What is single publication rule for filing suit against defamatory material on the internet/facebook page?

In Khawar Butt (supra) this Court dealing with the period of limitation for filing a suit against defamatory material on the internet/facebook page held that the single publication rule was more pragmatic and appropriate. It was held:

"14. I first proceed on to determine the legal issue: Whether, the leaving of the allegedly defamatory material on the internet/facebook page gives rise to a fresh cause of action every moment the said offending material is so left on the webpage-which can be viewed by others at any time, or whether the cause of action arises only when the offending material is first posted on the webpage/internet.

38. I am of the view that the Single Publication Rule is more appropriate and pragmatic to apply, rather the Multiple Publication Rule. I find the reasoning adopted by the American Courts in this regard to be more appealing than the one adopted by the English Courts, prior to the amendment of the law by the introduction of the Defamation Act, 2013. It is the policy of the law of limitation to bar the remedy beyond the prescribed period. That legislative policy would stand defeated if the mere continued residing of the defamatory material or article on the website were to give a continuous cause of action to the plaintiff to sue for defamation/libel. Of course, if there is re-publication resorted to by the defendant-with a view to reach the different or larger section of the public in respect of the defamatory article or material, it would give rise to a fresh cause of action.

39. The alleged libelous posting on Facebook, as averred in the plaint, was posted on around 26.10.2008, 27.10.2008 and even the booklet containing the allegedly defamatory material concerning the plaintiff is said to have been circulated around 25.12.2008. In view of the same, the limitation period for the suit expired on 25.12.2009.

40. Since the suit to claim damages for libel has not been filed within the period of limitation of one year from the date when the cause of action arose, i.e. when the libel was published, the said claim is barred by limitation."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 21/2017

Decided On: 27.05.2020

 Ajai Agarwal Vs.  IBNI8 Media & Software Limited and Ors.

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When should the court not reject plaint filed for recovery of compensation for libel and mental agony on the ground of limitation?

If the present suit was an action simpliciter for compensation for libel, the same was required to be filed within one year when the libel was published and as noted by this Court in the case of Khawar Butt (supra), single publication rule is more applicable and pragmatic in which case, the present suit had to be filed when the slanderous telecast was shown by defendant No. 1 on 29th July, 2006. However, in the present suit, the plaintiff claims a decree of exemplary or punitive damages in favour of the plaintiff on account of the mental agony, torture, humiliation and hatred suffered by the plaintiff and his family and a decree for loss of reputation and goodwill. As per the plaintiff, the cause of action though started accruing in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant on 29th July, 2006 when the first telecast was made, however, it continued when it received notices from various authorities including the Medical Council, Police etc as also when the writ petitions were filed and dismissed by this Court and the Allahabad High Court. From the pleadings/claims of the plaintiff in paragraph 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the plaint, it is not the mere publication of libel but thereafter also the continuous course of action which resulted in mental agony, harassment to the plaintiff on which count the plaintiff seeks exemplary and punitive damages. Since the period of limitation for such a claim in the suit would be governed by residuary clause i.e. Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which provides for a period of three years limitation from the time when the right to sue accrues and as per the plaintiff right to sue still subsists and as the present application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC has to be decided based on the averments in the plaint which have to be accepted by way of demurer, the suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation. It is however clarified that since in the present case, the issue of limitation would be a mixed question of fact and law, the same would be decided after the parties have led their respective evidence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 21/2017

Decided On: 27.05.2020

 Ajai Agarwal Vs.  IBNI8 Media & Software Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mukta Gupta, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1113/2020

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Whether freedom of access to information can violate existing law?

There can be no doubt that there has to be freedom
of access to information but, a significant one, such freedom
cannot violate a law that holds the field. Be it noted, this
Court has shown its concern with regard to the decrease of
sex ratio in three decisions, namely, Centre for Enquiry into
Health & Allied Themes (CEHAT) and others vs. Union of India
and others (2001) 5 SCC 577, Centre for Enquiry into Health
& Allied Themes (CEHAT) and others vs. Union of India and
others (2003) 8 SCC 398, Voluntary Health Association of
Punjab vs. Union of India and others (2013) 4 SCC 1, and
recently in Voluntary Health Association of Punjab vs. Union
of India and others 2016 (10) SCALE 531. The concern of the
legislative response in the 1994 Act has been further
articulated by this Court in last two decades. In such a
situation, whether the companies can take shelter of free
access or choose to be catalysts in the depletion of sex
ratio, has to be debated.
 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F  I N D I A

Writ Petition (Civil) No.341/2008
SABU MATHEW GEORGE 
 V
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 

CORAM :
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY
Dated:16th February, 2017.
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC 514

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How to mould relief if there is infringement of copyright on internet?

 On the question of what relief would be practical, the Division Bench by its order dated 06.03.2009 had directed SCIL to supply a list of its works to MySpace, which it would remove within one week of receipt of notice. Perhaps the Division Bench was more mindful of technological constraints as well as the notice and take down mechanism considering the order was made before the amendment to the IT Act which introduced safe harbor provisions only in October 2009. The Court is conscious of the fact that under the current system, MySpace hosts several hundreds and thousands of videos, which is only growing every single day. Without a notice containing the details and location of the exact works in which infringement is complained of, MySpace cannot be expected to scan through such large number of videos to discern infringement. This is not only impractical but also dangerous for reasons discussed previously. A vague order of injunction against works which are yet to exist is not only contrary to law but also impossible to monitor. Therefore, SCIL cannot give vague and general lists of its works but will have to give notice with specific details as well as locations of the works, which the appellant shall remove within 36 hours of receiving such notice.

67. Despite the lengthy analysis and reasoning, a fundamental aspect overlooked by the learned Single Judge is the peculiarity of the Internet intermediary industry. The Internet industry often coined the term "fastest growing industry" enabling access and innovations at an exponential rate. In cases like these, the Court has to appreciate that relief should be sound and practical, not far-reaching and momentous in regard to policy and growth of trade or information dissemination. Such care is warranted where interim orders in respect of liabilities are yet to be ascertained and claims tried. Whilst in other areas of law like property or contracts, the enforcement mechanism has remained relatively unchanged, enforcement under the technology regime, because its very nature is different. It is these considerations, which the court has to keep in mind while granting relief. Apart from avoidable prolixity and attendant imprecision in the impugned  judgment (which a reader may perhaps justifiably complain about this judgment as well) the width of the directions has resulted in what was colourfully described by the US Supreme Court in Reno v American Civil Liberties Union 521 US 244,as ―to burn the house to roast the pig‖ (i.e a disproportionate response, or a remedy worse than the disease). The court has - as always to tread a delicate balance between the Scylla of over protection (of intellectual property and privileging it in an overbearing manner) and the Charybdis of ineffective or under-protection, of IP rights: both of which chill and kill creativity, in the final analysis, harmful to society.

68. To summarize the conclusions, it is held as follows

(a) Sections 79 and 81 of the IT Act and Section 51(a)(ii) of the Copyright Act have to be read harmoniously. Accordingly, it is held that proviso to Section 81 does not preclude the affirmative defence of safe harbor for an intermediary in case of copyright actions.

(b) Section 51(a)(ii), in the case of internet intermediaries contemplates actual knowledge and not general awareness. Additionally, to impose liability on an intermediary, conditions underSection 79 of the IT Act have to be fulfilled.

(c) In case of Internet intermediaries, interim relief has to be specific and must point to the actual content, which is being infringed.

In light of the above discussion impugned order of the learned Single Judge is set aside and is substituted with the following relief:

(i) The plaintiff Super Cassettes shall provide an updated catalogue of "specific" works in which it holds copyright along with the location/ URL of such work on the appellant Myspace‟s website to the appellant as and when SCIL detects infringement.

(ii) On receiving such notice from the plaintiff SCIL, the appellant/MySpace shall within 36 hours remove/ block access to such content, in accordance with Rule 3 (4) of the Intermediary Guidelines Rules of 2011.

(iii) MySpace shall also keep an account of all such content removed pursuant to such requests as well as other details such as the number of viewings (wherever mechanisms exist to track such action) of such content, till it is removed, the advertisement revenue earned from it (proportionately) etc to enable calculation of damages, at the trial stage.

Delhi High Court

My Space Inc. vs Super Cassettes Industries Ltd. on 23 December, 2016

Read full judgment; Click here 

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Accrual of cause of action when defamatory material was posted on Internet/Facebook

Delhi High Court: Deciding a defamation case where the defamatory material was posted on Internet/Facebook, the Court, while relying on various Foreign Court judgments, held that the “Single Publication Rule” will apply where the original publication is in print and the re-publication is on the internet. The Court observed that the rule states that the publication of a book, periodical or newspaper containing defamatory material gives rise to only one cause of action for defamation, which implies, that the limitation period starts to run at the time the first publication is made, even if copies continue to be sold several years later. Hence the cause of action against the person for defamation in respect of the subsequent publication is to be treated as having accrued on the date of the first publication.

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Employees right to privacy in work place relating internet and drug test

An employee's right to privacy in the workplace is an increasingly controversial legal topic, especially in an age of increased reliance on computers and electronic mail to do business. Technology has enabled employers to monitor virtually all workplace communications made by employees using computers -- including use of the Internet and company e-mail. While employees may feel that this monitoring is a violation of their privacy rights, it is usually allowed under the law.  Other employee activities (such as private conversations) and certain physical spaces in the workplace (like locked desk drawers) receive more privacy protections, while specific activities like drug use may lead to testing for substance abuse. Below is a discussion of employees' privacy rights in the workplace.

Internet Usage and Email

An employee's activities while using an employer's computer system are largely unprotected by personal privacy laws. Emails are considered to be company property if they are sent using the company's computer system. Employers generally have the right to monitor and view employee email, so long as they have a valid business purpose for doing so. Many employers now have email systems that copy all email messages as they pass through the system to check for productivity, illegal use, and other issues. Emails are frequently being used as evidence during trial to prove employee misconduct or wrongdoing.

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