Showing posts with label surety. Show all posts
Showing posts with label surety. Show all posts

Friday, 30 December 2022

Under which circumstances the court can accept one personal bond and two surety for several cases against accused?

 This bail application has been filed by the applicant to modify the conditions of bail imposed by learned Court below in Case Crime No. 246 of 2018 (State v. Rizwan alias Atta), Police Station G.R.P., Kanpur Nagar and direct the Court below to accept one personal bond from applicant and two sureties in all for all eleven cases in view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No (s). 8914-8915 of 2015 (Hani Nishad @ Mohammad Imran @ Vikky v. State of Uttar Pradesh). {Para 2}

3. Contention has been raised that in this case, the applicant is involved in as many as 11 criminal cases of the same district i.e. Kanpur Nagar under various case crime numbers and he has been admitted to bail in each of the eleven criminal cases. Now the problem is that the applicant, due to poverty and insufficiency of means, is unable to furnish 22 sureties for all the 11 cases. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in order to secure the ends of justice and to protect the legal rights of the applicant, who is already on bail in all the 11 cases be permitted to furnish one personal bond and two sureties, which may be treated personal bond and surety bonds for all 11 cases against the applicant-accused, in view of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court as mentioned above.


4. In support of his submission, learned Counsel for the applicant has engaged attention of this Court to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court, copy whereof is Annexure No. 12 to the affidavit filed in support of this bail application, wherein, in a number of cases namely - 31 criminal cases against one applicant-accused, the Hon'ble Apex Court had issued direction to execute one personal bond and two sureties which would hold good for all 31 cases.

6. Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case as well as upon perusal of the aforesaid citation relied on by the applicant, it is directed that let the applicant be allowed to execute one personal bond and two sureties to the satisfaction of the Court concerned, which would hold good for all 11 cases concerned against the present applicant.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Cr. Misc. Bail Application No. 11380 of 2019

Decided On: 15.03.2019

 Rizwan  Vs.  State of U.P.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Arvind Kumar Mishra-I, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1678/2019

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Supreme Court: The court can accept one common surety for several cases of the accused if he is unable to provide separate sureties due to poverty

 The petitioner was directed to execute personal bond of Rs. 30,000/- in each case.

However, by the impugned order, the High Court has modified the conditions of bail imposed by the Trial Court in the instant cases by directing the Trial Court to accept one common surety for all the cases and one surety each for the 31 cases.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that even though the Court has granted bail to the petitioner, the petitioner is unable to execute the bail bonds because of the onerous conditions of bail imposed particularly the condition of producing 31 sureties.

Considering the submissions, the impugned order is modified to the extent that the petitioner shall execute a personal bond for Rs. 30,000/- (Rupees Thirty thousand only) and the same bond shall hold good for all 31 cases. There shall be two sureties who shall execute the bond for Rs. 30,000/- which bond shall hold good for all the 31 cases. It is clarified that the personal bond so executed by the Petitioner and the bond so executed by the two sureties shall hold good for all the 31 cases.

Supreme Court - Daily Orders
Hani Nishad @ Mohammad Imran @ ... vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh on 29 October, 2018
          
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Tuesday, 25 May 2021

Whether liability of the Personal guarantor for Corporate debt will extinguish on approval of the Insolvency resolution plan?

  All creditors and other classes of claimants, including financial and operational creditors, those entitled to statutory dues, workers, etc., who participate in the resolution process, are heard and those in relation to whom the CoC accepts or rejects pleas, are entitled to vent their grievances before the NCLT. After considering their submissions and objections, the resolution plan is accepted and approved. This results in finality as to the claims of creditors, and others, from the company (i.e. the company which undergoes the insolvency process). The question which the petitioners urge is that in view of this finality, their liabilities would be extinguished; they rely on Sections 128, 133 and 140 of the Contract Act to urge that creditors cannot therefore, proceed against them separately. {Para 128}

129. In Vijay Kumar Jain v. Standard Chartered Bank67, this court, while dealing with the right of erstwhile directors participating in meetings of Committee of Creditors observed that:

“we find that Section 31(1) of the Code would make it clear that such members of the erstwhile Board of Directors, who are often guarantors, are vitally interested in a resolution plan as such resolution plan then binds them. Such plan may scale down the debt of the principal debtor, resulting in scaling down the debt of the guarantor as well, or it may not. The resolution plan may also scale down certain debts and not others, leaving guarantors of the latter kind of debts exposed for the entire amount of the debt. The regulations also make it clear that these persons are vitally interested in resolution plans as they affect them”

130. The rationale for allowing directors to participate in meetings of the CoC is that the directors' liability as personal guarantors persists against the creditors and an approved resolution plan can only lead to a revision of amount or exposure for the entire amount. Any recourse under Section 133 of the Contract Act to discharge the liability of the surety on account of variance in terms of the contract, without her or his consent, stands negated by this court, in V. Ramakrishnan where it was observed that the language of Section 31 makes it clear that the approved plan is binding on the guarantor, to avoid any attempt to escape liability under the provisions of the Contract Act. It was observed that:

“25. Section 31(1), in fact, makes it clear that the guarantor cannot escape payment as the resolution plan, which has been approved, may well include provisions as to payments to be made by such guarantor.…”

131. And further that:

“26.1 Section 14 refers only to debts due by corporate debtors, who are limited liability companies, and it is clear that in the vast majority of cases, personal guarantees are given by Directors who are in management of the companies. The object of the Code is not to allow such guarantors to escape from an independent and co-extensive liability to pay off the entire outstanding debt, which is why Section 14 is not applied to them. However, insofar as firms and individuals are concerned, guarantees are given in respect of individual debts by persons who have unlimited liability to pay them. And such guarantors may be complete strangers to the debtor — often it could be a personal friend. It is for this reason that the moratorium mentioned in Section 101 would cover such persons, as such moratorium is in relation to the debt and not the debtor.”

132. In Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel (I) Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta68 (the “Essar Steel case”) this court refused to interfere with proceedings initiated to enforce personal guarantees by financial creditors; it was observed as follows:

“106. Following this judgment in V. Ramakrishnan case [SBI v. V. Ramakrishnan, (2018) 17 SCC 394], it is difficult to accept Shri Rohatgi's argument that that part of the resolution plan which states that the claims of the guarantor on account of subrogation shall be extinguished, cannot be applied to the guarantees furnished by the erstwhile Directors of the corporate debtor. So far as the present case is concerned, we hasten to add that we are saying nothing which may affect the pending litigation on account of invocation of these guarantees. However, NCLAT judgment being contrary to Section 31(1) of the Code and this Court's judgment in V. Ramakrishnan case [SBI v. V. Ramakrishnan, (2018) 17 SCC 394], is set aside.”

133. It is therefore, clear that the sanction of a resolution plan and finality imparted to it by Section 31 does not per se operate as a discharge of the guarantor's liability. As to the nature and extent of the liability, much would depend on the terms of the guarantee itself. However, this court has indicated, time and again, that an involuntary act of the principal debtor leading to loss of security, would not absolve a guarantor of its liability. In Maharashtra State Electricity Board (supra) the liability of the guarantor (in a case where liability of the principal debtor was discharged under the insolvency law or the company law), was considered. It was held that in view of the unequivocal guarantee, such liability of the guarantor continues and the creditor can realize the same from the guarantor in view of the language of Section 128 of the Contract Act as there is no discharge under Section 134 of that Act. This court observed as follows:

 Under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, the liability of the surety is coextensive with that of the principal debtor unless it is otherwise provided by the contract. A surety is no doubt discharged under Section 134 of the Indian Contract Act by any contract between the creditor and the principal debtor by which the principal debtor is released or by any act or omission of the creditor, the legal consequence of which is the discharge of the principal debtor. But a discharge which the principal debtor may secure by operation of law in bankruptcy (or in liquidation proceedings in the case of a company) does not absolve the surety of his liability (see Jagannath Ganeshram Agarwala v. Shivnarayan Bhagirath [AIR 1940 Bom 247; see also In re Fitzgeorge Ex parte Robson [[1905] 1 K.B. 462]).”


136. In view of the above discussion, it is held that approval of a resolution plan does not ipso facto discharge a personal guarantor (of a corporate debtor) of her or his liabilities under the contract of guarantee. As held by this court, the release or discharge of a principal borrower from the debt owed by it to its creditor, by an involuntary process, i.e. by operation of law, or due to liquidation or insolvency proceeding, does not absolve the surety/guarantor of his or her liability, which arises out of an independent contract.

137. For the foregoing reasons, it is held that the impugned notification is legal and valid. It is also held that approval of a resolution plan relating to a corporate debtor does not operate so as to discharge the liabilities of personal guarantors (to corporate debtors). The writ petitions, transferred cases and transfer petitions are accordingly dismissed in the above terms, without order on costs.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before L. Nageswara Rao and S. Ravindra Bhat, JJ.)

Transferred Case (Civil) No. 245/2020


Lalit Kumar Jain  Vs Union of India 

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Saturday, 25 July 2020

Madras High court guidelines on furnishing of surety for releasing accused on bail

1) Reading Sections 440, 441 and 445 Cr.P.C. together, it is clear that straightaway a Court cannot direct the accused to deposit cash security. First of all, the Court has to direct execution of bail bond by the sureties in case if the release is not on his own bond. Only in lieu of that deposit of cash security could be directed (see Section 445 Cr.P.C.).{Para 18}

19. As already stated even if the cash security is ordered under Section 445 Cr.P.C., the Court must pay regard to the circumstances of the case and the amount should not be excessive.

2)  The Courts demanding production of V.A.O. certificate, Residence certificate, Solvency Certificate or Tahsildar Certificate are not mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure. These are all creations and inventions of certain Courts. It is clear that these are all not out of any judicial thinking. It is out of an useless thinking curbing the liberty of the individual.

62. Some Courts insists that the surety should be a Government servant or a public servant or a person permanently employed in a reputed concern. This is not at all mentioned in the Code of Criminal Procedure. These are all inventions not by the Code but by some courts. It cannot be said that all Government servants, public servants are Buddas. There are many Government servants who are cheats. In many cases under Section 420 I.P.C., many Government servants are figuring as accused.



64. Chapter 33 of the Code does not say that the surety should be a member of the family or a blood relative. Court cannot insist that the sureties should be local surety. Suppose if the accused belongs to a different district, different State or even a foreigner or the accused is a business man or working here such as Nepalies, Biharies, etc. who will not have local sureties, their relatives are also in Bihar etc., it will be difficult for them to secure local sureties.

3)  Court should be satisfied as to the genuineness, identity of the surety and his residential address. It is equally applies to the accused. For this purpose, the Court can accept copy of anyone of the following documents after verification.

1. Passport

2. Ration Card

3. PAN card

4. Driving license

5. Voter's ID

6. Aadhaar Card

7. Photo ID issued by a recognised Educational Institution

8. Photo credit card

9. Kissan Photo Passbook

10. Pensioner's Photo card

11. Freedom fighter photo card

12. Identity Certificate with photo issued by a Gazetted officer or Tahsildar

13. Address card with photo issued by the Postal Department

14. Disability ID card or handicapped medical certificate issued by the Government

15. NREGS Job Card

16. CGHS/ECHS/State Government/ESIC Medical Card

17. Marriage Certificate issued by the Government

18. Post Office Statement or Passbook

19. Water Bill

20. Electricity Bill

21. Property Tax Receipt

22. Landline Telephone Bill

23. Credit Card Statement

24. Income-tax assessment order

25. Arms License

26. Certificate of Address issued by the head, Village Panchayat or an equivalent authority

27. Registered Lease/Sale/Rent Agreement

28. Caste and Domicile Certificate that has photo issued by the State Government

29. Gas Connection Bill

30. Insurance Policy

74. From the above analysis, we come to the conclusion that when the accused executes bail bond, when the surety executes surety bond, Court cannot insist production of property documents, surety need not be a Government servant or a blood relative or a local surety.
(viii) One person can be a surety for more than one accused.

(ix) In the first instance, cash surety cannot be insisted upon.

(x) When the accused is not in a position to produce personal surety and offers cash surety, it can be accepted.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Crl. M.P. No. 3888 of 2017 in Crl. O.P. No. 2891 of 2017

Decided On: 24.04.2017

 Sagayam  Vs.  State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
P. Devadass, J.
Citation:  : MANU/TN/1519/2017
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Sunday, 19 July 2020

Whether the court can hold surety liable for the dishonour of cheque if the complainant has failed to prove that accused had issued cheque toward liability of principal debtor?

Complainant in cross-examination further disclosed that he received the cheque Ex. 15 from Srushti Financer. However, there is no material on record nor it is the case of the complainant that any liability of Rs. 14,50,000 was existing against Srushti Financer and same is accepted by the accused and issued cheque Ex. 15 for discharging liability of Srushti Financer. No any document is placed on record by complainant to show any relation of the accused in respect of any loan transaction between the complainant and Srushti Financer. It is also not case of the complainant that accused accepted the liability of Srushti Financer and issued the cheque. No any document creating the liability of the accused is produced on record. If the cheque is drawn by the accused without accepting liability of another in writing, it does not attract Section 138 of N.I.Act. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the case of Hiten Sagar & Anr. v. IMC Ltd. & Anr. MANU/MH/0276/2001 : 2001 (3) CCC 571 (Bom.) : 2001 Cri. LJ 4311 wherein this Court has held that:

If the cheque drawn for discharge of liability of another person without creating any document, it does not come under section 138 of N.I.Act.

6. So, in view of the above reason, it is clear that on the date of cheque Ex. 15, no any evidence liability was existing against the accused and no any evidence that liability on the date of cheque was existing against the Srushti Financer and same was accepted by the accused and hence he issued the cheque.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Criminal Application No. 3661 of 2007

Decided On: 24.04.2008

 Nandkishore Mehra  Vs.  Sudhir Transport Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
V.K. Tahilramani, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/1616/2008
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Monday, 28 October 2019

How to ascertain limitation for enforcing liability against surety?

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri and other MANU/SC/2032/2006 : 2006 (11) SCC 506 has considered the meaning of the phrase "on demand" and held that when a contract of guarantee is clear that the guarantor's liability would arise only when the demand is made, the right to sue to the creditor accrues only when a demand for payment is made by the creditor and is refused by the guarantors. When a demand is made requiring payment within a stipulated period, the breach occurs or the right to sue accrues, if payment is not made within the stipulated period. If while making the demand for payment, no period is stipulated within which the payment should be made, the breach occurs or the right to sue accrues when the demand is served on the guarantor. The Hon'ble Apex Court has concluded thus:

"We have to however enter a caveat here. When the demand is made by the creditor on the guarantor, under a guarantee which requires a demand, as a condition precedent for the liability of the guarantor, such demand should be for payment of a sum which is legally due unrecoverable from the principal debtor. If the debt had already become time-barred against the principal debtor, the question of creditor demanding payment thereafter, for the first time, against the guarantor would not arise. When the demand is made against the guarantor, if the claim is a live claim (that is, a claim which is not barred) against the principal debtor, limitation in respect of the guarantor will run from the date of such demand and refusal/non-compliance. Where guarantor becomes liable in pursuance of demand validly made in time, the creditor can sue the guarantor within 3 years, even if the claim against the principal debtor gets subsequently time barred'".
16. It is undisputed that in this case the appellant made a demand on the respondents vide its legal notice dated 12.7.1997 calling upon the respondents, including the respondent No. 2, 4 and 5, to pay the amounts due. Though the legal notice dated 12.7.1997 and the acknowledgements as regards service of such notice on the respondents are not marked as exhibits by the appellant, the witness - P.W. 1, has categorically stated in his evidence-in-chief (paragraph 26) that office copy of the legal notice dated 12.7.1997 and the postal acknowledgement signed by respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 for receipt of the legal notice were part of the Court's record, and similarly, the un-served registered postal envelopes in respect of respondent Nos. 3 and 5 were also part of the court records. The respondents, more specifically respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 5, have disputed neither the issuance of the legal notice dated 12.7.1997 nor the receipt of the same.

17. As declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Syndicate Bank vs. Channaveerappa Beleri and other, the limitation for the creditor to sue a guarantor commences, where the period is stipulated in the demand, from the date of refusal to pay or from the date of stipulated for payment; in the event no time stipulated in the demand, from the date of receipt of the demand. In view of the undisputed fact that the appellant caused legal notice dated 12.7.1997 and the same were either received or refused by the respondents, the significant date would be 12.7.1997. The appellant had to file the petition under section 31(1)(aa) of the Act, in any event, within 3 years from this date. It's been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Financial Corporation vs. Ashok K Agarwal and Others MANU/SC/1724/2006 : AIR 2006 SC 1584 that the limitation for filing the petition under section 31 of the Act would be 3 years as provided under article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The present petition is filed under section 31(1)(aa) of the Act on 11.7.2000. As such, the petition is filed by the appellant within 3 years from 12.7.1997.

18. Further, it is nobody's case that the State Financial Corporation's claim against the respondent No. 6 (the principal borrower-debtor) was time barred, and in fact, it cannot be because admittedly the sale of the assets of the respondent No. 2, pursuant to the orders of the Company Court, was in the year 2008 i.e., after the initiation of the present proceedings. The learned District Judge has not considered the aforesaid circumstances and has concluded that the petition as against respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 5 had to be rejected as being time-barred because the appellant had filed the petition invoking the Deeds of Guarantee after a lapse of 15 years from the date these deeds were executed. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this court, the learned District Judge has erroneously concluded that the petition under section 31(1)(aa) of the Act was liable to be dismissed as against respondent Nos. 2, 4 and 5 on the ground that such petition is time-barred.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 4140 of 2010 (SFC)

Decided On: 25.02.2019

Karnataka State Industrial Investment and Development Corporation Limited Vs  G.C. Lohia and Ors.
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Monday, 1 June 2015

Whether surety who is defendant can obtain attachment before judgment and Injunction against principal debtor to protect his own interest?

In view of the aforesaid observations, and especially in view of the provisions of Order 38, Rule 5 read with sections 94(b) & (e) and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in order to protect the interest of the surety and in view of the peculiar circumstances of the facts in the present matter, I am of the opinion that the present applicant, who is the surety, is entitled to apply under Order 38, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure for attachment of the property of the principal debtor, i.e., the present non-applicant No. 1 before judgment, or even he can apply under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with sections 94 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to protect his interest and in the ends of justice.
Bombay High Court
Jugalkishore Rampratapji Rathi vs Brijmohan S/O Rampratapji Rathi ... on 10 November, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1994 (2) BomCR 537

Bench: S Mutalik


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Sunday, 22 June 2014

Whether An advocate can be prosecuted for impersonation of surety?


Looking at the offence alleged, it is found that cognizance has been taken under Sections 419, 468, 471/34, IPC. Section 419, IPC states about punishment for cheating by impersonation. Even if the allegation made in the charge-sheet is accepted to the effect that some person impersonated the surety, and signed the bail bond and the affidavit, which were identified by the petitioner No. 1 representing the accused as counsel, it cannot be said for a moment that he himself impersonated any one of the sureties. It transpires from the record that the case was looked after by the Advocate's Clerk, who after disclosure of the fact that bail bond executor has impersonated himself, immediately brought the said fact to the notice of the petitioner No. 1, who in turn filed a memo and affidavit bringing the said fact to the notice of the Court and as such, the Court has accepted the said affidavit and memo and allowed the accused Sanatan Patra to go on bail by executing fresh bail bond. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioners, who are the counsel for the accused persons, intentionally and knowing it fully well that the security was impersonated and identified him as genuine person in the bail bond. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, this Court has referred to the decision of the apex Court in Hiralal Jain v. Delhi Administration,MANU/SC/0134/1972 : AIR 1972 SC 2598, wherein an Advocate was engaged by some persons for identifying them as claimants in an application made on their behalf to claim certain land acquisition compensation amount and the advocate believing the statement of the claimants, as true, filed his vakalatnama agreeing to act on their behalf and there was no evidence to show prior knowledge on the part of the advocate that the claimants were not the real persons entitled to claim the amount and no concert between the former and the latter was brought on record and it was, therefore, held that there was no prima facie evidence to commit the advocate for offence under Sections 120B read with 419, 420, 511 and 467 read with 471, IPC.
6. Considering the aforesaid position of law as laid down by this Court as well as the apex Court, in the case at hand since there is no allegation that the petitioners have prior knowledge of impersonation and knowing it fully well that Manmath Nayak was not the real person, identified him in bail bond and the affidavit. Therefore, even if the allegations made in the FIR are fully correct, yet, there is no prima facie material against the petitioners to connect them with the offence under Sections 419, IPC.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA
CRLMC No. 914 of 2003
Decided On: 20.09.2013
Appellants: Asit Kumar Behera and Another
Vs.
Respondent: State of Orissa
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:B.R. Sarangi, J.

Citation: 116(2013)CLT1120, 2013(II)OLR827,2014(2) crimes433 orissa
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Sunday, 17 February 2013

Bombay High court :Judges should not insist for possession of immovable property by sureties in surety bonds of small amounts


Learned  Magistrate  or
the  Sessions  Judge  may  also  note  that  the
Criminal  Manual,  Chapter-I,  prescribes  that
                                                                                                       
production  of  solvency  certificate  from  the
Revenue Authorities is not always essential and
may be insisted upon only in cases of doubt and
cases involving large sums. Rupees 20,000/- is
not  a  large  sum.  It  also  provides  that
insistence  upon  the  possession  of  immovable
property by sureties in bonds of small amounts
not  exceeding  `15,000/-  would  also  cause
serious  inconvenience.  So  upto  `15,000/-  the
surety  need  not  even  have  any  immovable
property.  The  learned  Magistrate  and  the
Sessions  Judge  would  consider  this  while
dealing with similar situation in future.


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE – CRIMINAL
APPLICATION NO.1438 OF 2012
Khalil Ahmed Shaikh Vs. The State of Maharashtra 

     CORAM: R.C. CHAVAN, J.
     
DATED: JANUARY 09, 2013

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