Himachal Pradesh HC : Transgender Persons Cannot Invoke Section 69 Of BNS In False Promise Of Marriage Cases

 As per definition pronoun "he" and its derivatives are used of any person, whether male, female or transgender. For the first time, word "transgender" has been included in the definition of "gender", meaning thereby, transgenders cannot claim themselves to be male or female as they are given separate identity. {Para 10}

11. Section 2(35) of BNS defines "Woman" as under:

"2 (35) "woman" means a female human being of any age."

12. As per aforesaid provision of law, woman means female human being of any age. Since under BNS, "woman" and "transgender" have been given different identity and have been defined independently, under Section 2 coupled with the fact that physical relationship inter-se victim- prosecutrix and bail petitioner, if any, was developed prior to surgery of victim-prosecutrix, whereby she allegedly got her sex changed, there appears to be force in the claim of the bail petitioner that he could not have been booked under Section 69 of the BNS.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

Cr. MP(M) No. 1798 of 2024

Decided On: 30.08.2024

Bhupesh Thakur Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep Sharma, J.

Citation: MANU/HP/2423/2024.

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Supreme Court: Sessions or Pocso Courts Must Order Victim Compensation or interim compensation In Cases Of Sexual Offences Against Minors And Women

 In the circumstances, we direct that a Sessions Court, which adjudicates a case concerning the bodily injuries such as sexual assault etc. particularly on minor children and women shall order for victim compensation to be paid having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and based on the evidence on record, while passing the judgment either convicting or acquitting the Accused. Secondly, the said direction must be implemented by the District Legal Services Authority or State Legal Services Authority, as the case may be, in letter and spirit and in the quickest manner and to ensure that the victim is paid the compensation at the earliest. {Para 16}

17. There can also be a direction for payment of interim compensation which could be made by the Sessions Court depending upon the facts of each case.

19. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the second Respondent shall also be entitled to be considered for compensation Under Rule 7 of the POCSO Rules, 2012 and now Under Rule 9 of the POCSO Rules, 2020.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 4495 of 2024.

Decided On: 04.11.2024

Saibaj Noormohammad Shaikh Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Pankaj Mithal, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1363/2024.

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Supreme Court: Can't Deny Benefit Of First Proviso To S.45 PMLA Merely Because A Woman Is Well-Educated Or An MP/MLA

  This Court, in the carefully couched paragraph

extracted above used the phrase “persons of tender age and

woman who are likely to be more vulnerable, may sometimes

be misused by the unscrupulous elements”. This is vastly

different from saying that the proviso to Section 45(1) of the

PMLA applies only to “vulnerable woman”. Further, this

Court in the case of Saumya Chaurasia (supra) does not

say that merely because a woman is highly educated or

sophisticated or a Member of Parliament or a Member of

Legislative Assembly, she is not entitled to the benefit of the

proviso to Section 45(1) of the PMLA. {Para 27}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2024

[Arising out of SLP(Criminal) No. 10778 of 2024]

KALVAKUNTLA KAVITHA Vs  DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT 

Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.

Citation: 2024 INSC 632.

Dated: AUGUST 27, 2024.

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Whether complaint of sexual harassment made by one woman against another woman is maintainable?

A cursory glance at Section 2(m) of the 2013 Act shows that the term "respondent" brings within its fold "a person", thereby including persons of all genders. {Para 11}

12. Although there is substance in the submission of the petitioner that the said expression has to be read in conjunction with the rest of the statue as a whole, there is nothing in Section 9 of the 2013 Act [which has been referred to in Section 2(m)] to preclude a same-gender complaint under the Act. Although it might seem a bit odd at the first blush that people of the same gender complain of sexual harassment against each other, it is not improbable, particularly in the context of the dynamic mode which the Indian society is adopting currently, even debating the issue as to whether same-gender marriages may be legalized.

13. That apart, the definition of "sexual harassment" in Section 2(n) cannot be a static concept but has to be interpreted against the back-drop of the social perspective. Sexual harassment, as contemplated in the 2013 Act, thus, has to pertain to the dignity of a person, which relates to her/his gender and sexuality; which does not mean that any person of the same gender cannot hurt the modesty or dignity as envisaged by the 2013 Act. A person of any gender may feel threatened and sexually harassed when her/his modesty or dignity as a member of the said gender is offended by any of the acts, as contemplated in Section 2(n), irrespective of the sexuality and gender of the perpetrator of the act.

14. If Section 3(2) is looked into, it is seen that the acts contemplated therein can be perpetrated by the members of any gender, even inter se. In such context, the language of Section 2(m), Section 2(n) and Section 3 of the 2013 Act is set out below:-

"2(m) "respondent" means a person against whom the aggrieved woman has made a complaint under section 9;

15. In such view of the matter, the act alleged by the private respondent to have been perpetrated by the petitioner, as evident from the complaint dated September 15, 2020 (Annexure P-5), is maintainable under the 2013 Act. Hence, the complaint cannot be turned down at the outset.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

W.P.A. 9141 of 2020

Decided On: 27.11.2020

Malabika Bhattacharjee Vs. Internal Complaints Committe, Vivekananda College and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya, J.

Citation:  MANU/WB/0752/2020.

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Supreme court guidelines to Judges about Judgments writing in sexual offences

  Having regard to the foregoing discussion, it is hereby directed that henceforth:

(a) Bail conditions should not mandate, require or permit contact between the

accused and the victim. Such conditions should seek to protect the complainant from

any further harassment by the accused;

(b) Where circumstances exist for the court to believe that there might be a

potential threat of harassment of the victim, or upon apprehension expressed, after

calling for reports from the police, the nature of protection shall be separately

considered and appropriate order made, in addition to a direction to the accused not to

make any contact with the victim;

(c) In all cases where bail is granted, the complainant should immediately be

informed that the accused has been granted bail and copy of the bail order made over to him/her within two days;

(d) Bail conditions and orders should avoid reflecting stereotypical or patriarchal notions about women and their place in society, and must strictly be in accordance with the requirements of the Cr. PC. In other words, discussion about the dress, behavior, or past “conduct” or “morals” of the prosecutrix, should not enter the verdict granting bail;

(e) The courts while adjudicating cases involving gender related crimes, should not suggest or entertain any notions (or encourage any steps) towards compromises between the prosecutrix and the accused to get married, suggest or mandatemediation between the accused and the survivor, or any form of compromise as it is beyond their powers and jurisdiction;

(f) Sensitivity should be displayed at all times by judges, who should ensure that there is no traumatization of the prosecutrix, during the proceedings, or anything said during the arguments, and

(g) Judges especially should not use any words, spoken or written, that would undermine or shake the confidence of the survivor in the fairness or impartiality of the court. {Para 44}

45. Further, courts should desist from expressing any stereotype opinion, in words spoken during proceedings, or in the course of a judicial order, to the effect that (i) women are physically weak and need protection; (ii) women are incapable of or cannot take decisions on their own; (iii) men are the “head” of the household and should take all the decisions relating to family; (iv) women should be submissive and obedient according to our culture; (v) “good” women are sexually chaste; (vi) motherhood is the duty and role of every woman, and assumptions to the effect that she wants to be a mother; (vii) women should be the ones in charge of their children,

their upbringing and care; (viii) being alone at night or wearing certain clothes make women responsible for being attacked; (ix) a woman consuming alcohol, smoking, etc. may justify unwelcome advances by men or “has asked for it”; (x) women are emotional and often overreact or dramatize events, hence it is necessary to corroborate their testimony; (xi) testimonial evidence provided by women who are sexually active may be suspected when assessing “consent” in sexual offence cases;and (xii) lack of evidence of physical harm in sexual offence case leads to an  inference of consent by the woman.

46. As far as the training and sensitization of judges and lawyers, including public

prosecutors goes, this court hereby mandates that a module on gender sensitization be

included, as part of the foundational training of every judge. This module must aim at

imparting techniques for judges to be more sensitive in hearing and deciding cases of

sexual assault, and eliminating entrenched social bias, especially misogyny. The

module should also emphasize the prominent role that judges are expected to play in

society, as role models and thought leaders, in promoting equality and ensuring

fairness, safety and security to all women who allege the perpetration of sexual

offences against them. Equally, the use of language and appropriate words and

phrases should be emphasized as part of this training.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

(CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION)

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 329 OF 2021

[@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO. 2531 OF 2021]

(ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRL.) DIARY NO. 20318 OF 2020)

APARNA BHAT & ORS. Vs STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 

Author: S. RAVINDRA BHAT, J.

Dated:March 18, 2021.

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 230,2021 ALL SCR (Cri) 732

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Whether the court can hold accused guilty of sexual harassment if the transgender victim views herself as a woman?

 Finally the petitioner's counsel contended that admittedly the

defacto complainant is a transgender person and that therefore it is not

open to the prosecution to invoke the provisions of Tamil Nadu

Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002.

7.In response thereto, the learned Government Advocate (Crl.

Side) drew my attention to the decision of this Court made in Arunkumar

Srija Vs. Inspector General of Registration. This Court following the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court report in (2014) 5 SCC 483

(National Legal Services Authority Vs. Union of India) had held that it is

entirely for the transgender person to self-identify her gender and that this

self determination cannot be questioned by others.

8.In the case of hand, the defacto complainant/Neka views

herself as a woman. Therefore, the prosecution rightly accepted the said self identification and registered the case under Tamil Nadu Prohibition of

Harassment of Women Act, 2002. Therefore, I find no merit in the

contention of the petitioner's counsel that invocation of Tamil Nadu

Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002, is not maintainable.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

DATED: 28.10.2020

CORAM:

 MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN

Crl.O.P(MD)No.11848 of 2020

and

Crl.M.P.(MD)Nos.5454 and 5457 of 2020

M.Srinivasan  Vs. State through The Inspector of Police.

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Whether the court should release the woman accused of heinous offence on bail?

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that, the petitioner is a woman. Therefore, she is entitled the benefit of first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. The first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. says that, 'the Court may direct that a person referred to in Clause (i) or Clause (ii) be released on bail if such person is under the age of sixteen years or is a woman or is sick or infirm'. The counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that, this is a mandatory provision and the petitioner is entitled bail under the first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. I cannot agree with this submission of the petitioner. In the first proviso to Section 437 (1) Cr.P.C. the word 'may' is used, that itself shows that, it is the discretion of the court concerned to grant or not to grant bail to a person who is under the age of 16 years or a woman or a sick person or an infirm person.

 This Court earlier dismissed the bail application of the petitioners filed in Crime No. 980 of 2019 of Thamarassery Police Station and Crime No. 189 of 2011 of Kodenchery Police Station. Similar allegations are raised against the petitioner in this case also. The other contentions raised by the petitioner are discussed in detail by this Court. This Court also considered the arguments of the learned Public Prosecutor that the petitioner had attempted to commit suicide inside the jail and releasing the petitioner at this stage is dangerous to her. The relevant discussion in the order dated 30.6.2020 in B.A. No. 3246 of 2020 filed by the petitioner is extracted hereunder:

"10. Applying the above principles to the case in hand, I find that the petitioner is a lady, who is involved in six cases in which she has allegedly murdered her close relatives, including her former husband. It is also brought in by the learned Public Prosecutor that the petitioner had attempted to commit suicide inside the jail by slashing her wrists. Timely intervention saved her life. In case she is released on bail, there is every possibility of her influencing or intimidating witnesses, repeating similar offences also cannot be ruled out, and may even go to the extent of causing harm to herself. The nature of the accusation definitely will have to be borne in mind and the facts in this case point out to a very grave crime allegedly committed by the petitioner. The learned Sessions Judge was therefore, justified and declining bail to the petitioner. I have no reason to find otherwise"

The relevant paragraph of the order dated 20.3.2020 in B.A. No. 1607 of 2020 is extracted hereunder:

"14. Deprivation of freedom by refusal of bail is of - course not for punitive purpose, but prima facie when there are reasonable grounds to believe that the petitioner had committed the offence and seriousness and the gravity of the offences alleged against her is quite obvious, while exercising the discretion in a judicious manner, this court can only reject her request to enlarge her on bail. In fact there are no circumstances justifying her release on bail, at this stage. She is the prime accused in five other murder cases. The deceased in all the cases were close relatives rather members of the very same family. Release of her on bail where charge is not even framed would shake the confidence of the public/society in judicial system. To ensure a fair trial, I find that the discretion of this court cannot be exercised in favor of this petitioner, just considering the fact that she is a lady undergoing incarceration for the last more than five months."

13. I respectfully agree with the findings of this Court in the above two cases. The same principle is applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case also.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Bail Appl. No. 4628 of 2020

Decided On: 14.08.2020

 Jollyamma Joseph  Vs.  State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/2189/2020

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Orissa HC: Live-in relationship by Same-sex couple is permissible under Domestic violence Act and woman in the said relationship is entitled to get the protection of the said Act

Thus, taking into consideration the aforesaid authoritative

pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, there is hardly any scope to take a view other than holding that the petitioner has the right of self-determination of sex/gender and also he has the right to have a live-in relationship with a person of

his choice even though such person may belong to the same gender as the  petitioner.

Therefore, we allow the writ application (criminal) and direct that the petitioner and the daughter of the Opposite Party No.5 have the right to decide their sexual preferences including the right to stay as live-in partners.  The lady shall have all the rights of a woman as enshrined under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

ORISSA HIGH COURT: CUTTACK

Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 57 of 2020

Chinmayee Jena @ Sonu Krishna Jena Vs State of Odisha 

P R E S E N T

 MR. JUSTICE S.K.MISHRA

AND

 MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO

Date of Judgment – 24.08.2020

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ORDINARY TICKET PURCHASED WOMEN AND CHILDREN TRAVELLING ALONE CANNOT BE INSISTED TO LEAVE RESERVATION COMPARTMENT AFTER DAY TIME

Central Government Act

Section 139 in The Railways Act, 1989

139. Power to remove persons.—Any person failing or refusing to pay the fare and the excess charge referred to in section 138 may be removed by any railway servant authorised in this behalf who may call to his aid any other person to effect such removal: Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude a person removed from a carriage of a higher class from continuing his journey in a carriage of a class for which he holds a pass or ticket: Provided further that a woman or a child if unaccompanied by a male passenger, shall not be so removed except either at the station from where she or he commences her or his journey or at a junction or terminal station or station at the headquarters of a civil district and such removal shall be made only during the day.

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Whether in partition suit woman litigant is entitled to get exemption of court fees?

The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Girish Kanaiyalal Munshi (Deceased), Petition (L) No. 118/2007, reported in 2008 (4) ALL MR 306 bestowed its thoughtful consideration to these claims and counter-claims and explained the meaning of the clarification issued by the State of Maharashtra in the year 2000.

6. In the aforestated case, the application had been filed by the woman for issuance of Probate of the Will of her deceased husband. The Division Bench held that such an application would not be covered by 1994 notification as the clarification issued in the year 2000 made it clear that it is only those property disputes which arise out of and which concern matrimonial matters which enjoy such remission. In the opinion of the Division Bench, an application filed for issuance of Probate of deceased husband's Will is not a dispute concerning matrimonial matter. The observations of the Division Bench made in paragraph 26 are relevant and they are re-produced as under :-

"C) Furthermore it is pertinent to differentiate between matrimonial matters and matrimonial relationship as the two terms are not synonymous and hence the term 'matrimonial matters' arising in the Notification of 23/03/2000 cannot be replaced by 'matrimonial relationship' so as to bring a petition filed by a widow for probate of her deceased husband's Will, within the ambit of the Notification.

D) Lastly, the words, 'property dispute arising out of or concerning matrimonial matters' should be given their plain and simple meaning, that is, a dispute arising between parties to a marriage, (attention may be brought to the reference made by Deshmukh, J. to the Family Courts Act Sub-section 1 Section 7, to elucidate the meaning of the term 'matrimonial matters') and should therefore exclude testamentary petitions wherein not only is there an absence of a dispute, other than in cases when somebody files a caveat, it is not a matter between two parties to a marriage."

Bombay High Court

Smt. Arti Wd/O Deepak Kamlakar vs Shri Vijay S/O Deorao Kamlakar, ... on 28 June, 2018

Bench: S.B. Shukre

Citation: 2019(1) MHLJ 650  

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What are essential ingredients of offence U/S 366 of IPC?

In the above backdrop, it is pertinent to mention here the ingredients of Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code which are as under:

366 "Kidnapping, abducting or inducing woman to compel her marriage, etc.--Whoever kidnaps or abducts any woman with intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled, to marry any person against her will, or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extent do ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and whoever, by means of criminal intimidation as defined in this Code or of abuse of authority or any other method of compulsion, induces any woman to go from any place with intent that she may be, or knowing that it is likely that she will be, forced or seduced to illicit intercourse with another person shall be punishable as aforesaid.

In order to constitute the offence of 'abduction' a person must be carried off illegally by force or deception, that is, to compel a person by force or deceitful means to induce to go from one place to another. The intention of the Accused is the basis and the gravamen of an offence under this Section. The volition, the intention and the conduct of the Accused determine the offence; they can only bear upon the intent with which the Accused kidnapped or abducted the woman, and the intent of the Accused is the vital question for determination in each case. Once the necessary intent of the Accused is established, the offence is complete, whether or not the Accused succeeded in effecting his purpose, and whether or not the woman consented to the marriage or the illicit intercourse.

11. Apart from this, to constitute an offence Under Section 366 Indian Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to prove that the Accused induced the complainant woman or compelled by force to go from any place, that such inducement was by deceitful means, that such abduction took place with the intent that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse and/or that the Accused knew it to be likely that the complainant may be seduced to illicit intercourse as a result of her abduction. Mere abduction does not bring an Accused under the ambit of this penal section. So far as charge Under Section 366 Indian Penal Code is concerned, mere finding that a woman was abducted is not enough, it must further be proved that the Accused abducted the woman with the intent that she may be compelled, or knowing it to be likely that she will be compelled to marry any person or in order that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse or knowing it to be likely that she will be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse. Unless the prosecution proves that the abduction is for the purposes mentioned in Section 366 Indian Penal Code, the Court cannot hold the Accused guilty and punish him Under Section 366 Indian Penal Code.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 459 of 2016

Decided On: 24.04.2018

Kavita Chandrakant Lakhani  Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.K. Sikri and R.K. Agrawal, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 6 SCC 664

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Study material on domestic violence Act

http://www.lawweb.in/search/label/domestic%20violence

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/542601/

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NOTES ON EXECUTION OF DECREE PART 2

S 55. Arrest and detention:-

1) A judgment debtor shall be arrested and detained in civil prison:

Provided firstly that for the purpose of making an arrest ,no dwelling house shall be entered after sunset and before sunrise:

Provided secondly no outer door of a dwelling house shall be broken open unless judgment debtor refuses or prevent access to such dwelling house:

Provided thirdly if room is in occupancy of pardanashin lady,she should be permitted to leave the room:

Provided fourthly if decree is for payment of money and judgment debtor pays the amount of decree and costs,he shall be released.

3) When judgment debtor is arrested in execution of money decree and is brought before court,the court shall inform him that he may apply to be declared an insolvent,and he may be discharged if he has not committed any act of bad faith regarding subject of the application and if he complies with the provisions of law of insolvency.

4) Where a judgment debtor expresses his intention to apply to be declared an insolvent and furnishes security to the satisfaction of court,that he will within one month so apply,and that he will appear when called upon by court,the court may release him from arrest and he fails so to apply and to appear, the court may either direct security to be realized or commit him to civil prison in execution of decree.

Read important judgments on execution of decree:
Click here

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Notes on Sexual offences against woman as per Amendment Act 2013

Criminal law amendment Act 2013 has expanded protection to woman against sexual offences and several new offences are brought on statute book.

Earlier provisions dealing with offence of Rape namely

S 375,376,376A,376B,376C and 376D have been substituted by new sections which are as under:

Definition of Rape(S 375)

A man is said to commit rape if he-

a) penetrates his penis,to any extent,into the vagina,mouth,urethra,or anus of a woman or make her to do so with him or any other person;or

b)insert,to any extent,any object or a part of the body,not being the penis,into the vagina,the urethra or anus of woman or make her to do so with him or any other person;or

c)manipulates any part of the body of a woman so as to cause penetration in to the vagina,the urethra or anus of woman or make her to do so with him or any other person;or

d)applies his mouth to vagina,anus, urethra of a woman or makes her to do so with him or any other person,-

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Whether Writing of letter to woman intending to insult her modesty can be construed as making gesture U/S 509 IPC?

That is why even a verbal attack on a woman, a gesture and other acts stated in Section 509 I.P.C. were brought under the said Section. It is clear from a reading of Section 509 I.P.C. that by introducing the said provision, legislature intended that any sort of aggression into a woman's modesty whether by any word, deed or act should be deterred, as evident from the title to the Section itself. Thus, the acts which are done intending to insult the modesty of a woman which may not necessarily involve even any physical advances are also brought within the sweep of a separate provision viz., Section 509 I.P.C.

20. In such circumstances, can it be for a moment presumed that the legislature intended that a person who writes a letter to a woman with the intention to insult her modesty should go unpunished? If such a person, instead of uttering the insulting words, puts in writing all what he determines to utter against a woman and sends it to her, intending to insult her modesty, will any court be justified in holding that the legislature expected such person to escape safely? was it the intention of the legislature that such a culprit must go unhurt only because he used his pen and not his tongue, to insult the victim? After suffering all the trauma, when a woman comes before court with the best proof for the assault or violence made on her modesty by producing the letter, can the court refuse to look into the same on the ground that the legislature never intended to bring cases involving writings within the purview of Section 509 I.P.C.?

21. I find it extremely difficult to reach a conclusion which will defeat the very object of Section 509 I.P.C. There can be little doubt that the legislature would not have intended that a person who insults the modesty of a woman by his writings must be kept out of the province of Section 509 I.P.C. In a country like India, legislature would not have ever intended that a person who expresses his attitude or intention to insult modesty of a woman by sending a letter should be absolved from criminal liability. I am of view that the very object of the provision will be defeated if a contrary view is taken. Thus, while interpreting the meaning of the relevant expression in Section 509 I.P.C. in the light of the relevant rules of interpretation, I find that 'writing of letter' to a woman, intending to insult her modesty can be construed as 'making a gesture' under Section 509 I.P.C. I feel quite confident to hold that Indian legislature's intention will not be contrary to what I have already concluded.

22. So, if the court finds that a person writes a letter to woman and that the offender intends that such letter is seen or read by such woman and he also intends thereby to insult her modesty, an offence under Section 509 I.P.C. will be clearly attracted. Charge-sheet in this case itself reveals that the Petitioner allegedly wrote insulting and obscene letters to the victim-woman. It is also clear from the records that such letters were sent to her in the name-address so that the letters will be seen and read by the victim. It further appears from the contents of those letters that prima facie, intention of the author of the letters was to insult the modesty of the woman who receives the letter. Such intention can be discerned from the nature of the language, tone and tenor of the writing.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

Crl. M.C. No. 9717 of 2002

Decided On: 16.02.2005

M.M. Haries Vs. State of Kerala

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Hema, J.

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Whether Woman filing suit for partition against IN LAWS entitled to get exemption from payment of court fees?

It appears that in view of the case decided in
the year 2000 by the learned Single Judge (cited supra)
and as there was difference of opinion of other learned
Single Judge the matter of application of the notifications

to the probate proceeding was referred to larger Bench.
The Division Bench, as larger Bench, decided the point in
the case reported as 2008(3) AIR Bom R 820 (Re : Girish
Kanaiyalal Munshi). The Division Bench considered the
following point :-
"Whether a woman litigant who files a petition for
grant of Probate of a Will is exempted from payment of
Court Fees as per Government Notification dated 1st
October, 1994 duly amended by an explanatory
notification dated 23rd March 2000 ?"
6) In the aforesaid case, the Division Bench
considered almost all the cases decided by the learned
Single Judges of this Court in the past, including the
matters mentioned above and considered the view
expressed by the learned Single Judge of this Court who
had referred the matter to larger Bench. The Division
Bench accepted the views of the learned Single Judge who
had made request of reference and held that the petition
for probate of will is neither a petition in relation to any
property in dispute nor it arises out of or concerning a
matrimonial matter. When the larger Bench gave aforesaid
decision and held that benefit was not available, following
observations made at paragraph 26-D.

"26. After hearing the learned Senior Counsel Dr.
Tulzapurkar and the learned Advocate General and
in light of the extensive arguments forwarded on
behalf of the petitioner and the State, the various
judgments of this Court regarding the exemption
from payment of Court fees by women litigants and
several other relevant judgments of this Court and
the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the following issues can
be clearly outlined.
A) . . . .
B) . . . .
C) . . . .
D) Lastly, the words 'property dispute arising out
of or concerning matrimonial matters' should be
given their plain and simple meaning, that is, a
dispute arising between parties to a marriage,
(attention may be brought to the reference made by
Deshmukh J. to the Family Courts Act sub-section (1)
of Section 7, to elucidate the meaning of the term
'matrimonial matters') and should therefore exclude
testamentary petitions wherein not only is there an
absence of dispute, other than in cases when
somebody files a caveat, it is not a matter between
two parties to a marriage."
7) In the case reported as 2013(7) ALL MR 138
(Shrinivas vs. Savitribai) learned Single Judge used the
observations made by the Division Bench at paragraph 26-
D, quoted above, and held that woman litigant, who has
filed suit for partition against her in-laws after the death
of her husband, is not entitled to exemption of Court fees
under th aforesaid Government Notifications.

8) This Court would like to use the observations
made by the Division Bench, quoted above, and also the
interpretation of the decision made by the learned Single
Judge in the case of Shrinivas (cited supra). This Court
holds that when suit is filed by woman litigant for relief of
partition against her in laws, she cannot get the benefit of
the aforesaid Government Notifications as the matter is
not between the woman litigant and her husband and such
matters are excluded due to explanation added to the
Notification in the year 2000. So, this Court holds that no
interference is warranted in the order made by the
learned Judge of the trial Court. In the result, the petition
stands dismissed.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Writ Petition No.271 of 2016
Harsha Pradeep Patil.
V
Sayankabai Ragho Patil & Others. 
 CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.

 DATE : 13 OCTOBER 2016
Citation: 2017(1) BOM C R 86

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Whether person accused of posting of obscene messages through social networking site in account of woman can be discharged?

The gist of the allegations in the impugned first information report is to the
effect that the petitioner had posted obscene messages through a social
networking site in the account of the defacto complainant. It is further alleged
that father of the petitioner over his mobile phone requested the defacto
complainant not to take steps against the petitioner.
On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, FIR was registered and
investigation was initiated. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that
he was discharging his official duties at the relevant time when the said
messages are alleged to have been posted on the social networking profile of the
defacto complainant. It has further submitted that the seizure of the mobile
phone from the possession of the petitioner does not tally with the mobile phone
alleged to have been used for the purpose of dispatch of such electronic message.
 Learned Magistrate however rejected the application for discharge of the
petitioner.
I have considered the materials on record. Prima facie, the allegations in
the FIR disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences. It is alleged that the
petitioner posted obscene messages in order to harass the defacto complainant,
who is a lady. Plea of alibi, as claimed by the petitioner, is a question of fact
which may be agitated in the course of trial. However, it cannot be said with
absolute certainty that since the petitioner was employed at the material point of
time he had no access any electronic device so as to dispatch the electronic
messages as alleged in the FIR rendering such accusation patently absurd and
inherently improbable. The issue of discrepancy in the matter of seizure of the
mobile phone is also a question of fact which does not go to the root of the
jurisdiction of the Court to try the alleged offences.
In view of the aforesaid facts, I am of the opinion that the charge against
the petitioner cannot be said to be groundless and the prayer for discharge was
rightly turned down by the trial court. The factual defences of the petitioner are,
however, kept open to be agitated in accordance with law during trail, if so
advised.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revision Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
BEFORE:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Joymalya Bagchi
C.R.R. 1711 of 2016
BINOY SARKAR @ BINAY SARKAR
V
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

Judgement on : June 06, 2016
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4382 Cal

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Whether woman and minor can be respondent in domestic violence proceeding?

 Also, the expression “adult” would have the same effect of
stultifying orders that can be passed under the aforesaid
sections. It is not difficult to conceive of a non-adult 16 or 17
year old member of a household who can aid or abet the
commission of acts of domestic violence, or who can evict or
help in evicting or excluding from a shared household an
aggrieved person. Also, a residence order which may be
passed under Section 19(1)(c) can get stultified if a 16 or
17 year old relative enters the portion of the shared household

in which the aggrieved person resides after a restraint
order is passed against the respondent and any of his
adult relatives. Examples can be multiplied, all of which would
only lead to the conclusion that even the expression “adult” in
the main part is Section 2(q) is restrictive of the object sought to
be achieved by the kinds of orders that can be passed under
the Act and must also be, therefore, struck down, as this word
contains the same discriminatory vice that is found with its
companion expression “male”.
 We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the
Bombay High Court and declare that the words “adult male” in
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these
words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered
otiose, also stands deleted. We may only add that the
impugned judgment has ultimately held, in paragraph 27, that

the two complaints of 2010, in which the three female
respondents were discharged finally, were purported to be
revived, despite there being no prayer in Writ Petition
No.300/2013 for the same. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10084 of 2016

HIRAL P. HARSORA  V KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS HARSORA
AND ORS.
Bench: Kurian Joseph, Rohinton Fali Nariman
Dated:October 6, 2016.
Citation: AIR 2016 SC4774, 2017(2) MHLJ 147 SC,2017 CRLJ
509 SC

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Handbook on Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace released by Ministry of Women and Child Development on 7th December'15

http://wcd.nic.in/sites/default/files/Handbook%20on%20Sexual%20Harassment%20of%20Women%20at%20Workplace.pdf

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When woman in live-in-relationship is not entitled to get maintenance under Domestic violence Act?

         It is clear from the averments made in the application itself 
the respondent.  
that the respondent has never claimed to be living together with the 
petitioner and has also not claimed that at any point of time before 
filing  of  the  application, she  had lived together  with  the  petitioner. 
Living   together   with   another   person   in   a   shared   household   is   an 
essential   ingredient   of   the   domestic   relationship   as   contemplated 
under Section 2(f) of the Act, 2005.  That apart, the applicant should 
also have lived in a shared house hold with a man in a relationship 
which is akin to a marriage, if she is claiming herself to be wife or 
marriage partner.  Then, if she is already a married woman, she cannot 
enter into domestic relationship with a man.  It is an admitted position 
in the instant case that the respondent is a married woman, who has 
not obtained any legal divorce from her husband Chandan.  Therefore, 
by accepting the case of the respondent as it is, I am of the view that 
the proceedings initiated under Section 12 of the Act, 2005 cannot be 

sustained in law.  
 Of course, learned Counsel for the respondent submits that 
Section 2(f) of the Act, 2005 does not require that a woman should be 
a wife and it is enough that she is living with a man in relationship, 
which is similar that of a marriage. He is right.  But there is a rider to 
it.     She   should   be   unmarried   and   be   otherwise   qualified   to   marry. 
I have already found from the admitted position that the respondent is 
a married woman, whose marriage with her husband Chandan is still 
subsisting   and   this   being   the   position,   her   relationship   whatever   it 
might   be   with   the   petitioner,   cannot   be   termed   as   domestic 
relationship under Section  2(f) of the Act, 2005.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 773 OF 2014
 Narayan Jangluji Thool, V Sou. Mala w/o Chandan Wani,

 CORAM :  S. B. SHUKRE, J.
 DATED  :  27TH JANUARY, 2015.

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