“Shielding the Dishonest?” – Supreme Court Split Verdict on Section 17A PC Act in Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India

 

• Case title: Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India​

• Case No.: W.P. (Civil) No. 1373 of 2018 

• Dated: JANUARY 13, 2026​

• Court: Supreme Court of India​

• Bench: Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice K.V. Viswanathan​

• Provision under challenge: Section 17A, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (as amended in 2018)[​

• Result: Split verdict – Justice Nagarathna held Section 17A unconstitutional; Justice Viswanathan upheld it with a reinterpretation.​

Background: What Section 17A Requires

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LLM Notes: Right to Equality Under Article 14: Implications for Public Utility Services in India with Special Focus on the Air India v. Nargesh Meerza Case

 The right to equality stands as one of the most fundamental pillars of Indian democracy, enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution as a cornerstone of justice and fairness . This principle has evolved significantly through judicial interpretation, transforming from a narrow doctrine of reasonable classification to a comprehensive framework that prohibits arbitrary state action and ensures non-discriminatory treatment across all spheres of public life . The implications of this constitutional guarantee extend particularly to public utility services, where the state's role as a service provider intersects with its obligation to uphold fundamental rights, creating complex legal and administrative challenges that continue to shape India's constitutional jurisprudence .

Constitutional Framework of Article 14

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LLM Notes: Right to Equality under Article 14: Implications for Public Utility Services and the Airhostess Case

 Article 14 and the Right to Equality

Article 14 of the Indian Constitution guarantees that "the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". This means every individual, regardless of religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth, is entitled to be treated equally by the State and its agencies. The principle is foundational to preventing arbitrary discrimination and upholding fairness, rationality, and non-arbitrariness in all state actions.

Implications for Public Utility Services

Public utility services—such as transport, electricity, water supply, and airlines—are often run or regulated by the State. Article 14 requires that:

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Whether act of State of not deciding application of other party to contract within reasonable time amounts violation of article 14 of constitution?

 In Mansaram v. S.P. Pathak and Ors. MANU/SC/0363/1983 : (1984) 1 SCC 125 this Court has observed that when a power exists to effectuate a purpose it must be exercised within a reasonable time. It has been observed that this is all too well-settled principle to require buttressing precedent. Nonetheless, the Court refers to State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha MANU/SC/0406/1969 : (1969) 2 SCC 187 wherein the period of one year was found to be too long for the Commissioner to exercise revisional jurisdiction Under Section 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code. The principle of reasonable time as mentioned herein was followed recently by a Two-Judge Bench in Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan and Ors. MANU/SC/0846/2022 : (2023) 2 SCC 643. {Para 35}

36. Keeping in view the above-stated well established principles that State action irrespective of being in the contractual realm must abide by Article 14, and that a) after passage of a considerable period of time, in July, 2004 the reduction to 10000 KVA was agreed to and a new agreement to that effect was entered into; b) irrespective of the amount of reduction in KVA sought other applications were considered within a reasonable period of time; c) no reason has been put forth for keeping such application pending; d) that the Appellant duly and repeatedly followed up with the authorities to effectuate such reduction; and e) the Appellant has been unjustifiably asked to furnish costs for unutilized electricity which, in any case should not have extended beyond the period of six months (considering 'reasonable period' to consider an application, to be so), for a period much larger thereto, rendering such action unquestionably unreasonable and arbitrary.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 7224-7226 of 2009

Decided On: 06.07.2023

The Madras Aluminium Co. Ltd. Vs. The Tamil Nadu Electricity Board and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai, Sanjay Karol and Aravind Kumar, JJ.

Author: Sanjay Karol, J.

Citation: 2023/INSC/607, MANU/SC/0743/2023.

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Can the court ascertain whether the will is genuine or not, considering the principles of article 14 of the constitution?

In the matter of appreciating the genuineness of execution of a Will, there is no place for the Court to see whether the distribution made by the testator was fair and equitable to all of his children. The Court does not apply Article 14 to dispositions under a Will.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1565 of 2022

 Swarnalatha and Ors.  Vs. Kalavathy and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian, J.

Decided On: 30.03.2022

Citation: MANU/SC/0381/2022

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Supreme court: Inter-relation between Promissory Estoppel, Legitimate Expectations and article 14 of Constitution of India

Promissory Estoppel and Legitimate Expectations

289. As we have seen earlier, for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel there has to be a promise, and on that basis the party concerned must have acted to its prejudice. In the instant case it was only a proposal, and it was very much made clear that it was to be approved by the Central Government, prior whereto it could not be construed as containing a promise. Besides, equity cannot be used against a statutory provision or notification.

290.....In any case, in the absence of any promise, the Appellants including Aadhunik cannot claim promissory estoppel in the teeth of the notifications issued under the relevant statutory powers. Alternatively, the Appellants are trying to make a case under the doctrine of legitimate expectations. The basis of this doctrine is in reasonableness and fairness. However, it can also not be invoked where the decision of the public authority is founded in a provision of law, and is in consonance with public interest.

(emphasis supplied)

41. In Union of India v. Lt. Col. P.K. Choudhary MANU/SC/0169/2016 : (2016) 4 SCC 236, speaking through Chief Justice T S Thakur, the Court discussed the decision in Monnet Ispat (supra) and noted its reliance on the judgment in Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quinn (1990) 64 Aust LJR 327 : (1990) 170 CLR 1. It then observed:

This Court went on to hold that if denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of a right that is guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 of the Constitution but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.

Thus, the Court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot be claimed as a right in itself, but can be used only when the denial of a legitimate expectation leads to the violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.

42. As regards the relationship between Article 14 and the doctrine of legitimate expectation, a three judge Bench in Food Corporation of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries MANU/SC/0257/1993 : (1993) 1 SCC 71, speaking through Justice J.S. Verma, held thus:

7. In contractual sphere as in all other State actions, the State and all its instrumentalities have to conform to Article 14 of the Constitution of which non-arbitrariness is a significant facet. There is no unfettered discretion in public law: A public authority possesses powers only to use them for public good. This imposes the duty to act fairly and to adopt a procedure which is 'fairplay in action'. Due observance of this obligation as a part of good administration raises a reasonable or legitimate expectation in every citizen to be treated fairly in his interaction with the State and its instrumentalities, with this element forming a necessary component of the decision-making process in all State actions. To satisfy this requirement of non-arbitrariness in a State action, it is, therefore, necessary to consider and give due weight to the reasonable or legitimate expectations of the persons likely to be affected by the decision or else that unfairness in the exercise of the power may amount to an abuse or excess of power apart from affecting the bona fides of the decision in a given case. The decision so made would be exposed to challenge on the ground of arbitrariness. Rule of law does not completely eliminate discretion in the exercise of power, as it is unrealistic, but provides for control of its exercise by judicial review.

8. The mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirement of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness, a necessary concomitant of the Rule of law. Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant's perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny. The doctrine of legitimate expectation gets assimilated in the Rule of law and operates in our legal system in this manner and to this extent.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 3860-3862 of 2020 

Decided On: 01.12.2020

The State of Jharkhand Vs. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0906/2020

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Whether Classification Of Pensioners By Providing Cut-Off Date For The Purpose Of Grant Of Revised Pension is constitutional?

Even otherwise on merits also, we are of the firm opinion
that there is no valid justification to create two classes, viz., one
who retired pre1996
and another who retired post1996,
for the
purpose of grant of revised pension, In our view, such a
classification has no nexus with the object and purpose of grant

of benefit of revised pension. All the pensioners form a one class
who are entitled to pension as per the pension rules. Article 14 of
the Constitution of India ensures to all equality before law and
equal protection of laws. At this juncture it is also necessary to
examine the concept of valid classification. A valid classification
is truly a valid discrimination. It is true that Article 16 of the
Constitution of India permits a valid classification. However, a
very classification must be based on a just objective. The result
to be achieved by the just objective presupposes the choice of
some for differential consideration/treatment over others. A
classification to be valid must necessarily satisfy two tests.
Firstly, the distinguishing rationale has to be based on a just
objective and secondly, the choice of differentiating one set of
persons from another, must have a reasonable nexus to the
objective sought to be achieved. The test for a valid classification
may be summarised as a distinction based on a classification
founded on an intelligible differentia, which has a rational
relationship with the object sought to be achieved. Therefore,
whenever a cutoff
date (as in the present controversy) is fixed to
categorise one set of pensioners for favourable consideration over
others, the twin test for valid classification or valid discrimination

therefore must necessarily be satisfied. In the present case, the
classification in question has no reasonable nexus to the
objective sought to be achieved while revising the pension. As
observed hereinabove, the object and purpose for revising the
pension is due to the increase in the cost of living. All the
pensioners form a single class and therefore such a classification
for the purpose of grant of revised pension is unreasonable,
arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution of India. The State cannot arbitrarily pick and
choose from amongst similarly situated persons, a cutoff
date for
extension of benefits especially pensionary benefits. There has to
be a classification founded on some rational principle when
similarly situated class is differentiated for grant of any benefit.
8.1 As observed hereinabove, and even it is not in dispute that
as such a decision has been taken by the State Government to
revise the pension keeping in mind the increase in the cost of
living. Increase in the cost of living would affect all the
pensioners irrespective of whether they have retired pre1996
or
post1996.
As observed hereinabove, all the pensioners belong to
one class. Therefore, by such a classification/cutoff
date the
equals are treated as unequals and therefore such a classification

which has no nexus with the object and purpose of revision of
pension is unreasonable, discriminatory and arbitrary and
therefore the said classification was rightly set aside by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court. At this stage, it is
required to be observed that whenever a new benefit is granted
and/or new scheme is introduced, it might be possible for the
State to provide a cutoff
date taking into consideration its
financial resources. But the same shall not be applicable with
respect to one and single class of persons, the benefit to be given
to the one class of persons, who are already otherwise getting the
benefits and the question is with respect to revision.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, we
are of the opinion that the controversy/issue in the present
appeal is squarely covered by the decision of this Court in the
case of D.S. Nakara (supra). The decision of this Court in the
case of D.S. Nakara (supra) shall be applicable with full force to
the facts of the case on hand. The Division Bench of the High
Court has clearly erred in not following the decision of this Court
in the case of D.S. Nakara (supra) and has clearly erred in
reversing the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge.
The impugned judgment and order passed by the Division Bench

is not sustainable and the same deserves to be quashed and set
aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The judgment
and order passed by the learned Single Judge is hereby restored
and it is held that all the pensioners, irrespective of their date of
retirement, viz. pre1996
retirees shall be entitled to revision in
pension at par with those pensioners who retired post1996.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10857 OF 2016

All Manipur Pensioners Association  Vs  The State of Manipur and others .
M.R. SHAH, J.
Dated:JULY 11, 2019.

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When resolution passed by assembly is liable to be set aside on ground of violation of principle of natural justice?

We now deal with the submissions of the petitioners that
the impugned proceedings are violative of the fundamental
right of the petitioners under Article 14. According to the
petitioners, the said proceedings have been taken in violation
of the principles of natural justice. It is settled law that the
scope of judicial review in matters relating to action taken
against members by the legislative bodies is limited.
However, it is likewise well settled that the non-compliance
with the principles of natural justice is one of the limited
grounds on which judicial review could be undertaken against
the internal proceedings of the legislative bodies in appropriate
cases.
 The petitioners’ case, though not elegantly pleaded, is that
they have not been granted the opportunity to watch the video
recording or comment on the content and authenticity of the
video. In the questions of law raised in the writ petition, the
petitioners raised the question of “Whether denial of the right
to comment on the video material would amount to breach of
natural justice?” In the grounds taken by the petitioners, they
pray for the writ to be allowed “because on the question of
authenticity of videography and as to how far it can be pressed
into service, further, the respondents never gave a copy of the
alleged videography to the petitioner”.
 The minutes of the Privileges Committee meeting clearly
show that the video-recording played an important role in
arriving at the conclusions that the Privileges Committee did.
The video recording was specifically shown to the members of
the Privileges Committee “since some of them would have
forgot only the video recordings were shown again”15. Giving
some allowance for bad translation - the said sentence only
indicates that the Committee was not willing to rely solely on
the memory of the members of the Committee. At the risk of
repetition, we reiterate that the video recording served as the
common factual platform for all the members of the
Privileges Committee, from where the members discussed the
actions of the six petitioners, and recommended action against
them.
Even at Para 70 of the counter affidavit, the respondents assert that as the incident on 19.2.2015 happened
inside the assembly chamber, the speaker and other present members were eye-witnesses to the incident,
and that the nature of the incident was known to all members in the house, including the members of the
privileges committee.

39. This Court in Raja Ram Pal case, while dealing with the
question of the rules of natural justice in the context of
proceedings in the legislative bodies, held as follows:
“As already noted the scope of judicial review in these matters is restricted
and limited. Regarding non-grant of reasonable opportunity, we reiterate
what was recently held in Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana that the
principles of natural justice are not immutable but are flexible; they cannot
be cast in a rigid mould and put in a straitjacket and the compliance
therewith has to be considered in the facts and circumstances of each
case.”16
40. In Jagjit Singh v. State of Haryana, (2006) 11 SCC 1,
this Court discussed the scope of the principles of natural
justice in the context of the proceedings in the legislature
(action under Xth Schedule of the Constitution) and held thus:
“Undoubtedly, the proceedings before the Speaker which is also a tribunal
albeit of a different nature have to be conducted in a fair manner and by
complying with the principles of natural justice. However, the principles
of natural justice cannot be placed in a straitjacket. These are flexible
rules. Their applicability is determined on the facts of each case…”17
41. The principles of natural justice require that the
petitioners ought to have been granted an opportunity to see
the video recording. Perhaps they might have had an
opportunity to explain why the video recording does not
contain any evidence/material for recommending action
16 Extracted portion is a part of Paragraph 446 in the judgment.
17 The extracted portion is a part of paragraph 44 in the judgment.

against all or some of them or to explain that the video
recording should have been interpreted differently.
42. The Privileges Committee should have necessarily offered
this opportunity, in order to make the process adopted by it
compliant with the requirements of Article 14. Petitioner No. 1
in his reply letter to the notice issued by the Privileges
Committee seeks permission to give further explanation when
the video recording is provided to him. The Petitioner No. 3 in
his reply letter states that he believes his version of his
conduct will be proven by the video recording. The other
petitioners do not mention the video recording in their reply
letters. However, it is not the petitioners’ burden to request for
a copy of the video recording. It is the legal obligation of the
Privileges Committee to ensure that a copy of the video
recording is supplied to the petitioners in order to satisfy the
requirements of the principles of natural justice The failure
to supply a copy of the video recording or affording an
opportunity to the petitioners to view the video recording relied
upon by the committee in our view clearly resulted in the
violation of the principles of natural justice i.e. a denial of a
reasonable opportunity to meet the case. We, therefore, have

no option but to set aside the impugned resolution dated
31.03.2015 passed in the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly.
The same is accordingly set aside.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 455 OF 2015
Alagaapuram R. Mohanraj & Others … Petitioners
Versus
Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly
Rep. by its Secretary & Another … Respondents
Dated:February 12, 2016.
Chelameswar, J.
Citation:(2016)6 SCC82

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Leading judgment on government contract and tender proces

In Reliance Airport Developers (P) Ltd. vs. Airports
Authority of India & Ors., (2006) 10 SCC 1, this Court held
that while judicial review cannot be denied in contractual
matters or matters in which the Government exercises its
contractual powers, such review is intended to prevent
arbitrariness and must be exercised in larger public interest.

17) In Jagdish Mandal vs. State of Orissa and Others,
(2007) 14 SCC 517, the following conclusion is relevant:
“22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to
prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias
and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or
decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice
or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is
invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts,
certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract
is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and
awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions.
Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If
the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is
in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of
judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or
error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out.
The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be
invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public
interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or
contractor with a grievance can always seek damages in a
civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tenderers with
imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry,
to make mountains out of molehills of some
technical/procedural violation or some prejudice to self, and
persuade courts to interfere by exercising power of judicial
review, should be resisted. Such interferences, either interim
or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief
and succour to thousands and millions and may increase
the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before
interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of
power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following
questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone;
OR
Whether the process adopted or decision made is so
arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision
is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and
in accordance with relevant law could have reached”;

(ii) Whether public interest is affected.
If the answers are in the negative, there should be no
interference under Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting
or imposition of penal consequences on a
tenderer/contractor or distribution of State largesse
(allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences, dealerships and
franchises) stand on a different footing as they may require a
higher degree of fairness in action.”
18) The same principles have been reiterated in a recent
decision of this Court in Tejas Constructions &
Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. Municipal Council, Sendhwa &
Anr., (2012) 6 SCC 464.
19) From the above decisions, the following principles
emerge:
(a) the basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action
by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance
is the heartbeat of fair play. These actions are amenable to
the judicial review only to the extent that the State must act
validly for a discernible reason and not whimsically for any
ulterior purpose. If the State acts within the bounds of
reasonableness, it would be legitimate to take into
consideration the national priorities;
(b) fixation of a value of the tender is entirely within the
purview of the executive and courts hardly have any role to

play in this process except for striking down such action of the
executive as is proved to be arbitrary or unreasonable. If the
Government acts in conformity with certain healthy standards
and norms such as awarding of contracts by inviting tenders,
in those circumstances, the interference by Courts is very
limited;
(c) In the matter of formulating conditions of a tender
document and awarding a contract, greater latitude is
required to be conceded to the State authorities unless the
action of tendering authority is found to be malicious and a
misuse of its statutory powers, interference by Courts is not
warranted;
(d) Certain preconditions or qualifications for tenders have
to be laid down to ensure that the contractor has the capacity
and the resources to successfully execute the work; and
(e) If the State or its instrumentalities act reasonably, fairly
and in public interest in awarding contract, here again,
interference by Court is very restrictive since no person can
claim fundamental right to carry on business with the
Government.

20) Therefore, a Court before interfering in tender or
contractual matters, in exercise of power of judicial review,
should pose to itself the following questions:
(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the
authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or
whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary
and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such
that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in
accordance with relevant law could have reached”; and (ii)
Whether the public interest is affected. If the answers to the
above questions are in negative, then there should be no
interference under Article 226.

REPORTABLE

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5898 OF 2012
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 25802 of 2008
M/s Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. .... Appellant (s)
Versus
The State of Karnataka & Ors. .... Respondent(s)
 Dated:AUGUST 17, 2012.

 P. Sathasivam, J.

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Whether concept of equality is applicable in case of illegality?

The concept of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution is a positive concept which cannot be enforced in a negative manner. When any authority is shown to have committed any illegality or irregularity in favour of any individual or group of individuals other cannot claim the same illegality or irregularity on ground of denial thereof to them. Similarly wrong judgment passed in favour of one individual does not entitle others to claim similar benefits. In this regard this Court in Gursharan Singh & Ors. v. NDMC & Ors. [1996 (2) SCC 459] held that citizens have assumed wrong notions regarding the scope of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law to all citizens. Benefits extended to some persons in an irregular or illegal manner cannot be claimed by a citizen on the plea of equality as enshrined in Article14 of the Constitution by way of writ petition filed in the High Court The Court observed:

"Neither Article 14 of the Constitution

conceives within the equality clause this concept nor Article 226 empowers the High Court to enforce such claim of equality before law. If such claims are enforced, it shall amount to directing to continue and

perpetuate an illegal procedure or an illegal order for extending similar benefits to others. Before a claim based on equality clause is upheld, it must be established by the petitioner that his claim being just and legal, has been denied to him, while it has been extended to others and in this process there has been a discrimination."

"The doctrine of discrimination is founded upon existence of an enforceable right. He was discriminated and denied equality as some similarly situated persons had been given the same relief. Article 14 would apply only when invidious discrimination is meted out to equals and similarly circumstanced

without any rational basis or relationship in that behalf.

Supreme Court of India

Ekta Shakti Foundation vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi on 17 July, 2006

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Whether non communication of entries in annual Confidential Report will affect civil rights of employees?

Supreme Court Mandated Communication of not only all entries in annual confidential report but even whether the entry of a grade in a ACR in comparison to previous years entry resulted in lowering of the grade.
 In State of Maharashtra vs. Public Concern for Governance Trust & Ors. 2007 (3) SCC 587, it was observed (vide para 39): "In our opinion, when an authority takes a decision which may have civil consequences and affects the rights 
of a person, the principles of natural justice would at once come into play".


 In our opinion, non-communication of entries in the Annual Confidential Report of a public servant, whether he is in civil, judicial, police or any other service (other than the military), certainly has civil consequences because it may affect his chances for promotion or get other benefits (as already discussed above). Hence, such non-communication would be arbitrary, and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

Supreme Court of India

Dev Dutt vs Union Of India & Ors on 12 May, 2008

Bench: M Katju, H K Sema

Markandey Katju, J.

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