Supreme Court: Court can refer Suit for cancellation of the deed on the ground of fraud U/S 31 of the Specific Relief Act to Arbitration

1) It is submitted that while considering the application

u/s 8 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the court

has to consider an issue that whether there exists any

Arbitration Agreement between the parties. Such right

is certainly vested in Civil Court. The Plaintiff is

challenging the legality of agreement dated 20.05.2006

on the ground that the same is obtained by fraud and

is therefore seeking further declaration that the said

agreement is null and ab initio void. As such, the very

Arbitration clause as contained in the said agreement

is not enforceable. In spite of the fact that Section 16

of the said Act empowers the Arbitral Tribunal to

decide its own jurisdiction in view of particular

circumstances narrated in the plaint, the present

application deserves to be rejected.”

v. By a judgment dated 19.07.2011, the Additional Judge, Small

Causes Court, Pune, after hearing both sides, held as follows:

“11. After perusing the above mentioned cited cases, it

shows that when there is a clause of arbitration it is

mandated on the Civil Court to refer the dispute and

parties for arbitration as per agreement. In present

case the plaintiffs have materially contention about

playing fraud by Defendant No.3 but there is no any

contents in agreement as alleged by plaintiff in plaint

about keeping faith on Defendant No.3. It shows about

signing by Defendant No.3 for agreement dated

20.05.2006 and he was also party to said agreement.

The plaintiff alleged about playing fraud after resigning

by Defendant No.3 from partnership firm of Defendant

No.1 and signing the confirmation deed dated

13.07.2006 but as per Partnership Act remedy is

provided. Moreover, from the documents, it shows that

the confirmation deed dated 13.07.2007 was executed

by Defendant No.3 as Authorized Partner of M/s

Regency Mahavir Properties and another partner Dilip

Jain. The fraud alleged by the plaintiff is in respect of

the documents for which the remedy is also provided.

After considering the arbitration clause I find that the

application is to be allowed and the disputes have to

be referred for arbitration. Hence, I pass the following

order:

1) Application is allowed.

2) The plaintiff is directed to get the alleged dispute

resolved through the process of arbitration by

referring the plaintiff to invoke the process of

arbitration as per the arbitration clause 14

mentioned in the agreement dated 20.05.2006.”

Finding thus, the learned Judge referred the parties to arbitration.

2) High court dismissed writ petition with the result that the

parties stood referred to arbitration.

3) When sections 34 and 35 are seen, the position becomes even

clearer. Unlike section 31, under section 34, any person entitled to

any legal character may institute a suit for a declaration that he is

so entitled. Considering that it is possible to argue on a reading of

this provision that the legal character so declared may be against

the entire world, section 35 follows, making it clear that such

declaration is binding only on the parties to the suit and persons

claiming through them, respectively. This is for the reason that

under section 4 of the Specific Relief Act, specific relief is granted

only for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights. The principle

contained in section 4 permeates the entire Act, and it would be

most incongruous to say that every other provision of the Specific

Relief Act refers to in personam actions, section 31 alone being out

of step, i.e., referring to in rem actions.

25. The reasoning in the aforesaid judgment would again expose the

incongruous result of section 31 of the Specific Relief Act being

held to be an in rem provision. When it comes to cancellation of a deed by an executant to the document, such person can approach the Court under section 31, but when it comes to cancellation of a deed by a non-executant, the non-executant must approach the

Court under section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Cancellation of the very same deed, therefore, by a non-executant would be an action in personam since a suit has to be filed under section 34. However, cancellation of the same deed by an

executant of the deed, being under section 31, would somehow

convert the suit into a suit being in rem. All these anomalies only

highlight the impossibility of holding that an action instituted under

section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 is an action in rem.

26. Given this finding of law, it is clear that the judgments of the District

Court and the High Court in this case need no interference. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5147 OF 2016

DECCAN PAPER MILLS CO. LTD. Vs  REGENCY MAHAVIR PROPERTIES 

R.F. Nariman, J.
Dated:August 19, 2020.

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Leading Judgment on cancellation of deed and declaration that deed is void and voidable

  Section 31 of the Act (corresponding to Sec.39 of the Specific

Relief Act, 1877 - for short, "the old Act") states:



                      "31.    When cancellation may be ordered:-



               (1) Any person against whom a written instrument is

               void   or    voidable,        and       who        has reasonable

               apprehension that such instrument, if left outstanding

               may cause him serious injury, may sue to have it

               adjudged void or voidable; and the court may, in its

               discretion, so adjudge it and order it to be delivered

               up and cancelled.



                      (2)     ...................................."



It is clear from Sub-sec.(1) of Sec.31 of the Act that to enable the appellant get

Ext.B1 cancelled, it must be shown that the said instrument is void or voidable as

against her and the appellant has a reasonable apprehension that if Ext.B1 is

left outstanding, it may cause her serious injury.



        14.    It is said that most part of Sec.39 of the old Act (corresponding to

Sec.31 of the Act) was borrowed from Articles 1906 and 1908 of the Draft New

York Civil Code. The provision for cancellation of a written instrument is based

upon the administration of protective justice for fear that the instrument may be



vexatiously or injuriously used by one against another when the evidence to

challenge such written instrument may be lost or that it may throw a cloud or

suspicion over his title or interest.



      15.     Story, in Equity Jurisprudence (English Edition), 1920 in Article

694 states:



                    "In the first place, then, let us consider in which

             cases, court will direct the delivery up, cancellation or

             rescission of agreements, securities, deeds or other

             instruments. It is obvious that the jurisdiction

             exercised in cases of this sort, is founded upon the

             administration of a protective or preventive justice. If,

             therefore, the instrument was void for matter apparent

             upon the face of it, there was no call to exercise the

             jurisdiction, with the possible exception of instruments

             forming a cloud upon the title to land. The party is

             relieved upon the principle, as it is technically called

             quia timet: that is, for fear that such agreement,

             securities, deeds, or other instruments may be

             vexatiously or injuriously used against him when the

             evidence to impeach them may be lost; or that they

             may now through a cloud or suspicion over his title or

             interest."



      16.     Referring to Chapter V of the Old Act, Whitely Stoks states in

Anglo-Indian Code (Vol.I) at page 934:



                     "Chapter V declares that any person against

              whom a written instrument is void or voidable, who

              has reasonable apprehension that if left outstanding it

              may cause him serious injury, may obtain an

              adjudication that it is void or voidable and an order

              that it be delivered up and cancelled.       The relief

              extends    to a forged instrument, and also to one

              originally valid but which has subsequently forged.

              The Chapter applies to cases not unfrequent in India,

              where a party gets possession of document on which

              he might not indeed be able to found a claim in a

              court of justice but which might give him such prima

              facie right against the other as would expose him to

              vexatious demands and litigation."



      17.     The Bombay High Court, in Jeka Dula v. Bai Jivi and others

(AIR 1938 Bombay         37) laid down the      following three conditions for the

application of Sec.39 of the old Act (Sec.31 of the Act):



                     "i.     The written instrument is either void or

              voidable as against the plaintiff.



                     ii.      The plaintiff may reasonably apprehend

              serious    injury     from  the    instrument  being   left

              outstanding.



                     iii.     In view of all the circumstances of the

              case the court considers it reasonable and proper to

              administer the protective and preventive justice asked

              for."



      18.     A Full Bench of the Madras High Court considered the scope of

Sec.39 of the old Act (Sec.31 of the Act)                 in Muppudathi Pillai v.

Krishnaswami Pillai (AIR 1960 Madras 1) and held at page 4 as under:



                     "........... It stands to reason that the executant

              of the document should be either the plaintiff or a

              person who can in certain circumstances bind him. It

              is only then it could be said that the instrument is

              voidable by or void against him. The second aspect of

              the matter emphasises that principle. For there can

              be no apprehension if a mere third party, asserting a

              hostile title creates a document. Thus relief under

              Sec.39 would be granted only in respect of an

              instrument likely to affect the title of the plaintiff and

              not of an instrument executed by a stranger to that

              title."



The Full Bench       illustrated that when a trespasser purports to convey the

property in his own right and not in the right of the owners, the remedy of

cancellation of such an instrument cannot be granted because such a relief

would not remove the cloud upon his title by the instrument and the proper

remedy is to seek a declaration of the plaintiff's own title or a declaration that the

sale deed is not binding or valid against the plaintiff. Thus, when a document is

not executed by the plaintiff or by a person who can in any circumstance bind

him, that document cannot create a cloud upon the title of the true owner, nor

does it create apprehension that it may be a source of danger to him.



      19.     It is only in the case of instruments which are either executed by a

party or purports to have been executed by a party or by a person who can

under certain circumstances bind him that the relief under Sec.31 of the Act can

be claimed in law because in such cases only, could it be said that "there is a

cloud on his title and an apprehension that if the instrument is left outstanding, it

may be a source of danger."          To illustrate, a party who has executed the

document, or a principal in respect of a document executed by his agent or a

minor in respect of a document executed by his guardian, etc., could under

Sec.31 of the Act request the court to deliver up and cancel the document. A

person who neither has executed the document, nor is bound in any

circumstance by the person who executed the document could not seek relief

under Sec.31 of the Act as the document is neither void nor voidable against him

and as such document even if left outstanding is not capable of causing any


injury to him. The remedy of such person, if he thinks that the document may

create a cloud on his own title is to seek a declaration of his own title or that the

impugned document does not affect his title.
 In the present case appellant is not a party to Ext.B1. Nor is the

appellant bound under any circumstance by the person who has executed

Ext.B1. Exhibit B1 is executed by the 2nd respondent acting as power of attorney

holder of the 3rd respondent.    In the circumstances Ext.B1, assignment deed is

neither void nor is voidable against the appellant and hence she could not seek

relief under Sec.31 of the Act. If the appellant thinks that Ext.B1 might create a

cloud on the title she has claimed, her remedy was to sue for declaration of the

title she claims or that Ext.B1 does not affect the titled she claims.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                                        PRESENT:

                           MR.JUSTICE THOMAS P.JOSEPH

                    WEDNESDAY, THE 6TH DAY OF JUNE 2012

                                         RSA.No. 1139 of 2010

   KAMALAKSHI AMMA, 
Vs
 Sangeetha    

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Whether absolute sale can be cancelled by execution of Cancellation deed?

After giving our anxious consideration on the questions raised in the instant case, we come to the following conclusion: -
(i) A deed of cancellation of a sale unilaterally executed by the transferor does not create, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest in the property and is of no effect. Such a document does not create any encumbrance in the property already transferred. Hence such a deed of cancellation cannot be accepted for registration. (ii) Once title to the property is vested in the transferee by the sale of the property, it cannot be divested unto the transferor by execution and registration of a deed of cancellation even with the consent of the parties. The proper course would be to re-convey the property by a deed of conveyance by the transferee in favour of the transferor. (iii) Where a transfer is effected by way of sale with the condition that title will pass on payment of consideration, and such intention is clear from the recital in the deed, then such instrument or sale can be cancelled by a deed of cancellation with the consent of both the parties on the ground of non-payment of consideration. The reason is that in such a sale deed, admittedly, the title remained with the transferor. (iv) In other cases, a complete and absolute sale can be cancelled at the instance of the transferor only by taking recourse to the Civil Court by obtaining a decree of cancellation of sale deed on the ground inter alia of fraud or any other valid reasons.
Sale made absolute by transfer of property from vendor to purchaser. Such transfer cannot annulled by executing deed of cancellation. Cancellation of Sale deed can be ordered only under section 31 of specific relief act. Or purchaser can reconvey said property to vendor by paying stamp duty of sale deed.

Madras High Court

M/S.Latif Estate Line India Ltd vs Mrs. Hadeeja Ammal on 11 February, 2011
W.A. Nos. 592 and 938 of 2009

Citation;AIR 2011 Mad 66 (F.B.)

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