Whether Plaintiff Can Value Suit Differently For Purpose Of Jurisdiction & For Payment Of Court Fees?

 Section 8 of Suit Valuation Act, 1887 puts an obligation on the plaintiff to value the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction identically except for the Exceptions provided in Section 7 paragraph 5, 6, 9, 10 Clause (d) of the Court Fee Act, 1870. 12. It therefore, follows that though it is in the discretion of the plaintiff to value his suit as per his bona fide belief and discretion, but once he has valued his suit in terms of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act, the court fee shall become payable on the same amount in terms of Section 7 of the Court Fees Act. The plaintiff cannot adopt a dual policy of valuing his suit at a certain value for the purpose of jurisdiction and for the purpose of payment of court fees. Once the suit has been valued at a certain value, the advolerum court fees has to be paid mandatorily on the same valuation. {Para 11}

13. The plaintiff in the present case has valued his suit for the purpose of jurisdiction at Rs.2.5 crores while for the purpose of court fee has assessed each relief at Rs.500/- each It is no doubt true that the law gives a discretion to the plaintiff to value his suit and such discretion as exercised by the plaintiff in mentioning the valuation of the suit must not be interfered by the Court as observed by the Full Bench in Smt. Sheila Devi and Ors. Vs. Sh. Kishan Lal Kalra and Ors. ILR (1974) II Delhi 491. However, once the valuation has been done on a certain value by the plaintiff in exercise of his discretion, he is obliged to pay the court fee on the same amount in terms of Section 8 of the Suit Valuation Act as has been held in the decision of Apex Court in Commercial Aviation T. Co.(supra) and this court in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra). 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI 

 CS(OS) 172/2021

 RAJINDER SINGH BHATIA Vs MANJU BHATIA 

 CORAM: MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA

Decided on: 22nd August, 2022 

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Whether jurisdiction of arbitrator can be challenged after passing of arbitral award?

 However, since it is stated that proceedings are pending before the Arbitrator in pursuance of the impugned order, the same will stand transferred to the State Tribunal and the State Tribunal may proceed further taking into account the proceedings which have already been taken. Learned Counsel for the Respondent(s) pointed out that in view of Section 16(2), the objection to the jurisdiction could not be raised after statement of defence was filed. This contention cannot be accepted in view of the fact that the SLP was filed prior to the filing of statement of defence wherein this objection was raised.

21. We do not express any opinion on the applicability of the State Act where award has already been made. In such cases if no objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitration was taken at relevant stage, the award may not be annulled only on that ground.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

C.A. No. 974 of 2012,

Decided On: 08.03.2018

Madhya Pradesh Rural Road Development Authority Vs. L.G. Chaudhary Engineers and Contractors

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Goel, Rohinton Fali Nariman and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation: (2018) 10 SCC 826

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Whether Venue of arbitration can change intention of parties to vest jurisdiction in courts of specific region?

A perusal of the above rule shows that the place or venue "shall be India" i.e. any place in India could be the seat. However, for convenience the venue where arbitration was to be held was the office of the CAI. While the Rules and the By-laws of the CAI are applicable for the purpose of appointing of the tribunal, for holding of the proceedings and other procedural matters, the contract clearly expresses the intention of the parties to vest exclusive jurisdiction in Delhi Courts, for any issues arising out of the arbitration proceedings or the award. This clause brooks no ambiguity or vagueness. Thus, unlike a court jurisdiction clause, the parties clearly vested the Courts in Delhi with supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitral proceedings. The venue cannot change the intention of the parties to vest the Courts in Delhi with exclusive jurisdiction.

Delhi High Court

Spentex Industries Ltd. vs Louis Dreyfus Commodities India ... on 22 February, 2019

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Whether award passed by arbitrator which decides issue of limitation is interim award?

  In ITW Signode India Ltd. v. CCE (2004) 3 SCC 48 at
74, a case strongly relied upon by Shri Sinha, this Court held in
the context of limitation qua recovery of duty under Section 11A
of the Central Excise Act, 1944 as follows:
“69. The question of limitation involves a question of
jurisdiction. The finding of fact on the question of
jurisdiction would be a jurisdictional fact. Such a
jurisdictional question is to be determined having
regard to both fact and law involved therein. The
Tribunal, in our opinion, committed a manifest error
in not determining the said question, particularly,
when in the absence of any finding of fact that such
short-levy of excise duty related to any positive act
on the part of the appellant by way of fraud,
collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression of
facts, the extended period of limitation could not
have been invoked and in that view of the matter no
show-cause notice in terms of Rule 10 could have
been issued.”
Given the context of Section 11A of the Central Excise
Act, 1944, obviously the expression “jurisdiction” would mean
something more than merely being able to embark on the
merits of a dispute. In a recent judgment under Section 9A of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as inserted by the State of
Maharashtra), this Court in Foreshore Coop. Housing Society
Ltd. v. Praveen D. Desai (2015) 6 SCC 412, referred to the
30expression “jurisdiction” occurring in Section 9A and held an
earlier judgment of this Court to be per incuriam. Though the
Constitution Bench judgment in Ittavira (supra) was mentioned
by the Bench, referring to the argument of one of the counsel
for the parties, in the concluding portion, this judgment is not
referred to at all. In any case, the reasoning of the Court in that
case was in the context of Section 9A which, when contrasted
with Order XIV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, made the
Court accept the wider concept of “jurisdiction” as laid down in
Pandurang (supra).
29. In our view, therefore, it is clear that the award dated 23rd
July, 2015 is an interim award, which being an arbitral award,
can be challenged separately and independently under Section
34 of the Act. We are of the view that such an award, which
does not relate to the arbitral tribunal’s own jurisdiction under
Section 16, does not have to follow the drill of Section 16(5)
and (6) of the Act. Having said this, we are of the view that
Parliament may consider amending Section 34 of the Act so as
to consolidate all interim awards together with the final arbitral
award, so that one challenge under Section 34 can be made
31after delivery of the final arbitral award. Piecemeal challenges
like piecemeal awards lead to unnecessary delay and additional
expense.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 824 OF 2018
(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO.19771 OF 2017)
M/S INDIAN FARMERS FERTILIZER
CO-OPERATIVE LIMITED 
V
M/S BHADRA PRODUCTS 
Dated:January 23, 2018.

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When court should decide issue of undervaluation of suit as preliminary issue?

 In the case of The Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society v. M/s. Ponniamman Educational Trust, as reported in MANU/SC/0515/2012 : AIR 2012 SC 3912, after referring to the relevant provision, it has been held that --

"In order to consider an application under Order VII Rule 11, the Court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial Court at any stage of the suit."

5. But in the case of Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chettiar, as reported in MANU/SC/0016/1979 : 1980 (1) SCC 616, it has been held that --

"The plaintiff is entitled to give a tentative valuation if in spite of his genuine efforts, he is unable to make out an exact valuation, but plaint is liable to be rejected in case of deliberate undervaluation."

6. "Similarly, in the case of Sujir Keshav Nayak v. Sujir Ganesh Nayak, as reported in MANU/SC/0284/1992 : 1992 (1) SCC 731, it has been held that --

"In suit filed before Court of limited pecuniary jurisdiction, defendant has right to raise objection as to undervaluation of the suit which has to be decided as preliminary issue by the Court. It has also been held that if Court, on being prima-facie satisfied that valuation of suit was arbitrary, can direct the suit to be properly valued."

It has been further held that --

"In suits for accounting or for dissolution of partnership and accounting filed in Courts of limited pecuniary jurisdiction the plaintiff must take every care to disclose valuation which is not arbitrary, as the plaint is liable to be rejected on objection of the defendants, but in suits of such nature, filed before Courts of unlimited jurisdiction, the valuation disclosed by the plaintiff can be accepted as correct. This however, does not mean that Court's power to examine the correctness of valuation is taken away. If on perusal of plaint, the Court is prima facie satisfied that the plaintiff has not been fair and valued the suit or relief arbitrarily it is not precluded from directing the plaintiff to value it properly and pay Court-fee on it. Thus, summarizing the law, it has been held as under:

(1) Where the question of Court-fee is linked with jurisdiction, a defendant has a right to raise objection and the Court should decide it as a preliminary issue.

(2) But in those cases where the suit is filed in Court of unlimited jurisdiction, the valuation disclosed by the plaintiff or payment of amount of Court-fee on relief claimed in plaint or memorandum of appeal should be taken as correct.

(3) This does not preclude the Court even in suits filed in Courts of unlimited jurisdiction from examining if the valuation, on averments in plaint, is arbitrary."

7. In the present case, the trial Court with a limited pecuniary jurisdiction, cannot be said to have erred in directing the plaintiff to value the suit as per the guidelines inasmuch as it is very much within the jurisdiction of a Civil Judge even if material would not have been brought to the notice of the Civil Judge, to direct the plaintiff to value the relief as per the market guidelines.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (GWALIOR BENCH)

W.P. No. 7303 of 2016

Decided On: 26.10.2016

 Manoj Jain and Ors.

Vs.

Pramod Jain and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Vivek Agarwal, J.

Citation: AIR 2017 Madhya pradesh 39

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Whether order passed without jurisdiction will merge with orders passed by higher authority?

 It is required to be noted that the transfer and conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural is regulated by the GR dated 08/09/1983. The said GR can be said to be supplemental to the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and provides the mechanism as to how an application for transfer and conversion of agricultural land is to be dealt with. The said GR postulates that the transfer and conversion can be permitted on the terms and conditions which are mentioned in the GR. One of the conditions mentioned is that the transferee would continue to hold the land as Occupant Class II. The said GR does not envisage the conversion of the Occupancy Class II to Occupancy Class I. Once that be so, any order passed by the authority exercising powers under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code directing conversion of Occupancy Class II to Occupancy Class I would be in breach and violation of the said GR. This has precisely happened in the instant case as the Secy. & OSD has exceeded his jurisdiction in directing the conversion of land from Occupancy Class II to Occupancy Class I albeit on payment of 25% nazarana. Once the order can be said to have been passed without jurisdiction, even if the said order was to merge in the orders passed by the higher Courts then such an order would be of no avail to the party who seeks to reap its benefit as it is well settled by the judgments of the High Courts that there is no question of merger of the order passed by the original authority which is void on account of infirmity for want of jurisdiction. It has been held that the doctrine of merger has no application in so far as an illegal order is concerned.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 6747 of 2016

Decided On: 10.01.2017

 Niketan Land and Estate Pvt. Ltd.

Vs.

State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M. Savant, J.

Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR 222

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Whether courts at India will have jurisdiction if arbitration proceeding is conducted outside India?

The significant determinant in each case is the agreement
of the parties as to the place of arbitration and where in fact the
arbitration took place.
If in pursuance of the arbitration agreement, the
arbitration took place outside India, there is a clear exclusion of
Part-I of the Arbitration Act. In the present case, the parties
expressly agreed that the arbitration will be conducted according
to the ICC Rules of Arbitration and left the place of arbitration to
be chosen by the ICC. The ICC in fact, chose London as the seat
of arbitration after consulting the parties. The arbitration was
held in London without demur from any of the parties. All the
awards i.e. the two partial final awards, and the third final
award, were made in London and communicated to the parties.
We find that this is a clear case of the exclusion of Part-I vide

Eitzen Bulk A/S (supra), and the decisions referred to and
followed therein.
32. The respondent contends before us that Part-I of the
award was applicable, however they themselves stated the place
of arbitration to be London.
It is pertinent to reproduce the relevant portion in the
respondent’s application before the ICC while objecting to the
authority of the law firms representing the appellant. It stated:-
“The seat of this arbitration is London.”
Therefore, the two reasons for Part-I not being applicable
are as follows:-
(i) Parties agreed that the seat maybe outside India as
may be fixed by the ICC; and
(ii) It was admitted that the seat of arbitration was
London and the award was made there.
 Therefore, there is no doubt that Part-I has no application
because the parties chose and agreed to the arbitration being
conducted outside India and the arbitration was in fact held
outside India.
33. In view of the foregoing observations, we find that the
High Court committed an error in observing that the seat of

arbitration itself is not a decisive factor to exclude Part-I of the
Arbitration Act. We therefore set aside the judgment of the High
Court and dismiss the petition filed by the respondent under
Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the Bombay High Court.
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
 CIVIL APPEAL No. 3885 OF 2017

IMAX CORPORATION 
V
M/S E-CITY ENTERTAINMENT (I) Pvt. LTD.
Dated:March 10, 2017

Citation: AIR 2017 SC 1372

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Whether family court has jurisdiction to decide custody of minor children who are living abroad ordinarily?

The Family Court has referred to Section 9 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. On reading of the Section, it can be noticed that the application must be presented before the Court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. The word ‘ordinarily’ has got such a meaning that it rules out temporary residence of the children. In this case, the children were born at Doha Qatar and are pursuing their studies at that place only. If they had come to Belgaum at the time when the marriage between the appellant and the 1st respondent was dissolved, it does not mean that they are ordinarily residents of Belgaum. This being the position, it has to be now said that the Family Court has rightly held that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition. 

In the High Court of Karnataka at Dharwad

(Before Raghvendra S. Chauhan and Sreenivas Harish Kumar, JJ.)

Dr. Mrs. Mashmoom, v. Mr. Sajid, S

Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 22302/2013 (G & WC)

Decided on December 14, 2016

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine Kar 7559

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Whether issue of jurisdiction of arbitrator can be raised for the first time in proceeding U/S of S 34 of arbitration Act?

 A perusal of the record clearly indicates that the petitioner did not raise any issue of jurisdiction before the learned arbitrator, which is raised by the petitioner for the first time in this petition. It was not the case of the petitioner that though the issue of jurisdiction was raised by the petitioner before the learned arbitrator, the same is not considered by the learned arbitrator. In my view, the issue of jurisdiction thus not having been raised before the learned arbitrator, the same cannot be allowed to be raised for the first time in the present proceedings filed undersection 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.

Bombay High Court

Oil And Natural Gas Corpoation Ltd vs International Certification ... on 28 April, 2016

Bench: R.D. Dhanuka

Citation:2016(4)MHLJ727

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How to determine jurisdiction of court on the basis of cause of action?

From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding whether facts averred by the petitioner appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential, or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a 'part of cause of action', nothing less than than.

In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the Appellant Company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of 'cause of action' within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, was not wrong in dismissing the petition.

Supreme Court of India

Alchemist Limited And Another vs State Bank Of Sikkim And 

Others on 16 March, 2007

Bench: C.K. Thakker, Lokeshwar Singh Panta

 Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9698/2006 

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Whether award passed by arbitrator is valid even though there is not arbitration agreement?

Insofar as judgment of Supreme Court in case of Associate Builders (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is concerned, it is held by the Supreme Court that when a court is applying the 'public policy' test to an arbitration award, it does not act as a court of appeal and consequently errors of fact cannot be corrected. It is held that the arbitrator is ultimate master of the quantity and quality of evidence to be relied upon when he delivers his arbitral award. It is held by the Supreme Court that an award can be said to be against justice only when it shocks the conscience of the court. If the award is in contravention with the Arbitration Actitself, it would be regarded as patent illegality. It is held that the contravention of the substantive law of India would result in the death knell of an arbitral award. In my view, the learned arbitrator has exceeded his jurisdiction and has rendered an award though there was no arbitration agreement entered into between the parties. The impugned award thus was in contravention of the substantive law of India and showed patent illegality. The impugned award in my view thus has been rightly set aside by the learned Principal District Judge.

Bombay High Court

M/S. Gill & Company Pvt. Ltd. ... vs M/S. Patodia Ginning Factory on 20 April, 2016

Bench: R.D. Dhanuka

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
     ARBITRATION APPEAL NO. 40 OF 2015



Citation:2016(3) MHLJ890

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Whether court should consider objection to jurisdiction while deciding to give decree on basis of arbitration award?

 The other observations of the Civil Court that the
objection of jurisdiction cannot be considered in a proceeding

filed to get decree on the award cannot be considered, is also
not tenable. In that matter also written statement was filed and
objection to jurisdiction was taken. When there is such objection,
the Civil Court is expected to give decision on this objection also.
Further, separate proceeding under section 33 of the Act was
there and so, while deciding to give decree on the basis of
award, it was necessary for the Civil Court to decide as to
whether Arbitral Tribunal had jurisdiction, authority. Only after
deciding such objection, the Court can pronounce the judgment
in terms of award. Other observations of the Civil Court that the
participation of the employer in the arbitral proceeding amounts
to acquiescence is also not tenable. When there is initial want of
jurisdiction, the things cannot be cured by acquiescence and the
party who appeared before the arbitrator, but took objection to
its jurisdiction is not established from questing the validity of the
award on the ground of jurisdiction.
16) In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court holds
that the Civil Court has committed error in giving decree on the
basis of award and it has committed error in rejecting the
objection application filed by the employer. Shri. Mahurkar could
not have been appointed as arbitrator and there was no such
arbitration agreement. Thus, award is liable to be set aside.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 9 OF 1999
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 551 OF 1999

Maharashtra Krishna Vally Development
Corporation 
V
 M/s. S.D. Shinde & Company

CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE, J.
DATED : 23rd November, 2015.
Citation: 2016(3) MHLJ 705

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When jurisdiction of high court to take action for contempt of subordinate court is not barred?

In Bathina

Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras [AIR 1952 SC 149 : 1952

SCR 425 : 1952 Cri LJ 832] this Court examined the contention

that the publication of an article attributing corruption to a

judicial officer was not cognizable in contempt jurisdiction by

virtue of Section 2(3) of the Contempts of Courts Act, 1953,

which provided that:

“No High Court shall take cognizance of a

contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of

a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an

offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.”

32. The contention before this Court was that the allegations

made in the article constituted an offence under Section 499 IPC

and, that therefore, cognizance of such offence under the

Contempts of Courts Act was barred. Repelling the contention,

Mukherjea, J. said: (SCR p. 429)

“In our opinion, the sub-section referred to above

excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases

where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a
subordinate court are punishable as contempt under
specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not
where these acts merely amount to offences of other
description for which punishment has been provided
for in the Indian Penal Code. This would be clear from
the language of the sub-section which uses the words
„where such contempt is an offence‟ and does not say
„where the act alleged to constitute such contempt is an

offence‟.”

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Judgment Delivered on: June 01, 2016
CRL.A. 723/2014
REKHA ..... Appellant
versus
STATE ..... Respondent
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA

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Supreme court Judgment on territorial jurisdiction for filing case in Labour court

Though, the learned counsel on both sides had
addressed in detail on several issues, we do not
think it necessary to go into all those aspects
mainly because in our view they are only academic.
In the background of the factual matrix, the
undisputed position is that the appellant was
employed by the Company in Aurangabad, he was only
transferred to Pondicherry, the decision to close
down the unit at Pondicherry was taken by the Company
at Aurangabad and consequent upon that decision only
the appellant was terminated. Therefore, it cannot
be said that there is no cause of action at all in
Aurangabad. The decision to terminate the appellant
having been taken at Aurangabad necessarily part of
the cause of action has arisen at Aurangabad. We
have no quarrel that Labour Court, Pondicherry is
within its jurisdiction to consider the case of the
appellant, since he has been terminated while he was
working at Pondicherry. But that does not mean that
Labour Court in Aurangabad within whose jurisdiction

the Management is situated and where the Management
has taken the decision to close down the unit at
Pondicherry and pursuant to which the appellant was
terminated from service also does not have the
jurisdiction. In the facts of this case both the
Labour Courts have the jurisdiction to deal with the
matter. Hence, the Labour Court at Aurangabad is
well within its jurisdiction to consider the
complaint filed by the appellant. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1409 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 33917 of 2011)
NANDRAM APPELLANT
 VERSUS
M/S GARWARE POLYSTER LTD. RESPONDENT
Dated;FEBRUARY 16, 2016
Citation:(2016) 6 SCC290

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Whether court granting alimony pendente lite has inherent jurisdiction to modify its earlier order?

It is to be relevantly pointed out that where the parties are living apart and the wife's means are insufficient to support herself and her children, she is entitled to alimony pendente lite as per decision Bibi Balbir Kaur Kathuria V. Raghubir  Singh Kathuria reported in AIR 1974 Punjab and Haryana at page 225.  Moreover, the right of maintenance and the expenses of litigation is conferred on a spouse.  It cannot be gainsaid that a Court granting alimony pendente lite has inherent jurisdiction and power to modify, vary its earlier order as per decision Anuradha V. Santosh Nath  Khanna reported in AIR 1976 Delhi 246.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF MADRAS
DATED:  06.08.2015
CORAM:
 MR.JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR
and
 MR.JUSTICE M. VENUGOPAL

C.M.A.No.224 of 2014
and
M.P.Nos.1 of 2014

S.Keerthana Vs. G.Sridhar    
Citation;AIR 2016(NOC)135MADRAS

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Supreme Court: Police can not arrest accused if Magistrate has directed inquiry U/S 202 of CRPC

Criminal - Issue of process - Postponement of - Determination thereof - Sections 156(3) and 202(1) of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 - High Court declined to interfere with order whereby Police official was directed to give report to Court within thirty days under Section 202(1) of Code instead of directing investigation Under Section 156(3) of Code, as sought by Appellant - Hence, present appeal - Whether Magistrate ought to have proceeded under Section 156(3) or was justified in proceeding under Section 202(1) and what were parameters for exercise of power under two provisions - Held, direction Under Section 156(3) is to be issued, only after application of mind by Magistrate - When Magistrate does not take cognizance and does not find it necessary to postpone instance of process and finds case made out to proceed forthwith, direction under said provision is issued - Police of its own cannot exercise its power of arrest in course of making its report in pursuance of direction under Section 202 - Magistrate was right in not proceeded under Section 156(3) instead of Section 202 - Magistrate had given reasons, which had been upheld by High Court - Accused was alleged to have forged partnership and whether such forgery actually took place, whether it caused any loss to complainant and whether there is requisite mens rea are questions which were yet to be determined - Magistrate had not found clear material to proceed against accused - Magistrate and High Court rightly held that in present case report under Section 202 was right course instead of direction under Section 156(3) - No error in view taken by Magistrate and High Court that direction under Section 156(3) was not warranted in present case and police may not be justified in exercising power of arrest in course of submitting report under Section 202 of Code - Appeal dismissed.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.600 OF 2007

RAMDEV FOOD PRODUCTS PRIVATE LIMITED V STATE OF GUJARAT

 Bench: T.S. Thakur, Adarsh Kumar Goel, R. Banumathi
Dated;MARCH 16, 2015
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

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