Bombay HC: Facebook Screenshots Printouts of defamatory posts not sufficient to prove that it is made from a fake account

Learned Advocate appearing for applicant vehemently submits that First Information Report has been filed by respondent No.2, who is the brother-in-law (wife's brother) of applicant. According to informant, applicant had created a fake Facebook account in the name of one Minal Basavraj Swami and Chandra Surnal and through the said fake Facebook account the applicant has defamed the informant and his family members, especially the wife of applicant. There was marital discord at that time between the applicant and his wife. If we consider the charge sheet, then it can be seen that there is absolutely no proper investigation. Only the screen shots of Facebook, of which prints have been taken, are annexed after seizure and there are statements of two witnesses. Only on the basis of said material it cannot be said that the said Facebook posts were created by the applicant. Therefore, there is absolutely no evidence against the applicant and, therefore, it would be futile exercise to ask the applicant to face the trial. {Para 3}

4. We take the present case as a classic case, which is investigated in total ignorance of provisions of law and by a person, who appears to have not undergone training of detecting cyber crime. When it was specifically alleged in the First Information Report that two Facebook accounts have been fraudulently created, then the Investigating Officer ought to have got help of an expert to see from which IP address those accounts were created, whether any such electronic device of the said IP address is with the accused. Print of screen shots of Facebook material will not at any stretch of imagination would prove that the said post was created from an alleged fake account. Even if for the sake of argument we accept that there was dispute between applicant and his wife and the alleged post had a defamatory material in respect of informant, his family members including his sister i.e. wife of applicant; still we cannot reach the conclusion without any evidence that the applicant would have been the only person behind creation of such fake Facebook account.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Criminal Application No. 2850 of 2019

Decided On: 22.10.2024

Mahesh Shivling Tilkari Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vibha Kankanwadi and S.G. Chapalgaonkar, JJ.

Author: Vibha Kankanwadi, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/6841/2024.

Print Page

What is the Difference Between Mass Media and Social Media like Facebook, twitter etc?

 Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn are primarily classified as social media platforms rather than traditional mass media. Here’s a detailed explanation of their classification and characteristics in relation to mass media:

Definition and Distinction

- Mass Media: Traditionally, mass media refers to communication technologies that disseminate information to a large audience simultaneously. This includes newspapers, television, radio, and magazines. Mass media typically involves one-way communication where the audience is passive and receives information without direct interaction.

- Social Media: In contrast, social media encompasses platforms that enable users to create, share, and interact with content. This includes Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, and others. Social media allows for two-way communication where users can engage with content creators and other users through comments, shares, likes, and discussions.

Print Page

Does posting a person's name or photograph on a pornographic website amount to a breach of that person's privacy?

 In the present case, the petitioner's photographs and images, though not in themselves obscene or offensive, were taken from her Facebook and Instagram accounts without her consent and were uploaded on a pornographic website, adding derogatory captions to them. It is an irrefutable proposition that if the name and/or likeness of a person appears on a pornographic website, as in the present case, without the the consent or concurrence of such person, such act would by and in itself amount to an offence inter-alia under section 67 of the IT Act. This is so since section 67 makes it an offence to publish or transmit, or causes to be published or transmitted, in the electronic form, any material which appeals to the prurient interests of those who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. The only purpose of posting the petitioner's photograph on a pornographic website could be to use it to appeal to the prurient interests of those who are likely to see it. That apart, the inclusion of the name and/or likeness of a person on such website, even if the photograph of the person is not in itself obscene or offensive, without consent or concurrence, would at the very least amount to breach of the person's privacy, which a court may, in appropriate cases, injunct or restrain. It is is evident that such publication would likely result in ostracisation and stigmatisation of the person concerned in society; and therefore immediate and efficacious remedy is required in such cases. {Para 86}

 In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Anup Jairam Bhambhani, J.)

‘X’  Vs  Union of India and Others 

W.P.(CRL) 1082/2020 & Crl. M.A. Nos. 9485/2020, 10986-87/2020

Decided on April 20, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1788.

Print Page

Whether the court should order the transfer of investigation on the ground that the police officer is a Facebook friend of the complainant?

As regards the association, alliance and close family relations

of the complainant in FIR No.76 dated 1903.2018 with a senior police

officer who was the then Special Director of CBI, it appears to the Court

that all the allegations are mere assumption and not substantiated by any

material on record. The petitioner has drawn attention of the Court towards

two e-mails addressed to Ram Gopal Garg, the then ACB, CBI, Chandigarh

(rggarg@yahoo.com) and the copy of the same was addressed to head of

CBI at Chandigarh on official email address – hobacchg@cbi.gov.in as well

as to Tajinder Ludhra, the then IGP and Rakesh Asthana on email address

spl.dir@gov.in. These documents by any stretch of imagination, cannot be

said to be any connecting evidence substantiating the close family relations

or influence of the Special Director, CBI in the investigation conducted by

the police. The petitioner has also failed to mention the role of any police

official in hampering with the fair investigation conducted in the aforesaid

FIR or any role of any police official in lodging FIR No.75 dated

21.09.2020 under Sections 419, 420 IPC at Police Station, Sector 19,

Chandigarh.

As regards, the alleged proximity of a senior police official and

his wife with the complainant in FIR No.76 dated 19.03.2018, the same

have not been substantiated by way of any cogent proof. Even otherwise, if

a person appears in the friend list of a Facebook page of any public servant,

it cannot be assumed that an official shall favour such a person in an illegal

manner and maneuver investigation of a crime. It is indeed intriguing as to

how the petitioner gained access to the Facebook account of this police

official. Facebook accounts are privy to the account holder and the

petitioner must be put to strict proof as to how has he been able to access

the facebook account of a police official and where from he obtained the

facebook conversations Annexures P-1 and P-2.

The high ranking police officer who has never remained posted

in Chandigarh and having graduated with the husband of complainant from

same university/college in the year 1982 would not necessarily lead to any

inference that he was instrumental in getting the investigation conducted in

a biased manner. It appears to the Court that name of this officer has been

unnecessarily dragged into the litigation for ulterior motive with a view to

put pressure upon the Chandigarh police to act according to petitioner’s

whims.

The so-called officer, Mr. Asthana, never remained posted in

Chandigarh and the other high rank officer Tajinder Luthra was transferred

way back in 2018 from Chandigarh police and particularly in case of Mr.

Asthana, it can be said beyond doubt that he is not even remotely connected

with the affairs of Chandigarh Police.

The power of transferring an investigation must be in rare and

exceptional cases where the court finds it necessary in order to do justice

between the parties and to instil confidence in the public mind, or where

investigation by the State police lacks credibility and it is necessary for

having a fair, honest and complete investigation, and particularly, when it is

imperative to retain public confidence in the impartial working of the Stae

agencies. Under no circumstances, should the court make any expression of

its opinion on merit relating to any accusation against any individual. The

aforesaid view has been taken from judgment dated 21.08, 2013 rendered by

the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1167 of 2013 titled ‘Prof. K.V.

Rajendran vs. Superintendent of Police, CBCID South Zone, Chennai

& others’.

It is settled law that an accused does not have the right to

determine the prosecuting agency of its own choice. The Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of Romila Thapar v. Union of India, (2018) 10 SCC 753,

held that the accused “does not have a say in the matter of appointment of

investigating agency”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that “the

consistent view of this Court is that the accused cannot ask for changing the

investigating agency or to do investigation in a particular manner

including for court- monitored investigation.”

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

Decided on: 26.11.2020

Civil Writ Petition No.16659 of 2020

Dr. Mohit Dhawan Vs  U.T. Chandigarh & others

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANT PARKASH

Print Page

Questions and answers on law part 16

Q. 1:-Whether Tender contract comes under commercial dispute under Commercial Courts Act?

Ans:  Commercial Courts Act

2. Definitions.—(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—(c) “commercial dispute” means a dispute arising out of—

(vi) construction and infrastructure contracts, including tenders;

Q. 2 :- Whether civil revision is tenable if court fails to award costs while deciding suit?

Print Page

What is single publication rule for filing suit against defamatory material on the internet/facebook page?

In Khawar Butt (supra) this Court dealing with the period of limitation for filing a suit against defamatory material on the internet/facebook page held that the single publication rule was more pragmatic and appropriate. It was held:

"14. I first proceed on to determine the legal issue: Whether, the leaving of the allegedly defamatory material on the internet/facebook page gives rise to a fresh cause of action every moment the said offending material is so left on the webpage-which can be viewed by others at any time, or whether the cause of action arises only when the offending material is first posted on the webpage/internet.

38. I am of the view that the Single Publication Rule is more appropriate and pragmatic to apply, rather the Multiple Publication Rule. I find the reasoning adopted by the American Courts in this regard to be more appealing than the one adopted by the English Courts, prior to the amendment of the law by the introduction of the Defamation Act, 2013. It is the policy of the law of limitation to bar the remedy beyond the prescribed period. That legislative policy would stand defeated if the mere continued residing of the defamatory material or article on the website were to give a continuous cause of action to the plaintiff to sue for defamation/libel. Of course, if there is re-publication resorted to by the defendant-with a view to reach the different or larger section of the public in respect of the defamatory article or material, it would give rise to a fresh cause of action.

39. The alleged libelous posting on Facebook, as averred in the plaint, was posted on around 26.10.2008, 27.10.2008 and even the booklet containing the allegedly defamatory material concerning the plaintiff is said to have been circulated around 25.12.2008. In view of the same, the limitation period for the suit expired on 25.12.2009.

40. Since the suit to claim damages for libel has not been filed within the period of limitation of one year from the date when the cause of action arose, i.e. when the libel was published, the said claim is barred by limitation."

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 21/2017

Decided On: 27.05.2020

 Ajai Agarwal Vs.  IBNI8 Media & Software Limited and Ors.

Print Page

When should the court not reject plaint filed for recovery of compensation for libel and mental agony on the ground of limitation?

If the present suit was an action simpliciter for compensation for libel, the same was required to be filed within one year when the libel was published and as noted by this Court in the case of Khawar Butt (supra), single publication rule is more applicable and pragmatic in which case, the present suit had to be filed when the slanderous telecast was shown by defendant No. 1 on 29th July, 2006. However, in the present suit, the plaintiff claims a decree of exemplary or punitive damages in favour of the plaintiff on account of the mental agony, torture, humiliation and hatred suffered by the plaintiff and his family and a decree for loss of reputation and goodwill. As per the plaintiff, the cause of action though started accruing in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant on 29th July, 2006 when the first telecast was made, however, it continued when it received notices from various authorities including the Medical Council, Police etc as also when the writ petitions were filed and dismissed by this Court and the Allahabad High Court. From the pleadings/claims of the plaintiff in paragraph 54, 55, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the plaint, it is not the mere publication of libel but thereafter also the continuous course of action which resulted in mental agony, harassment to the plaintiff on which count the plaintiff seeks exemplary and punitive damages. Since the period of limitation for such a claim in the suit would be governed by residuary clause i.e. Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which provides for a period of three years limitation from the time when the right to sue accrues and as per the plaintiff right to sue still subsists and as the present application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC has to be decided based on the averments in the plaint which have to be accepted by way of demurer, the suit cannot be held to be barred by limitation. It is however clarified that since in the present case, the issue of limitation would be a mixed question of fact and law, the same would be decided after the parties have led their respective evidence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 21/2017

Decided On: 27.05.2020

 Ajai Agarwal Vs.  IBNI8 Media & Software Limited and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Mukta Gupta, J.

Citation: MANU/DE/1113/2020

Print Page

FIR For Facebook post : Karnataka HC Orders enquiry Against Magistrate Who Remanded Accused In Violation Of SC Guidelines

There is yet another important aspect which

requires consideration namely, the order passed by the

learned Magistrate granting police custody. To a specific

query made by this Court during the course of hearing to

the learned advocate for petitioner, whether registration

of FIR No.91/2019 and the grant of anticipatory bail by

the learned Sessions Judge was brought to the notice of

learned Magistrate, it was asserted by Shri.Aruna Shyam,

that the same was brought to the notice of learned

Magistrate. This submission was not disputed by the

prosecution. In Arnesh Kumar’s case, Hon'ble Supreme

Court of India has issued directions to ensure that the

Police Officers do not arrest the accused unnecessarily

and Magistrates do not authorize detention casually and

mechanically. The said directions read as follows:

“11. Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure

that police officers do not arrest the accused

unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorize detention

casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we

have observed above, we give the following directions:

11.1. All the State Governments to instruct its

police officers not to automatically arrest when a case

under Section 498-A IPC is registered but to satisfy

themselves about the necessity for arrest under the

parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41

CrPC;

11.2. All police officers be provided with a check

list containing specified sub-clause under section

41(1)(b)(ii);

11.3. The police officer shall forward the check list

duly filled and furnish the reasons and materials which

necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the

accused before the Magistrate for further detention;

11.4. The Magistrate while authorizing detention of

the accused shall peruse the report furnished by the

police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording

its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorize detention;

11.5. The decision not to arrest an accused, be

forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the

date of the institution of the case with a copy to the

Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent

of Police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in

writing;

11.6. Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-

A CrPC be served on the accused within two weeks from

the date of institution of the case, which may be

extended by the Superintendent of Police of the district

for the reasons to be recorded in writing;

11.7. Failure to comply with the directions

aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers

concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also

be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be

instituted before the High Court having territorial

jurisdiction.

11.8. Authorising detention without recording

reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate concerned

shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate

High Court.”

(Emphasis Supplied)

27. It was incumbent upon the learned Magistrate

to carefully scrutinize the papers and bestow his

attention to the submissions of the learned Advocate for

the petitioner before granting police custody. A special

care was required in the instant case because petitioner

was granted anticipatory bail by the learned Sessions

Judge, who is superior to him in hierarchy. It is

unfortunate that despite binding directions by the Apex

Court in various judgments including Arnesh Kumar, the

learned Magistrate has granted police custody. By this

act of the learned Magistrate, petitioner remained in

police custody in spite of an anticipatory bail order in his

favour. This is a serious matter and requires correction.

Further, the directions contained in paragraph No.11.8 of

Arnesh Kumar require initiation of departmental enquiry.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 11TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2019

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE P.S. DINESH KUMAR

CRIMINAL PETITION No.4306 OF 2019

SRI. JAIKANTH S  SEKAR K Vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA

Print Page

Whether departmental enquiry can be started against government servant on basis of his comment on facebook?

There must be inter connection of the offending conduct and the duty a member is to discharge or tend colour of reasonable relationship between the two. To such an area obviously the operation of Rule 3(1) of Conduct Rules and Rule 3 of Discipline Rules could be projected. But when the link is snapped of, it is purely his private conduct.

33. The very threat of disciplinary action even in respect of private conduct unconnected or unrelated with the duty or responsibility as a member of the cadre would be a haunting ghost. It would hinder a member even to have social intercourse which he legitimately has, as a citizen and hampers his pursuits to develop his personality and stifles his intellectual advancement. It impedes his adventitious thinking, intellectual speaking or writing. Instead of a pipeline for happy pursuits, it becomes a deterrent dragon practically crippling his personality and destroys his dignity of person. The threat of disciplinary action would also operate a parallel spying project and persons jealous of his or inimically disposed or disgruntled elements become unsolicited plain-clothes detectives. Ears are cocked to concocted palpably palatable tell tale stories of private life at once either to deter a member of discharge even lawful duties or induce higher tip's to take recourse to disciplinary route. If we lend credence to the contention of the State, the pernicious effects referred to above would ensue offending his freedom enshrined in Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The conduct of the petitioner complained of has no interconnection nor lend colour of reasonable relation to the duty of the petitioner as a member of the cadre and the link of unbecoming conduct is snapped of. Therefore, the conduct of the petitioner does not come within the sweep of Rule 3 of Discipline Rules. We are, therefore, of opinion that the respondents travelled beyond the bounds of their power. The enquiry into the private conduct of the petitioner is without authority or in excess of law. We have no hesitation to hold that the impugned action is beyond Rule 3(1) of the Discipline Rules. Accordingly, we quash the G.O. Ms. No. 2620/G.A.D., dated June 25, 1983 and allow W.P. No. 5552/83 with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 500/-. We dismiss W.P. No. 6568/83, but in the circumstances, without costs."

11. We are in respectful agreement with the afore stated view expressed by the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court.

12. The private conduct of the petitioner in uploading the post on social media for limited circulation cannot be linked with his official functions of officer of Corporation. There is absolutely no link between the alleged private act and his functions in the capacity of officer or Corporation servant. Even otherwise also, act of expressing oneself cannot be branded as unbecoming of a public servant. The enquiry into private conduct of petitioner is without authority and is in excess of law. The impugned action is surely beyond scope of Rule 3 of Rules of 1973.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 2302 of 2018

Decided On: 21.03.2018

Jayant  Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M. Borde and K.K. Sonawane, JJ.

Citation: 2018(4) MHLJ 656

Print Page

Whether person booked for defamatory facebook post can be granted anticipatory bail?

  It is the case of the prosecution that the applicant has posted
one article on the social media, “Facebook” which is defamatory in nature
and has hurt the feelings of a particular class of people from the society.
The police are yet to recover the said mobile phone of the applicant from
which the said post was published.
3. The learned counsel for the applicant submitted that, the
applicant being a lady her custodial interrogation may be avoided. He
submitted that the applicant is ready and willing to co-operate with the
investigating agency.
In view thereof, for the time being the applicant can be

directed to attend the Investigating Officer and to join the process of
investigation.
Hence, the following order:
(i) In the event of arrest of the applicant in C. R. No. 134 of 2017
dated 18.04.2017 registered with Oshiwara Police Station,
Mumbai, the applicant shall be released on bail on her
furnishing P.R. Bond of Rs. 25,000/- with one or two solvent
local sureties in the like amount.                                
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
ANTICIPATORY BAIL APPLICATION NO. 837 OF 2017
Nanda Bholanath Singh
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra 
CORAM : A.S. GADKARI, J.
DATE : 5 th MAY, 2017.

Print Page

Whether accused can be prosecuted under POCSO Act for his Facebook post?

Yet another contention advanced by learned counsel

is that, the incident took place before the introduction of the

Act. The POCSO Act came into force in the year 2012 and the

issue with respect to molestation took place much prior to

that. The incident under the consideration of the Commission

was not the issue of molestation. The issue was with respect

to the publication of the details of the victim child through face

book post, which took place on 23.05.2016 when the post was

uploaded in the face book. Therefore, in order to attract an

offence under Sec.23, the incident allegedly took place in

respect of the molestation of the child is not at all relevant.

The relevance of Sec.23 is in respect of the face book post,

which, even according to the petitioner, is after the

introduction of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance or

foundation for the contention advanced by the learned counsel

accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                             PRESENT:

                        MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY

                         11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2016

                           WP(C).No. 31378 of 2016 (V)
                           

                     SUDHEESH KUMAR.S.R.,
             

V

            STATE OF KERALA,
 Citation: 2017 CRLJ 443 kerala,2017 ALLMR (CRI)JOURNAL113

Print Page

Whether publication of identity of victim without malafide intention amounts to offence under POCSO Act?

  The subject matter of this writ petition is revolving

round Ext.P15 order passed by the Commission for Protection

of Child Rights.      The question to be decided is whether it

suffers from any manner of illegality or arbitrariness enabling

this Court to interfere with the same.            The paramount

contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is

that the petitioner has made the post in the face book which

contained the name of the child with bonafide and good

intentions. The intention of the petitioner was to book the real

culprit, who is a teacher in the school in question. It is also

stated that the name of the child is contained in Exts.P7 and

P8 and P9, which were received by the petitioner under the RTI

Act, and therefore mere posting of the same will not amount to

the offence under Sec.23 of the POCSO Act.             Therefore,

essence of the issue is dependent on Sec.23 of POCSO Act,

which reads as follows:

              "23. Procedure for media.--(1) No person shall

      make any report or present comments on any child

      from any form of media or studio or photographic

      facilities  without  having  complete    and authentic

      information, which may have the effect of lowering his

      reputation or infringing upon his privacy.



           (2) No reports in any media shall disclose, the

     identity of a child including his name, address,

     photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or

     any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of

     identity of the child:

           Provided that for reasons to be recorded in

     writing, the Special Court, competent to try the case

     under the Act, may permit such disclosure, if in its

     opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child.

           (3) The publisher or owner of the media or studio

     or photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally

     liable for the acts and omissions of his employee.

           (4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of

     sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be

     punished with imprisonment of either description for a

     period of which shall not be less than six months but

     which may extend to one year or with fine or with

     both".

     10. On an evaluation of Sec.23, it is unequivocally clear,

a prohibition is made under sub-section (1) thereto, by which,

no person shall make any report or comments on any child

from any form of media or studio or photographic facilities

without having complete and authentic information, which may

have the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon his

privacy.   Further, as per sub-section (2), no reports in any

media shall disclose the identity of a child including his name,



address,   photograph,     family   details,  school    etc.  etc.

Therefore, the intention under Sec.23 is very clear that the

victim child shall not be exposed to any sort of publication so

as to affect her future and damn her career. In my considered

opinion, in order to constitute an offence under sub-section (4)

of Sec.23, no mens rea, culpability, and malafide or illegal

intention is required. Mere publication of the details of the

victim child will attract the offence under sub-section (4).

Therefore, the thrust of the contention advanced by the

petitioner that the petitioner did not have any malafide

intention to expose the child, cannot be sustained under law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                             PRESENT:

                        MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY

                         11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2016

                           WP(C).No. 31378 of 2016 (V)
                             

                     SUDHEESH KUMAR.S.R.,
               

V

            STATE OF KERALA,
                     Citation: 2017 CRLJ 443 kerala

Print Page

Competition commission of India has closed case against facebook and google for abuse of dominance

 Further, the Commission notes that the Informant has not made any specific
allegation against OP 5 to OP 10. In any case, the Commission views these
public fora as a platform for providing opportunities to individuals for
registering their grievances and spreading public awareness. The general
averments made by the Informant against these fora, including publication of
defamatory materials on these websites allegedly maligning the Informant’s
reputation, do not raise any competition concern. Thus, the allegations in the
present case do not involve any issue which contravenes the provisions of
section 4 of the Act.

COMPETITION COMMISSION OF INDIA
Case No. 83 of 2015
In Re:
 Taj Pharmaceuticals Ltd.

And
1. Facebook

2. Google India Pvt. Ltd.

CORAM
Mr. Ashok Chawla
Chairperson
Mr. S. L. Bunker
Member
Mr. Sudhir Mital
Member
Mr. U.C. Nahta
Member

Mr. M. S. Sahoo
Member
Justice (Retd.) Mr. G. P. Mittal
Member
Dated: 07.10.2015

Print Page

Bombay high court bars ex-Tata general manager from boss bashing on Facebook

The Tata group has gained the primary spherical of a authorized skirmish with a former high-rating worker who took to social media to allegedly defame his employer after his providers have been terminated. The Bombay high court, which dominated within the firm’s favour, has imposed a reasonably complete gag order on the disgruntled employee, asking him to take away all materials deemed libelous and forbidding him from making any disparaging remarks a few broad part of Tata staff.The provocateur, Nityanand Sinha, a former general manager at HL Homes, a joint venture company of one of the Tata Housing firms, has been directed by Justice Gautam Patel to refrain from issuing derogatory statements about the firm in the future.

Print Page

Whether directing wife not to chat on facebook amounts to cruelty to wife as per S 498A of IPC?

 In paragraph 14 of the complaint, it is alleged that the accused Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 forced the complainant to apologize and make a solemn promise that the complainant shall not chat on "ORKUT", a social networking site. I do not think that even this allegation can amount to harassment within the meaning of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code as it has no relation to driving the complainant into such behavior as to endanger her life or cause injury to herself. This allegation also does not have any relation to coercing of the complainant into meeting any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security. On the contrary, spending long time on social networking site such as "ORKUT" or "FACEBOOK" by a person can be viewed as mental harassment by another spouse and, therefore, if the spouse is advised to spend loss time on a social networking site or desist from visiting it, the advice is capable as being seen as made with a view to keep the marriage intact and not otherwise.

Equivalent Citation: 2015ALLMR(Cri)2607, 2015(2)Crimes368(Bom.)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application No. 251 of 2014

Decided On: 14.01.2015

 Gopal and Ors. Vs. State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:S.B. Shukre, J.

Print Page

Is government aware Facebook gets licence to uploaded content? asks Delhi High Court

New Delhi: The Delhi High Court on Thursday said "it appears" that when anything was uploaded on social media sites like Facebook and Twitter the websites got a licence to the intellectual property rights of the content without paying any royalty and asked the Centre whether it was aware of this.

"It appears there are certain settings by which a user of social media can opt to restrict use of intellectual property rights (IPR). It also appears there can be grant of IPR licence of the content uploaded," a bench of justices Badar Durrez Ahmed and Sanjeev Sachdeva said.

Print Page

Whether posting of comment on facebook amounts to criminal intimidation?

 In the instant case, the allegation is that the appellants have abused the complainant and obstructed the second respondent from discharging his public duties and spoiled the integrity of the second respondent. It is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of "Criminal intimidation". The threat must be with intention to cause alarm to the complainant to cause that person to do or omit to do any work. Mere expression of any words without any intention to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring in the application of this section. But material has to be placed on record to show that the intention is to cause alarm to the complainant. From the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the second respondent causing obstruction in discharge of his duty. As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.

Supreme Court of India

Manik Taneja & Anr vs State Of Karnataka & Anr on 20 January, 2015

Bench: V. Gopala Gowda, R. Banumathi

Citation;2015 ALLSCR 960:AIR 2015 SC(SUPP)671

Print Page

Whether Posting comments about ill treatment by Police on their FB page may amount to Assault (S. 353 IPC) or criminal intimidation (S. 503 IPC)?

A Supreme Court Bench comprising of Justice V. Gopala Gowda and Justice R. Banumathi, while quashing an FIR registered against the appellants, observed, “As far as the comments posted on the Facebook are concerned, it appears that it is a public forum meant for helping the public and the act of appellants posting a comment on the Facebook may not attract ingredients of criminal intimidation in Section 503 IPC.”

The Court was hearing a Special Leave Petition against karnataka High Court judgment which had dismissed a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., holding that it was premature and was filed even before the completion of investigation.

The appellant had met with an accident with an auto rickshaw while she was driving. The passenger of the auto sustained injuries and was duly admitted in the hospital. The appellant had paid all the hospital expenses of the injured and the matter was amicably settled between them. No FIR was lodged. They were however called to the Police Station and were alleged threatened by the officers.

Being aggrieved with the manner with which they were treated, the appellants posted comments on the Bangalore Traffic Police Facebook page, accusing the respondent Police Officer of his and also forwarded an email complaining about the harassment meted out to them at the hands of the Respondent Police Inspector.

A Complaint was hence filed against them by the Police Inspector for posting of the comment on the Facebook by the appellants and FIR was registered against them under Sections 353 and 506 IPC.

It was submitted that such posting of derogatory comments on the Facebook page amounts to ‘threatening’ and ‘criminal intimidation’ within the meaning of Section 506 IPC affecting the complainant’s reputation and integrity

The appellants had contended that the Facebook page of the Bengaluru traffic police itself is a public forum meant for citizens to discuss and post their grievances and therefore, the comment of the appellants posted on the Facebook would not prima facie constitute an offence.

The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 353 IPC are that the person accused of the offence should have assaulted the public servant or used criminal force with the intention to prevent or deter the public servant from discharging his duty as such public servant.

The Court observed that there was nothing on record to show that force was used by the appellants or that the appellants assaulted the respondents or used criminal force to prevent the respondent from discharging his official duty.

With respect to section 503, it is the intention of the accused that has to be considered in deciding as to whether what he has stated comes within the meaning of “Criminal intimidation”.

The Bench observed that there was no intention on the part of the appellants to cause alarm in the minds of the respondent Police Inspector causing obstruction in discharge of his duty.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 141 OF 2015
[Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.6449 of 2014)

MANIK TANEJA vs. STATE OF KARNATKA & ANR.

Dated;January 20, 2015.

Citation: 2015(1)RCR(Criminal)765, 2015(1)SCALE484,2015 CRLJ 1483,(2015)7 SCC 423

R. BANUMATHI, J.

Print Page

Whether Facebook post can be used as evidence in court?

A Facebook post kept Rodney Bradford from facing possible criminal charges.

The 19-year-old was arrested on Ocober 18 as a robbery suspect in New York.

But Bradford's defense lawyer said the young man couldn't have committed the crime because at the time of the robbery he posted a Facebook status update from a computer at his father's apartment in Harlem.

Print Page

App which will make online dating and offline social interactions much safer

Soon your face could be your calling card. An upcoming app for Android, iOS, and Google Glass called NameTag will allow you to photograph strangers and find out who they are -- complete with social networking and online dating profiles.

Spot someone out and about that you want to identify, and you can capture their face using your device's camera. The app will send the photo wirelessly to NameTag's server, where it will compare the photo to millions of online records and return with a name, more photos, and social-media profiles, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, where the person (or their friends) might have publicly posted photos of themselves.

Print Page