Showing posts with label increment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label increment. Show all posts

Monday, 16 November 2020

Whether an employee who retired on 31st of a month is entitled to the increment which would have fallen due on 1st of the next month?

The petitioner was not on duty on 1.4.2003. Increment can be drawn only when an employee is on duty. The increment in terms of FR 24 & 26 did not become due during the period of service of the petitioner. Therefore, increment on 1.4.2003 cannot be sanctioned in favour of petitioner on the ground that he had completed twelve months of continuous service. The date of increment falls due on the first day of the succeeding month after the retirement. Petitioner retired on the basic pay drawn by him on 31.3.2003 i.e. his date of retirement. His pension has to be determined accordingly. Petitioner had become a pensioner on 1.04.2003. He cannot be held entitled to any increment which may fall due post his retirement. He is entitled only to those increments which fall due to him during the period of his service.

 In the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla

(Before Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Jyotsna Rewal Dua, JJ.)

CWP No 2503 of 2016

Hari Prakash Vs State of Himachal Pradesh

CWP No. 2503 of 2016 a/w CWPOA No. 663 of 2020

Decided on November 6, 2020, 

Citation: 2020 SCC OnLine HP 2362

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Sunday, 23 February 2020

What is distinction between order withholding increment with cumulative effect and one withholding increment without cumulative effect?

 The difference between an order withholding increment with cumulative effect and the one withholding increment without cumulative effect has been succinctly explained by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Punjab State Electricity Board, Now Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. vs. Raj Kumar Goel, reiterating the view taken in the case of Uttam Kumar vs. Delhi Jal Board, reported in MANU/DE/0135/2001 : 2001(4) S.C.T. 136: 2001 IVAD (Delhi) 166. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when increment is withheld without cumulative effect, it is in the realm of minor penalty and when it is done with cumulative effect, it could be in the compartment of major penalty. It further held that in the latter case, there is permanent postponement of the increment and in the former case, the increment withholding is only for a specific period and it is required to be released after expiration of the period for which the increment is directed to be withheld. That would mean that when the increment is directed to be withheld without cumulative effect, there would be only suspension of increment for the period for which it is withheld and the moment withholding period expires, the suspension of the increment would stand removed and that increment would be payable along with the increment payable in the year in which the withholding effect disappears.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition Nos. 425 and 541 of 2018

Decided On: 23.07.2019

 Nilkanth Dhyanoba Jogdande Vs.  Panjabrao Deshumukh Krishi Vidyapeeth

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.B. Shukre and S.M. Modak, JJ.

Citation: 2020(1) MHLJ 897
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Wednesday, 12 August 2015

Supreme Court: Employee is not entitled to get increment when he is suspended

Increment has a definite concept in service law jurisprudence. It is an increase or addition on a fixed scale; it is a regular increase in salary on such a scale. As noted in SBI v. Central Government Labour Court, (1972) 3 SCC 595, under the labour and industrial laws, an increment is when in a timescale of pay an employee advances from the lower point of scale to the higher by periodic additions. In other words, it is addition in the same scale and not to a higher scale. An increment is an incidence of employment and an employee gets an increment by working the full year and drawing full salary. During the period of suspension, the contract of service remains suspended. The order of suspension by the departmental enquiry has the effect of temporarily suspending the relations between the master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and, therefore, an employee is not entitled to increments during this period which is taken as period not spent on duty.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
C.A. No. 5523 of 2013 (@ SLP(C) No. 9338 of 2012)
Decided On: 17.07.2013

State of Punjab Vs. Jaswant Singh Kanwar

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu and Dipak Misra, JJ.
Equivalent Citation:(2014)13 SCC 622
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Whether suspension of employee results in suspension of all privileges and benefits attached to office?

Equivalent Citation:(2014)13 SCC 622
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
C.A. No. 5523 of 2013 (@ SLP(C) No. 9338 of 2012)
Decided On: 17.07.2013
Appellants: State of Punjab
Vs.
Respondent: Jaswant Singh Kanwar
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:H.L. Dattu and Dipak Misra, JJ.
To analyze the above proposition, the dictionary meaning of suspension is required to be set out. The term 'Suspend' would mean 'to debar usually, for a time, from any privilege, the execution of an office or from the enjoyment of an income'. It is temporary deprivation of office or privilege. By reason of suspension, the powers, functions and privileges remain in abeyance but one continues to be subjected to the same discipline and penalties and to the same authorities'. The above definition makes it clear that during the period of suspension, all the privileges and benefits attached to the office is temporarily suspended unless the period of suspension is considered as the period spent on duty.



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Monday, 14 April 2014

Benefit of three increments should be granted to those Judicial Officers who completes LL.M. course after joining service



 The above-noticed plea, in our considered view, is wholly unjustified. Firstly, Shetty Commission has nowhere recommended that three advance increments are not to be granted to those Officers who acquire higher qualification while in service. The phrase “selected candidates…. having higher qualification” does not and cannot mean that if higher qualification is acquired by the selected candidates after their appointment, it would not improve their efficiency with better knowledge of Law. Secondly, the Judicial Officers having Postgraduate Degree in Law before appointment and those who acquire such Degree after joining the service, constitute one homogenous class and the artificial classification to discriminate against the latter category of Officers does not satisfy the test of equality within the meaning of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Thirdly, the classification professed in the case of Judicial Officers contradicts the State when confronted with the other services like Junior Engineers to whom benefit of advance increments, on acquisition of higher qualification ‘during service’, has been expressly granted vide circular dated 30.08.2011 (Annexure P14).
(20). For the reasons afore-stated, we allow this writ petition and quash the impugned circular dated 19.05.2011 (Annexure P6) to the extent it denies the benefit of three increments to those Judicial Officers who have acquired/acquire higher qualification of LL.M. after joining the service. We further direct that :-
i. the benefit of three additional increments shall be admissible to the petitioners as well as other similarly placed Judicial Officers;
ii. the only permissible distinction shall be that the Judicial Officers who acquire LL.M. Degree before joining the service shall be entitled to additional increments from the date of joining the service, while those who have acquired/acquire the same after joining the service shall be entitled to these increments from the date of acquisition of the higher qualification of LL.M.;

iii. the three increments granted to the Judicial Officers on acquisition of LL.M. Degree shall be treated as ‘additional increments’ in the same manner as has been directed by this Court in Priya Sood’s case (Punjab matter);

PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT

Virender Parshad and Others Vs. State of Haryana and Others



Judge : SURYA KANT & R.P. NAGRATH
Decided On : Aug-02-2012
Case Number : CWP No.15883 of 2011 (O&M)
Citation: 2013(2)SCT728(P&H)

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