Whether a registered gift deed executed in favour of live in partner is void as it is for immoral consideration?

In our view, the whole approach of the trial Court and

First Appellate Court in this third round is completely

fallacious. If one may say the reasoning is based only on a

social belief that the man staying with a woman, who is not his

wife and giving his property to her is something immoral and

improper and she should not be the beneficiary of gift deed

even if the donor stands by the gift deed.

If one may say, even the belief of the original

plaintiffs and now the appellants before us is predicated on

this prejudice that they have an inherent right to get the

benefit of the properties as being the brothers of the

deceased and the lady who stayed with him, wife or not, is not

entitled for the same. It is in these circumstances that one

of the issues framed originally was also whether Pritam Kaur

enjoyed the status of a wife or not. In our view, if the donor

is making a gift out of his own free will and volition and is

the exclusive owner of the properties, it is nobody’s concern

as to whom he gives the properties to.

What is most material is that all the Courts have found

(i.e. three concurrent findings) that they are not ancestral

properties. This plea was really raised as an alternative in

the second round having failed to establish the reversionary

rights in the first round. That should have been the end of

the matter. The gift deed is a registered gift deed. The

common written statement filed by Gian Singh and Pritam Kaur

affirmed to the execution of the gift deed. The fact that they

did not step into the witness box is an incidence of Gian

Singh passing away and much later Pritam Kaur also having

passed away. That does not take the validity of the gift deed.

We are really not concerned with the moralistic issue whether

Pritam Kaur was actually married to Gian Singh as the second

wife or was she just living with him. There was undoubtedly

companionship and Gian Singh in his wisdom deemed it

appropriate to handover the properties through registered gift

deed to Pritam Kaur. In the written statement he did say that

she is his wife of 35 years’ standing.

We would in the end say that it is time that the Courts

get out of this mindset, or possibly may have got out of this

mindset by now on passing value judgments on relationships

between parties in determining either a testamentary or nontestamentary disposition so long as the document executed is

found to be validly executed. Some kind of a male chauvinistic

approach appears to have coloured judgments passed by the

trial Court and the First Appellate Court which is of course a

reflection of the mindset of the appellants before us.

We, thus, dismiss the appeal with costs and bring this

half decade of litigation to an end.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No.1731/2009

MOHINDER SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS. Vs MAL SINGH (D) THR. LRS. & ORS.

Dated: 09th MARCH, 2022

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Whether live in partner can seek maintenance under domestic violence Act?

In fact, under the provisions of the DVC Act, 2005 the victim i.e. estranged wife or live-in-partner would be entitled to more relief than what is contemplated Under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, namely, to a shared household also.

4. The questions referred to us by the Referral Order were formulated on the basis of the decisions of this court rendered in Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Anr. MANU/SC/0579/1988 : 1988 (1) R.C.R. (Criminal) 322 : (1988) 1 SCC 530 and Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU/SC/0193/2005 : 2005 (2) R.C.R. (Criminal) 190 : (2005) 3 SCC 636 which were rendered prior to the coming into force of the DVC Act, 2005. In view of what has been stated herein before, it is, therefore, our considered view that the questions referred would not require any answer. We, therefore, decline to answer the said questions. The Appellant is left with the remedy of approaching the appropriate Forum under the provisions of the DVC Act, 2005, if so advised. If in the event the Appellant moves the appropriate Forum under the provisions of the DVC Act, 2005, we would request the said Forum to decide the matter as expeditiously as possible.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1656 of 2015

Decided On: 30.10.2018

 Lalita Toppo Vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Ranjan Gogoi, C.J.I., U.U. Lalit and K.M. Joseph, JJ.

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Whether fiancé or live-in-partner of victim can file appeal against acquittal of accused?

The Court further notes that this understanding of “victim” is consistent with

the 1985 United Nations Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of

Crime and Abuse of Power, which was the basis of the 154th Law Commission‟s

report. That Declaration stipulates that “the term "victim" also includes, where

appropriate, the immediate family or dependants of the direct victim.” The term

“where appropriate” indicates that the test is proximity-dependent, and is to apply

on a case-to-case basis.

25. The European Union Council Framework Decision of 15 March 2001, on the

standing of victims, defines “victim” to mean “a natural person who has suffered

harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering or economic loss,

directly caused by acts or omissions that are in violation of the criminal law of a

Member State.” The 2001 Decision was replaced by a Directive in 2012, according

to which “victim” was defined as “a natural person who has suffered harm,

including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was directly

caused by a criminal offence”, as well as “family members of a person whose death

was directly caused by a criminal offence and who have suffered harm as a result of

that person's death.” “Family members”, in turn, were defined to include “the

spouse, the person who is living with the victim in a committed intimate

relationship, in a joint household and on a stable and continuous basis, the relatives

in direct line, the siblings and the dependants of the victim.”

26. Apart from the fact that the Directive‟s extension to family members is based

upon proximity, the crucial difference between the European Union Council

Framework Decision and Directive on the one hand, and S. 2(wa) on the other, is

the additional use of the word “directly”, to qualify harm and injury. The insertion

of the word “directly” was seen by the High Court of England and Wales as an

attempt to forge a consensus for minimum standards for victims‟ rights across EU,

and to achieve this by “limit[ing] causality.” (R (on the Application of Privacy

International v. The Commissioner for HM Revenue & Customs [2014] EWHC

1475 (Admin) (12 May 2014). This suggests that in ordinary legal discourse,

injuries/harm may be direct or indirect, but in the absence of a specific word or

phrase narrowing their scope down to only the direct, it is the context of the

legislation that must determine the scope of “victim”, in the context of proximity of

injury. 

27. Similarly, the South Australia Victims of Crime Act, 2001 takes care to

specifically distinguish “immediate victims” – i.e., a person who suffers physical

injury as a result of the commission of an offence, psychological injury as a result of

being directly involved in the circumstances of the offence, or – if the offence is

committed against a person who dies – a member of the “immediate family” of the

deceased – from a “victim” simpliciter, which includes any person who “suffers

harm as a result of the commission of the offence.”

28. On the other hand, the Crime Victims Rights Act 18 U.S.C. § 3771

(“CVRA”) conferred specific roles to crime victims in the criminal justice system.

Similarly, the Criminal Code of Canada defines victim in Section 722 (4) which

nuances out the different possibilities in a manner somewhat similar to Section

2(wa). It inter alia visualizes that when the person suffering injury dies, “ill or

otherwise incapable of making a statement …includes the spouse or common law

partner or any relative of that person, anyone who has in law or fact the custody of

that person or is responsible for the care or support of that person or any dependent

of that person”. R v Emard – 1999 BCJ No. 463 (BCSC) accepts that siblings can

be victims. Canadian courts have ruled that even fiancés, friends, co-employees and

even by-standers (R v W (R) OTR 537 (SC) can be termed victims. American and

Canadian statutes have empowered victims in sentencing proceedings, to intervene

and make submissions. The Court notes that the drafters of the 2008 amendment did

not draw any distinction as in South Australia between “immediate victims” and a

“victim” simpliciter. Consequently, “victim” can possibly also comprehend those

who suffer proximate physical or emotional harm such as fiancés, live-in partners,etc.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

Judgment pronounced on: 28.05.2015

CRL.A.1415/2012

RAM PHAL .V STATE & ORS.

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Whether live in partner is entitled to get maintenance U/S 125 of CRPC?

As regards maintenance that has been awarded to respondent No. 1, the Family Court has to determine whether or not the relationship was akin to a marriage or not. It has been argued before this Court that respondent No. 1 herein was aware of the fact that the petitioner was a married man and hence was legally not competent to enter into a matrimony, as has been alleged by the respondent herein. This Court cannot lose sight of the fact that twins were born out of this relationship which would be of some indication that the couple had gone for this relationship to give it some permanence and that can entitle respondent No. 1 to claim interim maintenance, based on the evidence added. However, since all these matters are matter of evidence and the Family Court is seized of it, it would be in the interest of justice to allow the final orders to be passed, while reducing the amount of maintenance that has been awarded to respondent No. 1 to sum of Rs. 10,000/-, so that she is in a position to maintain herself. The sum of Rs. 10,000 is being awarded in order to tide over the immediate difficulty that respondent No. 1 is put to on account of the fact that the petitioner is no longer supporting her financially. Section 125 Cr.P.C was incorporated in order to avoid vagrancy and destitution for a wife/minor children/old age parents, and the same has now been extended by judicial interpretation to partners of a live-in relationship. But the Apex court has also opined that the nature of the live in relationship has to be looked into while determining the entitlement.

In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh

(Before Jaishree Thakur, J.)

Ajay Bhardwaj 

v.

Jyotsna and others 

Crl. Revision No. (F) 166 of 2015 (O&M)

Decided on November 23, 2016

Citation: 2016 SCC ONLINE P&H9707

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Whether live in partner is entitled to get protection if one of partner has subsisting marriage?

Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P.2 it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in Civil Law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations.”

6. In the facts of the case before the Supreme Court the appellant (lady) had entered into the relationship knowing fully well that the man is married and therefore the Court declined to grant her any relief holding that the relationship would not be a relationship in the nature of marriage.

7. The ratio of Indra Sharma squarely applies on the facts of the present case for the reason it is admitted and pleaded in the writ petition that the second petitioner entered into a relationship with the first petitioner who is married and her marriage has not been dissolved by any competent court as on date, therefore, such a relationship cannot be granted any protection.

In the High Court of Allahabad

(Before Suneet Kumar, J.)

Kusum and Another 

v.

State of U.P. and 3 Others 

Citation: 2016 SCC OnLine All 988

Writ - C No. - 53503 of 2016

Decided on November 9, 2016

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