Whether court should release director of company on anticipatory bail if employee commits suicide due to alleged work place stress?

  The F.I.R. itself shows that the deceased was taking treatment for his stress management. He was disturbed and in the disturbed state of mind he had committed suicide. So, there is possibility that his commission of suicide was a result of his mental state. Though, there are allegations that he was disturbed because of stress in the company, the company was entitled to carry its business in the manner that was in the best interest of the company. That by itself would not mean that the bigger targets were given and meeting was arranged, so that the deceased would commit suicide. The only serious allegation in the F.I.R. is about the applicant threatening the deceased about his prospects in career. Effect of such treats will be a matter of trial based on the evidence led before the court. Today, I am only deciding the question whether the applicant’s custodial interrogation in this background is necessary. The applicant is 71 years of age. It is doubtful whether the offence U/s.306 r/w. S.107 of IPC is made out. The main allegations are about the company setting big targets, not granting leave and not accepting the resignation.

These acts would be in the normal course of business. The

deceased was earning Rs.1,35,000/-p.m. He was working with the

company since the year 2001. The company had not stopped his

salary, even during the period of lockdown, as submitted by

learned senior counsel. All these factors also need to be taken into consideration. Therefore, in my opinion, the applicant has made out a case for grant of anticipatory bail order in his favour. {Para 12}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 222 OF 2022

Dr. Surendra Manjrekar  Vs The State of Maharashtra 

CORAM : SARANG V. KOTWAL, J.

DATE : 28th JANUARY, 2022

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Whether government can refuse to grant disability pension to employee if he has waived his right to claim disability pension?

 As held by this Court, a Right to Equality guaranteed

under Article 14 of the Constitution of India would also apply

to a man who has no choice or rather no meaningful choice,

but to give his assent to a contract or to sign on the dotted

line in a prescribed or standard form or to accept a set of

rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable

and unconscionable a clause in that contract or form or rules

may be. We find that the said observations rightly apply to

the facts of the present case. Can it be said that the mighty

Union of India and an ordinary soldier, who having fought for

the country and retired from Regular Army, seeking reemployment

in the Territorial Army, have an equal

bargaining power. We are therefore of the considered view

that the reliance placed on the said document would also be

of no assistance to the case of the respondents.

25. The respondents herein are directed to grant disability

pension to the appellant in accordance with the rules and

regulations as are applicable to the Members of the

Territorial Army with effect from 1st January 2012. The

respondents are directed to clear arrears from 1st January

2012 within a period of three months from the date of this

judgment with interest at the rate of 9% per annum. {Para 23}

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2275 OF 2019

PANI RAM  Vs  UNION OF INDIA 

Author: B.R. GAVAI, J.

Dated: DECEMBER 17, 2021.

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Supreme Court: Pension payable to an employee on retirement shall be determined on the rules existing at the time of retirement

  While we accept the settled position of law that

the rule applicable in matters of determination of

pension is that which exists at the time of

retirement, we are unable to find any legal basis in

the action of the respondent University of

selectively allowing the benefit of Rule 25 (a). The

law, as recognized by this Court in Deoki Nandan

Prasad and Syed Yousuddin Ahmed (supra) unequivocally

states that the pension payable to an employee on

retirement shall be determined on the rules existing

at the time of retirement. However, the law does not

allow the employer to apply the rules differently in

relation to persons who are similarly situated. {Para 32}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.6994/2021

DR. G. SADASIVAN NAIR Vs COCHIN UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 

Author: NAGARATHNA J.

Dated: 1st December, 2021.

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Whether an employee should get alternative work and back wages if he acquires a physical disability during his service?

 Further, this arbitrary imposition under Clause 11 is in the teeth of the provisos to Sub Section (4) of Section 20 of the 2016 Act which read as under :

“Provided that, if an employee after acquiring disability is

not suitable for the post he was holding, shall be shifted to

some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits:

Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the

employee against any post, he may be kept on a

supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he

attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier.”

{Para 17}

18. The above provisos mandate that the Petitioners ought to be shifted to an alternative post with MSRTC with the same pay scale and service benefits and if it is not possible for MSRTC to adjust the Petitioners against any post immediately, they have to be kept on supernumerary posts until suitable posts are available or they attain the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. This is a mandate under the 2016 Act and a statutory right granted to the Petitioners. This right cannot be violated by Clause 11 of the Impugned Circular. MSRTC has no right and is in fact prohibited from treating the intervening period between the medical examination and a decision thereon as leave without pay. The very idea of restoring an employee to a position with the same pay scale and service benefits which he or she held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the action of termination taken by the employer.

19.  In our opinion, the Petitioners’ reinstatement by MSRTC entitles the Petitioners to claim back wages in their entirety. The denial of back wages to the Petitioners who have suffered due

to their disability would amount to indirectly punishing the Petitioners concerned and rewarding MSRTC by relieving them of their obligation to pay back wages. This would be wholly inequitable and unjust. This would be in contravention of the 2016 Act, as also in contravention of the Constitution of India. As a result, we are of the considered opinion that Clause 11 of the Impugned Circular is ultra vires the 2016 Act, as also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, we hereby quash and set-aside Clause 11 of the Impugned Circular.

20. Keeping in line with the mandate of Section 20 of the 2016 Act, we order and direct MSRTC to provide each one of the Petitioners with alternative posts having the same pay scale and service benefits as their earlier position.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 9762 OF 2019

Vikas Khanderao Keng, Vs The State of Maharashtra

CORAM: S.J. KATHAWALLA &

R.I.CHAGLA, JJ.

Dated : 16th JULY, 2020

Citation: 2021(2) MHLJ 131

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Whether nomination made by an employee can be treated as his will and curtail the right of legal heirs to claim a share in his service benefits?

 The purpose of taking a nomination by an employer is to relieve itself of the obligation to pay the benefits, irrespective of the right of a person who is entitled in law to the Fund. Nomination, in law, cannot be construed as a “Will” of the employee and cannot be treated as a testamentary disposition of the deceased employee with an intent to bestow the benefits on the heirs. Every employee has a right in law to decide how his movable assets should be treated and disbursed in the event of his death

and nomination cannot circumscribe the legal rights of disposition of the assets. The purpose of nomination is only to benefit a custodian so as to enable him to know how and to whom he has to hand over the assets, protecting him from litigations and multiplicity of cases from different people, claiming to be successors to the interest of the employee. Thus,

the liability of the employer / custodian is discharged by disbursing the funds to the ‘nominee’ and thereafter if there is an inter-se disputes between the lawful heirs, they could resort to appropriate remedies for identification of their shares. The concept of appointing a nominee therefore is only to ensure that the amounts are disbursed at the earliest to the nominee and this becomes significant as there may be occasions where it may take time for the legal heirs to resolve their disputes and in the meantime the trustee / Custodian Company or any other Institution may go into liquidation or any other contingency may arise making it difficult to realize the retiral and other dues.

 Whenever provident fund amount is

disbursed the custodian of the fund is anxious to have a good

discharge against all claims from whomsoever claiming

through the member. The Rules nowhere provide that the

nomination is to be construed as a will by the member. If a

nomination is to be taken as a final disposition made by the

member as to how it should be taken by his heir on his death, it

would lead to anomalies, because till the member dies, the

nominee acquires no right to claim the amount. The legal right

of a member to decide from time to time as to how his assets

should be taken consequent to his death, cannot be frozen by a

nomination given, as part of his service conditions. His legal

rights about disposition of his assets cannot be circumscribed

by such nomination, 11 he is to execute a “Will” later on,

contrary to the nomination that has been made earlier, the

terms and conditions of the ‘will’ alone can prevail, and so far

as the trustees of the fund are concerned, their obligation will

be fully discharged by paying it to the nominee, who will in turn

be liable to hand over the funds to the persons entitled to as per

the ‘Will’. In case of intestate succession, the nominee is bound

to hand over the amounts to the heirs of the deceased. The main

purpose of nomination is intended to benefit

 the custodianstrustees

of the fund to know as to how or to whom they should

hand over the amounts and need not make themselves

answerable to multiplicity of claims from different persons

claiming to succeed to the interests of the deceased member. If

there is no nomination, the custodian of the fund cannot decide

as to who are the lawful heirs to succeed and they will have to

wait for a Court order to be produced, and unless finality is

reached, therein, the disbursement of the fund will be delayed

Funds, like the provident fund, in the case of State or other

public institutions, may be sufficiently safe-guarded even if

there is to be a delay in disbursement. But in cases of other

institutions, if the amounts are not immediately disbursed on

the basis of nomination, and before proceedings in Court are

over, if for any reasons, the Companies or institutions are

liquidated, the contributions made by a member of such bodies,

will not enure to the benefit of the legal heirs till finality is

reached in Court proceedings unless the amount is deposited in

Court at the earliest stage. The concept of nomination has been

thought of to achieve the disbursement of the amounts at the

earliest point of time to the nominee, who will be answerable to

claims made by those who are entitled to the amount lawfully.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

W.P.(C) 6701/2018 and C.M. Nos.25451/2018, 41307/2019 and

11129/2020

SUMAN KUMARI @ SUMAN SINGH  Vs  NAND KISHOR & ORS 

CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Pronounced on: 06.11.2020

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Is the employer liable to pay interest to the employee if he withholds his leave encashment without specific order?

  We, accordingly, allow the petition partially by directing

the respondent to pay the petitioner his leave encashment dues

along with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date

the same became due, till payment.”{Para 11}

15. Another Division Bench of this Court in Prem Nath (supra)

dealing with a similar issue in the context of Rule 39 (3) of the CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972 held as under:-

“7. It is undisputed that the respondent retired from service on

31.08.2010 on attaining the age of superannuation and that at

the time of his retirement, or immediately thereafter, leave

encashment was not released to him. There is also no dispute

on the proposition that leave encashment can be withheld under

Rule 39 (3) of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, if at the time of

retirement, an employee is under suspension or disciplinary or

criminal proceedings are pending against him. However, a

reading of the said provision clearly shows that in order to

withhold the leave encashment in whole or in part, the authority

competent to grant leave has to pass an order specifically

withholding the encashment, if in its view there is a possibility

of some money becoming recoverable from the employee on

conclusion of the proceedings against him. 

8. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently submitted

that no such order was passed by the competent authority and

the learned counsel for the petitioners was not able to rebut the

said fact. Consequently, the petitioners herein could not have

withheld the leave encashment and the money ought to have

been released to the respondent soon after his retirement. We

also do not agree with the submissions of the learned counsel

for the petitioners that only because there is no Rule for grant

of interest of leave encashment, the respondent would not be

entitled to the same. Learned counsel has not been able to point

out any rule to the contrary, which creates a bar for grant of

interest in case due amount is released after a considerable

delay. It has been clearly held by the Apex Court in several

judgments including S.K.Dua vs. State of Haryana & Anr.,

(2008) 3 SCC 44 that if there are Statutory Rules or

Administrative Instructions occupying the field, an employee

could claim payment of interest relying on such rule, but even

in the absence of any Statutory Rules or Administrative

Instructions or Guidelines, an employee can claim interest

under Part-III of the Constitution relying on Articles 14, 19 and

21 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, we also rely on a

decision passed by the Division Bench of this Court in Writ

Petition (C) No.1186/2012, titled as ‘Government of NCT of

Delhi vs. S.K.Srivastava’. This judgment also supports our view

that if no order is passed under Rule 39(3) of Leave Rules, the

leave encashment cannot be withheld. The fact of the matter is

that the petitioners are retaining the money of the respondent

from the year 2010 to 2015 and the respondent is, thus, clearly

entitled to interest on the delayed payment. Interest is awarded

to compensate the recipient for the falling value of money due

to inflation. In so far as, the plea of the petitioners that serious

cases were pending against the respondent and, therefore, the

leave encashment was not released is concerned, the same has

no merit either. Although neither the petitioners nor the

respondent have been able to throw any light on the status of

the criminal and disciplinary proceedings as of today, however,

if this was the reason for withholding the leave encashment

then the same status continues perhaps even today. The reason

given for releasing the leave encashment in 2015 is an order

passed by the Public Grievances Commission. We fail to

understand that if the petitioners were withholding the leave

encashment due to pending proceedings then they had the

remedy of not implementing the order of the Public Grievances

Commission. However, having complied with that order and

released the leave encashment, the petitioners cannot be heard

to say that the leave encashment was withheld due to pending

proceedings. Learned tribunal has, thus, rightly come to

conclusion that the respondent deserves interest at the GPF

rate for the delayed payment of leave encashment.”

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

W.P.(C) 3114/2020 & CM 10817/2020

SH. S.B. SINGH Vs NATIONAL TEXTILE CORPORATION 

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Whether the court can declare that a private employee's service continues and is entitled to get all consequential benefits?

 9. Through the present petition the petitioner seeks enforcement of a contract of service. The law on the issue is no more res integra. Subject to well defined categories of exceptions, the law and more particularly provisions of Specific Relief Act, do not contemplate enforcing a service contract, as that would amount to specific performance of a contract. In this context I may usefully rely on a passage from Halsbury’s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 44, which is as under:-

“407. Contracts for personal work or services.— A judgment

for specific performance of a contract for personal work or

services is not pronounced, either at the suit of the employer

or the employee. The court does not seek to compel persons

against their will to maintain continuous personal and

confidential relations. However, this rule is not absolute and

without exception. It has been held that an employer may be

restrained from dismissing an employee in breach of contract

if there is no loss of confidence between employer and

employee or if (at least in a contract of employment to carry

out a public duty) the employee has been dismissed in a

manner which does not comply with statutory or contractual

regulations governing dismissal. No court may, whether by

way of an order for specific performance of a contract of

employment or an injunction restraining a breach or

threatened breach of such a contract, compel an employee to

do any work or attend at any place for the doing of any work.

This principle applies not merely to contracts of employment,

but to all contracts which involve the rendering of continuous

services by one person to another, such as a contract to work

a railway line ….”

10. Supreme Court in several judgments has observed that a Court would normally not give a declaration that a contract subsists and the employee, after removal from service, can be deemed to be in service against the consent of the employer, subject to three broad exceptions (i) where a public servant is removed in contravention of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where the worker is reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body

violates mandatory provisions of a Statute.

11. The only remedy thus available to such an employee, who is

discontinued from service, if aggrieved, is to sue for damages and this is evident from reading the provisions of Section 14 read with Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act.

8. In view of the aforesaid judgments, the following

conclusions in law emerge:-

(i) A contract of private employment is not similar to the

public employment and in such private employment there is

no scope of applicability of the principles of administrative

law/public law.

(ii) A contract of employment which provides termination of

services by one month's notice, then, at best the employee

will only be entitled to one month's pay in terms of the

employment contract. An employee is not entitled to any

relief of continuation in services or pay with consequential

benefits for alleged remaining period of services till the date

of his superannuation.

(iii) As per the provision of Section 14(1)(c) of the Specific

Relief Act, 1963, a contract which is determinable in nature

cannot be specifically enforced. Since the service contract in

the present case is determinable by one month's notice there

does not arise the question of giving of any reliefs which

tantamount to enforcement of a determinable contract. As

per Section 14(1)(b), a contract of personal service cannot

be enforced when the employer is not the Government or

“State” as per Article 12 of the Constitution of India.

Plaintiff has in fact received one month's pay and therefore

his claim will stand satisfied in law and he is not entitled to

any reliefs as prayed for in prayer clauses in the suit.”

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

  W.P.(C) 7196/2020

DEEPAK WANKHEDE  Vs INDIAN RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AGENCY 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE JYOTI SINGH

Date of Decision:09.11.2020

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Whether the employer will be liable for defamation of employee if he conducts departmental enquiry against him?

 In the present case, the defendant has taken the defence of privilege. The question is whether the charge-sheet issued against the plaintiff, the enquiry report and the letter of dismissal of the plaintiff can be said to be protected by absolute privilege or qualified privilege?

37. The enquiry proceeding was initiated by the defendant by issuing the charge-sheet on the basis of information received that the matriculation certificate and mark-sheet submitted by the plaintiff at the time of his appointment were not genuine. The information was received from a reliable source and in my opinion could not be brushed aside as frivolous. If it was finally established that the information was true, that would have amounted to a criminal offence on the part of the plaintiff. Having got such information, it was incumbent upon the management of the defendant to hold an enquiry into the matter. Such enquiry was held as part of the management's duty and in larger public interest. As such, in my considered opinion, the enquiry proceedings and all publications made in connection therewith were privileged. As Lord Finlay L.C. observed in Adam vs. Ward, (1917) Appeal Cases 309, if a communication is made in pursuance of a duty, the same would be privileged. His Lordship was of the view that this privilege is qualified and may be rebutted by proof of express malice. In the present case, no case of malice has been established by the plaintiff. Hence, at least, the defence of qualified privilege would be available to the defendant.

38. The law is fairly clear that any step which is essentially a step in a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding would be immune from liability for defamation as it gives rise to an occasion for privilege.  In O'Conor vs. Waldron, MANU/PR/0085/1934 : AIR 1935 PC 3, Lord Atkin observed that proceedings before an executive or administrative authority or a step to initiate such proceedings can only give rise to an occasion for qualified privilege. Gatley on Libel and Slander (5th Ed., page 181) states that no action will lie for defamatory statements contained in any document which is incidental to the proper initiation of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, information, complaint, writ or petition by which the quasi-judicial Tribunal is set in motion.

39. I have no doubt in my mind that the protection of privilege should extend to enquiry proceedings conducted by an employer against an employee. It would definitely not be desirable if an employer in spite of receiving information that an employee is allegedly committing a crime or other wrongful act detrimental to the public interest, refrains from holding an enquiry into the matter for the fear of being exposed to a defamation suit. Such a position would be extremely harmful to the interest of the public at large.

40. The question is whether such privilege should be absolute or qualified. I am of the view that the privilege should be qualified. This means that if the plaintiff is able to establish malice on the part of the defendant in conducting an enquiry proceeding against him by issuing charge-sheet, the defence of privilege will not be available to the defendant. However, in the present case, the plaintiff has been unable to establish malice on the part of the defendant in conducting the enquiry proceeding against him by issuing charge-sheet which culminated in his dismissal order. I am of the considered view that the materials complained of by the plaintiff and forming the basis of the present defamation suit are protected by qualified privilege. The fact that at a subsequent point of time due to intervention of the Hon'ble President of India, the order of dismissal was withdrawn and the plaintiff was reinstated in service, does not change the situation.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF CALCUTTA

CS 11 of 2006

Decided On: 17.02.2017

 Manik Lal Bhowmik  Vs.  Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arijit Banerjee, J.

Citation: MANU/WB/0098/2017

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Supreme court: Retired employee can file a petition regarding stoppage of his pension at the place where he is residing and getting pension

 As noted above, the learned single Judge has also observed that Petitioner ought to have filed the writ petition in Jharkhand High Court where his earlier writ petition was pending. The earlier writ petition which was initially filed in 2006 in Patna High Court was for refund of the amount as noted above. After dismissal of the writ petition by Patna High Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction, Shri B.N. Mishra had filed a Writ Petition No. 4930 of 2013 in Jharkhand High Court for the relief which was claimed in Writ Petition No. 13955 of 2006. As noted above, the cause of action for filing the Writ Petition No. 5999 of 2014 was entirely different. Stoppage of pension and asking for refund of more than Rs. 08 lakhs amount had serious adverse effect on the Petitioner, who was staying at his native place Darbhanga. A retired employee, who is receiving pension, cannot be asked to go to another court to file the writ petition, when he has a cause of action for filing a writ petition in Patna High Court. For a retired employee convenience is to prosecute his case at the place where he belonged to and was getting pension. The submission of the learned Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 on principle of forum non conveniens has no substance.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3630 of 2020 

Decided On: 05.11.2020

 Shanti Devi Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: MANU/SC/0842/2020

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Whether an employer can terminate the services of the employee if he acquires a disability during his service?

 The proviso to section 47 of The Disabilities Act 1995 referred earlier says that if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits. The certificate of disability issued by the board in the Solapur hospital as referred earlier shows that petitioner suffered 10% physical disability. Considering said disability and the fact that he was unable to work as a driver and as suggested by the Civil Surgeon, Osmanabad and the board at Solapur he was required to be given other posts or other work in the light of proviso to section 47 of The Disabilities Act, 1995, but instead respondent No. 3 terminated services of the petitioner by the impugned order without considering his request to provide him alternate work made in his application (Exh. 'B') dated 08-03-2010 and without hearing him or without any enquiry. Thus, termination of the petitioner was without any fault on his part. Therefore, we hold that the impugned order is not sustainable being in violation of section 47 of The Disabilities Act, 1995. Thus, as the termination of the petitioner is illegal and is liable to be set aside, he is entitled to financial/monetary benefits of his termination period i.e. from the date of his termination till the date of his retirement on superannuation as well as retiral benefits including pension.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 6939 of 2017

Decided On: 01.10.2019

Shaikh Salim Shaikh Amir Vs.  The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.P. Deshmukh and S.M. Gavhane, JJ.

Citation: MANU/MH/3149/2019

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Whether an employee who retired on 31st of a month is entitled to the increment which would have fallen due on 1st of the next month?

The petitioner was not on duty on 1.4.2003. Increment can be drawn only when an employee is on duty. The increment in terms of FR 24 & 26 did not become due during the period of service of the petitioner. Therefore, increment on 1.4.2003 cannot be sanctioned in favour of petitioner on the ground that he had completed twelve months of continuous service. The date of increment falls due on the first day of the succeeding month after the retirement. Petitioner retired on the basic pay drawn by him on 31.3.2003 i.e. his date of retirement. His pension has to be determined accordingly. Petitioner had become a pensioner on 1.04.2003. He cannot be held entitled to any increment which may fall due post his retirement. He is entitled only to those increments which fall due to him during the period of his service.

 In the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla

(Before Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Jyotsna Rewal Dua, JJ.)

CWP No 2503 of 2016

Hari Prakash Vs State of Himachal Pradesh

CWP No. 2503 of 2016 a/w CWPOA No. 663 of 2020

Decided on November 6, 2020, 

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine HP 2362

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Whether disciplinary authority can dismiss an employee after departmental enquiry even after his acquittal in a criminal case?

In the present case, the respondent was acquitted of the charge of murder. The circumstances in which the trial led to an acquittal have been elucidated in detail above. The verdict of the criminal trial did not conclude the disciplinary enquiry. The disciplinary enquiry was not governed by proof beyond reasonable doubt or by the rules of evidence which governed the criminal trial. True, even on the more relaxed standard which governs a disciplinary enquiry, evidence of the involvement of the respondent in a conspiracy involving the death of Bhanwar Singh would be difficult to prove. But there are, as we have seen earlier, circumstances emerging from the record of the disciplinary proceedings which bring legitimacy to the contention of the State that to reinstate such an employee back in service will erode the credibility of and public confidence in the image of the police force.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 3340 of 2020

The State of Rajasthan Vs  Heem Singh 

Author: Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, J

Dated: October 29, 2020.

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Whether causing simple hurt can be treated as crime involving moral turpitude for taking disciplinary action against employee??

There can be no manner of doubt about certain offences which can straightaway be termed as involving moral turpitude e.g. offences under the Prevention of Corruption of Act, NDPS Act, etc. The question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether an offence involving bodily injury can be categorized as a crime involving moral turpitude. In this case, we are concerned with an assault. It is very difficult to state that every assault is not an offence involving moral turpitude. A simple assault is different from an aggravated assault. All cases of assault or simple hurt cannot be categorized as crimes involving moral turpitude. On the other hand, the use of a dangerous weapon which can cause the death of the victim may result in an offence involving moral turpitude. In the instant case, there was no motive for the Respondent to cause the death of the victims. The criminal courts below found that the injuries caused to the victims were simple in nature. On an overall consideration of the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the crime committed by the Respondent does not involve moral turpitude. As the Respondent is not guilty of an offence involving moral turpitude, he is not liable to be discharged from service.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7011 of 2009

Decided On: 26.04.2019

 The State Bank of India  Vs.  P. Soupramaniane

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Whether employer can remove employee from service even if he was released on probation of offenders Act?

 Yet another reason given by the High Court for interference with the order of discharge is that the criminal court released the Respondent on probation only to permit him to continue in service. The release under probation does not entitle an employee to claim a right to continue in service. In fact the employer is under an obligation to discontinue the services of an employee convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude.1 The observations made by a criminal court are not binding2 on the employer who has the liberty of dealing with his employees suitably.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7011 of 2009

Decided On: 26.04.2019

 The State Bank of India  Vs.  P. Soupramaniane

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

L. Nageswara Rao and M.R. Shah, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 SC 2187

L. Nageswara Rao, J.

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Whether employee acting beyond one's authority is guilty of misconduct liable for disciplinary enquiry?

Loss of confidence is the primary factor and not the amount of money misappropriated. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. In the case of a bank, every officer/employee is supposed to act within the limits of his authority. If each officer/employee is allowed to act beyond his authority, the discipline of the organisation/bank will disappear. The functioning of the Bank would become chaotic and unmanageable. No organisation, more particularly, a bank can function properly and effectively if its officers and employees do not observe the prescribed norms and discipline. Such indiscipline cannot be condoned on the specious ground that it was not actuated by ulterior motives or by extraneous considerations.

In the High Court of Meghalaya at Shillong

(Before Ajay Kumar Mittal, C.J. and H.S. Thangkhiew, J.)

Shri Gautam Dhar  v.  State Bank of India and Others

Writ Appeal No. 59 of 2017

In

WP(C) No. 191 of 2014

Decided on June 11, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine Megh 105 : 2019 Lab IC 2650

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Whether Major punishment can be imposed on employee without oral enquiry?

A supplementary affidavit has been filed in which it has been alleged in para 4 that the petitioner was given charge-sheet and he was allowed to see the required documents but since he did not request for any date for the enquiry no date was fixed. In our opinion this is not the correct way in which the respondents should have proceeded. Even if the petitioner had not requested for an oral enquiry yet it was incumbent upon the respondents to have issued a notice fixed date, time and place of the enquiry and naming the enquiry officer.

4. In cases where a major punishment proposed to be imposed an oral enquiry is a must, whether the employee request, for it or not. For this it is necessary to issue a notice to the employee concerned intimating him date, time and place of the enquiry as held by the Division Bench of this Court in Subhash Chcndra Sharma v. Managing Director MANU/UP/0757/1999 against which SLP has been dismissed by the Supreme Court on 16.8.2000.

5. Following the aforesaid decision we are of the view that the impugned termination order was passed without holding enquiry against the petitioner which is illegal and it is hereby quashed. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4640 of 1999

Decided On: 08.05.2001

Subhash Chandra Sharma Vs.  U.P. Co-operative Spinning Mills and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Markandey Katju and R.B. Mishra, JJ.

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Whether dismissal order can be passed against employee without examination of witnesses?

Even if the employee refuses to participate in the enquiry, the employer cannot straightaway dismiss him, but he must hold an ex parte enquiry where evidence must be led vide Imperial Tobacco Co, Ltd. v. its workmen. MANU/SC/0401/1961 : AIR 1962 SC 1348, Uma Shanker v. Registrar. 1992 (651) FLR 674

9. A dismissal order has serious consequences and should be passed only after complying with the rules of natural justice. Since in the present case, no enquiry was held at all and no evidence led in the presence of the petitioner nor was he given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him or lead his own evidence the impugned dismissal order is illegal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

C.M.W.P. No. 33291 of 1996

Decided On: 07.09.1999

Subhash Chandra Sharma  Vs.  Managing Director, U.P. Co-op. Spg. Mils Federation Ltd., Kanpur and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Markandey Katju and Dhani Ram Chaudhary, JJ.

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Whether employer should advise employees about service rules?

The learned Tribunal as well as the High Court granted the relief
to respondent No. 4 on the ground that the department ought to
have informed and/or advised the employee with respect to the
seniority to be fixed on the basis of rotaquota
rule and as the

department failed to do so, respondent No. 4 cannot be denied
his legitimate right to be placed at an appropriate place in the
seniority list, as otherwise also he was selected for a promotion in
the LDCE quota also. On the aforesaid terms, the learned
Tribunal as well as the High Court are not justified in directing to
put respondent No. 4 in the seniority list above the appellant
who, in fact, was appointed in the LDCE quota and the
respondent No. 4 never accepted his promotion in the LDCE
quota. It was for the employee to know the rule. The department
was not expected to advise and/or tell the employee about how
the seniority will be fixed and/or about the rotaquota
rule.
NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7779 OF 2012

P. Subramaniyam Vs Union of India


M. R. Shah, J.
Dated:March 15, 2019.

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Whether departmental enquiry can started against government servant on ground that he has extra marital affairs?

Thus, this Court feels that a human dignity attaches to
itself also a right of concept of autonomy and also a right to
take ones own decisions for himself or herself relating to
his/her body and choices of his/per partner for whom he or
she wishes to live or have sexual intercourse. These choices
and selections cannot be a subject matter of departmental
proceedings and no employer can be allowed to do moral
policing on its employees which go beyond the domain of his
public life.
44. In view of the above discussions and observations, this
Court is of the opinion that an act of relationship entered by
an individual with another female or male as the case may be
while is/her spouse is alive would be an act of amounting to
adultery and would be considered as an immoral act so far as
the Indian society is concerned. It is not to be appreciated.
The same would, however, not be a ground for initiating
(33 of 33) [CW-2067/1999]
departmental proceedings by the employer and it be left best
for the person who may be affected individually to take
remedy and proceed against him/her in civil law or for
initiating divorce proceedings as the case may be.
45. Thus, this Court concludes that the respondents had no
authority to issue letter dated 30/01/1999 directing the
petitioners to undergo DNA Test alongwith child of Dharma
Rani and the action of suspending the petitioners and issuing
subsequently memorandum dated 16/12/2000 under Rule 16
of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules, 1958 is found to be illegal and unjustified and
the same is quashed and set aside and further, it is held that
the State Government shall not initiate departmental
proceedings on the basis of a complaint of any person against
a Government servant alleging therein of the said
Government servant having extra-marital relationship with
another man or woman whether married or unmarried.

Reportable
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2067/1999

Mahesh Chand Sharma  Vs  State of Rajasthan

MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV PRAKASH SHARMA

Pronounced on 07/03/2019

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Whether higher officer can be held guilty for abetment of suicide if he taking extra work from employee after office hours?

 In the context of aforesaid legal positions, this court is of

the view that alleged act of mis-behaviour and taking extra work
after the office hours from the deceased cannot be equated into
abetting the deceased to commit suicide. If any higher officer
compels his sub-ordinate to do extra work which is unbearable,
then he has other options and it cannot be said that he had no
other option except to commit suicide. Under these
circumstances, the appellant cannot be held responsible for
abetting the deceased to commit suicide.
High Court of Madhya Pradesh: Bench at Indore
Single Bench: Hon'ble Shri Justice S.K. Awasthi
Cr.A. No.4509/2018

Satendra Jha vs. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.

(Passed on 06/03/2019)

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