Showing posts with label executant of document. Show all posts
Showing posts with label executant of document. Show all posts

Tuesday, 9 May 2017

When it is not necessary to examine executant of sale deed to prove execution of sale deed?

 Coming to the question whether execution of sale deed in favour of plaintiff has
been proved, the High Court has held that the sale deed has not been proved for want of
examination of Buchamma. The High Court has ignored the pleadings of the parties and
the evidence on the question of execution of sale deed which establishes that sale deed
had been executed by Buchamma in favour of the plaintiff. In the written statement
filed on behalf of the defendants, the sale deed was denied for want of knowledge. A
perusal of same indicates that the authority of Buchamma to execute the sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff was put into question. Defendant no. 3 Sarojana in her deposition
in court did not deny the fact that sale deed was executed by Buchamma in favour of the
plaintiff. She has stated that she was not aware whether Buchamma has executed any
sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. She only asserted that she was the adopted daughter
of Yashoda.
15. It is settled law that denial for want of knowledge is no denial at all. The
execution of the sale deed was not specifically denied in the written statement. Once the
execution of the sale deed was not disputed it was not necessary to examine Buchamma
to prove it. The provisions contained in Order 8 Rule 5 require pleadings to be
answered specifically in written statement. This Court in Jahuri Sah & Ors. v. Dwarika
Prasad Jhunjhunwala AIR 1967 SC 109 has laid down that if a defendant has no
knowledge of a fact pleaded by the plaintiff is not tantamount to a denial of existence of
fact, not even an implied denial. Same decision has been followed by Madhya Pradesh
High Court in Dhanbai D/o Late Shri Cowash v. State of M.P. & Ors. 1978 MPLJ 717.
The High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Samrathmal & Anr. v. Union of India, Ministry of
Railway & Ors. AIR 1959 MP 305 relying on P.L.N.K.L. Chettyar Firm v. Ko Lu Doke
AIR 1934 Rang 278 and Lakhmi Chand v. Ram Lal AIR 1931 All. 423, had also opined
that if the defendant did not know of a fact, denial of the knowledge of a particular fact
is not a denial of the fact and has not even the effect of putting the fact in issue.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4816 OF 2016


Muddasani Venkata Narsaiah V Muddasani Sarojana

Citation:(2016) 12 SCC 288
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Saturday, 6 May 2017

Whether it is necessary to examine attesting witness if executant himself admitted execution of gift deed?

I have considered the facts of the present case and the arguments advanced by the learned
counsel appearing for the respective parties. Since the decision in the present case with regard to
the challenge thrown to both the impugned orders dated August 5, 2016 and September 06, 2016 is
dependant on the scope and purport of Section 68 of the evidence Act, the same is set out
hereinbelow :-
“ Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested: If a document is
required by law to be attested, it shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness atleast has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting
witness alive, and subject to the process of the Court and capable of giving evidence.
Provided that it shall not be necessary to call an attesting witness in proof of the
execution of any document, not being a Will, which has been registered in accordance with
the provisions of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 ( 16 of 1908), unless its execution by the
person by whom it purports to have been executed is specifically denied”.
The above proviso to Section 68 of the Evidence Act was incorporated by Section 2 of the
Indian Evidence ( Amendment) Act, 1926. A bare reading of the proviso to Section 68 of the
Evidence Act shows that the rigor of the section has been relaxed to some extent and it is, therefore,
not required to call an attesting witness, except in a case of a Will , unless the execution of the
registered document itself is specifically denied. This view is fortified by the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Khushalchand Swarup Chand Zabak Jain v. Sureshchandra
Kanhaiyalal Kochar @ Anr., reported in 1995 supp.(2) SCC 36, as well the said decision of this
Court in the case of Kumaresh Majumder(supra). In this case, from a reading of paragraph 19 of
the plaint in the suit it is clear that the plaintiff-petitioner has not disputed the execution of the said
deed of gift by the defendant-opposite party no.1. She has alleged that at the time of execution of
the said deed of gift the defendant-opposite party no.1 was suffering from various diseases.
Therefore, I am of the view that in the facts of the present case, the learned Court below was right
to hold that when the said deed of gift is a registered instrument and the defendant-opposite party
no.1 executant himself admitted to have executed the same, the execution of the said deed of gift
was duly proved even in the absence of any of the two witnesses and the same was correctly
marked as an exhibit. Accordingly, I do not find any merit in the challenge either against the firstimpugned order dated August 5, 2016 refusing to expunge the said deed of gift, marked an Exhibit-
“A” of the suit, from the list of exhibits or the second impugned order dated September 06, 2016.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Civil Revisional Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
Present :  Justice Ashis Kumar Chakraborty
 C.O. 4225 of 2016
 Kakali Ghosh
Vs.
 Madan Mohan Ghosh & Anr.

Judgement on : 20.12.2016
Citation:AIR 2017(NOC) 187 Cal
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Friday, 14 October 2016

Leading Judgment on cancellation of deed and declaration that deed is void and voidable

  Section 31 of the Act (corresponding to Sec.39 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1877 - for short, "the old Act") states:



                      "31.    When cancellation may be ordered:-



               (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is

               void   or    voidable,        and       who        has reasonable

               apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding

               may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it

               adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its

               discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered

               up and cancelled.



                      (2)     ...................................."



It is clear from Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.31 of the Act that to enable the appellant get

Ext.B1 cancelled, it must be shown that the said instrument is void or voidable as

against her and the appellant has a reasonable apprehension that if Ext.B1 is

left outstanding, it may cause her serious injury.



        14.    It is said that most part of Sec.39 of the old Act (corresponding to

Sec.31 of the Act) was borrowed from Articles 1906 and 1908 of the Draft New

York Civil Code. The provision for cancellation of a written instrument is based

upon the administration of protective justice for fear that the instrument may be



vexatiously or injuriously used by one against another when the evidence to

challenge such written instrument may be lost or that it may throw a cloud or

suspicion over his title or interest.



      15.     Story, in Equity Jurisprudence (English Edition), 1920 in Article

694 states:



                    "In the first place, then, let us consider in which

             cases, court will direct the delivery up, cancellation or

             rescission of agreements, securities, deeds or other

             instruments. It is obvious that the jurisdiction

             exercised in cases of this sort, is founded upon the

             administration of a protective or preventive justice. If,

             therefore, the instrument was void for matter apparent

             upon the face of it, there was no call to exercise the

             jurisdiction, with the possible exception of instruments

             forming a cloud upon the title to land. The party is

             relieved upon the principle, as it is technically called

             quia timet: that is, for fear that such agreement,

             securities, deeds, or other instruments may be

             vexatiously or injuriously used against him when the

             evidence to impeach them may be lost; or that they

             may now through a cloud or suspicion over his title or

             interest."



      16.     Referring to Chapter V of the Old Act, Whitely Stoks states in

Anglo-Indian Code (Vol.I) at page 934:



                     "Chapter V declares that any person against

              whom a written instrument is void or voidable, who

              has reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it

              may cause him serious injury, may obtain an

              adjudication that it is void or voidable and an order

              that it be delivered up and cancelled.       The relief

              extends    to a forged instrument, and also to one

              originally valid but which has subsequently forged.

              The Chapter applies to cases not unfrequent in India,

              where a party gets possession of document on which

              he might not indeed be able to found a claim in a

              court of justice but which might give him such prima

              facie right against the other as would expose him to

              vexatious demands and litigation."



      17.     The Bombay High Court, in Jeka Dula v. Bai Jivi and others

(AIR 1938 Bombay         37) laid down the      following three conditions for the

application of Sec.39 of the old Act (Sec.31 of the Act):



                     "i.     The written instrument is either void or

              voidable as against the plaintiff.



                     ii.      The plaintiff may reasonably apprehend

              serious    injury     from  the    instrument  being   left

              outstanding.



                     iii.     In view of all the circumstances of the

              case the court considers it reasonable and proper to

              administer the protective and preventive justice asked

              for."



      18.     A Full Bench of the Madras High Court considered the scope of

Sec.39 of the old Act (Sec.31 of the Act)                 in Muppudathi Pillai v.

Krishnaswami Pillai (AIR 1960 Madras 1) and held at page 4 as under:



                     "........... It stands to reason that the executant

              of the document should be either the plaintiff or a


              person who can in certain circumstances bind him. It


              is only then it could be said that the instrument is


              voidable by or void against him. The second aspect of

              the matter emphasises that principle. For there can

              be no apprehension if a mere third party, asserting a


              hostile title creates a document. Thus relief under


              Sec.39 would be granted only in respect of an


              instrument likely to affect the title of the plaintiff and


              not of an instrument executed by a stranger to that


              title."




The Full Bench       illustrated that when a trespasser purports to convey the

property in his own right and not in the right of the owners, the remedy of


cancellation of such an instrument cannot be granted because such a relief


would not remove the cloud upon his title by the instrument and the proper


remedy is to seek a declaration of the plaintiff's own title or a declaration that the


sale deed is not binding or valid against the plaintiff. Thus, when a document is


not executed by the plaintiff or by a person who can in any circumstance bind


him, that document cannot create a cloud upon the title of the true owner, nor


does it create apprehension that it may be a source of danger to him.




      19.     It is only in the case of instruments which are either executed by a

party or purports to have been executed by a party or by a person who can

under certain circumstances bind him that the relief under Sec.31 of the Act can

be claimed in law because in such cases only, could it be said that "there is a

cloud on his title and an apprehension that if the instrument is left outstanding, it

may be a source of danger."          To illustrate, a party who has executed the

document, or a principal in respect of a document executed by his agent or a

minor in respect of a document executed by his guardian, etc., could under

Sec.31 of the Act request the court to deliver up and cancel the document. A

person who neither has executed the document, nor is bound in any

circumstance by the person who executed the document could not seek relief

under Sec.31 of the Act as the document is neither void nor voidable against him

and as such document even if left outstanding is not capable of causing any


injury to him. The remedy of such person, if he thinks that the document may

create a cloud on his own title is to seek a declaration of his own title or that the

impugned document does not affect his title.
 In the present case appellant is not a party to Ext.B1. Nor is the

appellant bound under any circumstance by the person who has executed

Ext.B1. Exhibit B1 is executed by the 2nd respondent acting as power of attorney

holder of the 3rd respondent.    In the circumstances Ext.B1, assignment deed is

neither void nor is voidable against the appellant and hence she could not seek

relief under Sec.31 of the Act. If the appellant thinks that Ext.B1 might create a

cloud on the title she has claimed, her remedy was to sue for declaration of the

title she claims or that Ext.B1 does not affect the titled she claims.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                                        PRESENT:

                           MR.JUSTICE THOMAS P.JOSEPH

                    WEDNESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF JUNE 2012

                                         RSA.No. 1139 of 2010

   KAMALAKSHI AMMA, 
Vs
 Sangeetha    


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