Showing posts with label labour law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label labour law. Show all posts

Thursday, 20 July 2023

How to ascertain whether a person is a workman or not as per Industrial disputes Act?


In Standard Chartered Bank (supra) the Court while considering the appointment of the respondent therein as a Personal Financial Consultant in which the key responsibilities were as indicated in para 2 thereof by relying upon the judgment in Inthru Noronha vrs. Colgate Palmolive (India) Ltd, MANU/MH/0259/2005 : 2005 (2) Mh.L.J. 884, has held in para 10 as under;


"10. These duties upon which there is absolutely no dispute or caveat would belie the contention of the first respondent that she was doing work predominantly of a clerical nature. Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 defines the expression "workman" to mean any person "employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward". A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in H.R.Adyanthaya vrs. Sandoz (India) Ltd., MANU/SC/0525/1994 : 1994 (II) CLR 552 held that in order that a person can be designated as a workman under Section 2(s) he/she must be employed to do work which falls within one of the stipulated categories viz. manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory. In other words, it is not enough that a person is not covered by either of the four exceptions to the definition. It is now also a well settled principle of law that the burden lies on the person who asserts the status of a workman under section 2(s) to establish with reference to the dominant nature of his/her duties that the work which is performed falls within one of the stipulated categories in Section 2(s). Mukesh K. Tripathi vrs. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC, MANU/SC/0726/2004 : 2004 (III) CLR 534 at para 37 and Ganga Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd. Vrs. Jaivir Singh, MANU/SC/7946/2007 : 2007(III) CLR 840 at para 9".


Looking to the nature of the services, it has further held in para 18, as under:


"18. The fact that in an organizational structure the employee, in the course of the decision making process, is subject to checks and balances is not a matter which would establish that she/he is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s). Modern forms of business in corporate organizations put into place a carefully crafted process of checks and balances. Rarely, if ever, would an employee have authoritarian control over business decisions. Employees are made subject to checks and balances both at the lateral and vertical level. Managerial decisions are subject to verification and approval. The fact that decisions of an employee are subject to verification or subject to a system of controls and balances does not establish that the employee is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s). Managers do not become workmen because their decisions are structured by processes and approvals. Absolute autonomy is not the norm in managerial decision making. Nor does the law insist on absolute discretion or absolute autonomy for a person to be a manager. Basically the answer to the question must depend upon the dominant nature of the duties and responsibilities.


In Standard Chartered Bank (supra), reliance was also placed on Dhruba Kumar Changkokoti vrs. Travel Corporation of India Ltd, MANU/MH/0725/2000 : 2000(II) CLR 644, which holds that a person who was employed to promote tourism of a travel company in Eastern Europe could not be regarded as a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the ID Act and so also on Mukesh K. Tripathi vrs. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC, MANU/SC/0726/2004 : 2004 (III) CLR 534, which holds that a person who had been recruited to develop the business of the employer could not have done so without being a full fledged officer of the Corporation and would not be a workman within the meaning of section 2(s) of the ID Act. In Twenty First Century (supra), while considering a plea as to whether a Purchase Officer was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the ID Act, the following was the answer :


"13. It was, however, argued that the respondent could not be said to be part of the management because he had no one working under him. The true test must depend on the nature of the function and not whether the person has any other employee working under him. Indeed, an employee can be at the lowest managerial post and could still be said to perform managerial function. Having regard to the nature of the activity of purchase, it appears that the function must be classified as managerial being part of the controlling and regulating functions of the industry. In this view of the matter, the respondent no.1 must be held to be an employee mainly in a managerial capacity and is, therefore, excepted from the meaning of "workman" by virtue of section 2(s)(iii) of the Act." {Para 5}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 2101 of 2023

Decided On: 13.07.2023

 Abbott India Limited  Vs.  Dipak

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Avinash G. Gharote, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2668/2023.

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Tuesday, 5 May 2020

Supreme Court upholds law which restores trial of labour law offences to criminal court

Actually what has been done is that the cases which ought to have been tried by the regular criminal Courts were sought to be transferred to the Labour Courts by the Amendment of 1981 and only that process was sought to be reversed by the impugned Amendment of 2002. Thus, in the wisdom of the Legislature, the process would be better served by maintaining the regular criminal Courts as a forum for adjudication of such disputes which have a criminal aspect, relating to the identical 16 labour law statutes. It is not the function of this Court to test the wisdom of the Legislature and substitute its mind with the same, as has been reiterated in the cases of State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. v. McDowell & Co. and Ors. MANU/SC/0427/1996 : (1996) 3 SCC 709. & Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu MANU/SC/1854/2005 : (2005) 12 SCC 752. It is for the Legislature to weigh this aspect as to what would be the appropriate method for providing expeditious justice to the common man - an aspect which would be common both to the wisdom of the Legislature and of the judiciary.

8. The process as evolved shows that the system, as it is, is working in the criminal Courts for the last more than a decade and no grievance has been made about the same. The absence of any representation on behalf of the Respondent(s) further gives credence to this reasoning.

9. We are of the view that it is really not possible to sustain the impugned order which is accordingly set aside and the provisions of Madhya Pradesh Labour Laws (Amendment) & Misc. Provisions Act, 2002 are upheld.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 4658/2009 and C.A. No. 7613/2009 (IV-A)

Decided On: 29.01.2020

 State of M.P.  Vs.   M.P. Transport Workers Fedn.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sanjay Kishan Kaul and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

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Thursday, 19 March 2020

Whether delinquent can be held guilty in departmental inquiry if management fails to adduce evidence?

In the instant case, the Management has not led any evidence and has not proved the reports tendered, as well as, the written script of a purported oral telephonic recorded discussion. The voices in the recorded conversion are not proved and what is placed before the enquiry officer is a written script of the purported discussion.

14. The learned Advocate for the Management submits that the documents which were before the Court of criminal jurisdiction in the form of F.I.R. and the charge-sheet submitted by the police authorities before the concerned Court, were also brought on record in the enquiry as Evidence. I am of the view that if the Management was relying upon the Management's evidence and investigation papers pertaining to the F.I.R. and the criminal case, and no other evidence was being led, then this case would be covered by the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court in the case of G. M. Tank Vs. State of Gujarat MANU/SC/8156/2006 : (2006) 5 SCC 446. Nevertheless, the two charges pertaining to "Company Droh" and 'seeking bribe from a consumer', have been held to be not proved as per the Enquiry Officer's report.

15. Considering the law pertaining to departmental and domestic enquiries under Article 311 and the Model Standing Orders framed under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 1946 and keeping in view the law laid down by the Honourable Apex Court while interpreting the 15th Amendment with the 42nd amendment to the constitution in Union of India and others Vs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, MANU/SC/0124/1991 : AIR 1991 SC 471 and Managing Director, Electronic Corporation of India Vs. B. Karunakar, MANU/SC/0474/1992 : 1992 (1) SCC 709, I find that the enquiry conducted by the Petitioner is defective. This conclusion is arrived at on account of the defective Regulation 88 from Clause (d) to (g) by which the delinquent is directed to first lead oral and documentary evidence and the Management is left with the choice of not leading any evidence. The enquiry is, therefore, rendered vitiated.

16. I have discussed in the foregoing paragraphs as regards the conclusions, drawn by the Enquiry Officer while holding that charge (1) and charge (4) having been proved. Placing reliance upon newspaper cuttings/news items and on a complaint filed against him by a consumer, which was not proved, cannot be the basis for concluding that an employee deserves to be dismissed from service. In my view, the gravity of such misconduct alleged, would not attract the punishment of dismissal from service.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 11616 of 2018

Decided On: 20.02.2020

Chief Engineer, Latur Zone & Competent Offer, Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited
Vs.  Nathuram

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.V. Ghuge, J.

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Sunday, 16 June 2019

How to ascertain that contract labourer was direct employee?

 It is now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal or merely a camouflage to deny employment benefits to the employee and that there was in fact a direct employment, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the direct employee of the principal employer. Two of the well-recognized tests to find out whether the contract labourers are the direct employees of the principal employer are: (i) whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of the contractor; and (ii) whether the principal employer controls and supervises the work of the employee. In this case, the Industrial Court answered both questions in the affirmative and as a consequence held that the first Respondent is a direct employee of the Appellant.

19. The expression 'control and supervision' were further explained with reference to an earlier judgment of this Court as follows:

12. The expression "control and supervision" in the context of contract labour was explained by this Court in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers' Union thus: (SCC p. 388, paras 38-39)

38. ...if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.

39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him. But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short, worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer but that is secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.

20. From this judgment, it is clear that test No. 1 is not met on the facts of this case as the contractor pays the workmen their wages. Secondly, the principal employer cannot be said to control and supervise the work of the employee merely because he directs the workmen of the contractor 'what to do' after the contractor assigns/allots the employee to the principal employer. This is precisely what paragraph 12 explains as being supervision and control of the principal employer that is secondary in nature, as such control is exercised only after such workman has been assigned to the principal employer to do a particular work.

21. We may hasten to add that this view of the law has been reiterated in 'Balwant Rai Saluja and Anr. v. Air India Limited and Others' [MANU/SC/0732/2014 : 2014(9) SCC 407], as follows:

65. Thus, it can be concluded that the relevant factors to be taken into consideration to establish an employer-employee relationship would include, inter alia:

(i) who appoints the workers;

(ii) who pays the salary/remuneration;

(iii) who has the authority to dismiss;

(iv) who can take disciplinary action;

(v) whether there is continuity of service; and

(vi) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether there exists complete control and supervision.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1799-1800 of 2019 

Decided On: 20.02.2019

Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. Vs.  Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Rohinton Fali Nariman and Vineet Saran, JJ.

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Friday, 19 April 2019

Whether employee can be granted service benefits if he is terminated from service?

Dismissal is punitive in nature while a termination of employment simply brings an employment contract to an end. 'Dismissed' as per Oxford Dictionary is "treat as unworthy of serious consideration and refuse further hearing to (a case)", whereas Black's Law Dictionary defines 'dismissal' as "termination of an action or claim without further hearing".

8. In the present case, a notice was served upon the respondent. A fair hearing was given and therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner had exercised the powers arbitrarily. Termination of employment as per Black's Law Dictionary is the complete severance of an employer-employee relationship.

9. Many a times dismissal and termination are held to be synonymous, however, they differ in letter and spirit as well as the ascertainment of the rights of the employee would differ. A dismissal on account of grave misconduct, as in the present case, would necessarily entail dismissal. In the present case, the Petitioner Corporation has been fair enough to conduct an enquiry and give an opportunity of hearing to the employee.

10. Thus, the difference between termination and dismissal is that-Dismissal could be on account of misconduct involving dishonesty or criminality and that is not the case in termination. On termination, the employee would be entitled to receive gratuity and other terminal benefits, whereas the same cannot be granted in case of dismissal.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

W.P. No. 1347 of 2004

Decided On: 05.10.2018

 Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation  Vs.  A.B. Patel

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Sadhana S. Jadhav, J.

Citation: 2019(2) MHLJ 207
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Wednesday, 20 April 2016

When management is not justified to terminate employee on ground that he has overstayed sick leave?

 Next contention would be whether the grounds
for termination of the services of the respondent no.1 are
justified. The petitioner are relying upon Clause III(d) of
the settlement dated 06.05.1997 in support of their
contention that the petitioner is entitled to terminate the
services of the respondent no.1. The said Clause reads
thus :
“(d) An employee remaining absent on
duty beyond the period of leave already
sanctioned for him, shall cease to be an
employee of the bank unless he returns
within eight days after the expiry of such
leave and furnishes good cause to the
satisfaction of the manager/chairman of
his inability to report for duty on the due
date”. :50:
20. On going through the said clause in cases in
which the employee has remained absent from duty
beyond sanctioned period of leave he ceased to be an
employee of the bank unless he returns within eight days
after the expiry of such leave and furnishes good cause to
the satisfaction of the manager/chairman of his inability
to report for duty on the due date. In the present case,
the petitioner has not brought anything on record to show
up to when the leave of the respondent no.1 was
sanctioned. The learned Tribunal has taken note of the
fact that the respondent no.1 was sick and that the
respondent no.1 had sick leave to his credit during the
said relevant period. In order to imply that the employee
has ceased or abandoned his services, there must be a
total or complete giving up of duty so as to indicate an
intention not to renounce the services. Thus, the question
of abandoning the services is also a question of an
intention of the parties and normally such an intention
cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate
evidence in that behalf. This is a question of fact to be
determined in the light of surrounding circumstances of
each case. Only because action on the part of the
employee to avail of leave without any prior sanction
thereof or overstay despite of expiry of the period of
leave, it cannot be assumed that he is ceased to be an
employee of the bank. Admittedly, there is no legislation
in the present case which governs the right of the parties
to draw such inference. In the present case, from
September, 2000 to December, 2000 there were different
proceedings with regard to the transfer of the respondent
no.1 which were being examined by the Co-Operative
Tribunal as well as by this Court. The petitioner never
raised the contention that the respondent no.1 had
ceased to be their employee. The fact that the
respondent no.1 continued to be in services of the
petitioner was not disputed by the petitioner in any of
such proceedings. All these circumstances and taking
note that the respondent no.1 had accumulated sick leave
and privilege leave, the petitioner could not arbitrarily
debit double of the medical leave to come to the
conclusion that the respondent no.1 has failed to remain
present after the sanctioned leave. The petitioner has
acted arbitrarily in taking the action nor issued any show
cause notice to the respondent no.1 with that regard. The
question of assuming that the respondent no.1 had
ceased to be an employee automatically is totally uncalled
for as the petitioner ought to have sent a notice to the
respondent no.1 and conducted proper inquiry before
taking any such action. The learned Tribunal has
examined all these aspects and has come to the
conclusion that the petitioner is not at all justified to
terminate the services of the respondent no.1 for the
reasons stated in the letter of termination. It is also to be
noted that the learned Tribunal took note of the fact that
in the present case there was no allegation that the
respondent no.1 was habitual, unauthorised and
unjustifiably absent without applying for leave. The
learned Tribunal also noted that though no inquiry was
held, it was open to the petitioner to justify such
discharge which the petitioner failed to bring any evidence
with that regard. The learned Tribunal further noted that
no inquiry was held before issuing the order of
termination nor any request was made by the petitioner
to give them an opportunity to adduce any evidence for
justifying the action. The learned Tribunal further noted
that the evidence on record clearly indicate that the
respondent no.1 was sick and had applied for sick leave
w.e.f. 31.05.2000. No decision was taken on such
application and the transfer order was served during the
pendency of such application. The learned Tribunal
concluded at para 127 of the impugned award that the
impugned order passed by the petitioner was arbitrary,
illegal and totally in beach of the principles of natural
justice, equity and fair play. These findings which have
been arrived at by the learned Tribunal on the basis of
material on record cannot be said to be perverse and as
such I find no reason to interfere in the findings of the
learned Tribunal and consequently, the learned Tribunal
was justified to pass the impugned award by coming to
the conclusion that the termination of the services of the
respondent no.1 are unsustainable in law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
WRIT PETITION NO. 40 OF 2004
The Goa Urban Co-op. Bank Ltd.,

V e r s u s
Mr. Rui A. E. Ferreira

CORAM : F. M. REIS, J
DATE : 21st July, 2014
Citation;2015(7) ALLMR 388
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Monday, 21 March 2016

Supreme court Judgment on territorial jurisdiction for filing case in Labour court

Though, the learned counsel on both sides had
addressed in detail on several issues, we do not
think it necessary to go into all those aspects
mainly because in our view they are only academic.
In the background of the factual matrix, the
undisputed position is that the appellant was
employed by the Company in Aurangabad, he was only
transferred to Pondicherry, the decision to close
down the unit at Pondicherry was taken by the Company
at Aurangabad and consequent upon that decision only
the appellant was terminated. Therefore, it cannot
be said that there is no cause of action at all in
Aurangabad. The decision to terminate the appellant
having been taken at Aurangabad necessarily part of
the cause of action has arisen at Aurangabad. We
have no quarrel that Labour Court, Pondicherry is
within its jurisdiction to consider the case of the
appellant, since he has been terminated while he was
working at Pondicherry. But that does not mean that
Labour Court in Aurangabad within whose jurisdiction

the Management is situated and where the Management
has taken the decision to close down the unit at
Pondicherry and pursuant to which the appellant was
terminated from service also does not have the
jurisdiction. In the facts of this case both the
Labour Courts have the jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. Hence, the Labour Court at Aurangabad is
well within its jurisdiction to consider the
complaint filed by the appellant. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1409 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 33917 of 2011)
NANDRAM APPELLANT
 VERSUS
M/S GARWARE POLYSTER LTD. RESPONDENT
Dated;FEBRUARY 16, 2016
Citation:(2016) 6 SCC290

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Saturday, 28 November 2015

When principle of 'no work,no pay' is not applicable in case of labourer?

 Thus, in view of the cases referred to supra,
there was absolutely no justification on the
part of the Industrial Tribunal to deny back
wages to the respondent even when it is found
that the order of termination is void ab initio
in law for non-compliance of the mandatory
provisions under Section 6-N of the Act. Keeping
in view the fact that the period of termination
was in the year 1975 and the matter has been
unnecessarily litigated by the employer by
contesting the matter before the Industrial
Tribunal as well as the High Court and this
Court for more than 40 years, and further, even
after the Award/order of reinstatement was
passed by the Industrial Tribunal directing the
employer to give him the post equivalent to the
post of Tube-well Operator, the same has been
denied to him by offering the said post which is
not equivalent to the post of Tube-well Operator
and thereby, attributing the fault on the
respondent for non reporting to the post offered
to him, which is once again unjustified on the
part of the employer.
 Thus, the principle “no work no pay” as
observed by this Court in the catena of cases
does not have any significance to the fact
situation of the present case as the termination
of the services of the workman from the post of
Tube-well Operator is erroneous in law in the
first place, as held by us in view of the above
stated reasons.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2381 OF 2007
STATE OF U.P ………APPELLANT
Vs.
CHARAN SINGH ………RESPONDENT
Citation;(2015)8 SCC150
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Wednesday, 12 August 2015

Supreme Court: Employee is not entitled to get increment when he is suspended

Increment has a definite concept in service law jurisprudence. It is an increase or addition on a fixed scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale. As noted in SBI v. Central Government Labour Court, (1972) 3 SCC 595, under the labour and industrial laws, an increment is when in a timescale of pay an employee advances from the lower point of scale to the higher by periodic additions. In other words, it is addition in the same scale and not to a higher scale. An increment is an incidence of employment and an employee gets an increment by working the full year and drawing full salary. During the period of suspension, the contract of service remains suspended. The order of suspension by the departmental enquiry has the effect of temporarily suspending the relations between the master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and, therefore, an employee is not entitled to increments during this period which is taken as period not spent on duty.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
C.A. No. 5523 of 2013 (@ SLP(C) No. 9338 of 2012)
Decided On: 17.07.2013

State of Punjab Vs. Jaswant Singh Kanwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu and Dipak Misra, JJ.
Equivalent Citation:(2014)13 SCC 622
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