Showing posts with label chhattisgarh high court. Show all posts
Showing posts with label chhattisgarh high court. Show all posts

Sunday, 22 December 2024

CHHATTISGARH HC (FB) : Additional district Judge can entertain application U/S 34 of arbitration Act

To sum up, as an upshot of the above discussion, M/s. Sarin Construction Company, Raipur (MANU/CG/0051/2005 : AIR 2006 Chh 412) (supra) based on Section 42 of the Act, 1996 and the judgment of Allahabad High Court in M/s. I.T.I. Ltd. Allahabad (MANU/UP/0549/1998 : AIR 1998 All 313) (supra) sailed on the reasoning that the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction i.e. the Court of District Judge alone has jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings and all subsequent applications arising out of that agreement, however, the judgments rendered by the different High Courts in preceding paragraphs and the decision of the Supreme Court in Sundaram Finance Limited represented by J. Thilak, Senior Manager (Legal) (MANU/SC/0122/2018 : AIR 2018 SC 965) (supra) would categorically pronounce that the word 'Court' defined in 2 (1)(e) not only includes the Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction i.e. Court of Principal District Judge or District Judge(s), but also includes the Court of Additional District Judge(s), therefore, any application filed under any provision of the Act, 1996 before the Court after passing of the award, including applications under Section 34 or 36 of the Act, 1996, can be heard and decided not only by the District Judge(s), but also by the Court of Additional District Judge(s), upon being made over by the District Judge by a general or special order. In respect of application with regard to an arbitration agreement where the award is yet to be passed, such application may be moved before the District Judge and can be made over to the Court of Additional District Judge by general or special order but in such eventuality any subsequent application till passing of award is to be decided by the same Court, which has dealt with the earlier application, by virtue of Section 42 of the Act, 1996. {Para 43}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

W.P. Nos. 227 and 299 of 2018

Decided On: 12.10.2018

A Suo Motu Taken Writ Petition Vs. State of Chhattisgarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Prashant Kumar Mishra, Manindra Mohan Shrivastava and Ram Prasanna Sharma, JJ.

Author: Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.

Citation: MANU/CG/0529/2018.

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Saturday, 25 March 2023

Is a prenuptial agreement between husband and wife not to have a child after marriage a valid contract?


  Under the Hindu religion, the marriage had assumed the

sacred character of sacrament. The personal thought of marriage

was a prime necessity for that alone could enable a person to

discharge properly his religious and secular obligation. To make it

say it otherwise, the marriage is necessarily a basis of social

organisation and the foundation of important legal rights and

obligation. The importance and imperative character of the

institution of marriage needs no comment and in Hindu Law

marriage is a Sanskar. Therefore, presumed contract as has

been stated by the appellant/husband that the second marriage

was performed on the condition that they would not have a child

from the second marriage cannot be a barrier as a valid sacred

promise, if not performed, will assume the character of cruelty.

Under the Hindu law, marriage is not a contract. Therefore, the

alleged promise as projected by the husband that they would not

have a child from the second marriage cannot be given a priority

over the sacrament or sanskar to have family. The alleged

promise also cannot be pressed into motion against the human

conduct if a lady after the marriage expects to have her own child. The role narrated by husband of contract of not to have child even after marriage is bound to be somnolent. A birth die is cast by nature. To deprive a woman from motherhood as a pre-condition for marriage cannot be given a priority. The type of condition set forth by husband only adds gloomy atmosphere to a married life as against a cheer by a child. Therefore, a demand to have child by wife from husband cannot be constituted a cruelty. {Para 11}

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

First Appeal (M) No. 138 of 2018

 P. Venkat Rao P. Ramarao, Vs Smt. P. Padmavati P. Venkat Rao, 

Coram: 

Hon'ble Justice Shri Goutam Bhaduri

Hon'ble Justice Shri N.K. Chandravanshi

Author:  Goutam Bhaduri, J

Dated: 09.3.2023

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Tuesday, 21 July 2020

When can sanctioning authority grant sanction for prosecution of a public servant under the Prevention of Corruption Act after rejecting it?

 The crisp question involved in this matter is, whether the sanctioning authority has power and jurisdiction to review its order in the matter of sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short, 'the Act of 1988') for offence under Section 13(1)(e) read with Section 13(2) of the Act of 1988 and an order passed refusing sanction to prosecute under Section 19 of the Act of 1988 can be reviewed?
 Recognising the power of review on the part of sanctioning authority, Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Himachal Pradesh v. Nishant Sareen MANU/SC/1051/2010 : (2010) 14 SCC 527 : AIR 2011 SC 404 held as under:-


"12. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstance whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It seems to us a sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent authority, as the case may be, it is not permissible for the sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change of the Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by such authority for the reasons best known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there may not be any end to such statutory exercise.
13. In our opinion, a change of opinion per se on the same materials cannot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. However, in a case where fresh materials have been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in light of the fresh materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servant may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such a course."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Writ Petition (Cr.) No. 355 of 2017

Decided On: 06.04.2018

 Dilip Kumar Sharma  Vs.  State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

Citation: MANU/CG/0093/2018
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Sunday, 5 January 2020

Whether oath taken by high court judge can be disclosed under RTI?

Respondent No.1 herein in the application filed under Section 6(1)
of the Act of 2005 had only stated that he wish to have the copy of
the oath taken and subscribed by the Hon'ble Judges of the High
Court which is exempted from being disclosed under Section 8(1)(j)
of the Act of 2005, as respondent No.1 herein did not disclose any
public interest much less larger public interest involved in seeking
such information of the Hon'ble Judges in the said application nor
was any finding recorded by the second appellate authority i.e. the
Chhattisgarh State Information Commission as to the involvement
of any larger public interest in directing supply of such information
to respondent No.1 under Section 19(8)(a)(i) of the Act of 2005.
The application as filed by respondent No.1 is blissfully silent in that
regard. There is no averment in the application, how the public
interest requires disclosure of such information and the application

is silent in this regard.Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the application
filed by respondent No.1 under Section 6 of the Act of 2005 was
bereft and fails to fulfill the requirement under Section 8(1)(j) of the
Act of 2005 and thus, grant of such information by the learned
Information Commission simply holding that oath is taken by the
Hon'ble Judges in public in presence of respectable persons as
such, the information sought for is granted under Sections 8 and
19(8)(a)(iv) of the Act of 2005, runs contrary to the law and is liable
to be quashed.
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Writ Petition (Art. 227) No.19 of 2017

The Public Information Officer, High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur, Vs Arun Kumar Gupta, 
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal
Order delivered on: 5-8-2019
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Sunday, 29 December 2019

Chhatis HC: Presumption U/S 90 of evidence Act can be raised in respect of executed documents only

It would thus be seen that the plaintiffs' case rests only on the certified
copy of the sale deed which do not contain the signature or thumb
impression of any of the parties or their witnesses. Even the copy of two
sale deeds, said to be available in the records, is not stated to contain

signature or thumb impression of the parties to the transaction or the
witnesses. The parties to the transaction were not available to be examined
as they are dead. No witness has been examined. There is no other
material on record to prove execution of sale deed. There is no evidence on
record to prove that there was an intention to sell the property for
consideration either paid or promised to be paid or part paid and partly
promised to be paid. Sale deed was executed in favour of Ishrat Khan by
respective vendors named in so called sale deed dated 11.11.1932 and
19.3.1934. Thus, the plaintiffs completely failed to prove execution of sale
deed so as to transfer a valid title in favour of Late Ishrat Khan.
14.Much reliance has been placed by learned counsel for the
appellants/plaintiff on the oral evidence of Abdul Shakil (PW3) that it has
been deposed by him that as per the then prevalent practice, copy of only
those documents were retained in the office which were executed,
therefore, a presumption will have to be drawn that sale deed was
executed. We are unable to accept this submission. In the absence of there
being proof of actual execution of the document of sale, particularly when
the plaintiffs were not allowed to lead secondary evidence, the evidence of
Abdul Shakil (PW3) would not, by itself, carry such a great probative value
as to hold that a transaction of sale had taken place in which consideration
passed, transaction of sale was completed, possession transferred in favour
of late Ishrat Khan.
15.Reliance placed in the case of Kaliya (supra) is of no help because that
deals with a situation where the party has been permitted to lead
secondary evidence by allowing his application under Section 65 of the
Evidence Act. In the present case, the application was dismissed as not
pressed.
16.Section 90 of the Evidence Act would also not come to the aid of the
plaintiffs, because it does not create presumption in respect of an ordinary
copy of a document. It is only when the document is executed then only
the presumption, in particular circumstances, would be available to be
made regarding genuineness of the document in so far as execution and
attestation thereof is concerned.

HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

First Appeal No. 22 of 2008

 Smt. Kadir Bee, W/o Late Ishrat Khan, Vs  Smt. Mumtaj Begum, W/o Latif Miyan Musalman, 

Division Bench : Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manindra Mohan Shrivastava
Hon'ble Mrs. Justice Rajani Dubey

Dated: 20/06/2018
Per Manindra Mohan Shrivastava, J.
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Sunday, 22 December 2019

Whether doctrine of res judicata is applicable if suit is filed under new rent Act?

 Therefore, even after dismissal of earlier proceeding if a new act is promulgated, the beneficiary under the statute can always ring the bell of the Court under permissible grounds seeking eviction.

20. In facts of the case therefore, the principles of res-judicata is completely foreign. The res judicata only operates in respect of the issue in which the matter directly and substantially in issue has been directly and substantially in issue in a former suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title and has been decided. In the instant case on the earlier occasion, the ejectment case was dismissed for the reason that the daughter-in-law cannot be said to be a dependent, but in the subsequent proceeding before the Rent Controller, the facts were otherwise and the parties were also different and it was under the new statute, therefore, the finding of res judicata by the rent controlling authority is completely perverse and wrong appreciation of facts.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

WP (227) No. 2 of 2018

Decided On: 09.08.2018

Utsav Dey Vs. Sushil Kumar Bhadraja and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Goutam Bhaduri, J.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 188
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Friday, 20 December 2019

Chhatis HC: Eviction suit is not liable to be dismissed if tenancy agreement is not registered

Reading of Section 4 of the Act of 2011 speaks about the tenancy agreement. It shows that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (Central Act 4 of 1882), the lease shall not be created on rent of any accommodation except by in writing and the tenancy which is continuing before the commencement of the Act, the existing agreement is required to be filed before the Rent Controller and in case of no agreement is existing, the same is required to be executed and thereafter to be filed before the Rent Controller. Reading of Section 4 and the non-compliance thereof, no consequence is provided in the Act of 2011 qua eviction proceeding.

When we turn to the objection made by tenant it contains the pleading of non-registration of the tenancy agreement as per Section 4 of the Act of 2011. In view of the the principles as has been stated above, this Court is of the opinion that for noncompliance of Section 4 of the Act of 2011, the landlord cannot be non-suited as it is only directory in nature.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

WP (227) No. 2 of 2018

Decided On: 09.08.2018

Utsav Dey Vs. Sushil Kumar Bhadraja and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Goutam Bhaduri, J.

Citation: 2019(1) RCR(Rent) 188
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Tuesday, 29 October 2019

Whether civil court can grant injunction to restrain revenue court?

 In view of the above-stated legal position, the trial Court has rightly held that the Revenue Court is not the court subordinate to the Civil Court, therefore, no injunction can be granted against Revenue Court under Section 41(b) of the Act of 1963. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

Second Appeal No. 730 of 1999

Decided On: 06.09.2018

 Prakash Narain Vs.  Sharda Prasad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 (NOC) 264 CHH
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Saturday, 27 July 2019

What are necessary pre-requisite for taking cognizance of offence against Notary?

Section 13(1) of the Notary Act, 1952 clearly bars the act of taking cognizance of any offence against the Notary in exercise or purported exercise of his function under the Act except upon a complaint in writing made by an officer authorised by Central Government or State Government by general or special order. Therefore, filing of a complaint against a Notary of his function performed under the Act by upon an authorization of an officer of Central/State Government is mandatory requirement of law for institution of valid complaint as per provision under Section 13(1) is mandatory in nature.

12. At this stage, it would be expedient to notice the functions entrusted to the Notary under the Act of 1952. Section 8(1)(a) of the Act provides as under:-

8. Functions of notaries.- (1) A notary may do all or any of the following acts by virtue of his office, namely:-

(a) verify, authenticate, certify or attest the execution of any instrument;

(b) to (i) xxx xxx xxx xxx

13. Reverting to the facts of present case in the light of principle of law laid down in the above-stated Judgments and in view of above-stated legal analysis, it is quite vivid that in the present case the accused/petitioner is an advocate working as a Notary and authenticated the document in question under Section 8(1)(a) of the Act of 1952 in performance of statutory duty conferred upon him by Act of 1952. The questioned authentication of agreement would clearly fall within the meaning of Section 8(1)(a) of the Act of 1952. Therefore, the bar under Section 13(1) of the Act of 1952 would squarely attract and far alleged offences against the petitioner, the learned Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of, except on the complaint filed in the manner indicated under Section 13(1) of the Act of 1952.

14. The Karnataka High Court in the matters of V. Ranga Ramu vs. State of Karnataka MANU/KA/0143/1999 : 1999 CRI. L.J. 561 and Allahabad High Court in the matter of Dinesh Chandra Sinha v. State of U.P. MANU/UP/0353/2017 : 2017 CRI. L.J. 3015 has held that in absence of any complaint by the Officer authorised by Central Government or State Government regarding the duty of notary, the order taking cognizance is not proper and accused is entitled for discharge.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CRMP No. 294 of 2017

Decided On: 13.05.2019

 Rajkumar Mishra Vs. Gurjeet Kaur Bajwa

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
Citation: 2019 SCC Online Chh 48
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Thursday, 20 June 2019

Whether Magistrate should follow principles laid down by Supreme Court for registration of FIR against doctors under S. 156(3) CrPC?

The principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew(supra) and Martin F. D'Souza (supra) for registration of criminal case against a doctor before registering an FIR under Section 154(1) of the CrPC by getting an expert opinion from a qualified doctor would apply with equal force while registering/directing for registration of offence under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, because it is also another mode of getting the FIR registered for which the person concerned has failed to get the FIR registered under Sections 154(1) & 154(3) of the CrPC, as by virtue of Section 156(1) of the CrPC, it is the power and jurisdiction of the police officer to investigate any cognizable offence without the order of the Magistrate and by virtue of Section 156(3) of the CrPC, the Magistrate is empowered under Section 190 to order such an investigation as mentioned in Section 156(3) of the CrPC. Therefore, before directing investigation and registration of FIR under Section 156(3) of the CrPC, the principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court in Jacob Mathew (para-52) (supra) and Martin F. D'Souza(para-106) (supra) is mandatory and has to be followed before directing investigation against medical professionals by obtaining medical opinion from experts is sine qua non for direction of registration and investigation of offence against medical practitioners. Thus, the course open to the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is to call for the medical opinion of experts in line with and as per the direction in Jacob Mathew (supra) and Martin F. D'Souza (supra) before entertaining an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC and directing registration of FIR and investigation against medical professional, which was not followed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate while granting the application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC making the order vulnerable.

In the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur
(Before Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.)

Dr. Smt. Krishna Dixit  v. State of Chhattisgarh,

Writ Petition (Cr.) No. 146 of 2016
Decided on May 14, 2019
Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Chh 47
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Wednesday, 5 June 2019

When plea of defendant that agreement of sale was mortgage by conditional sale is not tenable?

The finding of the Court below that since the defendant had pleaded that it was a loan, therefore, the burden would be shifted on the plaintiff that it was not a sale agreement appears to be not according to the law as Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act covers such transaction. For sake of brevity, Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act is reproduced as under.

58(c) Mortgage by conditional sale. - Where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property-

on condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or

on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or

on condition that on such payment being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller,

the transaction is called a mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale:

[Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale].

9. Reading of the aforesaid provision would show the defendant though had raised the defence that it was a loan but the transaction is not been embodied in the document Ex. P-1, therefore, as per the proviso clause the transaction cannot be deemed to be a mortgage as condition do not have been incorporated in the document Ex. P-1 except the defence and the oral evidence. Consequently, the finding of the trial Court cannot be sustained on this issue.

11. Further more, the defendant stated that the husband of the defendant has demanded a loan of Rs. 40,000/- which was arranged by the plaintiff and thereafter a fiduciary agreement of sale was executed which is Ex. P-1, thereby the defendant admitted the existence of agreement (Ex. P-1) but stated that it was for a mortgage. No such averments have been contained in the document. Therefore, it would be difficult to accept such defence in view of proviso to section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act the document was of a mortgage.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

First Appeal No. 72 of 2004

Decided On: 03.01.2019

Santosh Mahobiya  Vs.  Mahendra Tamboli

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Goutam Bhaduri, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Chhat 92
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Whether one co-owner will become exclusive owner of property by adverse possession if his name is mutated in revenue record?

 Similarly, in the matter of Jatina Khatoon and others v. S.K. Najeeb (Dead) through Legal Representatives and others MANU/SC/1076/2017 : (2018) 11 SCC 717, it has been held by the Supreme Court that mere non-participation in rent and profit of land of a co-sharer does not amount to ouster so as to be given title by adverse possession, relying upon its earlier decision in the matter of Karbalai Begum v. Mohd. Sayeed MANU/SC/0363/1980 : (1980) 4 SCC 396 : (AIR 1981 SC 77).

29. Similarly, in the matter of Darshan Singh and others v. Gujjar Singh (Dead) by L.Rs. and others MANU/SC/0007/2002 : (2002) 2 SCC 62 : (AIR 2002 SC 606), the Supreme Court has held that mere mutation in revenue records in favour of one co-sharer does not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration denying title of the other co-sharers and in the normal course possession by one co-sharer of property belonging to several co-sharers will be deemed to be possession on behalf of the others. It was further held in paragraph 9 of the report as under:--

"9. In our view, the correct legal position is that possession of a property belonging to several co-sharers by one co-sharer shall be deemed that he possesses the property on behalf of the other co-sharers unless there has been a clear ouster by denying the title of other co-sharers and mutation in the revenue records in the name of one co-sharer would not amount to ouster unless there is a clear declaration that title of the other co-sharers was denied."
30. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of the principles of law laid down qua the plea of adverse possession by ouster in the abovestated judgments rendered by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court, it is quite vivid that in the instant case, the defendants have taken the plea of adverse possession half-heartedly by simply stating that the plaintiffs did not assert any title over the suit land right from the year 1954 till the date of institution of suit and neither claimed any title nor made any dispute with regard to the suit land and allowed the defendants to get their names mutated in the revenue records and further allowed division of holdings in the relevant revenue records as per convenience of the defendants and the defendants are in possession right from 1954 and therefore they have become title holders by remaining in possession for long time which has been accepted by the two Courts below. The defendants have taken the following plea of adverse possession and ouster of the plaintiff, in the written statement as under:--

{Vernacular omitted}

31. In the considered opinion of this Court, as held earlier, mere mutation in the revenue records and not asserting title over the suit land would not amount to ouster so as to give title by adverse possession to the defendants particularly when there is no pleading of ouster raised, except that the suit lands have been mutated in their names and there is division of holdings in the name of the defendants and they are in possession of the suit land for long time since 1954. It is already held that possession of joint property by one co-owner is in the eyes of law, possession of all even if one is actually out of possession and passage of time does not extinguish the right of the co-owner who has been out of possession of the joint property except in the event of ouster or abandonment.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

Second Appeal No. 450 of 2003

Decided On: 24.01.2019

Lunja  Vs.  Bugad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

Citation: AIR 2019 Chhat 83
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Sunday, 24 March 2019

Whether court can grant decree for specific performance on contract on basis of insufficiently and unregistered agreement of sale if it is exhibited?

 It is also settled that receiving a document in evidence and its admissibility under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Registration Act, 1908 are different matters. A document, which is not required to be stamped or registered stands on a different footing after the same was received in evidence, but a document which requires to be sufficiently stamped and registered before it is made admissible in evidence would not be made admissible in evidence merely because it is exhibited and received in evidence. For such document marking of exhibit is only for convenience and it does not decide the admissibility of the document. Holding it otherwise would make the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and the Registration Act, 1908 redundant and the Court's would allow decree for specific performance on the basis of documents which are not enforceable.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FA No. 87 of 2012

Decided On: 22.02.2019

 Mahadev Singh Vs.  Bihari Lal Sanadaya

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Prashant Kumar Mishra and Vimla Singh Kapoor, JJ.

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Sunday, 3 March 2019

What is difference between advance amount and earnest amount?

 Difference between 'advance amount' and the 'earnest money' has been considered by the Supreme Court in number of cases. In Shree Hanuman Cotton Mills v. Tata Air-Craft Ltd. MANU/SC/0086/1969 : (1969) 3 SCC 522 : (AIR 1970 SC 1986) the Supreme Court laid down certain principles to determine as to when the amount paid as 'advance' be treated as 'earnest money' and the seller is entitled to forfeit the same. Para 21 of the judgment is reproduced hereunder. "21. From a review of the decisions cited above, the following principles emerge regarding 'earnest':

(1) It must be given at the moment at which the contract is concluded.

(2) It represents a guarantee that the contract will be fulfilled or, in other words, 'earnest' is given to bind the contract.

(3) It is part of the purchase price when the transaction is carried out.

(4) It is forfeited when the transaction falls through by reason of the default or failure of the purchaser.

(5) Unless there is anything to the contrary in the terms of the contract, on default committed by the buyer, the seller is entitled to forfeit the earnest.

10. In the matter of DDA v. Grihsthapana Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd., MANU/SC/0247/1995 : 1995 Supplementary (1) SCC 751 : (AIR 1995 SC 1176) the Supreme Court, following privy council's decision in the matter of Chiranjit Singh v. Har Swamp, MANU/PR/0083/1925 : ATR 1926 PC 1, held that for the question whether the respondents are entitled to forfeit the entire amount, it is to be seen that a specific covenant under the contract was that the respondents are entitled to forfeit the money paid under the contract. So when the contract fell through by the default committed by the appellant, as part of the contract, they are entitled to forfeit the entire amount.

11. In Videocon Properties Ltd. v. Bhalchandra Laboratories MANU/SC/1097/2003 : (2004) 3 SCC 711 : AIR 2004 SC 1787) the Supreme Court examined the nature and character of the earnest money and took a view that the words used in the agreement alone would not be determinative of the character of the "earnest money" but really the intention of the parties and surrounding circumstances. It held that the earnest money serves two purposes of being part-payment of the purchase money and security for the performance of the contract by the party concerned.

12. It is not the description by word used in the agreement only that would be determinative of the character of the sum but really the intention of the party have to be looked into and what may be called as an 'advance money' may really be a deposit or 'earnest money' and what is termed as a deposit or earnest money "may ultimately turn out to be really an advance or part of purchase

13. In Satish Batra (MANU/SC/0887/2012 : 2012 AIR SCW 5869, paras 17 and 18) (supra), the Supreme Court considered the issue and held thus in paragraphs 15 and 16.

15. The law is, therefore, clear that to justify the forfeiture of advance money being part of "earnest money" the terms of the contract should be clear and explicit. Earnest money is paid or given at the time when the contract is entered into and, as a pledge for its due performance by the depositor to be forfeited in case of non-performance, by the depositor. There can be converse situation also that if the seller fails to perform the contract the purchaser can also, get the double the amount, if it is so stipulated. It is also the law that part payment of purchase price cannot be forfeited unless it is a guarantee for the due performance of the contract. In other words, if the payment is made only towards part payment of consideration and not intended as earnest money then the forfeiture clause will not apply.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

First Appeal No. 316 of 2017

Decided On: 14.09.2018

 Sunil Jain Vs Vishal Ram Sahu

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Prashant Kumar Mishra and Vimla Singh Kapoor, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Chhat 37
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Friday, 1 March 2019

Whether bar as per O 2 R 2 of CPC can be proved on basis of photocopy of plaint?

True it is that the defendants have filed a photo copy, we cannot ignore that the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Gurbux Singh (supra) lays down the legal requirement of filing the plaint as evidence to prove that the earlier suit was filed on the same cause of action as the subsequent suit and at that time, though the plaintiff could have asked for relief/reliefs sought in the subsequent suit, he omitted to do so and then without the leave of the Court, filed subsequent suit. Therefore, as emphatically propounded by Their Lordships in the Supreme Court in the recent decision, filing of the plaint, that means, leading of plaint as evidence in support of plea of non-maintainability of suit under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC was imperative. We do not find that the defendant, later on, filed any certified copy of the plaint or that his prayer to lead secondary evidence was allowed and the fact of having filed a suit earlier on the same cause of action was proved by leading secondary evidence or the learned Trial Court called for records of the earlier suit. Therefore, as the photo copy of the plaint was not admissible in evidence, it cannot be said that the legal requirement of filing the plaint of the earlier suit was even substantially complied with. The submission of learned counsel for the respondent that, the certified copy of the judgment of the earlier case refers to material plea taken by the plaintiff in its plaint in the earlier suit should be taken as proof as to what was the pleading, made by the plaintiff in the earlier suit, cannot be accepted. True it is that while delivering judgment in the earlier case, learned Trial Court in that case, referred to the pleadings but that cannot be said to be complete plaint being on record before the Court to examine whether the second suit ought to be held to be not maintainable under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. We wish to emphasize that Their Lordships in the case of Gurbux Singh MANU/SC/0241/1964 : AIR 1964 SC 1810 (supra) noted that such a plea based on provisions contained in Order 2 Rule 2 CPC is a technical bar which has to be established satisfactorily and cannot be presumed merely on the basis of inferential reasoning which learned counsel for the respondent seeks us to do. Learned Trial Court recorded finding based on inferential process of reasoning and committed manifest error in law. Therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with in this appeal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

FA No. 175 of 2011

Decided On: 09.07.2018

 Vikas Ahuja  Vs.  Jaiprakash Joshi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Manindra Mohan Shrivastava and Rajani Dubey, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Chhat 15
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Friday, 28 December 2018

Whether second appeal is maintainable against order passed in application under O 21 R 97 of CPC?

When the application of Order 21 Rule 97 CPC is adjudicated, it is enveloped within the definition of decree and first appeal having been preferred, the provisions of CPC will come into play. When the proceeding of this character reach the District Court in a state of appeal, the procedure which is prevailing in ordinary Court of the country with regard to the proceeding, the ordinary Rule of CPC will apply.

7. In the case of R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrmekhara Thevar MANU/PR/0005/1947 : AIR 1948 PC 12, while considering a similar ratio of law Lord Simond observed:

"The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedures applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special Statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal."
8. In this case against the adjudication of decree first appeal was preferred by ordinary application of civil procedure code, therefore, if the first appeal is adjudicated by ordinary application of procedure of CPC, second appeal would lie.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

W.P.(227) No. 249 of 2018

Decided On: 22.03.2018

 Sita Devi Sharma Vs. Mukta Ben
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Whether right to appeal is available if special statute under which right is claimed which does not confer right to appeal?

In the case of R.M.A.R.A. Adaikappa Chettiar v. R. Chandrmekhara Thevar MANU/PR/0005/1947 : AIR 1948 PC 12, while considering a similar ratio of law Lord Simond observed:

"The true rule is that where a legal right is in dispute and the ordinary Courts of the country are seized of such dispute the Courts are governed by the ordinary rules of procedures applicable thereto and an appeal lies, if authorized by such rules, notwithstanding that the legal right claimed arises under a special Statute which does not in terms confer a right of appeal."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

W.P.(227) No. 249 of 2018

Decided On: 22.03.2018

 Sita Devi Sharma Vs. Mukta Ben

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Goutam Bhaduri, J.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 927 Chh
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Whether husband is entitled to get divorce even if he has not filed application for execution of order of restitution of conjugal rights?

In Smt. Bimla Devi v. Singh Raj {MANU/PH/0030/1977 : AIR 1977 PH 167} Hon'ble Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana has observed that the decree of restitution of conjugal rights has been passed in favour of husband against wife, it is wife who has not complied with the decree, due to which there is no restitution of conjugal rights as between them for more than two years, then, notwithstanding Section 23(1)(a), wife is entitled to dissolution of marriage.

24. In Radhakumari v. Dr. K.M.K. Nair {MANU/KE/0053/1988 : AIR 1988 Ker 235} Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court of Kerala has observed that the failure on part of the husband in not enforcing the decree for restitution of conjugal rights, will not disentitle him from getting a decree for divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) of the Act if there was no resumption of cohabitation between the parties for a period of one year or more after passing of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights. As a matter of fact, the lower Court rightly held that there is no material in this case evidencing any conduct on the part of the appellant husband which would amount to a wrong within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, dis-entitling him to the relief of divorce.

25. In Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumari {MANU/SC/0215/1977 : AIR 1977 SC 2218} the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that in order to be a 'wrong' within the meaning of Section 23(1)(a), the conduct alleged has to be something more than a mere disinclination to agree to an offer of reunion, it must be misconduct serious enough to justify denial of the relief to which the husband or the wife is otherwise entitled.

26. From the aforesaid judicial precedents in Smt. Bimla Devi (supra), Radhakumari (supra) and Dharmendra Kumar (supra) the legal position which emerges is that when the applicant gets the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights against the non-applicant, and applicant does not file execution of such judgment and decree, does not attempt to bring her back, does not comply with the aforesaid judgment and decree where the non-applicant is ready for the union, then applicant could not be deemed as to be wrongdoer and applicant would be entitled to get the decree of divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) of the Act of 1955 subject to the fulfillment of the conditions of this Section and other conditions of Section 23 of the Act of 1955. Similarly, if non-applicant does not comply such decree, non-applicant is not ready to lead conjugal life with the applicant, then non-applicant is also entitled to get decree of divorce under Section 13(1-A)(ii) of the Act of 1955 subject to the fulfillment of the conditions of this Section and other conditions of Section 23 of the Act of 1955. If there is no restitution of the conjugal rights for one year or upwards after passing of the decree of the restitution of conjugal rights, and other conditions of Section 23 of the Act of 1955 are fulfilled, then any of the parties would be entitled to get the decree of divorce irrespective of this fact who was not inclined to comply with the aforesaid decree.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

First Appeal (M) No. 160 of 2016

Decided On: 01.05.2018

Sandeep Kumar Mishra  Vs.  Nikky
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Whether husband has condoned cruelty caused by wife if he has filed petition for restitution of conjugal rights?

In the case in hand, after the alleged cruelty, the appellant had preferred an application under Section 9 of the Act of 1955 and obtained the judgment and decree in his favour. These circumstances clearly establish that at the time of filing of the application under Section 9 of the Act of 1955, the appellant had condoned the alleged cruelty. If he had not condoned the alleged cruelty committed by the respondent, then he would not have filed the application under Section 9 of the Act of 1955. Thus, in the case in hand, the alleged cruelty is out of consideration for grant of divorce.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

First Appeal (M) No. 160 of 2016

Decided On: 01.05.2018

Sandeep Kumar Mishra  Vs.  Nikky

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.B. Radhakrishnan, C.J. and Sharad Kumar Gupta, J.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 926 Chh
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Saturday, 24 November 2018

Whether plaint can be rejected on ground that suit is barred by benami prohibition Act?

 Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC provides for rejection of plaint where the suit appears, from the statements in the plaint, to be barred by any law. On its plain reading, the plaint discloses that the Plaintiff seeks declaration and further reliefs on the strength of alleged title and possession by him, his wife and his two sons, including the Defendant, as a Hindu Undivided Family and such ownership and possession is asserted in the plaint to seek relief as against the Defendant. The relief sought for is as if it is on behalf of the Hindu Undivided Family as a unit, though the Plaintiff has asserted that the suit property was acquired utilizing funds belonging to him as well. The question whether the plea setup by the Plaintiff is one amounting to a benami transaction which would fall within provisions of the Act would call for the adjudication of issues of fact and law. Such issues cannot be considered as issues of law only. The reading of the plaint does not satisfy the judicial mind that it is barred by law. Hence, the plaint in the litigation in hand is not liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC on the ground that it is barred by law.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

CR No. 79 of 2017

Decided On: 28.06.2018

 Rohin Shukla Vs. Ravi Shanker Shukla

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.B. Radhakrishnan, C.J.

Citation: AIR 2018 Chhatis 166
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