The use of the phrase “until the contrary is proved” in Section
118 of the Act and use of the words “unless the contrary is
proved” in Section 139 of the Act read with definitions of “may
presume” and “shall presume” as given in Section 4 of the
Evidence Act, makes it at once clear that presumptions to be
raised under both the provisions are rebuttable. When a
presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on
whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact
presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and
reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed,
the purpose of the presumption is over.
20. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two
options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not
exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the
non-existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a
prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt
existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not
expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is
expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may
adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was
not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or
liability to be discharged by him. However, the court need not
insist in every case that the accused should disprove the nonexistence
of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence
because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible
nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of
the passing of the consideration and existence of debt,
apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused.
Something which is probable has to be brought on record for
getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To
disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record
such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the
court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not
exist or their non-existence was so probable that a prudent man
would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea
that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to
prove that the note in question was not supported by
consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the
accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the
circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may
likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also
rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in
Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions
arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.” [underlining
added].
18. In the present case, by examining himself as PW-1, the
complainant has discharged the initial burden cast upon him
that the cheques were issued for the rice bags purchased on
credit. With the examination of PW-1, the statutory
presumption under Section 139 of the Act arises that the
cheques were issued by the respondent-accused for the
discharge of any debt or other liability in whole or in part. The
courts below disbelieved the evidence of the complainant on
the ground that there are no averments in the complaint that
the commodities were sold for cash and that the rice bags were
sold on credit and the cheques were issued for the goods sold
on credit. Though the complaint contains no specific
averments that the cheques were issued for the purchase
made on credit, in his evidence, PW-1 clearly stated that the
cheques were issued for the commodities purchased on credit.
The courts below erred in brushing aside the evidence of PW-1
on the ground that there were no averments in the complaint as
to the purchases made by cash and purchase. The courts
below also erred in not raising the statutory presumption under
Section 139 of the Act that the complainant received the
cheques to discharge the debt or other liability in whole or in
part.
19. It is for the respondent-accused to adduce evidence to
prove that the cheques were not supported by consideration
and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him.
The receipts-Ex.-22/C (colly) relied upon by the respondentaccused
do not create doubt about the purchases made on
credit and the existence of a legally enforceable debt for which
the cheques were issued. The courts below erred in saying
that by the receipts-Ex.22/C (colly), the respondent-accused
has rebutted the statutory presumption raised under Section
139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The oral and the
documentary evidence adduced by the complainant are
sufficient to prove that it was a legally enforceable debt and that
the cheques were issued to discharge the legally enforceable
debt. With the evidence adduced by the complainant, the
courts below ought to have raised the presumption under
Section 139 of the Act. The evidence adduced by the
respondent-accused is not sufficient to rebut the presumption
raised under Section 139 of the Act. The defence of the
respondent that though he made payment for the
commodities/rice bags, the blank cheques were not returned by
the appellant-complainant is quite unbelievable and
unacceptable. The impugned judgment of the High Court
cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.61-62 OF 2011
M/S SHREE DANESHWARI TRADERS Vs SANJAY JAIN AND ANOTHER
R . BANUMATHI, J.
Dated:August 21, 2019.
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