was his arrest which resulted in actual 'police custody', and the confession made by him, before such arrest and prior to his being 'Accused of any offence', would be directly hit by Section 26 of the Evidence Act and there is no possibility of applying the exception Under Section 27 to any information given by him in the course of such confession, even if it may have led to the discovery of any fact. In consequence, the purported discovery of the dead body, the murder weapon and the other material objects, even if it was at the behest of Rajesh Yadav, cannot be proved against him, as he was not 'Accused of any offence' and was not in 'police custody' at the point of time he allegedly made a confession. {Para 27}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 793-794 of 2022 and 795 of 2022

Decided On: 21.09.2023

 Rajesh and Ors. Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala and P.V. Sanjay Kumar, JJ.

Author: P.V. Sanjay Kumar, J.

Citation: : MANU/SC/1040/2023.

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Whether court can convict the accused on the basis of his videographic confession made before police?

Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court went completely wrong in placing reliance on the voluntary statements of the Accused and their videography statements. Under Article 20(3)1 of the Constitution of India, an Accused cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. Again, Under Section 252 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; a confessional statement given by an Accused before a Police officer is inadmissible as evidence.

The reference of the Supreme Court judgment by the trial Court (Shri N. Sri Rama Reddy v. Shri V.V. Giri) is also misplaced. That case only refers to the admissibility of a tape-recorded conversation in an election petition which is tried before a Court under the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 87 of the Representation of People Act, 1951). This Court, in the above cited judgment was not dealing with a criminal case and most certainly not on the admissibility of a statement given by an Accused to the Police Under Section 161 of Code of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, the above judgment also ends with a note of caution:

20. The other disturbing feature that we have noticed is that voluntary statements of the Appellants were recorded on a DVD which was played in Court and formed the basis of the judgment of the Trial Court as is noticeable from paragraph Nos. 34 and 35 of its judgment. Such a statement is again in the nature of a confession to a Police Officer and is completely hit by the principles of Evidence Act. If at all the Accused were desirous of making confessions, the Investigating Machinery could have facilitated recording of confession by producing them before a Magistrate for appropriate action in terms of Section 164 of the Code. Any departure from that course is not acceptable and cannot be recognized and taken on record as evidence. The Trial Court erred in exhibiting those DVD statement Exh.P-25 to 28. As a matter of fact, it went further in relying upon them while concluding the matter on the issue of conviction.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1597-1600 of 2022 

Decided On: 30.09.2022

Munikrishna and Ors. Vs.  State by Ulsoor PS

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit, C.J.I., S. Ravindra Bhat and Sudhanshu Dhulia, JJ.

Author: Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/1289/2022

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Delhi HC: Extracting Confession From Child Is Beyond Scope Of Preliminary Assessment Report and it is Unconstitutional

 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the NGO/HAQ, Intervener in

the CRL.Ref. 3/2016 has placed before us, a copy of the preliminary

assessment report prepared by a psychologist in the format supplied by the

Department. Under Clause 3 of the said report, it can be clearly noted that

a confession is sought to be extracted from the child as to the manner in

which the offence was committed and the reasons thereof. This manner of

seeking a confession from the child is unconstitutional and beyond the scope

of a report of preliminary assessment to be prepared under Section 15 of the

J.J. Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

CRL.A. 193/2018

VIKAS SANGWAN  Vs THE STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL

Dated: 19.09.2022

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Landmark Supreme Court Judgment on the admissibility of admission given by accused in his first information report

 The report is not a confession of the appellant. It is not a statement made to a police officer during the course of investigation. Section 25 of the Evidence Act and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure do not bar its admissibility. The report is an admission by the accused of certain facts which have a bearing on the question to be determined by the Court, viz., how and by whom the murder of Gulab was committed, or whether the appellant's statement in Court denying the correctness of certain statements of the prosecution witnesses is correct of not. Admissions are admissible in evidence under s. 21 of the Act. Section 17 defines an admission to be a statement, oral or documentary, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, thereafter mentioned, in the Act. Section 21 provides that admissions are relevant and may be proved as against a person who makes them. Illustrations (c), (d) and (e) to s. 21 are of the circumstances in which an accused could prove his own admissions which go in his favour in view of the exceptions mentioned in s. 21 to the provision that admissions could not be proved by the person who makes them. It is therefore clear that admissions of an accused can be proved against him.

15. The Privy Council in very similar circumstances, held long ago in Dal Singh v. King Emperor L.R. 44 IndAp 137 such first information reports to be admissible in evidence. The report was held admissible because it was not a confession and it was helpful in determining the matter before the Court.

17. In Nisar Ali's case MANU/SC/0032/1957 : 1957CriLJ550 Kapur J. who spoke for the Court said, after narrating the facts :

"An objection has been taken to the admissibility of this report as it was made by a person who was a co-accused. A first information report is not a substantive piece of evidence and can only be used to corroborate the statement of the maker under s. 157, Evidence Act, or to contradict it under s. 145 of that Act. It can not be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused, nor to corroborate or contradict other witnesses. In this case, therefore, it is not evidence."

18. It is on these observations that it has been contended for the appellant that his report was inadmissible in evidence. Ostensibly, the expression 'it cannot be used as evidence against the maker at the trial if he himself becomes an accused supports the appellant's contention. But it appears to us that in the context in which the observation is made and in the circumstances, which we have verified from the record or that case, that the Sessions Judge had definitely held the first information report lodged by the co-accused who was acquitted to be inadmissible against Nisar Ali, and that the High Court did not refer to it at all in its judgment, this observation really refers to a first information report which is in the nature of a confession by the maker thereof. Of course, a confessional first information report cannot be used against the maker when he be an accused and necessarily cannot be used against a co-accused. Further, the last sentence of the above-quoted observation is significant and indicates what the Court meant was that the first information report lodged by Qudratullah, the co-accused, was not evidence against Nisar Ali. This Court did not mean - as it had not to determine in that case - that a first information report which is not a confession cannot be used as an admission under s. 21 of the Evidence Act or as a relevant statement under any other provision of that Act.

19. We therefore hold that the objection to the admissibility of the first information report lodged by the appellant is not sound and that the Courts below have rightly admitted it in evidence and have made proper use of it.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 210 of 1963

Decided On: 24.01.1964

Faddi  Vs.  The State of Madhya Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M. Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal, JJ.

Citations: 1964 AIR 1850, 1964 SCR (6) 312

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Whether the presence of Advocate of accused is mandatory if the confession of the accused is recorded without audio-video electronic means?

The plea regarding absence of a counsel during proceedings before the

Magistrate under section 164, CrPC resulting into any prejudice, are

misconceived. What mandatorily is needed, as noted earlier, is that the

Magistrate must satisfy himself of the voluntariness of the statement and all

the statutory safeguards which includes bringing the repercussions and the

voluntariness of making confessions to the knowledge of the accused, must

be meticulously complied with. It is pertinent to take note of the first Proviso to

Section 164(1), added with effect from 31.12.2009, which specifies that:

“Provided that any confession or statement made under this subsection

may also be recorded by audio-video electronic means in the

presence of the advocate of the person accused of an offence.”

(emphasis supplied)

41. Section 164 of the Code thus does not contemplate that a confession or

statement should necessarily be made in the presence of the advocate(s),

except, when such confessional statement is recorded with audio-video

electronic means.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

INHERENT JURISDICTION

REVIEW PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 446-447 OF 2019

IN

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1174-1175 OF 2019

Manoharan Vs  State by Inspector of Police,

SURYA KANT, J.

Dated:NOVEMBER 07, 2019.

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Whether admission given by accused is admissible in evidence?

 Such a person, viz., person who is named in
the FIR, and therefore, the accused in the eyes
of law, can indeed be questioned and the

statement is taken by the Police Officer. A
confession, which is made to a Police Officer,
would be inadmissible having regard to Section
25 of the Evidence Act. A confession, which is
vitiated under Section 24 of the Evidence Act
would also be inadmissible. A confession unless
it fulfills the test laid down in Pakala
Narayana Swami (supra) and as accepted by this
Court, may still be used as an admission under
Section 21 of the Evidence Act. This, however,
is subject to the bar of admissibility of a
statement under Section 161 of the Cr.PC.
Therefore, even if a statement contains
admission, the statement being one under Section
161, it would immediately attract the bar under
Section 162 of the Cr.PC.
41. Bar under Section 162 Cr.PC, no doubt,
operates in regard to the statement made to a
Police Officer in between two points of time,
viz., from the beginning of the investigation
till the termination of the same. In a case
where statement containing not a confession but
admission, which is otherwise relevant and which
is made before the investigation commences, may
be admissible. We need not, however, say
anything more.
42. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C.
Shukla and other  AIR 1998 SC 1406,
 a Bench of three learned
Judges, after approving Pakala Narayana Swami
(supra), had occasion to consider the
distinction between confession and admission.
This Court went on to hold as follows:
“45. It is thus seen that only
voluntary and direct
acknowledgement of guilt is a
confession but when a confession
falls short of actual admission of

guilt it may nevertheless be used
as evidence against the person who
made it or his authorised agent as
an “admission” under Section 21.
The law in this regard has been
clearly — and in our considered
view correctly — explained
in Monir's Law of Evidence(New Edn.
at pp. 205 and 206), on which Mr
Jethmalani relied to bring home his
contention that even if the entries
are treated as “admission” of the
Jains still they cannot be used
against Shri Advani. The relevant
passage reads as under:
“The distinction between
admissions and confessions is of
considerable importance for two
reasons. Firstly, a statement
made by an accused person, if it
is an admission, is admissible in
evidence under Section 21 of the
Evidence Act, unless the
statement amounts to a confession
and was made to a person in
authority in consequence of some
improper inducement, threat or
promise, or was made to a Police
Officer, or was made at a time
when the accused was in custody
of a Police Officer. If a
statement was made by the accused
in the circumstances just

mentioned its admissibility will
depend upon the determination of
the question whether it does not
amount to a confession. If it
amounts to a confession, it will
be inadmissible, but if it does
not amount to a confession, it
will be admissible under Section
21 of the Act as an admission,
provided that it suggests an
inference as to a fact which is
in issue in, or relevant to, the
case and was not made to a Police
Officer in the course of an
investigation under Chapter XIV
of the Code of Criminal
Procedure. Secondly, a statement
made by an accused person is
admissible against others who are
being jointly tried with him only
if the statement amounts to a
confession. Where the statement
falls short of a confession, it
is admissible only against its
maker as an admission and not
against those who are being
jointly tried with him.
Therefore, from the point of view
of Section 30 of the Evidence Act
also the distinction between an
admission and a confession is of
fundamental importance.””
(Emphasis supplied)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.714 OF 2019
(@ SLP(Criminal) No.5415 of 2017)

DIPAKBHAI JAGDISHCHANDRA PATEL Vs STATE OF GUJARAT 

K.M. JOSEPH, J.

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Leading judgment on admissibility of confession of one accused against co-accused

In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh MANU/SC/0031/1952 : (1952) SCR 526, this Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King MANU/PR/0047/1949 : (1949) 76 Indian Appeal 147 at 155 and laid down as under:

Gurubachan's confession has played an important part in implicating the Appellant, and the question at once arises, how far and in what way the confession of an Accused person can be used against a co-accused? It is evident that it is not evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because, as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v. The King "It does not indeed come within the definition of" 'evidence' contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act., It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination." Their Lordships also point out that it is "obviously evidence of a very weak type......... It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities.

They stated in addition that such a confession cannot be made the foundation of a conviction and can only be used in "support of other evidence." In view of these remarks it would be pointless to cover the same ground, but we feel it is necessary to expound this further as misapprehension still exists. The question is, in what way can it be used in support of other evidence? Can it be used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be used to corroborate an accomplice or, as in the present case, a witness who, though not an accomplice, is placed in the same category regarding credibility because the judge refuses to believe him except in so far as he is corroborated ?

In our opinion, the matter was put succinctly by Sir 'Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty MANU/WB/0030/1911 : [1911] I.L.R. 38 CAl. 559 at 588 where he said that such a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused "or, to put it in another way, as Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan MANU/TN/0024/1930: [1931] I.L.R. 54 Mad. 75 at 77.

the provision goes no further than this--where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession de-scribed in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.

Translating these observations into concrete terms they come to this. The proper way to approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the evidence against the Accused excluding the confession altogether from consideration and see whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely be based on it. If it is capable of belief independently of the confession, then of course it is not necessary to call the confession in aid. But cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to act on the other evidence as it stands even though, if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a conviction. In such an event the judge may call in aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to the other evidence and thus fortify himself in believing what without the aid of the confession he would not be prepared to accept.

12. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh (supra) was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v. State of Bihar MANU/SC/0059/1964 : (1964) 6 SCR 623 at 631-633 wherein it was observed:

As we have already indicated, this question has been considered on several occasions by judicial decisions and it has been consistently held that a confession cannot be treated as evidence which is substantive evidence against a co-accused person. In dealing with a criminal case where the prosecution relies upon the confession of one Accused person against another Accused person, the proper approach to adopt is to consider the other evidence against such an Accused person, and if the said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may sustain the charge framed against the said Accused person, the court turns to the confession with a view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerburty a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused". In re Periyaswami Moopan Reilly. J., observed that the provision of Section 30 goes not further than this: "where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence". In Bhuboni Sahu v. King the Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir John Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that "a confession of a co-accused is obviously evidence of a very weak type. It does not indeed come within the definition of "evidence" contained in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It is a much weaker type of evidence than the evidence of an approver, which is not subject to any of those infirmities. Section 30, however, provides that the court may take the confession into consideration and thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on which the court may act; but the Section does not say that the confession is to amount to proof. Clearly there must be other evidence. The confession is only one element in the consideration of all the facts proved the case; it can be put into the scale and weighed with the other evidence". It would be noticed that as a result of the provisions contained in Section 30, the confession has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to evidence in a general way, because whatever is considered by the court is evidence; circumstances which are considered by the court as well as probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as evidence in that generic sense because of the provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case against an Accused person, the court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused person; it must begin with other evidence adduced by the prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence, then it is permissible to turn to the confession in order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of the provisions contained in Section 30. The same view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh where the decision of the Privy Council in Bhuboni Sahu case has been cited with approval.

13. The law so laid down has always been followed by this Court except in cases where there is a specific provision in law making such confession of a co-accused admissible against another accused.2

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 949 of 2018 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9816 of 2017)

Decided On: 31.07.2018

 Surinder Kumar Khanna Vs. Intelligence Officer Directorate of Revenue Intelligence

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Abhay Manohar Sapre and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 8 SCC 271

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on extra judicial confession

 Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence and the

court must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is

corroborated by other prosecution evidence. In order to accept

extra-judicial confession, it must be voluntary and must inspire

confidence. If the court is satisfied that the extra-judicial confession

is voluntary, it can be acted upon to base the conviction.

Considering the admissibility and evidentiary value of extra-judicial

confession, after referring to various judgments, in Sahadevan and

Another v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 6 SCC 403, this court held

as under:-

“15.1. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab 1995 Supp (4) SCC

259 this Court stated the principle that:

“10. An extra-judicial confession by its very nature is

rather a weak type of evidence and requires

appreciation with a great deal of care and caution.

Where an extra-judicial confession is surrounded by

suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes

doubtful and it loses its importance.”

15.4. While explaining the dimensions of the principles governing

the admissibility and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial

confession, this Court in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8

SCC 180 stated the principle that:

“19. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and

made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court.

The confession will have to be proved like any other fact.

The value of the evidence as to confession, like any other

evidence, depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom

it has been made.”

The Court further expressed the view that:

“19. … Such a confession can be relied upon and conviction

can be founded thereon if the evidence about the confession

comes from the mouth of witnesses who appear to be

unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in

respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to

indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an

untruthful statement to the accused.…”

15.6. Accepting the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, the

Court in Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2010) 10 SCC 604

held that:

“29. There is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial

confession can never be the basis of a conviction, although

ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated

by some other material. [Vide Thimma and Thimma Raju v.

State of Mysore (1970) 2 SCC 105, Mulk Raj v. State of U.P.

AIR 1959 SC 902, Sivakumar v. State By Inspector of Police

(2006) 1 SCC 714 (SCC paras 40 and 41 : AIR paras 41

and 42), Shiva Karam Payaswami Tewari v. State of

Maharashtra (2009) 11 SCC 262 and Mohd. Azad alias

Shamin v. State of W.B. (2008) 15 SCC 449]”

10

14. It is well settled that conviction can be based on a voluntarily

confession but the rule of prudence requires that wherever possible

it should be corroborated by independent evidence. Extra-judicial

confession of accused need not in all cases be corroborated. In

Madan Gopal Kakkad v. Naval Dubey and Another (1992) 3 SCC

204, this court after referring to Piara Singh and Others v. State of

Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 452 held that the law does not require that

the evidence of an extra-judicial confession should in all cases be

corroborated. The rule of prudence does not require that each and every circumstance mentioned in the confession must be separately and independently corroborated.

15. As discussed above, if the court is satisfied that if the

confession is voluntary, the conviction can be based upon the same.

Rule of Prudence does not require that each and every

circumstance mentioned in the confession with regard to the

participation of the accused must be separately and independently

corroborated. In the case at hand, as pointed out by the trial court

as well as by the High Court, R.K. Soni (PW-2) and R.C. Chhabra

(PW-3) were the senior officers of the bank and when they reached

the bank for inspection on 23.04.1994, the accused submitted his

confessional statement (Ex.-PW-2/A). Likewise, in the enquiry

conducted by R.C. Chhabra (PW-3), the accused had given

confession statement (Ex.-PW-3/A).

16. Contention of the appellant is that PWs 2 and 3 being the

higher officials, it cannot be said that the confession statement of

the accused has been made voluntarily and it must have been

under the inducement or under false promise of favour. Mere

allegation of threat or inducement is not enough; in the court’s

opinion, such inducement must be sufficient to cause a reasonable

belief in the mind of the accused that by so confessing, he would

get an advantage. As pointed out by the trial court and the High

Court, though the confession statement has been initially made in

the presence of R.C. Chhabra (PW-3) and M.P. Sethi by the

appellant, no question was put to R.C. Chhabra (PW-3) that extrajudicial

confession (Ex.-PW3/A) was an outcome of any threat,

inducement or allurement. The statement which runs to eleven

sheets has been held to be made by the appellant voluntarily.

Likewise, confession statement (Ex.-PW-2/A) made before R.K.

Soni (PW-2) was in the handwriting of the appellant made in the

presence of R.K. Soni (PW-2) and H.O. Agrawal, the then Assistant Chief Officer (Inspection). Here again, it was not suggested to R.K. Soni (PW-2) that Ex.-PW-2/A was outcome of some threat or

pressure. The trial court as well as the High Court concurrently held

that the confession statements (Ex.-PW-3/A and PW-2/A) were

voluntarily made and that the same can form the basis for

conviction. We do not find any good ground warranting interference with the said concurrent findings.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.576 OF 2010

RAM LAL Vs STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH 

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Dated: October 03, 2018.

Citation: AIR 2018 SC 4616

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Whether court can rely on confession recorded by magistrate if he is not examined as witness?

 It is unnecessary for us to say anything on this question, since we are satisfied that the learned Sessions Judge was wholly wrong in excluding and the High Court was certainly right in acting upon the confessional statement made to the Magistrate. The learned Magistrate has put to the accused all the necessary questions to satisfy himself that the confession was voluntary. He has also appended the necessary certificate. We do not accept Shri Jain's submission that the learned Magistrate should have been examined as a witness. Section 80 of the Evidence Act makes the examination of the Magistrate unnecessary. It authorises the Court to presume that the document is genuine, that any statements as to the circumstances under which it was taken are true and that such confession was truly taken in accordance with law. Shri Jain submitted that if the Magistrate had been examined as a witness, the accused might have been in a position to show, by cross examination that the confession recorded by the Magistrate was not voluntary. The Magistrate has appended a certificate that he was satisfied that the confession was voluntary. No circumstance has been brought out in the evidence justifying the calling of the Magistrate as a witness. We do not think that the circumstances of the case justify any comment on the alleged failure of the prosecution to examine the Magistrate as a witness.

Supreme Court of India

Madi Ganga vs State Of Orissa on 19 February, 1981

Equivalent citations: AIR 1981 SC 1165, 1981 CriLJ 628, (1981) 2 SCC 224, 1981 (13) UJ 503 SC

Bench: B Islam, O C Reddy

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