Showing posts with label judicial review. Show all posts
Showing posts with label judicial review. Show all posts

Saturday, 24 May 2025

LLM Notes: Administrative Discretion in Quasi-Judicial Decisions

 Definition and Nature

Administrative discretion refers to the flexibility granted to administrative authorities in making decisions within the framework of the law. When such discretion is exercised in the context of determining rights and liabilities—especially where the authority is required to act judicially—it is termed a quasi-judicial decision. Quasi-judicial functions stand midway between administrative and judicial functions: they involve a discretionary element like administrative actions but require adherence to principles of natural justice and objective decision-making akin to judicial proceedings.

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Saturday, 8 February 2025

LLM Notes: The Doctrine of Judicial Review in Indian Constitutional Law with Recent Judgments

 Judicial review in India is the power of the Supreme Court and High Courts to examine the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. It is implicitly provided for in Articles 13, 32, 136, 142, and 226 of the Constitution, ensuring constitutional supremacy and the separation of powers.

Meaning of Judicial Review

Judicial review empowers courts to assess the alignment of laws and legal acts with the Constitution. The judiciary scrutinizes the legislative, administrative, and executive branches to ensure compliance with the Constitution.
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Monday, 18 November 2024

Important findings of Supreme court in the judgment of S. R. Bommai v. Union of India

 S. R. Bommai v. Union of India ([1994] 2 SCR 644 : AIR 1994 SC 1918 : (1994)3 SCC1) is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of India, where the Court discussed at length provisions of Article 356 of the Constitution of India and related issues. This case had huge impact on Centre-State Relations. The judgement attempted to curb blatant misuse of Article 356 of the Constitution of India, which allowed President's rule to be imposed over state governments.

Bommai v. Union of India came before the bench of 9 judges (consisting of Kuldip Singh, P. B. Sawant, Katikithala Ramaswamy, S. C. Agarwal, Yogeshwar Dayal, B. P. Jeevan Reddy, S. R. Pandian, A. M. Ahmadi, J. S. Verma).

The principles laid down by Supreme Court

The Supreme Court laid down certain guidelines so as to prevent the misuse of Article 356 of the constitution.

  1. The majority enjoyed by the Council of Ministers shall be tested on the floor of the House.
  2. Centre should give a warning to the state and a time period of one week to reply.
  3. The court cannot question the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President but it can question the material behind the satisfaction of the President. Hence, Judicial Review will involve three questions only:
    a. Is there any material behind the proclamation
    b. Is the material relevant.
    c. Was there any malafide use of power.
  4. If there is improper use of Article 356 then the court will provide remedy.
  5. Under Article 356(3) it is the limitation on the powers of the President. Hence, the president shall not take any irreversible action until the proclamation is approved by the Parliament i.e. he shall not dissolve the assembly.
  6. Article 356 is justified only when there is a breakdown of constitutional machinery and not administrative machinery

Article 356 shall be used sparingly by the center, otherwise it is likely to destroy the constitutional structure between the center and the states. Even Bhimrao Ambedkar envisaged it to remain a 'dead letter' in the constitution.

Based on the report of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre–state Relations(1988), the Supreme Court in Bommai case (1994) enlisted the situations where the exercise of power under Article 356 could be proper or improper.

Imposition of President's Rule in a state would be proper in the following situations:

  • Where after general elections to the assembly, no party secures a majority, that is, Hung Assembly.
  • Where the party having a majority in the assembly declines to form a ministry and the governor cannot find a coalition ministry commanding a majority in the assembly.
  • Where a ministry resigns after its defeat in the assembly and no other party is willing or able to form a ministry commanding a majority in the assembly.
  • Where a constitutional direction of the Central government is disregarded by the state government.
  • Internal subversion where, for example, a government is deliberately acting against the Constitution and the law or is fomenting a violent revolt.
  • Physical breakdown where the government willfully refuses to discharge its constitutional obligations endangering the security of the state.

The imposition of President's Rule in a state would be improper under the following situations:

  • Where a ministry resigns or is dismissed on losing majority support in the assembly and the governor recommends imposition of President's Rule without probing the possibility of forming an alternative ministry.
  • Where the governor makes his own assessment of the support of a ministry in the assembly and recommends imposition of President's Rule without allowing the ministry to prove its majority on the floor of the Assembly.
  • Where the ruling party enjoying majority support in the assembly has suffered a massive defeat in the general elections to the Lok Sabha such as in 1977 and 1980.
  • Internal disturbances not amounting to internal subversion or physical breakdown.
  • Maladministration in the state or allegations of corruption against the ministry or stringent financial exigencies of the state.
  • Where the state government is not given prior warning to rectify itself except in case of extreme urgency leading to disastrous consequences.
  • Where the power is used to sort out intra-party problems of the ruling party, or for a purpose extraneous or irrelevant to the one for which it has been conferred by the Constitution.

Malafide exercise of Article 356

While dealing with the question as to whether the Presidential Proclamation under Article 356 was justiciable all the judges were unanimous in holding that the presidential proclamation was justiciable. The Supreme Court held that the proclamation under Article 356(1) is not immune from judicial review. The validity of the Proclamation issued by the President under Article 356(1) is judicially reviewable to the extent of examining whether it was issued on the basis of any material at all or whether the material was relevant or whether the Proclamation was issued in the malafide exercise of the power. The Supreme Court or the High court can strike down the proclamation if it is found to be malafide or based on wholly irrelevant or extraneous grounds. The deletion of Clause (5) by the 44th Amendment Act, removes the cloud on the reviewability of the action. When a prima facie case is made out in the challenge to the Proclamation, the Union of India has to produce the material on the basis of which action was taken. It cannot refuse to do so, if it seeks to defend the action. The court will not go into the correctness of the material or its adequacy. Its inquiry is limited to whether the material was relevant to the action. Even if part of the material is irrelevant, the court cannot interfere so long as there is some material which is relevant to the action taken. It is submitted that the validity of the Presidents proclamation under Article 356 is justiciable.

Powers of President under Article 356

The second question which was taken into consideration by the court was that whether the President has unfettered powers to issue Proclamation under Article 356(1) of the Constitution of India. It was contended that The Supreme Court in this regard held that the power conferred by Article 356 upon the President is a conditioned power. It is not an absolute power. This satisfaction may be formed on the basis of the report of the Governor or on the basis of other information received by him or both. The existence of relevant material is a pre-condition to the formation of satisfaction. The satisfaction must be formed on relevant material. The dissolution of the Legislative Assembly should be resorted to only when it is necessary for achieving the purposes of the proclamation. The exercise of the power is made subject to approval of the both Houses of Parliament.

Article 74 and justiciability of advice of Council of Ministers to the President

In regard to the contention, that Article 74(2) bars the inquiry into advice which was tendered by Council of Ministers to the President, the Supreme Court at length considered the scope and effect of Article 74(2). Here it would be appropriate to mention that article 74(2) of the constitution provides that the court cannot inquire as to any, and if so what, advice was tendered by Council of Ministers to the President. In this regard Supreme Court held that although Article 74(2) bars judicial review so far as the advice given by the Ministers is concerned, it does not bar scrutiny of the material on the basis of which the advice is given. The material on the basis of which advice was tendered does not become part of the advice. The Courts are justified in probing as to whether there was any material on the basis of which the advice was given, and whether it was relevant for such advice and the President could have acted on it. Hence when the Courts undertake an inquiry into the existence of such material, the prohibition contained in Article 74(2) does not negate their right to know about the factual existence of any such material. This is not to say that the Union Government cannot raise the plea of privilege under Section 123 of the Evidence Act. As and when such privilege against disclosure is claimed, the Courts will examine such claim within the parameters of the said section on its merits. But Article 74(2) as such is no bar to the power of judicial review regarding the material on the basis of which the proclamation is issued.

Invalidation of proclamation

The Supreme Court also held that the power of the court to restore the government to office in case it finds the proclamation to be unconstitutional, it is, in Courts opinion, beyond question. Even in case the proclamation is approved by the Parliament it would be open to the court to restore the State government to its office in case it strikes down the proclamation as unconstitutional. If this power were not conceded to the court, the very power of judicial review would be rendered nugatory and the entire exercise meaningless. If the court cannot grant the relief flowing from the invalidation of the proclamation, it may as well decline to entertain the challenge to the proclamation altogether. For, there is no point in the court entertaining the challenge, examining it, calling upon the Union Government to produce the material on the basis of which the requisite satisfaction was formed and yet not give the relief.

Powers of Parliament

Moreover, the Supreme Court firmly held that there was no reason to make a distinction between the Proclamation so approved and legislation enacted by the Parliament. If the Proclamation is invalid, it does not stand validated merely because it is approved of by the Parliament. The grounds for challenging the validity of the Proclamation may be different from those challenging the validity of legislation. However, that does not make any difference to the vulnerability of the Proclamation on the limited grounds available. And therefore the validity of the Proclamation issued under Article 356(1) can be challenged even after it has been approved by both Houses of Parliament under Article 356(3).

Elections to Legislature pending final Disposal of case

Another issue taken into consideration by the Supreme Court was whether any relief can be granted when the validity of proclamation is challenged and whether the court can grant an interim stay against holding the fresh election. In this regard the Court held that the Court will have power by an interim injunction, to restrain the holding of fresh elections to the Legislative Assembly pending the final disposal of the challenge to the validity of the proclamation to avoid the fait accompli and the remedy of judicial review being rendered fruitless.

Secularism

Supreme Court while adjudicating that a State Government cannot follow particular religion discussed at length the concept of Secularism. The Court held that Secularism is one of the basic features of the Constitution. Secularism is a positive concept of equal treatment of all religions. This attitude is described by some as one of neutrality towards religion or as one of benevolent neutrality. While freedom of religion is guaranteed to all persons in India, from the point of view of the State, the religion, faith or belief of a person is immaterial. To the state, all are equal and are entitled to be treated equally. In matters of State, religion has no place. And if the Constitution requires the State to be secular in thought and action, the same requirement attaches to political parties as well. The Constitution does not recognize, it does not permit, mixing religion and State power. Both must be kept apart. That is the constitutional injunction. None can say otherwise so long as this Constitution governs this country. Politics and religion cannot be mixed. Any State government which pursues nonsecular policies or nonsecular course of action acts contrary to the constitutional mandate and renders itself amenable to action under Article 356. Given the above position, it is clear that if any party or organization seeks to fight the elections on the basis of a plank which has the proximate effect of eroding the secular philosophy of the Constitution would certainly be guilty of following an unconstitutional course of action.

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Thursday, 8 August 2024

Leading Supreme Court judgment on Judicial review over power of President to impose state emergency under Article-356 of Indian constitution

 The power of the President of India to impose a state emergency under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution is indeed subject to judicial review, a principle established by the Supreme Court in the landmark case of S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994). This case is pivotal in understanding the constitutional limitations on the President's power to impose President's Rule in a state, thereby rejecting the doctrine of political question.

Background of the Case

Article 356 allows the President to impose President's Rule in a state if the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of the state or otherwise, is satisfied that the governance in the state cannot be carried out according to the provisions of the Constitution. This power has often been misused for political reasons, leading to its invocation in situations where it may not have been warranted.

The S.R. Bommai case arose from the dismissal of several state governments in 1989-1991 by the Central Government, invoking Article 356, on the grounds that they had lost their majority or were acting against the secular principles of the Constitution.

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Sunday, 26 May 2024

Bombay HC: It is duty of the court to ensure that subjective satisfaction of investigating officer for arrest of accused is on factual basis and not on the basis of his whims or caprice

   There can be no dispute that it is within the domain of the Investigating Agency to interrogate the accused and to arrive at a subjective satisfaction on the issue of arrest. We are conscious and mindful that the satisfaction of the investigating agency is

subjective in nature and the Court cannot go into the reasonableness

of the reasons of arrest and or substitute its objective opinion for

the subjective satisfaction. Nevertheless, the subjective satisfaction is not wholly immune from judicial reviewability. The Court can consider whether the reasons for deprivation of liberty are rational, reasonable or fanciful. In Barium Chemicals Ltd vs. Company law Board the Apex Court with reference to Section 237 of the Companies Act has observed that the Court cannot go into the question of aptness or sufficiency of the grounds upon which the subjective satisfaction of an authority is based. However, the entire process is not subjective. While the existence of relevant

material/information is objective, whereas drawing inference

therefrom alone is a subjective process. Only check upon the

subjective power is the existence of circumstances/material

information. In case it is established that there was no material

information or factual basis, the exercise of power becomes illegal. It is thus within the powers of the Court to ensure that the subjective satisfaction is on factual basis and not on the basis of the whims or caprice of the investigating agency. {Para 27}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION NO. 378 OF 2023 WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 804 OF 2023

Chanda Kochhar Vs Central Bureau of Investigation

CORAM : ANUJA PRABHUDESSAI, &

N. R. BORKAR, JJ.

DATED : 6th FEBRUARY, 2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Monday, 17 February 2020

Supreme Court: Discrepancies In Evidence Against Delinquent Not A Ground To Interfere With Findings Of Disciplinary authority

It is not the case of no evidence or that the findings are
perverse. The finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct
has been interfered with only on the ground that there are
discrepancies in the evidence of the Department. The
discrepancies in the evidence will not make it a case of no
evidence. The Inquiry Officer has appreciated the evidence and
returned a finding that the respondent is guilty of misconduct.
15. The disciplinary authority agreed with the findings of the enquiry
officer and had passed an order of punishment. An appeal before
the State Government was also dismissed. Once the evidence has
been accepted by the departmental authority, in exercise of power
of judicial review, the Tribunal or the High Court could not interfere
with the findings of facts recorded by reappreciating evidence as if
the Courts are the Appellate Authority. We may notice that the
said judgment has not noticed larger bench judgments in S. Sree
Rama Rao and B.C. Chaturvedi as mentioned above. Therefore,
the orders passed by the Tribunal and the High Court suffer from
patent illegality and thus cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly,
appeal is allowed and orders passed by the Tribunal and the High
Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed is
restored.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8071 OF 2014

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA Vs N. GANGARAJ 

HEMANT GUPTA, J.
Dated:FEBRUARY 14, 2020.
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Sunday, 4 February 2018

What is doctrine of judicial review?

 In short, Judicial review is directed not against the decision, but is confined to the examination of the decision making process. When the issue raised in judicial review is whether a decision is vitiated by taking into account irrelevant, or neglecting to take into account of relevant factors or is so manifestly unreasonable that no reasonable authority entrusted with the power in question could reasonably have made such decision. The judicial services of the decision making process includes examination, as a matter of law, of the relevance of the factors as held by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Maharani Rajlaxmi Kumari Devi A.I.R. 1989 S.C. 1010.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal Nos. 364 and 441 of 2005 in Writ Petition No. 1097 of 2004

Decided On: 11.06.2007

Hindoostan Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. Vs.  Hindustan Crown Mills Siddhivinayak Kamgar Karmachari Sangharsha Sanghatana 
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Sunday, 21 May 2017

What is scope of judicial review in matters relating to award of contract by state?

The scope of judicial review in matters relating to
award of contract by the State and its instrumentalities is
settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. While these
decisions clearly recognize that power exercised by the
Government and its instrumentalities in regard to allotment
of contract is subject to judicial review at the instance of an
aggrieved party, submission of a tender in response to a
notice inviting such tenders is no more than making an offer
which the State or its agencies are under no obligation to
accept. The bidders participating in the tender process
cannot, therefore, insist that their tenders should be

accepted simply because a given tender is the highest or
lowest depending upon whether the contract is for sale of
public property or for execution of works on behalf of the
Government. All that participating bidders are entitled to is
a fair, equal and non-discriminatory treatment in the matter
of evaluation of their tenders. It is also fairly well-settled
that award of a contract is essentially a commercial
transaction which must be determined on the basis of
consideration that are relevant to such commercial decision.
This implies that terms subject to which tenders are invited
are not open to the judicial scrutiny unless it is found that
the same have been tailor made to benefit any particular
tenderer or class of tenderers. So also the authority inviting
tenders can enter into negotiations or grant relaxation for
bona fide and cogent reasons provided such relaxation is
permissible under the terms governing the tender process.
9. Suffice it to say that in the matter of award of contracts
the Government and its agencies have to act reasonably and
fairly at all points of time. To that extent the tenderer has an
enforceable right in the Court who is competent to examine
whether the aggrieved party has been treated unfairly or

discriminated against to the detriment of public interest.
(See: Meerut Development Authority v. Association of
Management Studies and Anr. etc. (2009) 6 SCC 171
and Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd.
(2000) 1 SCR 505).
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10751 OF 2013
(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.18405 of 2012)
Maa Binda Express Carrier and Anr
V
Northeast Frontier Railway and Ors. 
Citation : (2014) 3 SCC 760.
Dated:November 29, 2013
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Thursday, 30 June 2016

Leading judgment on government contract and tender proces

In Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. vs. Airports
Authority of India & Ors., (2006) 10 SCC 1, this Court held
that while judicial review cannot be denied in contractual
matters or matters in which the Government exercises its
contractual powers, such review is intended to prevent
arbitrariness and must be exercised in larger public interest.

17) In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others,
(2007) 14 SCC 517, the following conclusion is relevant:
“22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias
and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or
decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice
or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is
invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts,
certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract
is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and
awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions.
Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If
the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is
in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of
judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or
error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out.
The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be
invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public
interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or
contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a
civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with
imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry,
to make mountains out of molehills of some
technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and
persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial
review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim
or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief
and succour to thousands and millions and may increase
the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before
interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of
power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following
questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone;
OR
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so
arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision
is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and
in accordance with relevant law could have reached”;

(ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no
interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting
or imposition of penal consequences on a
tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse
(allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and
franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a
higher degree of fairness in action.”
18) The same principles have been reiterated in a recent
decision of this Court in Tejas Constructions &
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. Municipal Council, Sendhwa &
Anr., (2012) 6 SCC 464.
19) From the above decisions, the following principles
emerge:
(a) the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action
by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance
is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to
the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act
validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any
ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of
reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into
consideration the national priorities;
(b) fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the
purview of the executive and courts hardly have any role to

play in this process except for striking down such action of the
executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the
Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards
and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders,
in those circumstances, the interference by Courts is very
limited;
(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender
document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is
required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the
action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a
misuse of its statutory powers, interference by Courts is not
warranted;
(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have
to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity
and the resources to successfully execute the work; and
(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly
and in public interest in awarding contract, here again,
interference by Court is very restrictive since no person can
claim fundamental right to carry on business with the
Government.

20) Therefore, a Court before interfering in tender or
contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review,
should pose to itself the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or
whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary
and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such
that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in
accordance with relevant law could have reached”; and (ii)
Whether the public interest is affected. If the answers to the
above questions are in negative, then there should be no
interference under Article 226.

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5898 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25802 of 2008
M/s Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. .... Appellant (s)
Versus
The State of Karnataka & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
 Dated:AUGUST 17, 2012.
 P. Sathasivam, J.
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Sunday, 24 April 2016

Whether writ petition is maintainable in high court against administrative decision of information commissioner under RTI?

Mr. Deb submits that in view of the bar contained in Section 23, no Court including the High Court can entertain any proceedings and writ petitions are also proceedings and therefore, no proceedings lie before the High Court against any order of the State Information Commission. The Second limb of his argument is that even if the writ jurisdiction of the High Court is not ousted, the same can only be exercised only when there is complete lack of jurisdiction in the State Information Commissioner and merely because the jurisdiction has been exercised rightly or wrongly is not a ground to interfere in the order of the State Information Commissioner. These arguments have been raised only for the purpose of being rejected. There is no merit whatsoever in the arguments.
As far as the first argument is concerned, it is against the whole concept of the Constitution of India where the rule of law is granted primacy. The right of judicial review is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and the decision of any authority is subject to judicial review under Article 226 or under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The law in this regard is absolutely clear.
A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar V. Union of India, MANU/SC/0261/1997 : (1997) 3 SCC 261 held as follows:-
"78. ..... ..... ..... ..... ..... ...... ... We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
79. We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided."
One of the cornerstones of our Constitution scheme is that judicial review is part and parcel of the basic structure of the Constitution. Every decision which affects the rights of any party is subject to judicial review. Policy matters may be beyond the scope of judicial review but when any administrative decision affects the rights of the parties then that decision can be challenged though the grounds of challenge may be limited. As far as judicial or quasi judicial authorities are concerned, their judgments and orders are definitely amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in rejecting the first submission of Mr. Deb that this Court has no jurisdiction in the matter.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA AT AGARTALA
WP(C) 231 of 2010
Decided On: 12.08.2015
Appellants: Dayashis Chakma
Vs.
Respondent: The State Chief Information Commissioner and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Deepak Gupta, C.J. and S.C. Das, J.
Citation;AIR 2016(NOC)255 Tripura
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Monday, 18 April 2016

What is scope of Judicial review in case of tender and commercial contracts?

 As far as law relating to tenders is concerned, the narrow scope for judicial review of tender conditions is well settled. In essence, the court can only interfere in policy decision if they are arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide and not otherwise. On analysing the aforesaid decisions it is evident that unless administrative action of State is against public interest, is arbitrary and malafide, the courts ought not to interfere in matters of commercial contracts. In many cases, the court would not have expertise to review administrative decisions and the court cannot risk to substitute its own decision. The court should also bear in mind that interfering with the decisions in the matter of award of contracts by the State would also impose heavy administrative burden, and therefore, the court should be cautious and reluctant to 6 (2005) 1 SCC 679 17 w226.14-J.sxw interfere with such decisions. The court should also note that a person who willing participated in tender process had no right to challenge the tender conditions especially after undertaking in writing to comply with the tender terms.
Bombay High Court
M/S. Vascular Concepts Ltd vs The State Of Maharashtra on 21 April, 2014
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO.226 OF 2014
CORAM : V. M. KANADE & A. K. MENON, JJ.
Citation;2015 (7) ALLMR  111
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Sunday, 29 March 2015

When court should exercise power of judicial review in relation to omission in compliance of tender document?

Tender document-omission in compliance statement-consequence- Where the matter is purely technical the court should not exercise the power of judicial review. We find great force in this submission. We are clearly of the opinion that the mistake is in relation to a non-essential matter that is in relation to peripheral or collateral matter. There has been every intention to comply with the terms of the bid. For an accidental omission it cannot be punished. We concur with the High Court.

Supreme Court of India

Tata Cellular vs Union Of India on 26 July, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1996 AIR 11, 1994 SCC (6) 651,2015 ALLSCR(O.C.C.)1

Bench: Mohan, S. (J)
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Tuesday, 13 January 2015

When Judicial officer can be compulsorily retired in public interest?

When even verbal repeated complaints are
received against a judicial officer or on enquiries,
discreet or otherwise, the general impression
created in the minds of those making inquiries or
the Full Court is that concerned judicial officer
does not carry good reputation, such discreet
inquiry and or verbal repeated complaints would
constitute material on the basis of which ACR
indicating that the integrity of the officer is
doubtful can be recorded. While undertaking
judicial review, the Court in an appropriate case
may still quash the decision of the Full Court on
administrative side if it is found that there is no
basis or material on which the ACR of the judicial
officer was recorded, but while undertaking this
exercise of judicial review and trying to find out
whether there is any material on record or not, it
is the duty of the Court to keep in mind the nature
of function being discharged by the judicial officer,
the delicate nature of the exercise to be performed
by the High Court on administrative side while
recording the ACR and the mechanism/system
adopted in recording such ACR.”
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE
WRIT PETITION NO. 302 OF 2013
Smt.Shraddha Vinod Deo. ..
V/s.
The State of Maharashtra and another. 
CORAM : NARESH H. PATIL AND
B.P.COLABAWALLA, JJ.

PRONOUNCED ON : 8th October 2014.
Citation;2015(1) MHLJ 62


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