Section 9 of the Act postulates that any aggrieved woman may make a complaint, in writing, of sexual harassment at the work place to the Local Committee within a period of three months from the date of incident, and in the case of series of incidents, within a period of three months from the date of the last incident. The second proviso to Section 9 provides that the LCC may for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the time of making the complaint not exceeding three months, if it is satisfied that the circumstances prevailing prevented the woman from filing of the complaint within the period prescribed.{Para 13}
14. In other words, a complaint of sexual harassment is mandatorily required to be filed within a period of three months from the date of the last incident of such harassment or within a further extended period of three months, i.e., within a maximum period of six months from the date of the last incident of sexual harassment.
15. No doubt, the issue of limitation is ordinarily a mixed question of fact and law and it may not be possible to throw out a complaint at the threshold without collecting material on the factual aspects relating to the limitation. Nonetheless, where a complaint on the simple reading of the averments made therein appears to be patently barred by limitation, it can be rejected at the very first instance on the analogy of Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure, without even calling the other side to participate in the proceedings.
23. The last incident of actual sexual harassment took place in April 2023. The subsequent incident of August 2023, whereunder the Appellant was removed as Director of CFRGS, with no financial implications arose out of a complaint received from the Central Government undertaking i.e. NFCG wherein Appellant was specifically named. The said action was taken completely independently on the basis of the complaint of NFCG alleging that the project report was not submitted within time and that the amount sanctioned for the project be refunded. It may be pertinent to note that the MoU was signed by the Appellant with the NFCG and the bank account was also under her control.
24. In view of the above, the incident of removal of Appellant as the Director of CFRGS cannot be attributed as an act of sexual harassment in connection with the previous incidents. It was based upon the report of NFCG, an independent body.
25. The inquiry into the project funds was taken up by the Executive Council and it was a collective decision and not a unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor. Thus, the said act would also not amount to an act of sexual harassment in conjunction with the previous reported acts.
26. The actions taken against the Appellant in August 2023, are administrative in nature and does not create a gender based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.
27. It would be important to refer to the expressions "in relation to" or "connected with" used in Section 3(2) of the Act. The use of the above expression clearly demonstrates that there has to be a direct link between the action complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment. In view of what has been said above, we find no such direct link between the last incident of sexual harassment which happened in April 2023, and those referred to subsequently in August 2023 or December 2023.
29. The alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter. The administrative measures of August 2023, were independent and were collective decisions of the NFCG and the Executive Council which cannot be solely attributed to the Vice-Chancellor. The said decision may have caused inconvenience to the Appellant or may have given an impression that they are in line with previous acts of harassment, but they were not part of the continued sexual harassment. The subsequent events have no connection to the earlier act of sexual misconduct and as such, fall clearly out of the preview of acts or behaviours amounting to sexual harassment. In this way, the incident of April 2023, remains the last event related to sexual harassment.
32. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances as well as the discussion, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court committed no error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the Appellant is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Civil Appeal No. 11786 of 2025.
Decided On: 12.09.2025
Vaneeta Patnaik Vs. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Pankaj Mithal and P.B. Varale, JJ.
Author: Pankaj Mithal, J.
Citation: 2025 INSC 1106, MANU/SC/1270/2025.
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