What are important factors to be considered by JJB or children court while doing preliminary assessment of juvenile as per S 15 of Juvenile justice Act 2015?

 In the report submitted by the experts to the Board it does not deal with the aforementioned aspects, which are relevant in view of the language used under Section 15 of the Act of 2015 like family history and relationship, school and education, work with which the juvenile was engaged at the time of commission of offence, peer relationships, whether he has been trauma and abuse (physical, sexual and emotional abuse experience), mental health disorders/developmental disability. {Para 15}

16. The Act of 2015 enacted with laudable object of “best interest of child” therefore, at the time of conducting preliminary assessment of a child each provisions and the words used is to be given its fullest meaning so as to achieve the object of the Act of 2015. Rule 10 A (3) envisages that at the time of preliminary assessment child should be presumed to be innocent unless proved otherwise, therefore, while assessing the understanding of the juvenile, the consequences of the offences allegedly committed the mindset of the assessing Committee or the Board should be that the juvenile before it is innocent.

17. The order passed by the Board on 05.01.2023 would reveal that the Board considered the report of experts and further put some question to juvenile during the proceedings and came to the conclusion that juvenile is to be tried as an adult under the provisions of Section 18(3) of the Act of 2015.

18. From the report of the experts relied upon by the Board it is clearly appearing that experts have not assessed the juvenile as mandated under Section 15 of the Act of 2015. There is no detailed report of the assessment made, no document is enclosed along with the report of conducting assessment, procedure adopted, factors assessed, mode of assessment, evaluation of child based on the stages of assessment and further there is no discussion of circumstances in which the juvenile allegedly committed the offence.

19. In absence of the aforementioned detailed assessment as mandated under Section 15 of the Act of 2015, I am of the considered view that the Board failed in its duty to comply with the provision under Section 15 of the Act of 2015 making preliminary assessment of the juvenile. The Children Court also have only considered the offence committed by the juvenile and the manner in which it was committed and failed to take note of the requirement under Section 15 of the Act of 2015 for preliminary assessment of juvenile. The Children Court also have considered only two line report submitted by the expert.

 In the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur

(Before Parth Prateem Sahu, J.)

Xyz  Vs  State of Chhattisgarh, through Police Station Sariya.

CRR No. 962 of 2023

Decided on May 2, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine Chh 4280.

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Bombay HC: Child Cannot Be Automatically Tried As An Adult Even If It Commits Heinous Crime

 As per Section 2(33) of the J.J. Act "heinous offences" means the offences in which minimum punishment is seven years or more. The learned JJB has held that none of the Sections 18, 20, 38 and 39 provides minimum punishment for seven years. The sine qua non for trying the CCL as an adult for committing heinous offence is minimum punishment of seven years. This issue is no longer res integra. In the case of Shilpa Mittal Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another [MANU/SC/0020/2020 : (2020) 2 Supreme Court Cases 787] the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:

"34. From the scheme of Sections 14, 15 and 19 referred to above it is clear that the Legislature felt that before the juvenile is tried as an adult a very detailed study must be done and the procedure laid down has to be followed. Even if a child commits a heinous crime, he is not automatically to be tried as an adult. This also clearly indicates that the meaning of the words "heinous offence" cannot be expanded by removing the word "minimum" from the definition.

35. Though we are of the view that the word "minimum" cannot be treated as surplusage, yet we are duty-bound to decide as to how the children who have committed an offence falling within the 4th category should be dealt with. We are conscious of the views expressed by us above that this Court cannot legislate. However, if we do not deal with this issue there would be no guidance to the Juvenile Justice Boards to deal with children who have committed such offences which definitely are serious, or may be more than serious offences, even if they are not heinous offences. Since two views are possible we would prefer to take a view which is in favour of children and, in our opinion, the Legislature should take the call in this matter, but till it does so, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution, we direct that from the date when the 2015 Act came into force, all children who have committed offences falling in the 4th category shall be dealt with in the same manner as children who have committed "serious offences". {Para 11}

12. Having regard to this, it is clear that the learned JJB did not commit any error in rejecting the application Exhibit 25 in J.C. No. 160 of 2019 and the learned Appellate Court did not commit any error in dismissing Criminal Appeal No. 2 of 2021. Hence, the revision application is devoid of any substance. Revision Application is accordingly dismissed

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Revision Application No. 90 of 2021

Decided On: 16.03.2022

The State of Maharashtra Vs. Shadab Tabarak Khan

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.G. Sewlikar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0906/2022

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Whether the court should release the woman accused of heinous offence on bail?

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that, the petitioner is a woman. Therefore, she is entitled the benefit of first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. The first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. says that, 'the Court may direct that a person referred to in Clause (i) or Clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm'. The counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that, this is a mandatory provision and the petitioner is entitled bail under the first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. I cannot agree with this submission of the petitioner. In the first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. the word 'may' is used, that itself shows that, it is the discretion of the court concerned to grant or not to grant bail to a person who is under the age of 16 years or a woman or a sick person or an infirm person.

 This Court earlier dismissed the bail application of the petitioners filed in Crime No. 980 of 2019 of Thamarassery Police Station and Crime No. 189 of 2011 of Kodenchery Police Station. Similar allegations are raised against the petitioner in this case also. The other contentions raised by the petitioner are discussed in detail by this Court. This Court also considered the arguments of the learned Public Prosecutor that the petitioner had attempted to commit suicide inside the jail and releasing the petitioner at this stage is dangerous to her. The relevant discussion in the order dated 30.6.2020 in B.A. No. 3246 of 2020 filed by the petitioner is extracted hereunder:

"10. Applying the above principles to the case in hand, I find that the petitioner is a lady, who is involved in six cases in which she has allegedly murdered her close relatives, including her former husband. It is also brought in by the learned Public Prosecutor that the petitioner had attempted to commit suicide inside the jail by slashing her wrists. Timely intervention saved her life. In case she is released on bail, there is every possibility of her influencing or intimidating witnesses, repeating similar offences also cannot be ruled out, and may even go to the extent of causing harm to herself. The nature of the accusation definitely will have to be borne in mind and the facts in this case point out to a very grave crime allegedly committed by the petitioner. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore, justified and declining bail to the petitioner. I have no reason to find otherwise"

The relevant paragraph of the order dated 20.3.2020 in B.A. No. 1607 of 2020 is extracted hereunder:

"14. Deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is of - course not for punitive purpose, but prima facie when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had committed the offence and seriousness and the gravity of the offences alleged against her is quite obvious, while exercising the discretion in a judicious manner, this court can only reject her request to enlarge her on bail. In fact there are no circumstances justifying her release on bail, at this stage. She is the prime accused in five other murder cases. The deceased in all the cases were close relatives rather members of the very same family. Release of her on bail where charge is not even framed would shake the confidence of the public/society in judicial system. To ensure a fair trial, I find that the discretion of this court cannot be exercised in favor of this petitioner, just considering the fact that she is a lady undergoing incarceration for the last more than five months."

13. I respectfully agree with the findings of this Court in the above two cases. The same principle is applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case also.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 4628 of 2020

Decided On: 14.08.2020

 Jollyamma Joseph  Vs.  State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/2189/2020

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Landmark Judgment on grant of bail to juvenile and conduct of trial under Juvenile Justice Act 2015

We, thus, sum up the references by

holding as under:-

Q. (i). Under which provision of law, a

child, who has completed or is above the age

of 16 years and is alleged to have committed

a ‘heinous offence’ can maintain his

application during the pendency of

preliminary assessment by the Board under

Section 15 of the Act of 2015?

A. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, a

child, who has completed or is above the age of

16 years and is alleged to have committed a

‘heinous offence’ can maintain his application for

release on bail under Section 12 of the Act of

2015 during the pendency of preliminary

assessment by the Board under Section 15 of the

Act of 2015.

Q. (ii). Under which provision of law, a

child, who has completed or is above the age

of 16 years and is alleged to have committed

a ‘heinous offence’ can maintain his

application for release on bail after the

transfer of his case to the Children’s Court

for trial by the Board ?

A. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, a

child, who has completed or is above the age of

16 years and is alleged to have committed a

‘heinous offence’ can maintain his application for

release on bail under Section 12 of the Act of

2015 after the transfer of his case to the

Children’s Court.

Q. (iii). Whether the powers conferred

on the Board in the matter of bail to a

person, who is apparently a child alleged to

be in conflict with law are also available to

the Children’s Court ?

A. In view of clear, unambiguous and specific

stipulation in Section 8(2) of the Act of 2015,

which provides that the powers conferred on the

Board under the Act may also be exercised by the

High Court and the Children’s Court in the matter

of grant of bail to a person, who is apparently a

child and is alleged to have committed a bailable

or non-bailable offence, the powers conferred on

the Board under the Act of 2015 are also

available to the Children’s Court and the High

Court.

Q. (iv). Whether seriousness of the

offence alleged is a ground for rejecting the

bail in case of a child in conflict with law?.

A. Seriousness of the offence alleged cannot

be made a ground for rejecting bail under the Act

of 2015.

Q. (v). Whether an appeal under Section

101(5) of the Act of 2015 or an application

under Section 439 of the CrPC would be

maintainable before the High Court by any

person aggrieved by the order granting or

rejecting bail by the Children’s Court?

A. Against an order granting or refusing bail

passed by the Children’s Court, no application for

bail or cancellation of bail under Section 439(1)

or 439(2) of the CrPC shall lie before the High

Court and against such an order only an appeal

under Section 101(5) of the Act of 2015 would

be maintainable. The ‘phrase’ “in accordance with

the procedure specified in the Code of Criminal

Procedure” does not allude to application of the

entire CrPC to the Act of 2015. The said

reference to the CrPC in Section 101(5) of the

Act of 2015 only means that the procedure, and

not the substantive Sections, prescribed under

Chapter XXIX shall apply to the appeal that could

be filed under the said Section. To clarify further,

the appeal, in terms of Section 101(5) has to be

considered on the basis of material available on

the record, i.e., material produced before the

Board under Section 13 of the Act of 2015 and

considerations arrived at in terms of Section 12

of the Act of 2015 for the purpose of grant of

bail and not the considerations of grant of bail in

terms of Sections 437, 438 and 439 of the CrPC.

The reference in Section 101(5) to “procedure

specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure” does

not enlarge the scope of sub-sections to create a

substantive right in terms of Section 439 of the

CrPC in Section 101(5) of the Act of 2015.

Q. (vi). What is the scope of Section

19(1)(i) of the Act of 2015 in connection

with the trial of a child as an adult? Whether

the provisions of Section 19 of the Act of

2015 are mandatory or the Children’s Court

has to compulsorily follow the

recommendations of the Board made under

Section 15 read with Section 18(3) of the

Act of 2015 ?

A. Upon a case of a child having been

transferred to the Children’s Court, a duty has

been cast upon the Children’s Court to further

decide about the suitability of the child to be tried

as an adult. The words used in Section 19(1)(i)

and 19(1)(ii) of the Act of 2015 give two options

to the Children’s Court. First, to try the

transferred child as an adult and second not to

deal with child as an adult. The Children’s Court is

required to record its reason while arriving at a

conclusion whether the child should be treated as

child or an adult in view of Rule 13 (6) of the

Rules. In case, the Children’s Court decides to

deal with child as a child it has to conduct an

inquiry as a Board following the procedures for

trial of a summons case in accordance with the

provisions of Section 18 as would appear from

the words used in Section 19(1)(i) of the Act of

2015. In case, it decides to try the child as an

adult, it shall follow the procedure as prescribed

by the CrPC for the purpose of trial by Sessions

Court and pass appropriate orders after trial

without prejudice to the provisions of Sections 19

and 21 of the Act of 2015 considering special

‘needs of the child’ the tenets of ‘fair trial’ and

maintaining a ‘child friendly’ atmosphere as

provided under Section 19(1)(i) of the Act of

2015.

The provisions of Section 19(1) of the Act

of 2015 are mandatory. The Children’s Court

cannot dispense with the requirement of deciding

as to whether there is need to try the transferred

child as an adult or to deal with the transferred

child as a child.

Q. (vii). What is the scope of application

of the provisions of CrPC after the Board

transfers the trial of the case to the

Children’s Court having jurisdiction to try

such offences and the Children’s Court

decides that there is a need for trial of the

child as an adult?

A. The procedure followed by the Children’s

Court for trial of a child as an adult would be of a

warrant case and the proceedings in Chapter

XVIII prescribed under Sections 225 to 237 of

the CrPC, which deal with warrant cases by a

Court of Sessions only would be applicable while

trying a child as an adult, subject to exceptions

indicated under the Act of 2015.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA

CRIMINAL APPEAL (SJ) No.2117 of 2019

LALU KUMAR @ LAL BABU @ LALLU,  Vs  The State of Bihar

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH

and  MR. JUSTICE BIRENDRA KUMAR

(Per: MR. JUSTICE ASHWANI KUMAR SINGH)

Date :01-10-2019

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Procedure to be followed under the Juvenile Justice Act if juvenile above the age of 16 years is involved in the heinous offence

 The Board would inquire into or try a heinous offence adopting the procedure of summons cases if the child was below sixteen years when he had committed the offence. For a child above sixteen years, inquiry must be as per Section 15.

32. Now comes the prominent provision for our purpose: Section 15 of the Act. If a child above 16 years is accused of committing a heinous offence, the Board must conduct a preliminary assessment about the child's mental and physical capacity to commit the alleged offence, his ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence. Then, the Board will pass an order under Section 18 (3) of the Act. It pays to quote Section 15:

Section 15 - Preliminary assessment into heinous offences by Board:

(1) In case of a heinous offence alleged to have been committed by a child, who has completed or is above the age of sixteen years, the Board shall conduct a preliminary assessment with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such offence, ability to understand the consequences of the offence and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence, and may pass an order in accordance with the provisions of subsection (3) of section 18:

Provided that for such an assessment, the Board may take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts.

Explanation.-- For the purposes of this section, it is clarified that preliminary assessment is not a trial, but is to assess the capacity of such child to commit and understand the consequences of the alleged offence.

(2) Where the Board is satisfied on preliminary assessment that the matter should be disposed of by the Board, then the Board shall follow the procedure, as far as may be, for trial in summons case under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):

Provided that the order of the Board to dispose of the matter shall be appealable under sub-section (2) of section 101:

Provided further that the assessment under this section shall be completed within the period specified in section 14.

(italics supplied)

33. As Section 15 permits the Board may, during the preliminary assessment, take the assistance of experienced psychologists or psycho-social workers or other experts. First, the preliminary assessment is "not a trial." Second, it is, instead, an inquiry to assess the child's capacity to commit the alleged offence and to understand its consequences. On inquiry, the Board must satisfy itself in its preliminary assessment about the juvenile's mental and physical capacity, his ability to understand the consequences of the offence, and so on. Then, if the Board is "satisfied on preliminary assessment that the matter should be disposed of", it will follow "the procedure, as far as may be, for trial in summons case under Cr PC." The Board's order is appealable under sub-section (2) of Section 101.

34. Now comes the role of the Children's Court. Once it receives the preliminary assessment from the Board under section 15, it may decide to try the child as an adult under Cr. P.C. If it decides to the contrary, it tries him as a juvenile. The Children's Court, too, "may conduct an inquiry as a Board and pass appropriate orders" under Section 18.

The Adjudicatory Bounds:

35. Against the Board's order under Section 15 of the Act, Section 101 (2) provides for an appeal. The appeal must be before the Court of Sessions. The appellate court, too, takes the assistance of experienced psychologists and medical specialists, other than those who assisted the Board in its passing the order under appeal. As subsection (4) mandates, there is no further appeal against the Court of Session's order.

 So we need to revisit Section 15 of the Act to determine what circumstances compel a juvenile to face the trial as if he were an adult. (1) It must be a heinous offence; here it is. (2) The child must have completed sixteen years; here he has. (3) The Board must have conducted a preliminary assessment; here it has. (4) That preliminary assessment concerns four aspects: (a) the child's mental and (b) physical capacity to commit such offence; (c) his ability to understand the consequences of the offence; (d) and the circumstances in which he allegedly committed the offence. The preliminary assessment, indeed, has been on all these aspects. Agreed. But has the Board found the child fitting into the scheme on all four counts?

88. I reckon of the four aspects--physical capacity, mental ability, understanding, and the circumstances--none is dispensable. They all must be present, for they are not in the alternative. Let us remind ourselves, just because the statute permits a child of 16 years and beyond can stand trial in a heinous offence as an adult, it does not mean that the statute intends that all those children should be subject to adult punishment. It is not a default choice; a conscious, calibrated one. And for that, all the statutory criteria must be fulfilled.

The whole endeavour of the JJ Act is to save the child in conflict with the law from the path of self-destruction and being a menace to the society. It is reformative, not retributive. Section 15, I believe, must be read and understood keeping in view the objective that permeates the whole Act and the spirit it is imbued with.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Appeal No. 1153 of 2018, Criminal Writ Petition No. 1346 of 2018 and Criminal Application No. 262 of 2018 in Writ Petition No. 1346 of 2018

Decided On: 15.07.2019

Mumtaz Ahmed Nasir Khan  Vs.  The State of Maharashtra 

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Landmark Supreme Court judgment clarifying heinous offences and serious offences under Juvenile justice Act 2015

 1) “Whether an offence prescribing a maximum sentence of

more than 7 years imprisonment but not providing any minimum

sentence, or providing a minimum sentence of less than 7 years,

can be considered to be a ‘heinous offence’ within the meaning of

Section 2(33) of The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of

Children) Act, 2015?” is the extremely important and interesting

issue which arises in this case.

 2) It is contended by Mr. Siddharth Luthra, that if the

definitions of offences, i.e., petty, serious and heinous are read

literally then there is one category of offences which is not

covered by the Act of 2015. He submits that petty offences are

those offences where the punishment is up to 3 years, serious

offences are those where the maximum punishment is of 7 years,

and as far as heinous offences are concerned, if the definition is

read literally, then these are only those offences which provide a

minimum sentence of 7 years and above. He submits that this

leaves out a host of offences falling within the 4th category. The 4th

category of offences are those where the minimum sentence is

less than 7 years, or there is no minimum sentence prescribed

but the maximum sentence is more than 7 years. He has

submitted a chart of such offences. It is not necessary to set out

the chart inextenso

but we may highlight a few of these offences.

3) Some of these offences relate to abetment but they also include

offences such as those under Section 121A, 122 of IPC, offences

relating to counterfeiting of currency, homicide not amounting to

murder (as in the present case), abetment to suicide of child or

innocent person and many others. He submits that it could not

have been the intention of the Legislature to leave out these

offences and they should have been in some category at least.

The submission of Mr. Luthra is that if from the definition of

‘heinous offences’, the word ‘minimum’ is removed then all

offences other than petty and serious would fall under the

heading of ‘heinous offences’. He submits that if the 4th category

of offences is left out it would result in an absurdity which could

not have been the intention of the Legislature. He further

submits that applying the doctrine of surplusage, if the word

‘minimum’ is removed then everything will fall into place.

4)  What has  happened in this case is that there is a 4th category of offences which is not dealt with under the Act. It cannot be said with certainty that the Legislature intended to include this 4th category of offences in the category of ‘heinous offences’. Merely because removing the word ‘minimum’ would make the Act workable is not a sufficient ground to hold that the word ‘minimum’ is  surplusage.

27. Mr. Luthra, drew our attention to the speech of the Minister

while introducing the Bill in relation to the Act of 2015. We need

not repeat the speech in detail but reading of the same clearly

indicates that the Minister while dealing with the issue of

‘heinous offences’ wherein the children could be tried as adults

mainly made reference to the offences of murder, rape and

terrorism. There are some other speeches that have been

referred to by Mr. Luthra, but we are not referring to the same

because the intention of the Legislature as a whole cannot be

gauged from the speeches of individual members, some of whom

supported the Bill and some of whom did not support the Bill.

The main reliance could only be made on the objects and reasons

and introduction of the Bill by the Minister which basically

makes reference to offences like murder, rape, terrorism, where

the minimum punishment is more than 7 years.

30. We must also while interpreting an Act see what is the

purpose of the Act. The purpose of the Act of 2015 is to ensure

that children who come in conflict with law are dealt with

separately and not like adults. After the unfortunate incident of

rape on December 16, 2012 in Delhi, where one juvenile was

involved, there was a call from certain sections of the society that

juveniles indulging in such heinous crimes should not be dealt

with like children. This incident has also been referred to by the

Minister in her introduction. In these circumstances, to say that

the intention of the Legislature was to include all offences having

a punishment of more than 7 years in the category of ‘heinous

offences’ would not, in our opinion be justified. When the

language of the section is clear and it prescribes a minimum

sentence of 7 years imprisonment while dealing with heinous

offences then we cannot wish away the word ‘minimum’ .

31. No doubt, as submitted by Mr. Luthra there appears to be a

gross mistake committed by the framers of the legislation. The

legislation does not take into consideration the 4th category of

offences. How and in what manner a juvenile who commits such

offences should be dealt with was something that the Legislature

should have clearly spelt out in the Act. There is an unfortunate

gap. We cannot fill the gap by saying that these offences should

be treated as heinous offences. Whereas on the one hand there

are some offences in this category which may in general parlance

be termed as heinous, there are many other offences which

cannot be called as heinous offences. It is not for this Court to

legislate. We may fill in the gaps but we cannot enact a

legislation, especially when the Legislature itself has enacted one.

We also have to keep in mind the fact that the scheme of the

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 is

that children should be protected. Treating children as adults is

an exception to the rule. It is also a well settled principle of

statutory interpretation that normally an exception has to be

given a restricted meaning.

Though we are of the view that the word ‘minimum’ cannot

be treated as surplusage, yet we are duty bound to decide as to

how the children who have committed an offence falling within

the 4th category should be dealt with. We are conscious of the

views expressed by us above that this Court cannot legislate.

However, if we do not deal with this issue there would be no

guidance to the Juvenile Justice Boards to deal with children

who have committed such offences which definitely are serious,

or may be more than serious offences, even if they are not

heinous offences. Since two views are possible we would prefer

to take a view which is in favour of children and, in our opinion,

the Legislature should take the call in this matter, but till it does

so, in exercise of powers conferred under Article142 of the

Constitution, we direct that from the date when the Act of 2015

came into force, all children who have committed offences falling

in the 4th category shall be dealt with in the same manner as

children who have committed ‘serious offences’.

36. In view of the above discussion we dispose of the appeal

by answering the question set out in the first part of the

judgment in the negative and hold that an offence which does

not provide a minimum sentence of 7 years cannot be treated to

be an heinous offence. However, in view of what we have held

above, the Act does not deal with the 4th category of offences

viz., offence where the maximum sentence is more than 7 years

imprisonment, but no minimum sentence or minimum

sentence of less than 7 years is provided, shall be treated as

‘serious offences’ within the meaning of the Act and dealt with

accordingly till the Parliament takes the call on the matter.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 34 OF 2020

SHILPA MITTAL Vs  STATE OF NCT OF DELHI 

Dated:January 09, 2020

Deepak Gupta, J.
Citation: (2020) 2 SCC 787,AIR 2020 SC 405

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Whether a child, who has not committed heinous offence can be transferred to Children's Court?

 The legal issue is raised as follows :
Whether a child, who has not committed heinous offence can
be transferred to Children's Court?
 Under section 15 of the said Act, preliminary assessment in
respect of offence whether is heinous, is to be made by Juvenile Justice
Board. The word “heinous offences” is defined under section 2 (33) of
the said Act, which states as follows :
“2 (33). “heinous offences” includes the offences for
which the minimum punishment under the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) or any other law for the time being in
force is imprisonment for seven years or more” .
10. Section 2 (54) of the said Act defines “serious offences” includes
the offences for which the punishment under the Indian Penal Code (45
of 1860) or any other law for the time being in force, is imprisonment
between three to seven years.

11. Under section 307 of IPC, minimum punishment is not
prescribed, but punishment may extend to ten years and fine, and if
hurt is caused to any person, then punishment can be extended upto
life imprisonment.
12. Thus, due to the benchmark of minimum punishment of 7 years
or more, section 307 of IPC cannot fall within the ambit of heinous
offences.
 In the present case, all the petitioners though are between the
age group of 16 to 18 years, they have not committed heinous offences
and, therefore, their case is not covered under section 15 of the said Act
and no order can be passed under section 18 (3) of the said Act of
transferring the case to Children's Court. Hence, the order dated 19th
January, 2018 passed by Juvenile Justice Board of Sangli District and
also the order dated 13th July, 2018 passed by Juvenile Justice Board,
Sangli are quashed and set aside and the inquiry is to be conducted by
Juvenile Justice Board, Sangli under section 18 (3) of the said Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 4044 OF 2018

 Saurabh Jalinder Nangre, Vs State of Maharashtra,

CORAM: MRS.MRIDULA BHATKAR, J.
DATED: DECEMBER 10, 2018

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