Showing posts with label denial of title. Show all posts
Showing posts with label denial of title. Show all posts

Thursday, 27 June 2019

Whether rent court should decide title dispute of tenanted premises?

 The major question arising for consideration is whether the findings entered into by the Rent Control Appellate Authority that the denial of title was bona fide is legal and proper and is supported by evidence and law. The other question as to whether landlords established the grounds of eviction could arise only if the first question is answered in favour of the revision petitioner.

18. The authorities under the Act are not supposed to decide the title in dispute between the parties since law does not extend its jurisdiction to adjudging the title of parties to the alleged tenanted premises. Such a function to decide title is exclusively confined by law to civil courts. The authority of the functionaries under the Act is only to ascertain whether denial of title in the proceedings is bona fide or not. If the finding entered as required by 2nd proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act accepts denial as a bona fide contention, the eviction of the occupant then could be pursued only in a civil court. Pursuit of eviction proceedings in the Rent Control Court after the finding under the 2nd proviso to Section 11(1) of the Act could be justified only if the said finding ended up in holding that the denial was without bona fides. In testing the bona fides of the contention denying title, the function of the authorities under the Act is only to check up whether such a plea was raised in good faith and with honesty and proceed accordingly. In that process, we however, do not think, it is necessary for the Rent Control Court to make sure that the plea denying title is one which should essentially be upheld by the civil court in the proceedings instituted before it.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

R.C. Rev. No. 234 of 2015

Decided On: 04.06.2019

 Baby Vs.   Babu P. Pappachan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A. Hariprasad and T.V. Anilkumar, JJ.

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Sunday, 9 December 2018

To what extent issue of title is relevant in tenancy court ?

It may be pointed out that it is well settled law that the question of title of the property is not germane for decision of the eviction suit. In a case where a plaintiff institutes a suit for eviction of his tenant based on the relationship of the landlord and tenant, the scope of the suit is very much limited in which a question of title cannot be gone into because the suit of the plaintiff would be dismissed even if he succeeds in proving his title but fails to establish the privity of contract of tenancy. In a suit for eviction based on such relationship the Court has only to decide whether the defendant is the tenant of the plaintiff or not, though the question of title if disputed, may incidentally be gone into, in connection with the primary question for determining the main question about the relationship between the litigating parties. In L.I.C. v. India Automobiles & Co. MANU/SC/0199/1991 : [1990]3SCR545 this Court had an occasion to deal with similar controversy. In the said decision this Court observed that in a suit for eviction between the landlord and tenant, the Court will take only a prima facie decision on the collateral issue as to whether the applicant was landlord. If the Court finds existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, it will have to pass a decree in accordance with law. It has been further observed that all that the Court has to do is to satisfy itself that the person seeking eviction is a landlord, who has prima facie right to receive the rent of the property in question. In order to decide whether denial of landlord's title by the tenant is bonafide the Court may have to go into tenant's contention on the issue but the Court is not to decide the question of title finally as the Court has to see whether the tenant's denial of title of the landlord is bonafide in the circumstances of the case.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7151 of 1993

Decided On: 21.09.1995

 Ranbir Singh  Vs. Asharfi Lal

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Kuldip Singh and Faizanuddin, JJ.

Citation: (1995) 6 SCC 580
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Sunday, 7 October 2018

Whether licensee can challenge title of licensor?

 Lastly, and on the same basis, is the finding that defendant 1 was inducted into the flat as a licensee by Sadashiv and was therefore estopped from questioning his licensor's title. The claim to protection under section 15-A of the Rent Act is not available to defendants 1 to 3. In fact defendant 1 does not make that claim in the proper sense of the concept for he has set up an adverse title to his licensor. A licensee recognises the superior title of his licensor and where the claim set up by him conflicts with the licensor's title, he is not a licensee or entitled to the benefit of section 15-A.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Suit No. 595 of 1976

Decided On: 16.04.1990

 Narayan Sadashiv Bhalerao Vs.  Navnitdas Narayandas Barshikar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.M. Daud, J.

Citation: 1990(2) BomCR 483
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Saturday, 13 January 2018

Whether tenant can challenge ownership of landlord over tenanted premises in eviction suit?

There is a specific reference to the registered document under which the appellant purchased the suit building from the earlier landlord in the plaint. Yet, in the written statement the respondent denied the title of the appellant. We notice that there are several documents on record relating to the ownership of the appellant, apart from the registered sale deed, such as municipal tax receipts, ration card etc. Yet, the respondent refused to acknowledge the appellant’s title. He denied it in his evidence. This is not a simple case of denial of derivative title by a person who did not know about the purchase of the building by the landlord. Even after going through the relevant documents relating to the appellant’s title the respondent feigned ignorance about it. The High Court has accepted that in his cross-examination the respondent has stated that he was not accepting the appellant as his landlady. The High Court has, however, gone on to say that by this piece of evidence no decree of eviction can be passed against the respondent under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Act because the respondent will have no occasion to establish in what circumstances he denied the title of the appellant. The High Court has further held that the respondent was within permissible limit in asking the appellant to produce documentary evidence about his title as a landlord. The High Court, in our opinion, fell into a grave error in drawing such a conclusion. Even denial of a landlord’s title in the written statement can provide a ground for eviction of a tenant. It is also settled position in law that it is not necessary that the denial of title by the landlord should be anterior to the institution of eviction proceedings. This is so stated by this Court in Majati Subbarao v. P.V.K. Krishnarao(deceased) by LRs.[10].
14. The High Court has expressed that the respondent was justified in asking the appellant to produce the documents. Implicit in this observation is the High Court’s view that the respondent could have in an eviction suit got the title of the appellant finally adjudicated upon. There is a fallacy in this reasoning. In eviction proceedings the question of title to the properties in question may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally. Similar question fell for consideration of this Court in Bhagadi Kannabalu. In that case it was argued that the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question and hence could not maintain the application for eviction on the ground of default and sub- letting under the A.P. Tenancy Act. This Court referred to its decision in Tej Bhan Madan v. II Additional District Judge and Ors.[11] in which it was held that a tenant was precluded from denying the title of the landlady on the general principle of estoppel between landlord and tenant and that this principle, in its basic foundations, means no more than that under certain circumstances law considers it unjust to allow a person to approbate and reprobate. Section 116 of the Evidence Act is clearly applicable to such a situation. This Court held that even if the landlady was not entitled to inherit the properties in question, she could still maintain the application for eviction and the finding of fact recorded by the courts below in favour of the landlady was not liable to be disturbed. The position on law was stated by this Court as under:
“In this connection, we may also point out that in an eviction petition filed on the ground of sub-letting and default, the court needs to decide whether relationship of landlord and tenant exists and not the question of title to the properties in question, which may be incidentally gone into, but cannot be decided finally in the eviction proceeding.”
 REPORTABLE
 Supreme Court of India
Keshar Bai vs Chhunulal on 7 January, 2014

Bench: Ranjana Prakash Desai, J. Chelameswar
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 106   OF 2014
      
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Wednesday, 1 November 2017

Whether it is permissible to amend written statement to deny title of landlord?

In the instant case, it is not disputed by the Respondents that they were put in possession of the premises as tenants thereof by the Appellants. In the circumstances, they cannot dispute the title of the landlord in respect of the said premises. The said plea was not raised by them in the written statement. They cannot be permitted to introduce the said plea by way of amendment, that too, at this belated stage. The Rent Controller was, therefore, right in rejecting their application for amendment. In our view, the High Court was not justified in allowing the application of the Respondent-tenants to amend their written statement.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 8384-8386 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 22183-22185 of 2015)

Decided On: 03.07.2017

Jaspal Kaur Cheema and Ors. Vs. Industrial Trade Links and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Jasti Chelameswar and S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
Citation: (2017) 8 SCC 592
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Sunday, 29 October 2017

When tenant is liable to evicted from tenanted premises on ground of denial of title of landlord?

The learned counsel for the respondent has rightly relied on the decision of this Court reported in 1999 (1) Mah.L,J. 57 to contend that the law recognizes dual ownership, it is well settled that the land may be owned by one person, whereas the structure may be owned by the other and that person who owns the structure is nevertheless a landlord and competent to maintain suit for recovery of possession against the sublessee. In the present, case, however, it will be wholly unnecessary to examine the plea that the petitioner has become the direct tenant of the Corporation inasmuch as the Corporation has already granted lease in favour of the respondent/lessee. In that sense, the respondent has become the direct lessee of the Corporation and also the owner of the suit structure after the consent decree. In such a situation, it will be preposterous to contend that the petitioner has become the direct lessee or tenant of the Corporation. Moreover there is absolutely no iota of evidence to show that there is any privity of contract between the petitioner and the corporation in this behalf.

13. In the circumstances, I find no reason to interfere with the conclusion reached by the Appellate Court that the respondent is the landlady in respect of the suit property including the suit premises and was, therefore, entitled to demand the amount towards the monthly rent and also entitled to terminate the tenancy or to maintain the suit for recovery of possession. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner, after receipt of notice dated 18th February 1980,' did not tender the amount demanded in the said notice, but instead started questioning the title of the respondent. It is not in dispute that the petitioner neither tendered the amount, nor raised any dispute regarding the standard rent within the specific period of one month. Therefore, in such a situation, the court will have no option but to decree the suit within the meaning of Section 12(3)(a) of the Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

W.P. No. 4503 of 1989

Decided On: 10.08.2001

 Ramchandra Bhau Marathe Vs. Smt. Shaila Marutirao Naik

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.

Citation: 2001(supp 2) BOM C R 852
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Sunday, 22 October 2017

When tenant will not be evicted from tenanted premises even if he denies title of landlord?

Even the other ground, about denial of title by the tenant, the District Court has found that this plea was necessitated because of the civil suit pending between the appellant and one Vishwanath Tandale, filed by the appellant himself before the Civil Court bearing RCS No.1044 of 1983. That suit was pending at the relevant time. The fact that the respondent-tenant rushed to the Rent Controller immediately after receipt of notice from the appellant, is indicative of a bonafide plea taken by the respondent-tenant regarding dispute of ownership of the suit shop; and a plea legitimately available to the respondent-tenant. This finding of the District Court found favour with the High Court. Even in respect of this finding no interference is called for, being flawless.
NON-REPORTABLE

Supreme Court of India
Baburao vs Pokhardas(D) Tr.Lrs on 16 August, 2016

Bench: T.S. Thakur, A.M. Khanwilkar, D.Y. Chandrachud
Citation:(2016) 15 SCC 97
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Sunday, 24 September 2017

Whether landlord is entitled to get eviction decree in same suit in which tenant has denied his title?

 It was argued by learned Counsel for the appellant that even accepting that there was a denial of title by the appellant and the result would be only that the respondent-landlord became entitled to forfeit the lease and in order to be a ground for eviction in a suit that forfeiture would have to precede the suit or petition for eviction. It was submitted by him that it was not open to a landlord to take advantage of a denial of title by the tenant in the very proceedings for eviction in the course of which the denial was made. The denial must be anterior to the eviction proceedings. In support of this argument learned Counsel placed reliance on the decision in Maharaja of Jeypore v. Rukmani Pattamahdevi 46 IA 109 : AIR 1919 PC 1. In our view, this argument also does not stand scrutiny. In V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesoda Ammal MANU/SC/0505/1979 : [1980]1SCR334 a Constitution Bench of this Court comprising seven-learned Judges held that in the matter of determination of tenancy the State Rent Acts do not permit a landlord to snap his relationship with the tenant merely by serving on him a notice to quit as is the position under the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord can recover possession of the property only on one or more of the grounds enacted in the relevant section of the Rent Acts. Even after the termination of the contractual tenancy the landlord under the definitions of landlord and tenant contained in the, Rent Acts remains a landlord and a tenant remains a tenant because of the express provision made in the enactments that a tenant means 'a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour'. Yet another important feature of the Rent Acts is that either by way of a non obstante clause or by necessary implication these enactments have done away: with the law contained in Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. The difference between the position obtaining under the Transfer of Property Act and the Rent Acts in the matter of determination of a lease is that under the former Act in order to recover possession of the leased premises determination of the lease is necessary because during the continuance of the lease the landlord cannot recover possession of the premises while under the Rent Acts the landlord becomes entitled to recover possession only on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down in the relevant sections. He cannot recover possession merely by determining the tenancy. Nor can he be stopped from doing so on the ground that he has not terminated the contractual tenancy. In the case before us, we find that the denial of landlord's title by the tenant has been expressly made a ground for eviction under Section 10(2)(vi) of the A.P. Rent Act which we have already set out earlier. In view of this, the entire basis for the argument that the denial of title must be anterior to the proceedings for eviction under the A. P. Rent Act is knocked out. In our opinion, the argument of learned Counsel for the appellant must, therefore, be rejected. We find, on the other hand, that a number of High Courts have taken the view that even a denial of the landlord's title by a tenant in a written statement in an eviction petition under the Rent Act concerned furnishes a ground for eviction and can be relied upon in the very proceedings in which a written statement containing the denial has been filed (See : Sada Ram v. Gajjan Shiama, MANU/PH/0080/1970; Shiv Parshad v. Smt. Shila Rani, MANU/HP/0009/1974 and Machavaram Venkata Narayana Rao v. Sarvepalli Narayana v Rao Sarada, (1978) 1 Ren CJ 368 : AIR 1978 NOC 160 (Andh Pra). As observed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court to insist that a denial of title in the written statement cannot be taken advantage of in that suit but can be taken advantage of only in a subsequent suit to be filed by the landlord would only lead to unnecessary multiplicity of legal proceedings as the landlord would be obliged to file a second suit for ejectment of the tenant on the ground of forfeiture entailed by the tenant's denial of his character as a tenant in the written statement.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No.2732 of 1980 
Decided On: 19.09.1989

Majati Subbarao vs. P.V.K. Krishna Rao (Deceased) by Lrs.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Kuldip Singh and M.H. Kania, JJ.
Citation: AIR 1989 SC 2187
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Monday, 17 July 2017

Whether tenant disputing title of landlord is bound to deposit arrears of rent?

 I have given due consideration to the respective submissions and I have gone through the documents filed on record. On the relationship of landlady and tenant, the facts on record indicate that though the tenant had filed suit for specific performance of agreement dated 10-12-1981 that was entered into with Kishanlal Algare, he could succeed only in obtaining a decree for refund of earnest amount. After said decree attained finality, the landlady purchased the suit property on 28-2-2008. A notice of attornment and an intimation to that effect was given to the tenant. Though it is true that the tenant had filed a counter claim for cancellation of the aforesaid sale deed which was executed in favour of the landlady and the proceedings in that regard were still pending, the same would not have the effect of effacing the relationship of landlady or tenant or of clothing the tenant with title as legal owner of the suit premises. As observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Ambica Prasad (supra), a transferee from a landlord would step into the shoes of the landlord with all rights and liabilities.

Even if the sale deed dated 28-2-2008 is cancelled, the title of the property would revert back to the vendor -Prabhakar who was the son of Kishanlal. The status of Prabhakar would continue to be that of a tenant. It would only be a case of a change of landlord/landlady. Hence, the contention that as the proceedings with regard to challenge to the sale deed dated 28-2-2008 were pending, said Prabhakar could not be treated as a tenant cannot be accepted. Both the Courts have rightly held the plaintiff to be the landlady pursuant to the sale deed in her favour and the subsequent intimation dated 28-11-2008 as per Exhibit-44.
Even assuming that the tenant intended to dispute the relationship between the parties, he ought to have complied with provisions of Section 15(3) of the said Act without prejudice to his defence. Having failed to do so and the title of the landlady having been established, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the defendant was the tenant of the landlady and was liable to pay her rent. This conclusion is supported by the ratio of the decisions in Chandiram Ahuja and Prabhakar Manekar (supra). Moreover, there is also no deposit of rent during pendency of the suit or the appeal. This non-deposit is also fatal to the case of the tenant.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 211 of 2015

Decided On: 30.06.2016

 Zainab Bee Vs.  Prabhakar Rajaram Kharwade

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.S. Chandurkar, J.
Citation: 2016 Bom Rent cases 442
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Thursday, 8 May 2014

Whether Tenant denying title of landlord is liable to be evicted?


  17. In our opinion, denial of landlord’s title or disclaimer  of
           tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to affect  adversely
           and substantially the interest of the landlord and  hence  is  a
           ground for eviction of tenant within the meaning of  clause  (c)
           of sub-section (1) of  Section  12  of  the  M.P.  Accommodation
           Control Act, 1961. To amount to such denial  or  disclaimer,  as
           would  entail  forfeiture  of  tenancy  rights  and  incur   the
           liability to be evicted, the tenant should  have  renounced  his
           character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal  terms  set  up
           title of the landlord in himself or in a third party.  A  tenant
           bona fide calling upon the landlord to prove  his  ownership  or
           putting the landlord to proof of his  title  so  as  to  protect
           himself (i.e. the tenant) or to earn a protection made available
           to him by  the  rent  control  law  but  without  disowning  his
           character of possession over  the  tenancy  premises  as  tenant
           cannot  be  said  to  have  denied  the  title  of  landlord  or
           disclaimed the tenancy. Such an  act  of  the  tenant  does  not
           attract applicability of Section 12(1)(c) abovesaid. It  is  the
           intention of the tenant, as culled out from the  nature  of  the
           plea  raised   by   him,   which   is   determinative   of   its
           vulnerability.”

  REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                       CIVIL APPEAL NO. 106   OF 2014
       [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.5126 of 2011]


KESHAR BAI   Vs   CHHUNULAL                   


    Citation:2014(2) ALLMR 937 SC,AIR 2014 SC 1394


(SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.
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Wednesday, 18 September 2013

Whether one co-owner can file eviction suit against tenant without impleading other co-owners?


The principal question, therefore, is whether the plain- tiff being a co-owner landlord can be said to reasonably require the premises for his own occupation within the expression "if he is the owner" in section 13 ( 1 ) (f). Mr. V.S. Desai reads to us from Salmond on Juris- prudence (13th edition) and relies on the following passage in Chapter 8 (Ownership), paragraph 46 at page 254: "As a general rule a thing is owned by one person only at a time, but duplicate ownership is perfectly possible. Two or more persons may at the same time have ownership of the same thing vested in them. This may happen in several distinct ways, but the simplest and most obvious case is that of co-ownership. Partners, for example, are co-owners of the chattels which constitute their stock-in trade of the lease of the premises on which their business is conducted, and of the debts owing to them by their customers. It is not correct to say that property owned by co-owners is divided between them, each of them owning a sepa- rate part. It is an undivided unity, which is vested at the same time in more than one person ...... The several ownership of a part is a different thing from the co-ownership of the whole. So soon as each of two co-owners begins to own a part of the thing instead of the whole of it, the co-ownership has been dissolved into sole

ownership by the process known as partition. Co- ownership involves the undivided integrity of what is owned"

Supreme Court of India
Sriram Pasricha vs Jagannath & Ors on 24 August, 1976
Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 2335, 1977 SCR (1) 395
A.C. Gupta, P.K. Goswami and Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ.


Indian Evidence Act 1872 Sec. 116--Whether tenant can deny the landlord's title.
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956--Sec. 13(1)(f)--Whether one of the co-owners can file a suit for eviction without impleading other co-owners--Whether a co- owner, an owner for the purpose of an eviction suit--Stage for raising objection about frame of suit.
HEADNOTE:
The plaintiff respondent is one of the co-owners of the premises which were let out to the appellant tenant. The plaintiff filed a suit for eviction under s. 13(1)(f) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act 1956. The grounds for eviction were the non-payment of the rent and the reasonable requirement of the premises for the landlord. The trial court held that the plaintiff being only a co-sharer cannot be said to be the owner within the meaning of s. 13(1)(f). The trial court, however, held that the plaintiff succeeded in proving the reasonableness of the requirement of the members of the family for whose benefit the premises were held by him and, therefore, granted a decree for eviction. An appeal filed by the appellants failed. In the second appeal filed by the appellants it was contended that al- though reasonable requirement of the premises were estab- lished, the respondent was not entitled to a decree for eviction since he was only a co-sharer and, therefore, not the owner of the premises. The single Judge of the High Court held that it will not be sufficient if the reasonable requirement is of all the members of the family of the co- owners but such owners must again be the landlords who only are entitled to a decree for recovery of the possession under s. 13(1)(f). A Division Bench set aside the decision of the Single Judge on the ground that a co-owner is as much as absolute owner as a sole owner. In appeal by special leave, the appellant contended:
A landlord to be able to evict a tenant under Section 13(1)(f) must be an absolute owner of the premises from which eviction is sought.
Dismissing the appeal,
HELD: The contention of the appellant that the co-sharer plaintiff must be the absolute owner and a co-owner cannot without impleading all the owners of the premises ask for eviction cannot be accepted because the plea pertaining to the domain of the frame of the suit should have been raised at the earliest opportunity and it was not done. Secondly, the relation between the parties being that of landlord and tenant only the landlord could terminate the tenancy and institute the suit for eviction. The tenant in such a suit is estopped from questioning the title of the landlord under s. 116 of the Evidence Act. Under the general law, in a suit between the landlord and tenant, the question of title to the lease property is irrelevant. The plaintiff is one of the co-owners of the premises. The other co-sharers being his mother and married brother who reside in the same prem- ises along with him. Jurisprudentially, it is not correct to say that a co-owner of a property is not an owner. He owns every part of the composite property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part owner or a fractional owner of the property. The position will change when partition takes place. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the submission that the plaintiff who is admitted- ly the landlord and co-owner of the premises is not the owner of the premises within the meaning of s. 13(1)(f). [399 A--C. 401 B & 402 A-B]
 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by GOSWAMI, J.
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