Whether theft can be committed in respect of information contained in document?

By the order of the Magistrate dated 08.10.2010, cognizance
was taken against respondents No.1 to 16 for commission of
the offences under Sections 380, 411 and 120B IPC. There
are no averments in the complaint nor are there allegations
in the statement of the complainant or the witness P.B.
Dinesh as to when and how the theft was committed and the
order of the Magistrate dated 08.10.2010 taking cognizance
of the criminal case against respondents No.1 to 16 qua
documents No.1 to 54 is liable to be set aside.
 It is held that the “document” as defined in Section 29 IPC is
a “moveable property” within the meaning of Section 22 IPC
which can be the subject matter of theft. The information
contained thereon in the documents would also fall within the
purview of the “corporeal property” and can be the subject
matter of the theft. The findings of the High Court is
modified to that extent.
 In the facts and circumstances of the present case, use of
documents No.1 to 28 and documents No.29 to 54 by the
respondents in judicial proceedings is to substantiate their
case namely, “oppression and mismanagement” of the
administration of appellant-Company and their plea in other
pending proceedings and such use of the documents in the
litigations pending between the parties would not amount to
theft. No “dishonest intention” or “wrongful gain” could be
attributed to the respondents and there is no “wrongful loss”
to the appellant so as to attract the ingredients of Sections
378 and 380 IPC.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 875 OF 2019

BIRLA CORPORATION LIMITED  Vs  ADVENTZ INVESTMENTS AND HOLDINGS  LIMITED

Dated:May 09, 2019.

R. BANUMATHI, J.

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How much of information received from accused U/S 27 of Evidence Act may be proved?

. Section 27 of the Act reads as under:
“27. How much of information received from accused
may be proved.
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody
of a police officer, so much of such information,
whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
6 Cr. Revision No.404/2017
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved.”
(Emphasis supplied)
10. Section 27 of the Act makes that part of the statement
which is distinctly related to the discovery admissible as a whole,
whether it be in the nature of confession or not (K.Chinnaswamy
Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and another, AIR 1962 SC
1788, relied on).
For the application of section 27 the statement must be split
into its components and to separate the admissible portion and
only those components or portions which were the immediate
cause of the discovery would be legal evidence and not the rest
which must be excluded and rejected. (see: Mohd. Inayatullah
Vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1976 SC 483).
Section 27 permits the derivative use of custodial
statements in the ordinary course of events. In Indian Law, there
is no automatic presumption that the custodial statements have
been extracted through compulsion (see: Smt. Selvi Vs. State of
Karnataka, AIR 2010 SC 1974).
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
BENCH AT INDORE
Criminal Revision No.404 of 2017

Gyanchand Jain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh

Dated:18/06/2018

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Whether public authority can be directed to preserve information for any period longer that provided under rules of that public authority?

The right to access information does not extend beyond the period during which the examining body is expected to retain the answer-books. In the case of CBSE, the answer-books are required to be maintained for a period of three months and thereafter they are liable to be disposed of/destroyed. Some other examining bodies are required to keep the answer-books for a period of six months. The fact that right to information is available in regard to answer-books does not mean that answer-books will have to be maintained for any longer period than required under the rules and regulations of the public authority. The obligation under the RTI Act is to make available or give access to existing information or information which is expected to be preserved or maintained. If the rules and regulations governing the functioning of the respective public authority require preservation of the information for only a limited period, the applicant for information will be entitled to such information only if he seeks the information when it is available with the public authority. For example, with reference to answer-books, if an examinee makes an application to CBSE for inspection or grant of certified copies beyond three months (or six months or such other period prescribed for preservation of the records in regard to other examining bodies) from the date of declaration of results, the application could be rejected on the ground that such information is not available. The power of the Information Commission under Section 19(8) of the RTI Act to require a public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provision of the Act, does not include a power to direct the public authority to preserve the information, for any period larger than what is provided under the rules and regulations of the public authority.

30. On behalf of the Respondents/examinees, it was contended that having regard to Sub-section (3) of Section 8 of RTI Act, there is an implied duty on the part of every public authority to maintain the information for a minimum period of twenty years and make it available whenever an application was made in that behalf. This contention is based on a complete misreading and misunderstanding of Section 8(3). The said Sub-section nowhere provides that records or information have to be maintained for a period of twenty years. The period for which any particular records or information has to be maintained would depend upon the relevant statutory rule or regulation of the public authority relating to the preservation of records. Section 8(3) provides that information relating to any occurrence, event or matters which has taken place and occurred or happened twenty years before the date on which any request is made under Section 6, shall be provided to any person making a request. This means that where any information required to be maintained and preserved for a period beyond twenty years under the rules of the public authority, is exempted from disclosure under any of the provisions of Section 8(1) of RTI Act, then, notwithstanding such exemption, access to such information shall have to be provided by disclosure thereof, after a period of twenty years except where they relate to information falling under Clauses (a), (c) and (i) of Section 8(1). In other words, Section 8(3) provides that any protection against disclosure that may be available, under Clauses (b), (d) to (h) and (j) of Section 8(1) will cease to be available after twenty years in regard to records which are required to be preserved for more than twenty years. Where any record or information is required to be destroyed under the rules and regulations of a public authority prior to twenty years, Section 8(3) will not prevent destruction in accordance with the Rules. Section 8(3) of RTI Act is not therefore a provision requiring all 'information' to be preserved and maintained for twenty years or more, nor does it override any rules or regulations governing the period for which the record, document or information is required to be preserved by any public authority.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6454 of 2011 

Decided On: 09.08.2011

Central Board of Secondary Education and Anr. Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Ors.

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Whether public authority is required to furnish unavailable information under RTI?

At this juncture, it is necessary to clear some misconceptions about the RTI Act. The RTI Act provides access to all information that is available and existing. This is clear from a combined reading of Section 3 and the definitions of 'information' and 'right to information' under Clauses (f) and (j) of Section 2 of the Act. If a public authority has any information in the form of data or analyzed data, or abstracts, or statistics, an applicant may access such information, subject to the exemptions in Section 8 of the Act. But where the information sought is not a part of the record of a public authority, and where such information is not required to be maintained under any law or the rules or regulations of the public authority, the Act does not cast an obligation upon the public authority, to collect or collate such non-available information and then furnish it to an applicant. A public authority is also not required to furnish information which require drawing of inferences and/or making of assumptions. It is also not required to provide 'advice' or 'opinion' to an applicant, nor required to obtain and furnish any 'opinion' or 'advice' to an applicant. The reference to 'opinion' or 'advice' in the definition of 'information' in Section 2(f) of the Act, only refers to such material available in the records of the public authority. Many public authorities have, as a public relation exercise, provide advice, guidance and opinion to the citizens. But that is purely voluntary and should not be confused with any obligation under the RTI Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6454 of 2011 

Decided On: 09.08.2011

Central Board of Secondary Education and Anr. Vs. Aditya Bandopadhyay and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. Raveendran and A.K. Patnaik, JJ.

Citation: (2011) 8 SCC 497

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Whether authority can refuse to provide information under RTI on ground that investigation is pending?

 Access to information, under Section 3 of the Act, is the rule and exemptions under Section 8, the exception. Section 8 being a restriction on this fundamental right, must Therefore is to be strictly construed. It should not be interpreted in manner as to shadow the very right itself. Under Section 8, exemption from releasing information is granted if it would impede the process of investigation or the prosecution of the offenders. It is apparent that the mere existence of an investigation process cannot be a ground for refusal of the information; the authority withholding information must show satisfactory reasons as to why the release of such information would hamper the investigation process. Such reasons should be germane, and the opinion of the process being hampered should be reasonable and based on some material. Sans this consideration, Section 8(1)(h) and other such provisions would become the haven for dodging demands for information.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

WP(C) No. 3114/2007

Decided On: 03.12.2007

Bhagat Singh Vs. Chief Information Commissioner and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

Citation: 2007 SCC ONLINE DEL 1607

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Whether inordinate delay in providing information under right to information Act amounts to harassment?

 Further, Commission is convinced with the averment of the Appellant for having suffered gross detriment due to the delay of over 2 years in providing the information to him. Appellant deserves to be compensated on this account. Accordingly, in exercise of the powers vested in the CIC under section 19(8)(b) of the RTI Act, Commission directs the public authority through its Chief Executive Officer to compensate the Appellant by an amount of Rs. 5000/- for the inconvenience and detriment caused to him. The CPIO should ensure that this amount is remitted to the Appellant by demand draft/pay order within 30 days from the date of receipt of this order.

Central Information Commission

(Before Divya Prakash Sinha, IC)

Relevant facts emerging from the Appeal:

Aabid Hussain Vs  CPIO, O/o CEO, Cantonment Board, Jabalpur (MP) … 

File No. CIC/DCABO/A/2016/271739/IARMY/SD

Decided on October 16, 2017, [Hearing on: 16/10/2017]

RTI application filed on	:	31/08/2015
PIO replied on	:	No reply
First appeal filed on	:	05/10/2015
First Appellate Authority order	:	No order
Second Appeal dated	:	24/11/2015

Citation:2017SCC ONLINE CIC  1506

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Whether information under RTI can be denied on ground that alternate remedy is available?

Although the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has
elaborately made his submission and taken this Court through the Scheme of
RTI Act, particularly, Sections 4, 8 and 22 of the RTI Act, I am unable to
persuade myself that RTI Act can be invoked for all purposes regardless of
the fact that there is existence of alternative effective mechanism provided
under the respective departments for seeking information. If such recourse is
encouraged and entertained it will destroy the very frame work of the
respective mechanism which provides for furnishing information under the
respective department. I do not see any merits in the contentions of the
learned counsel for the petitioner that in view of the overriding provisions
provided under Section 22 of the RTI ACT any kind of information can be
obtained. Such an interpretation would run contrary to the other provisions
of the Acts of similar nature and would make such acts otiose and nugatory.
The framers of the Act and the object behind the Act would not have envisaged
that any information to be sought can be made available only under the RTI
Act and not at all through other Acts. Such an interpretation would not
advance the letter and spirit of the RTI Act. In the above circumstances, I
am inclined to accept the submissions made on behalf of the first respondent
and more so I am bound by the decisions passed by the Hon'ble Division Bench 
of this Court (cited supra).
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT               

DATED: 13.04.2017  

    
DELIVERED ON : 13.04.2017    

CORAM   

 MR.JUSTICE V.PARTHIBAN           

W.P(MD)No.4309 of 2014   

S.Robinson Vs Tamil Nadu State Information Commission, 

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Whether attestation by independent witnesses is necessary for recording information from accused regarding recovery of articles?

The edifice of the argument that information under Section
27 of the Evidence Act should be recorded in presence of
independent witnesses is founded on the perception that the
Investigating Officer might misuse his powers and forcibly extract
the information from the accused in custody. The said
apprehension has no basis whatsoever. Hon'ble the Supreme
Court in the cases of Deoman Upadhyaya (supra) as well as in
the case of State of Maharashtra Vs. Damu reported in(25 of 32)
(2000)6 SCC 269; (MANU/SC/0299/2000) held that
admissibility of the information given by an accused in custody
under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is based on the doctrine of
“confirmation by subsequent events”. The Section was given
an expansive meaning in Damu’s case in the following words:
“37. The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the
Evidence Act is the doctrine of 'confirmation by
subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the
principle that if any fact is discovered in a search made on
the strength of any information obtained from a prisoner,
such a discovery is a guarantee that the information
supplied by the prisoner is true. The information might be
confessional or non-inculcator in nature, but if it results in
discovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information.
Hence the legislature permitted such information to be
used as evidence by restricting the admissible portion to
the minimum. It is now well-settled that recovery of an
object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in the
section. The decision of Privy Council in Pullukurn Kottayya
v. Emperor AIR 1947 PC 67 as the most quoted authority
for supporting the interpretation that the "fact discovered"
envisaged in the Section embraces the place from which
the object was produced, the knowledge of the accused as
to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to
that effect.”
In view of the fact that the information becomes admissible
only to the extent of the part leading to the discovery of a fact,
the subsequent confirmation gives a guarantee about the sanctity
of such information. The facts discovered should be such which
are in exclusive knowledge of the accused and none else. If the
Investigating Officer, after recording information under Section 27
of the Evidence Act from an accused in his custody, recovers
some incriminating article from an open place accessible to all(26 of 32)
and sundry, the information and the discovery would loose
significance. Likewise, if the fact discovered is known to the
Investigating Officer in advance, then the discovery made in
furtherance of the subsequent information recorded under Section
27 at the instance of the accused would be inconsequential. The
only logical conclusion in these circumstances is that there is no
legal requirement of seeking attestation of the information
received from the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act
by independent witnesses. Attestation if any would be required
when discovery of the fact is made and memo thereof prepared.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of D.K.Basu Vs.
State of West Bengal reported in (1997)1 SCC 416;
(MANU/SC/0157/1997), gave numerous directions to be
followed as preventive measures in all cases of arrest and or
detention. The direction at Sr.No.10 of the said judgment is that
the arrestee may be permitted to meet his lawyer during
investigation though not throughout the investigation.
The entire endeavour of the learned counsel, who argued in
favour of the proposition that witnesses should be kept present to
attest the information memo prepared under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, was based on the perception that the Investigating
Officer may indulge into use of force and third degree methods
for extracting the confession. The directions given by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in D.K.Basu’s Judgment (supra) and the
consequent amendments brought around in the Cr.P.C.
particularly Sections 41-A, 41-B, 41-D, 50, 50-A, 53 and 54 are(27 of 32)
sufficient to alleviate these perceptions and apprehensions.
Furthermore, the accused, by leading appropriate evidence can
always challenge the sanctity of information recorded under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act if such information is recorded
under threat, duress or by coercion. It is essential to note that in
the entire framework of Code of Criminal Procedure, which
governs the process of investigation, there is no requirement of
keeping witnesses present at the time of recording information of
the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act.
In the case of A.R.Antulay Vs. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak
reported in AIR 1984 SC 718; (MANU/SC/0082/1984), the
Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the
absence of a specific provision made in the statute indicating that
offences will have to be investigated, inquired into, tried and
otherwise dealt with according to that statute, the same will have
to be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with
according to the Criminal Procedure Code.
In other words, Criminal Procedure Code is the parent
statute which provides for investigation, inquiry and trial of cases
by Criminal Courts of various designations and there is no
provision in the Cr.P.C. requiring attestation of the information
recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act by independent
witnesses.
Reportable
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Leave To Appeal No. 94 / 2017
State of Rajasthan

V
Mangal Singh 

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Whether freedom of access to information can violate existing law?

There can be no doubt that there has to be freedom
of access to information but, a significant one, such freedom
cannot violate a law that holds the field. Be it noted, this
Court has shown its concern with regard to the decrease of
sex ratio in three decisions, namely, Centre for Enquiry into
Health & Allied Themes (CEHAT) and others vs. Union of India
and others (2001) 5 SCC 577, Centre for Enquiry into Health
& Allied Themes (CEHAT) and others vs. Union of India and
others (2003) 8 SCC 398, Voluntary Health Association of
Punjab vs. Union of India and others (2013) 4 SCC 1, and
recently in Voluntary Health Association of Punjab vs. Union
of India and others 2016 (10) SCALE 531. The concern of the
legislative response in the 1994 Act has been further
articulated by this Court in last two decades. In such a
situation, whether the companies can take shelter of free
access or choose to be catalysts in the depletion of sex
ratio, has to be debated.
 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F  I N D I A

Writ Petition (Civil) No.341/2008
SABU MATHEW GEORGE 
 V
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 

CORAM :
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DIPAK MISRA
 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMITAVA ROY
Dated:16th February, 2017.
Citation:(2017) 2 SCC 514

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Whether information regarding corruption can be disclosed under RTI?

 As mentioned above, the expression pertaining to allegation of

corruption cannot be exhaustively defined. The Act is to step-in-aid

to establish the society governed by law in which corruption has no

place. The Act envisages a transparent public office. Therefore, even

in organizations which are exempt from the provisions of the Act, in

terms of the notification issued under Section 24(4)of the Act, still

information which relates to corruption or the information which

excludes the allegation of corruption would be relevant information

and cannot be denied for the reasons that the organization is

exempted under the Act.

16. The information sought in the present case is in respect of the

number of vacancies which have fallen to the share of the specified

category and whether such posts have been filled up from amongst

the eligible candidates. If such information is disclosed, it will lead

to transparent administration which is antithesis of corruption. If

organization has nothing to hide or to cover a corrupt practice, the

information should be made available. The information sought may

help in dispelling favoritism, nepotism or arbitrariness. Such

information is necessary for establishing the transparent

administration. Therefore, we do not find any illegality in the order

passed by the State Information Commissioner, Haryana and

affirmed by learned Single Judge in the orders impugned in the

present appeals.

Dismissed.”

Section 24 (4) of the Act is reproduced below:-

“24. Act not to apply to certain organizations:

xxx xxx xxx

Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to such intelligence and

security organizations, being organizations established by the State

Government, as that Government may, from time to time, by

notification in the Official Gazette, specify:

Provided that the information pertaining to the allegations of

corruption and human rights violations shall not be excluded under

this sub-section:

Provided further that in the case of information sought for is

in respect of allegations of violation of human rights, the information

shall only be provided after the approval of the State Information

Commission and, notwithstanding anything contained in Section 7,

such information shall be provided within forty-five days from the

date of the receipt of request.”

Thus, the Division Bench has held that even where the State

Government is empowered by issuance of notification to exempt certain

organizations from the applicability of the Act yet in respect of information

pertaining to allegation of corruption shall not be excluded under Sub

Section (4) of Section 24 of the Act.

In the present case as noticed the petitioner seeks the

information regarding the corruption and details of corruption cases

pertaining to the public servants in the State of Haryana. Keeping in view

the above principles laid down by the Division Bench in First Appellate

Authority-cum-Additional Director General of Police's case (supra) and

fact that the judgment of the Apex Court in Girish Ramchandra

Deshpande's case (supra) is not applicable in the facts and circumstance of

the present case, this Court is of the opinion that order 2.4.2014 (Annexure

P/6) passed the respondent-Commission requires a revisit and cannot be

sustained.

Accordingly, the present writ petition is allowed. The

impugned order 2.4.2014 (Annexure P/6) passed by the respondentCommission

is quashed. The respondent-Commission shall decide the

second appeal afresh keeping in view the above principles laid down by the

Division Bench in First Appellate Authority-cum-Additional Director

General of Police's case

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT

CHANDIGARH

 Civil Writ Petition No.17718 of 2014 (O&M)

Date of decision: 26.7.2016

Subhash 

V

State Information Commission, Haryana and others 

CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE G.S.SANDHAWALIA

Citation: 2016(6) ALLMR(JOURNAL)43

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SC;RBI should be proactive in disclosing information to information seekers under RTI Act.

The exemption contained in Section 8(1)(e) of  Right to Information Act, 2005 applies to exceptional cases and only with regard to certain pieces of information, for which disclosure is unwarranted or undesirable. If information is available with a regulatory agency not in fiduciary relationship, there is no reason to withhold the disclosure of the same. However, where information is required by mandate of law to be provided to an authority, it cannot be said that such information is being provided in a fiduciary relationship. Financial institutions have an obligation to provide all the information to the RBI and such an information shared under an obligation/duty cannot be considered to come under the purview of being shared in fiduciary relationship. One of the main characteristic of a Fiduciary relationship is "Trust and Confidence".
 Similarly, in another case the respondent Jayantilal N.
Mistry sought information from the CPIO, RBI in respect of a
Cooperative Bank viz. Saraspur Nagrik Sahkari Bank Limited
related to inspection report, which was denied by the CPIO on
the ground that the information contained therein were
received by RBI in a fiduciary capacity and are exempt under
Section 8(1)(e) of RTI Act. The CIC directed the petitioner to
furnish that information since the RBI expressed their
willingness to disclose a summary of substantive part of the
inspection report to the respondent. While disposing of the
appeal the CIC observed:-
“Before parting with this appeal, we would like to
record our observations that in a rapidly unfolding
economics scenario, there are public institutions, both
in the banking and non-banking sector, whose
activities have not served public interest. On the

contrary, some such institutions may have attempted
to defraud the public of their moneys kept with such
institutions in trust. RBI being the Central Bank is
one of the instrumentalities available to the public
which as a regulator can inspect such institutions and
initiate remedial measures where necessary. It is
important that the general public, particularly, the
share holders and the depositors of such institutions
are kept aware of RBI’s appraisal of the functioning of
such institutions and taken into confidence about the
remedial actions initiated in specific cases. This will
serve the public interest. The RBI would therefore be
well advised to be proactive in disclosing information
to the public in general and the information seekers
under the RTI Act, in particular. The provisions of
Section 10(1) of the RTI Act can therefore be
judiciously used when necessary to adhere to this
objective.”
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
TRANSFERRED CASE (CIVIL) NO. 91 OF 2015
(Arising out of Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 707 of 2012)
Reserve Bank of India ……..Petitioner(s)
versus
Jayantilal N. Mistry …..Respondent(s)
Dated;December 16, 2015

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Whether litigant can seek information under RTI without attending court?

 In an earlier order in a different second appeal the Commission admonished the appellant

for running parallel inquiry and rejected his appeal. In case of Vijay Kumar Gupta V.

Dwarka   Court   (CIC/SA/C/2015/000021   &   CIC/SA/C/2015/000033)   this   Commission

orderd:

“….the complainant was warned by the Commission not to misuse the

RTI Act by running a parallel inquiry against the Courts where his cases are

pending for trial.   Once the appellant is subjected to the jurisdiction of the Court

of law, either as a petitioner or respondent, he will have to follow and complete

that process in a Court of law.  The common sense and the common law explains

that a citizen cannot run the processes for two remedies at a time, on the same

subject matter, each of which will obstruct the other.  The action of the appellant

in seeking information through the RTI Act about a case pending for trial in a

court of law, without attending the court, reflects malicious intention and it would

amount to obstruction in the legal proceedings and also disrespect to the process

of adjudication. 

With the above observations, the Commission rejects both the above complaints.”

Similarly in another case of Vijay Kumar Gupta (CIC/SA/A/2014/000965)

5…The appellant is trying to run a simultaneous/parallel trial through RTI Act.  It is

misuse of RTI. This RTI application of the appellant itself is an obstruction or

impediment to the proceedings before the court of law. Once he is subjected to the

jurisdiction of the Court of law, either as a petitioner or respondent, he will have to

follow and complete that process in a Court of law.  He has to explore the possibility

of getting information through that process only because he is already in the Court

of law.  The common sense and the common law explains that a citizen cannot run

processes for two remedies at a time on the same subject matter each of which will

obstruct the other. 

CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)

Information Commissioner

CIC/SA/A/2015/000208

Ram Kishan v. State Council of Educational Research & Training 

 Decision: 19.08.2015

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Whether information under RTI is to be supplied in Hindi even though information is in English?

This aspect needs clarification. It is true that the
proceedings in a High Court are in English language.
Therefore by and large “records” are in English. Yet is the
public information officer also bound to supply the “record”
in “Hindi”, even when it is specifically requisitioned though
originally the records are in English. The answer to this
would be in negative. This is not the intent or the mandate of
the Act. This is for two reasons. Firstly, the definition of
“right to information” itself states that a citizen has access to
information which is “held” by or under the control of any
public authority. Obviously since the “information” in the
form of a record is “held” by the public authority in English,
it has to be supplied in that language. Secondly, even Section
4 (4) of the Act, which has been referred above, states that
the obligation of the Public Authority is to “disseminate” 16
“information” in local language but with considerations of
“local language” as well as “cost effectiveness” alongwith
other consideration. The cost of translation of all record in
“Hindi” would be immense and would be practically not
possible. As such the records can only be given as they exist.
The public authority i.e. High Court in the present case, is
not obliged to translate records into Hindi, and furnish them
even when requisition is so made.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
SPECIAL APPEAL NO. 62 of 2010
State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
V
Uttarakhand State Information Commission and others.

Dated : 26th May, 2015
Coram : Hon’ble K.M. Joseph, C.J.
 Hon’ble V.K. Bist, J.

Citation;AIR 2015Uttarakhand 106

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Whether information commissioner can direct public authority to preserve information for longer period than provided in rules of public authority?

 For example, in paragraph 54 of the judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the right to access information does not extent beyond the period during which the examining body is expected to retain the answer-books. In the case of CBSE, and in case of University of Pune, the the answer-books are required to be maintained for a period of three months and thereafter they are liable to be disposed of/destroyed. The fact that right to information is available with regard to answer-books does not mean that answer- books will have to be maintained for any longer period than required under the rules and regulations of the public authority. The obligation under the RTI Act is to make available or give access to dss JUDGMENT-WP-310-14 existing information or information which is expected to be preserved or maintained. If the rules and regulations governing the functioning of the respective public authority require preservation of the information for only a limited period, the applicant for information will be entitled to such information only if he seeks the information when it is available with the public authority. The power of Information Commission under Section 19(8) of RTI Act to require public authority to take any such steps as may be necessary to secure compliance with the provisions of the Act, does not include a power to direct the public authority to preserve the information for any period larger than what is provided under the rules and regulations of the public authority. The contention that there is an implied duty on the part of every public authority to maintain the information for a minimum period of twenty years and make it available whenever an application was made in that behalf was rejected, has based on complete misreading and misunderstanding of Section 8(3) of the RTI Act. The period for which any particular records or information has to be maintained would depend upon the relevant statutory rule or regulation of the public authority regarding preservation of records.

Bombay High Court

The University Of Pune, Through ... vs State Of Maharashtra And Ors on 13 March, 2015

Bench: M.S. Sonak

Citation;2015(3) MHLJ 359 Bom

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Whether it is necessary to hear partnership firm prior to disclosure of information regarding partnership firm under RTI?

In the present case, the fourth respondent sought extensive disclosure in regard to the business of the partnership firm. There is a serious element of contest between the petitioners and the fourth respondent as to whether the fourth respondent continues to be a partner. Whereas the fourth respondent asserts that he continues to be a partner, the contention of the petitioners is that the fourth respondent has retired from the partnership firm. We clarify that we are not expressing any view on the merits as admittedly one suit which has been filed by the fourth respondent is pending. 
Be that as it may, the facts which have come on the record are sufficient to hold that before directing the disclosure of information, the State Information Commission ought to have issued notice to the petitioners and heard them on their objection to the disclosure of information. The proceedings before the Public Information Officer and before the State Information Commission have to be conducted in a manner consistent with the principles of natural justice and where a disclosure of this nature is sought in regard to the business of the partnership firm, it was but necessary that the petitioners should have been heard before any final order was passed. If the petitioners were heard, they would have been in a position to point out to the State Information Commission that orders had already been passed by the Public Information Officer on the earlier applications of the fourth respondent on 8 November 2013. 
For these reasons, we allow Writ Petition No.45657 of 2014 and set aside the orders passed by the State Information Commission on 31 December 2013, 31 January 2014 and 6 March 2014. We direct that the State Information Commission shall issue notice to the petitioners and give them a reasonable opportunity of being heard before deciding the application or applications, as the case may be, preferred by the fourth respondent.
Case :- WRIT - C No. - 45657 of 2014 

Petitioner :- M/S Sangam Transport Thru' Auth. Partner & Another 
Respondent :- State Information Commission & 3 Others 

Hon'ble Dr. Dhananjaya Yeshwant Chandrachud,Chief Justice 
Hon'ble Dilip Gupta,J. 
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC) 577 ALL

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CIC directs Delhi Women Commission to disclose rape records

New Delhi: Amid outrage over the interview of a December 16 gang-rape convict, CIC on Wednesday directed the Delhi Commission of Women to make public records of rapes committed in the national capital with stern conditions to ensure that identities of victims are not disclosed.

"The Commission observes that the records relating to rape victims cannot be totally blocked from sharing for research purposes on the ground of personal information under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act.

"When it is possible to separate information that can be given from that cannot be given, the PIO has to invoke doctrine of severability to facilitate the information," Information Commissioner Sridhar Acharyulu said.

The case relates to Baladevan Rangaraju who claimed that he wanted information on rape victims for research purpose and personally requested the Secretary of the Department, who after knowing the purpose, refused to furnish the records.

Rangaraju said information sought by him had to be maintained by the Department according to Delhi Commission for Women Act, 1994.

The Commission expressed concern over the issue of the protection of privacy of the rape victims and contended that it was not possible to separate the names of the victims from various documents including medico-legal case reports.

"Facilitate inspection of the records to the authorised female representative of the appellant with an assurance that they shall not bring any electronic device like video records, mobile, camera etc, block out the names and personal details of the victim and accused by whitener on the photostat copies," Sridhar said setting stern guidelines for disclosure of sensitive information.

He said each paper shall be verified by the officials of Delhi Women Commission to ensure that nowhere victims' names and private details are revealed before certifying.

"The appellant is directed to enter a non-disclosure agreement with an undertaking that he/his representative will not reveal information about the personal details of the victims and the accused and that they shall be responsible for any such revelation through the documents shared," he said.

Acharyulu warned that any such disclosure would not only result in the breach of undertaking but also an offence under the Indian Penal Code.

"It shall be responsibility of the respondent authority to secure records, and the appellant shall share the copy of the research report with the Women's Commission and this Commission," the Commissioner said in his order.

Read full judgment here

CENTRAL INFORMATION COMMISSION

Prof. M. Sridhar Acharyulu (Madabhushi Sridhar)

Information Commissioner

CIC/SA/A/2014/001250

Mr Baladevan Rangaraju v. PIO, Delhi Commission for Women, GNCTD

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Show cause notice issued to Ministry of Environment and Forests for rendering “false and misleading” information in response to an RTI application

 While coming down heavily upon Ministry of Environment and Forests for rendering “false and misleading” information in response to an RTI application seeking information on the harmful effects of electromagnetic radiation emitted by cellphone towers on human beings, CIC issued a show cause to the Ministry asking why maximum penalty should not be imposed for false and misleading information on such a vital issue of public importance. The said order of the Commission came upon an RTI application filed by a person who sought information in relation to World Health Organization (WHO) press release –“ Radio frequency Electro Magnetic Fields (EMF) as possible carcinogenic” to humans based on increased risks for glioma, a malignant type brain cancer and also if any action has been taken by the Ministry in this regard. The applicant also sought to know if Ministry has conducted any study to gather data of Electro Magnetic Fields to measure the harmful biological effects of EMF on human beings and if it has declared radio frequency electromagnetic fields as a source of Air pollution. The Ministry, in response to his query had submitted that it had not undertaken or sponsored any study to gather data to measure the alleged harmful biological effects of EMF on human beings from Cell phone tower. However, during the proceedings before CIC, it was found that an inter-ministerial group was constituted by Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and Department of Telecommunication in 2010, which had reported that EMF can have adverse effects on humans and had also suggested that cellphone towers not be installed near schools, residential colonies and hospitals. While reprimanding the officials of Ministry for providing false information, Commission noted, “The Commission found that the answer of the CPIO in response to this RTI request is false and misleading. They said a) there is no study, but there is study, b) there is no adverse impact on human beings, but the report confirmed adverse impact of EMF, c) were not aware of, but they knew or presumed to have known the contents of both reports by WHO and Inter-Ministerial Group, as those reports were placed on their official website”. “The commission is surprised that the respondent authority knew that the report was submitted by the inter-ministerial group, but officers neither cared to submit the copy of the report nor read it. The commission could trace the report from the websites of department of telecommunication and DDA", noted CIC and issued a show cause notice upon the Ministry in the matter.
Suresh Chander Gupta v. Ministry of Environment & Forests,  decided on February 20, 2015)
Read full judgment here;click here

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Whether a person can file repeated application for information under RTI on same subject?

Answer-i)             The principle of res judicata applies to judicial proceedings and RTI application is not a proceeding,

ii)           The RTI application  is not a free service but a paid service under a right given by Parliament,  

iii)          The PIOs are servants of this democracy paid out of funds contributed by citizens and not masters AND the time and sources belongs to public. They work for   money and still they feel harassed providing information against prescribed fees.

iv)           The Act does not bar  filing of  frequent applications,

v)            An information obtained earlier may be lost at the hands of an applicant and he may require the same again,

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Whether court can restrain Media from publishing/broadcasting any information regarding call of hartal/strike?

  From the foregoing discussion, we conclude

that this Court, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, cannot

issue any writ restraining from publishing/broadcasting

any information regarding call of hartal/strike. 
   IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                            PRESENT:

     THE AG.CHIEF JUSTICE MR.ASHOK BHUSHAN
            MR.JUSTICE A.M.SHAFFIQUE
                                &
      MR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR

   WEDNESDAY, THE 29TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2014/
                  WP(C).NO. 32529 OF 2007 (S)
                  ----------------------------



       S.SUDIN
     
Vs           THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
     


                                                

               ASHOK BHUSHAN, Ag. CJ,
                   A.M.SHAFFIQUE, J
                              &
          A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR, J.

     
Citation; AIR 2015 Kerala 49

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