Supreme Court: Provisions of Commercial courts Act will prevail over the Arbitration Act

  Thus, the Objects and Reasons of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is to provide for speedy disposal of the commercial disputes which includes the arbitration proceedings. To achieve the said Objects, the legislature in its wisdom has specifically conferred the jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters as per Section 10 of the Act, 2015. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the Act, 2015 is the Act later in time and therefore when the Act, 2015 has been enacted, more particularly Sections 3 & 10, there was already a provision contained in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, 1996. As per settled position of law, it is to be presumed that while enacting the subsequent law, the legislature is conscious of the provisions of the Act prior in time and therefore the later Act shall prevail. It is also required to be noted that even as per Section 15 of the Act, 2015, all suits and applications including applications under the Act, 1996, relating to a commercial dispute of specified value shall have to be transferred to the Commercial Court. Even as per Section 21 of the Act, 2015, Act, 2015 shall have overriding effect. It provides that save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. {Para 10}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6876 of 2022, 6878 of 2022 and 6877 of 2022

Decided On: 19.10.2022

Jaycee Housing Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Registrar (General), Orissa High Court, Cuttack and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: M.R. Shah, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1363/2022.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: Designated Commercial Courts Subordinate To Rank Of Principal Civil Judge In The District Can Hear Appeals/Application Under Arbitration Act

 Thus, the Objects and Reasons of Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is to provide for speedy disposal of the commercial disputes which includes the arbitration proceedings. To achieve the said Objects, the legislature in its wisdom has specifically conferred the jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters as per Section 10 of the Act, 2015. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the Act, 2015 is the Act later in time and therefore when the Act, 2015 has been enacted, more particularly Sections 3 & 10, there was already a provision contained in Section 2(1)(e) of the Act, 1996. As per settled position of law, it is to be presumed that while enacting the subsequent law, the legislature is conscious of the provisions of the Act prior in time and therefore the later Act shall prevail. It is also required to be noted that even as per Section 15 of the Act, 2015, all suits and applications including applications under the Act, 1996, relating to a commercial dispute of specified value shall have to be transferred to the Commercial Court. Even as per Section 21 of the Act, 2015, Act, 2015 shall have overriding effect. It provides that save as otherwise provided, the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. {Para 10}

11. Therefore, considering the afore-stated provisions of the Act, 2015 and the Objects and Reasons for which the Act, 2015 has been enacted and the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division in the High Courts are established for speedy disposal of the commercial disputes including the arbitration disputes, Sections 3 & 10 of the Act, 2015 shall prevail and all applications or appeals arising out of arbitration under the provisions of Act, 1996, other than international commercial arbitration, shall be filed in and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Courts, exercising the territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such commercial courts have been constituted. If the submission on behalf of the Appellants that all applications/appeals arising out of arbitration under the provisions of Act, 1996, other than the international commercial arbitration, shall lie before the principal civil Court of a district, in that case, not only the Objects and Reasons of enactment of Act, 2015 and establishment of commercial courts shall be frustrated, even Sections 3, 10 & 15 shall become otiose and nugatory. If the submission on behalf of the Appellants is accepted, in that case, though with respect to other commercial disputes, the applications or appeals shall lie before the commercial courts established and constituted Under Section 3 of Act, 2015, with respect to arbitration proceedings, the applications or appeals shall lie before the principal civil Court of a district. There cannot be two fora with respect to different commercial disputes.

Under the circumstances, notification issued by the State of Odisha issued in consultation with the High Court of Orissa to confer jurisdiction upon the court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) designated as Commercial Court to decide the applications or appeals arising out of arbitration under the provisions of Act, 1996 cannot be said to be illegal and bad in law. On the contrary, the same can be said to be absolutely in consonance with Sections 3 & 10 of Act, 2015. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court holding so.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 6876 of 2022, 6878 of 2022 and 6877 of 2022

Decided On: 19.10.2022

Jaycee Housing Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Registrar (General), Orissa High Court, Cuttack and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.R. Shah and Krishna Murari, JJ.

Author: M.R. Shah, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1363/2022.

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Supreme Court: Award passed in domestic Arbitration after 2015 Amendment can be set aside on ground of patent illegality

Pursuant to the recommendations of the Law Commission, the 1996 Act was amended by Act 3 of 2016, which came into force w.e.f. 23.10.2015. The ground of "patent illegality" for setting aside a domestic award has been given statutory force in Section 34(2A) of the 1996 Act. The ground of "patent illegality" cannot be invoked in international commercial arbitrations seated in India. Even in the case of a foreign award under the New York Convention, the ground of "patent illegality" cannot be raised as a ground to resist enforcement, since this ground is absent in Section 48 of the 1996 Act. The newly inserted Sub-section (2A) in Section 34, reads as follows:

(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award:

Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.

20. In Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited19, this Court was considering a challenge to an award passed in an international commercial arbitration, between the Appellant - company a foreign entity registered under the laws of Korea, and the Respondent, a Government of India undertaking. In paragraph (19) of the judgment, this Court noted that the expansive interpretation given to "public policy of India" in the Saw Pipes (supra) and Western Geco International Limited20 cases, which had been done away with, and a new ground of "patent illegality" was introduced which would apply to applications Under Section 34 made on or after 23.10.2015. In paragraphs (36) and (37) of the judgment, this Court held that insofar as domestic awards are concerned, the additional ground of patent illegality was now available Under Sub-section (2A) to Section 34. However, re- appreciation of evidence was not permitted under the ground of "patent illegality" appearing on the face of the award.

21. In paragraphs (39) and (40) of Ssangyong Engineering (supra), the Court reiterated paragraphs (42.2) and (42.3) of Associate Builders (supra) wherein, it was held that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes a contract in a manner which no fair minded or reasonable person would take i.e. if the view taken by the arbitrator is not even a possible view to take. In paragraphs (39) and (40), the Supreme Court held as under:

39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority MANU/SC/1076/2014 : (2015) 3 SCC 49, namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award. Para 42.2 of Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority MANU/SC/1076/2014 : (2015) 3 SCC 49, however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award.

40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paras 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority MANU/SC/1076/2014 : (2015) 3 SCC 49, namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added Under Section 34(2-A).

(emphasis supplied)

22. The present case arises out of a domestic award between two Indian entities. The ground of patent illegality is a ground available under the statute for setting aside a domestic award, if the decision of the arbitrator is found to be perverse, or, so irrational that no reasonable person would have arrived at the same; or, the construction of the contract is such that no fair or reasonable person would take; or, that the view of the arbitrator is not even a possible view.

23. In the present case, the High Court has referred to the judgment in Associated Builders (supra) at length in paragraph (42) of its judgment dated 26.02.2019 and arrived at the correct conclusion that an arbitral award can be set aside Under Section 34 if it is patently illegal or perverse. This finding of the High Court is in conformity with paragraph (40) of the judgment of this Court in Ssangyong Engineering (supra).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Special Leave Petition (C) Nos. 3584-85 of 2020

Decided On: 22.05.2020

Patel Engineering Ltd. Vs.  North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Ltd.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Banumathi, Indu Malhotra and Aniruddha Bose, JJ.

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Whether dispute between non-signatory to arbitration agreement can be referred to arbitration in domestic arbitration?

Under the Act, an arbitration agreement means an agreement which is enforceable in law and the jurisdiction of the arbitrator is on the basis of an arbitration Clause contained in the arbitration agreement. However, in a case where the parties alleged that the arbitration agreement is vitiated on account of fraud, the Court may refuse to refer the parties to arbitration. In Ayyasamy case, this Court held that mere allegation of fraud is not a ground to nullify the effect of arbitration agreement between the parties and arbitration Clause need not be avoided and parties can be relegated to arbitration where merely simple allegations of fraud touched upon internal affairs of parties is levelled. Justice A.K. Sikri observed that it is only in those cases where the Court finds that there are serious allegations of fraud which make a virtual case of criminal offence and where there are complicated allegations of fraud then it becomes necessary that such complex issues can be decided only by the civil court on the appreciation of evidence that needs to be produced. In para (25) of Ayyasamy case, Justice Sikri held as under:

25......Therefore, the inquiry of the Court, while dealing with an application Under Section 8 of the Act, should be on the aforesaid aspect viz. whether the nature of dispute is such that it cannot be referred to arbitration, even if there is an arbitration agreement between the parties. When the case of fraud is set up by one of the parties and on that basis that party wants to wriggle out of that arbitration agreement, a strict and meticulous inquiry into the allegations of fraud is needed and only when the Court is satisfied that the allegations are of serious and complicated nature that it would be more appropriate for the Court to deal with the subject-matter rather than relegating the parties to arbitration, then alone such an application Under Section 8 should be rejected.

32. While concurring with Justice Sikri, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud pointed out that the duty of the Court is to impart "sense of business efficacy" to the commercial transactions pointing out that mere allegations of fraud were not sufficient to decline to refer the parties to arbitration. In para (48) of Ayyasamy case, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud held as under:

48. The basic principle which must guide judicial decision-making is that arbitration is essentially a voluntary assumption of an obligation by contracting parties to resolve their disputes through a private tribunal. The intent of the parties is expressed in the terms of their agreement. Where commercial entities and persons of business enter into such dealings, they do so with a knowledge of the efficacy of the arbitral process. The commercial understanding is reflected in the terms of the agreement between the parties. The duty of the court is to impart to that commercial understanding a sense of business efficacy.

(Underlining added)

33. When we apply the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, as discussed earlier, both parties have consciously proceeded with the commercial transactions to commission the Photovoltaic Solar Plant at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, U.P. The first Respondent has proceeded to procure the materials, entered into agreement with Juwi India for engineering, installation and commissioning and the sale and purchase agreement with Astonfield, were all the conscious steps taken in the commercial understanding to commission the Solar Plant at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, U.P. Even though Juwi India and Astonfield are not parties to the main agreement-Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012), all the agreements/contracts contain clauses referring to the main agreement. It is the duty of the Court to impart the commercial understanding with a "sense of business efficacy" and not by the mere averments made in the plaint. The High Court was not right in refusing to refer the parties on the ground of the allegations of fraud levelled in the plaint.

34. It is only where serious questions of fraud are involved, the arbitration can be refused. In this case, as contended by the Appellants there were no serious allegations of fraud; the allegations levelled against Astonfield is that Appellant No. 1-Ameet Lalchand Shah misrepresented by inducing the Respondents to pay higher price for the purchase of the equipments. There is, of course, a criminal case registered against the Appellants in FIR No. 30 of 2015 dated 05.03.2015 before the Economic Offences Wing, Delhi. The Appellant No. 1-Ameet Lalchand Shah has filed Criminal Writ Petition No. 619 of 2016 before the High Court of Delhi for quashing the said FIR. The said writ petition is stated to be pending and therefore, we do not propose to express any views in this regard, lest, it would prejudice the parties. Suffice to say that the allegations cannot be said to be so serious to refuse to refer the parties to arbitration. In any event, the Arbitrator appointed can very well examine the allegations regarding fraud.

35. Main agreement-Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012) for leasing and commissioning of Solar Plant at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh contains arbitration Clause (Clause 29). As discussed earlier, other three agreements-two agreements between Rishabh and Juwi India (01.02.2012) and Sale and Purchase Agreement (05.03.2012) between Rishabh and Astonfield are integrally connected with the commercial understanding of commissioning the Solar Project at Dongri, Raksa, District Jhansi, Uttar Pradesh and to resolve the dispute between the parties, they are to be referred to arbitration. The order of the High Court declining to refer the parties to arbitration cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The four agreements namely:(i) Equipment and Material Supply Contract (01.02.2012) between Rishabh and Juwi India; (ii) Engineering, Installation and Commissioning Contract (01.02.2012) between Rishabh and Juwi India; (iii) Sale and Purchase Agreement (05.03.2012) between Rishabh and Astonfield; and (iv) Equipment Lease Agreement (14.03.2012) between Rishabh and Dante Energy and the parties thereon are referred to arbitration.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4690 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 16789 of 2017)

Decided On: 03.05.2018

 Ameet Lalchand Shah and Ors. Vs. Rishabh Enterprises and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ranjan Gogoi and R. Banumathi, JJ.

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