Similar is the ratio of High Court of Allahabad in
Ram Shanker Rastogi vs. Smt. Vinay Rastogi, AIR 1991 Allahabad
255. The facts of this case were also identical to the present
one before this Court. It has been held in this judgment that the
plea of estoppal or res judicata cannot be invoked in a case of
this nature nor the question of maintainability of petition under
Section 25(2) for enhancement of maintenance allowance
previously awarded by a consent order cannot be raised. This
judgment reads as follows:
“10. Neither the provisions of S. 11
of the Code of Civil Procedure nor the
principles of res judicata will bar a suit
for maintenance on an enhanced rate for
a different period under altered
circumstances even though on an earlier
occasion a maintenance decree had been
passed and a certain rate of maintenance
had been fixed thereunder. The reason
being that such a decree as to the rate of
maintenance is not final.
11. The case of Hirabai Bharucha v.
Pirojshah Bharucha, AIR 1945 Bombay
537, stems from proceedings under S.
40 of the Parsi Marriage and Divorce Act,
1936. Under this provision, a Court is
authorised to award permanent alimony
to a wife either at the time of the passing
of any decree under that Act or
subsequently thereto. The wife is granted
a decree of divorce. After the decree is
passed, the husband and wife arrive at
certain consent terms. One of the terms
of the consent order is :
"This Court doth declare that the
defendant hereby agrees not to claim
any alimony now or at any time in
future.".
The wife applies under S. 40 for alimony.
It is held that on grounds of public policy
the wife cannot enter into a contract that
she will not claim any alimony in future.
The contract is void and the Court will
take notice of that and ignore that part of
the order although it was made by
consent. Reliance is placed upon a
remark by Lord Atkin :
"The wife's right to future maintenance is
a matter of public concern which she
cannot barter away."
Accepting this proposition, the learned
Judge takes the view that the wife cannot
barter away her right to future
maintenance and enter into a contract to
that effect and such a contract will be a
void contract in the eye of law.
12. Let us now read Section 25.
Subsection (1), inter alia, provides that
any Court exercising jurisdiction under
the Act may, at the time of passing any
decree or at any time subsequent
thereto, order that the respondent shall
pay to the applicant for her or his
maintenance and support such gross
sum or such monthly or periodical sum
for a term not exceeding the life of the
applicant as, having regard to the
respondent's own income and other
property, if any, the income and the
other property of the applicant, the
conduct of the parties and other
circumstances of the case, which may
seem to the Court to just. Sub-section (2)
may be extracted :--
(2) If the court is satisfied that there is a
change in the circumstances of either
party at any time after it has made an
order under sub-section (1), it may at the
instance of either party, vary, modify or
rescind any such order in such manner as
the court may deem just."
Admittedly, the Second Civil Judge
exercised powers under the Act while
passing a decree of divorce under S.
13 and, as already indicated, he passed
an order fixing a certain sum as the
monthly maintenance allowance for the
wife. The Court did not pass any order
that the wife will not claim an
enhancement of the maintenance
allowance in future Assuming a wife
gives up her right to claim a higher rate
of maintenance allowance in future her
consent, in our opinion, will not bring into
existence a valid contract. Such an
agreement will not only defeat the
provisions of subsection (2) of S. 25 but
will also frustrate the purpose of giving
maintenance allowance. Judicial notice
can be taken of rising prices with the
result that the cost of bare existence is
regularly rising, rather mercurially. In
principle, it makes no difference between
an agreement by a wife not to claim any
alimony at all and an agreement not to
claim any enhancement of the rate of
maintenance allowance, whatever be the
change in the circumstances”.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA.
FAO(HMA) No. 138 of 2010.
Date of decision: November 24, 2016.
Kubja Devi.
V
Shri Ishwar Dass.
Coram
Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, Judge.
Citation: AIR 2017 HP 21