Whether the court can make out a case of cruelty against husband U/S 498A of IPC based on stale letters issued by the wife to her father?

  The prosecution has relied upon the letters and the counsel

for the Appellant would argue that the letters are very stale, being of the years 1984, 1986, 1987 and 1988 whereas the incident had taken place at a much later point of time i.e. in 1994.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the Appellant had argued that

the letters are antiquated and much period has passed after they

were written. Perusal of the said letters would reflect the consistent conduct of the Appellant being an alcoholic, subjecting the deceased to beating on being drunk, being abusive to her and the scenario continue for over four years when the letters were

addressed. In despair, she sought assistance from her father and her helplessness could be seen when she is demanding money and

assistance from her father and requesting him to come to her

rescue. The harassment meted out to her is spelt out from the said letters. The father of the deceased has spoken about the continuous harassment meted out to his daughter by her husband on consuming liquor and then abusing and clobbering her. PW-5 deposes that he used to meet his daughter, whenever he used to visit Thane and on such visit, Shobha used to narrate the illtreatment meted out to her by her husband. There is no challenge to the said version of PW-5.

 The letters brought on record by the father of the deceased, no

doubt, relate back to 5 years, prior to the incident, but the

testimony of the daughter (PW-4) and the father of the deceased

PW-5 speak of the continuous harassment to the deceased at the

hands of the Appellant. The allegations levelled go unchallenged

and there is no denial or any suggestion given that the Appellant

has given up drinking and had stopped the harassment or illtreatment to his wife on consumption of liquor. The consistency in the behaviour of the Appellant clearly makes out a charge of cruelty attracting Section 498A of the IPC.

11. For the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC, cruelty has been

set out as any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to

drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or

danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the

woman. The conduct of the Appellant would squarely fall within

the four corners of cruel treatment, which would make it

punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. Cruelty can be

physical or mental and merely because a woman has tolerated the harassment at the hands of her husband for a long period of time, it cannot be said that his behaviour has ceased to be cruel. Here is a woman, who suppressed her feelings and emotions stirring inside her on account of the harassment and ill-treatment at the hands of her husband, but when she is unable to escape the cruel treatment and is unable to put an end to the said treatment, she takes the extreme step of putting an end to her life. The cruelty being spread over a period of time does not make a woman numb so that she did not suffer the agony, discomfort meted out to her and the conduct continues to be cruel though it continued as a normal feature of married life of Shobha. For this reason, the submission of learned counsel for the Appellant that the letters are stale and cannot be relied upon, and deserves a rejection.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.589 OF 1998

Pandurang Ganpat Thalkar, Vs  The State of Maharashtra,

CORAM : MRS. BHARATI DANGRE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 30TH JUNE, 2021.

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Whether the court can convict accused based on the letter sent to investigating officer after the commencement of investigation?

In Vinod Chaturvedi v. State of Madhya Pradesh :

AIR 1984 SC 911, the father of the deceased person had sent a

letter to the Superintendent of Police, after the registration of the

first information report. The High Court heavily relied upon this

letter to enter conviction against the accused. But, the Apex

Court held as follows:

“The High Court fell into a clear error in relying on

the two letters marked as Exhibit P1 and Exhibit P9.

Exhibit P1 was a letter of P.W 1. Sunderlal to the

Superintendent of Police. Admittedly by 29-4-73

when this letter said to have been written

investigation had started on the basis of the first

information report and therefore, a letter written by

P.W. 1 who stood in the place of the prosecutor

would not at all be admissible in evidence. No

detailed reasons are warranted for this conclusion.

The position is clearly covered by a decision of this

Court in the case of Kali Ram v. State of Himachal

Pradesh. ”

14. In Rajeevan v. Superintendent of Police : 2011 (1)

KHC 738, this Court had held that, the letters addressed to the

investigating officer by the Executive Officers of the Panchayaths

giving information regarding the functioning of a firm and the

licence issued to it, were hit by Section 162 of the Code.

15. In the instant case, the investigation of the case was

conducted by PW4 Excise Inspector. After the amendment of

Section 50 of the Act with effect from 03.06.1997, Abkari Officers

under the Act can only file a final report in accordance with

Section 173(2) of the Code and they have to be treated as police

officers (See Joseph v. State of Kerala : 2009 (4) KHC 537).

If that be so, a statement made by a person to an Excise

Inspector during the course of investigation has to be excluded

from evidence by virtue of Section 162 of the Code (See Raja

Ram Jaiswal v. State of Bihar : AIR 1964 SC 828).

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

M.R.BALAKRISHNAN Vs STATE OF KERALA 

PRESENT

 MR. JUSTICE R. NARAYANA PISHARADI

Crl.R.P.No.2792 of 2009

Dated this the 7th day of July, 2020

O R D E R

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Whether letters written by deceased related to her death are admissible as her dying declaration?

Thus, from a review of the authorities mentioned above and the clear language of Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following propositions emerge:

(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of hearsay and makes admissible the statement of a person who dies, whether the death is a homicide or a suicide, provided the statement relates to the cause of death, or exhibits circumstances leading to the death. In this respect, as indicated above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of the peculiar, conditions of our society and the I'lvccip nature and character of owe people, has thought it necessary to widen the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.

(2) The test of proximity cannot be too literally construed and practically reduced to a cut-and-dried formula of universal application so as to be confined in a strait-jacket. Distance of time would depend on vary with the circumstances of each case. For instance, where death is a logical culmination of a continuous drama long in process and is, as it were, a finale of the story, the statement regarding each step directly connected with the end of the drama would be admissible because the entire statement would have to be read as an organic whole and not torn from the context Sometimes statements relevant to or furnishing an immediate motive may also be admissible as being a part of the transaction of death, It is manifest that all these statements come to light only after the death of the deceased who speaks from death. For instance, where the death takes place within a very short time of the marriage or the distance of time is not spread over snore, than 3-4 months the statement may be admissible under Section 32.

(3) The second part of Clause (1) of Section 32 is yet another exception to the rule that in criminal law the evidence of a person who was not being subjected to or given an opportunity of being cross-examined by the accused, would be valueless because the place of cross-examination is taken by the solemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason that a person on the verge of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong evidence to show that the statement was secured either by prompting or tutoring.

(4) It may be important to note that Section 32 does not speak of homicide alone but includes suicide also, hence all the circumstances which may be relevant to prove a case of homicide would be equally relevant to prove a case of suicide.

(5) Where the main evidence consists of statements and letters written by the deceased which are directly connected with or related to her death and which reveal a tell-tale story, the said statement would clearly fall within the four comers of Section 32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance of time alone in such cases would not make the statement irrelevant.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 745 of 1983

Decided On: 17.07.1984

 Sharad Birdhichand Sarda Vs.  State of Maharashtra

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Whether Writing of letter to woman intending to insult her modesty can be construed as making gesture U/S 509 IPC?

That is why even a verbal attack on a woman, a gesture and other acts stated in Section 509 I.P.C. were brought under the said Section. It is clear from a reading of Section 509 I.P.C. that by introducing the said provision, legislature intended that any sort of aggression into a woman's modesty whether by any word, deed or act should be deterred, as evident from the title to the Section itself. Thus, the acts which are done intending to insult the modesty of a woman which may not necessarily involve even any physical advances are also brought within the sweep of a separate provision viz., Section 509 I.P.C.

20. In such circumstances, can it be for a moment presumed that the legislature intended that a person who writes a letter to a woman with the intention to insult her modesty should go unpunished? If such a person, instead of uttering the insulting words, puts in writing all what he determines to utter against a woman and sends it to her, intending to insult her modesty, will any court be justified in holding that the legislature expected such person to escape safely? was it the intention of the legislature that such a culprit must go unhurt only because he used his pen and not his tongue, to insult the victim? After suffering all the trauma, when a woman comes before court with the best proof for the assault or violence made on her modesty by producing the letter, can the court refuse to look into the same on the ground that the legislature never intended to bring cases involving writings within the purview of Section 509 I.P.C.?

21. I find it extremely difficult to reach a conclusion which will defeat the very object of Section 509 I.P.C. There can be little doubt that the legislature would not have intended that a person who insults the modesty of a woman by his writings must be kept out of the province of Section 509 I.P.C. In a country like India, legislature would not have ever intended that a person who expresses his attitude or intention to insult modesty of a woman by sending a letter should be absolved from criminal liability. I am of view that the very object of the provision will be defeated if a contrary view is taken. Thus, while interpreting the meaning of the relevant expression in Section 509 I.P.C. in the light of the relevant rules of interpretation, I find that 'writing of letter' to a woman, intending to insult her modesty can be construed as 'making a gesture' under Section 509 I.P.C. I feel quite confident to hold that Indian legislature's intention will not be contrary to what I have already concluded.

22. So, if the court finds that a person writes a letter to woman and that the offender intends that such letter is seen or read by such woman and he also intends thereby to insult her modesty, an offence under Section 509 I.P.C. will be clearly attracted. Charge-sheet in this case itself reveals that the Petitioner allegedly wrote insulting and obscene letters to the victim-woman. It is also clear from the records that such letters were sent to her in the name-address so that the letters will be seen and read by the victim. It further appears from the contents of those letters that prima facie, intention of the author of the letters was to insult the modesty of the woman who receives the letter. Such intention can be discerned from the nature of the language, tone and tenor of the writing.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Crl. M.C. No. 9717 of 2002

Decided On: 16.02.2005

M.M. Haries Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Hema, J.

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Whether development agreement can be repudiated unilaterally by sending letter?

The above said rulings, in my opinion are not strictly applicable to the facts of this particular case. Because of the simple reason, it is not that plaintiff comes to the court stating that the defendants have repudiated the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney, but it is only stated that they have issued a letter to the plaintiff that they have repudiated but it is not accepted by the plaintiffs with regard to that repudiation, therefore the suit is not filed for specific performance. According to the plaintiffs, for all practical purposes, the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney exists for the enforcement of their rights in the said agreement until and unless the court decides the said repudiation is proper and correct. Therefore, the said letter has to be tested during the course of trial, whether such a letter could have been issued by the defendants or legally the said document can be construed as a cancellation or repudiation of Joint Development Agreement and General Power of Attorney, when the said two documents are coupled with the interest of the plaintiff. Therefore, in my opinion, the above said rulings only applicable. It is not the case of the plaintiff that they have accepted the repudiation letter and based their suit on the basis of the repudiation letter alleging the cause of action arose for the purpose of filing the injunction suit on the basis of such letter. Therefore, this particular point has to be thrashed out during the course of full dressed trial.

14. The Trial Court has also observed and expressed its doubt whether the Joint Development Agreement and the General Power of Attorney which are registered documents under which the rights have been created in favour of the plaintiff can be easily set at naught by means of issuing a letter and the court has also expressed that it has to be considered by the court during the course of trial. I do not find any strong reasons to deviate from the observation made by the Trial Court

15. In view of the above said circumstances, in the subsistence of Joint Development Agreement and General Power of Attorney in favour of the plaintiff and that the parties have acted upon those documents and particularly, the plaintiff is allowed to do some improvement on the property and construction activities to be taken up by the plaintiff on the property, the defendant cannot turn back and say that the plaintiff has no right to continue with the said agreements.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

M.F.A. No. 5708/2016 (CPC)

Decided On: 23.01.2017

 C. Vijayakumar and Ors.

Vs.

Cwind-Engure J.V.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.N. Phaneendra, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 karnat 43

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