Showing posts with label obscenity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label obscenity. Show all posts

Tuesday, 25 March 2025

Supreme Court: What are essential ingredients of offence punishable U/S 294 of IPC?

 However, what is important to observe is that whenever any application is filed by the complainant before the Court of Judicial Magistrate seeking police investigation Under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it is the duty of the concerned Magistrate to apply his mind for the purpose of ascertaining whether the allegations levelled in the complaint constitute any cognizable offence or not. In other words, the Magistrate may not undertake the exercise to ascertain whether the complaint is false or otherwise, however, the Magistrate is obliged before he proceeds to pass an order for police investigation to closely consider whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are borne out on plain reading of the complaint. {Para 11}


12. In the case on hand, it appears that the Magistrate passed an order directing police investigation mechanically and without ascertaining whether the allegations levelled disclose commission of any offence or not.


13. It is the case of the complainant that the Appellant herein committed offence punishable Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code. The Magistrate very promptly accepted this contention without ascertaining if the necessary ingredients required to constitute the offence were disclosed in the complaint or not. In our view, even if all the allegations as levelled in the complaint are believed to be true, none of the ingredients to constitute the offence punishable Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code could be said to be borne out.


14. In so far as Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, this Court in N.S. Madhanagopal and Anr. v. K. Lalitha reported in MANU/SC/1805/2022 : (2022) 17 SCC 818 has explained the true purport and scope of Section 294. We quote the relevant observations as under:


6. Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code talks about the obscene acts and songs. Section 294 Indian Penal Code as a whole reads thus:


294. Obscene acts and songs.-Whoever, to the annoyance of others-


(a) does any obscene act in any public place, or


(b) sings, recites or utters any obscene songs, ballad or words, in or near any public place, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine, or with both.


7. It is to be noted that the test of obscenity Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. The following passage from the judgment authored by K.K. Mathew, J. (as his Lordship then was) reported in P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko [P.T. Chacko v. Nainan Chacko,   MANU/KE/0284/1967 : 1967 KLT 799] explains as follows: (SCC OnLine Ker paras 5-6)


5. The only point argued was that the 1st Accused has not committed an offence punishable Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code, by uttering the words above-mentioned. The courts below have held that the words uttered were obscene and the utterance caused annoyance to the public. I am not inclined to take this view. In R. v. Hicklin [R. v. Hicklin, (1868) LR 3 QB 360], QB at p. 371 Cockburn, C.J. Laid down the test of "obscenity" in these words: (QB p. 371) '... the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences....'


6. This test has been uniformly followed in India. The Supreme Court has accepted the correctness of the test in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra [Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra,   MANU/SC/0080/1964 : 1964:INSC:171 : AIR 1965 SC 881]. In Roth v. United States [Roth v. United States, 1957 SCC OnLine US SC 106: MANU/USSC/0157/1957 : 1 L Ed 2d 1498 : 354 US 476 (1957)], Chief Justice Warren said that the test of "obscenity" is the 'substantial tendency to corrupt by arousing lustful desires'. Mr. Justice Harlan observed that in order to be "obscene" the matter must "tend to sexually impure thoughts". I do not think that the words uttered in this case have such a tendency. It may be that the words are defamatory of the complainant, but I do not think that the words are "obscene" and the utterance would constitute an offence punishable Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code.


8. It has to be noted that in the instance case, the absence of words which will involve some lascivious elements arousing sexual thoughts or feelings or words cannot attract the offence Under Section 294(b). None of the records disclose the alleged words used by the Accused. It may not be the requirement of law to reproduce in all cases the entire obscene words if it is lengthy, but in the instant case, there is hardly anything on record. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by itself cannot attract an offence Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code.


9. To prove the offence Under Section 294 Indian Penal Code mere utterance of obscene words are not sufficient but there must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others, which is lacking in the case. No one has spoken about the obscene words, they felt annoyed and in the absence of legal evidence to show that the words uttered by the Appellant- Accused annoyed others, it cannot be said that the ingredients of the offence Under Section 294(b) Indian Penal Code is made out.


15. We fail to understand how the act of a police officer assaulting the complainant within public view or public as alleged would amount to an obscene act. Obscene act for the purpose of Section 294 has a particular meaning. Mere abusive, humiliating or defamatory words by themselves are not sufficient to attract the offence Under Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code.


16. Thus, in so far as Section 294 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, we are of the view that no case is made out to put the Appellant/Accused to trial.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 352/2020

Decided On: 16.01.2025

Om Prakash Ambadkar Vs. The State of Maharashtra and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0134/2025, 2025 INSC 139.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Saturday, 2 November 2024

From Hicklin to Community Standards: The Journey of Obscenity Law in India

 The Hicklin Test is a legal standard used to determine obscenity, originating from the English case R v. Hicklin in 1868. Under this test, material is considered obscene if it has the tendency to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences. This test was adopted by the Indian Supreme Court in various cases, notably in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra (1965), where the court upheld the conviction of a bookseller for selling Lady Chatterley’s Lover, citing that the book's content could corrupt readers.

Application of the Hicklin Test in Indian Context

1. Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra:

   - The Supreme Court applied the Hicklin Test to determine whether Lady Chatterley’s Lover was obscene under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The court ruled that the book's content could corrupt those who were likely to read it, thus justifying its classification as obscene.

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Balancing Act: Freedom of Expression and Film Censorship in K. A. Abbas v. Union of India

 In the landmark case K. A. Abbas v. Union of India, decided on September 24, 1970, the Supreme Court of India addressed significant issues surrounding freedom of speech and expression in relation to film censorship under the Cinematograph Act, 1952. The case arose when K. A. Abbas, a journalist and filmmaker, sought a 'U' certificate for his documentary film A Tale of Four Cities, which depicted stark contrasts between the lives of the affluent and the impoverished in major Indian cities. The Central Board of Film Censors denied this certificate unless certain scenes deemed inappropriate were removed, leading Abbas to challenge the constitutionality of prior censorship.

Case Background

Abbas's film included scenes from a red-light district, which the Censor Board found unsuitable for children. The appeal process involved recommendations for cuts, which Abbas argued violated his fundamental right to free expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. He contended that pre-censorship was inherently unconstitutional and that any restrictions on free speech must be reasonable and non-arbitrary.

Supreme Court Judgment
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Supreme Court: Films that merely glorify or encourage social evils are not permissible; however, those that condemn such evils should not be banned simply for depicting them

The guidelines aforementioned have been carefully drawn. They require the authorities concerned with film certification to be responsive to the values and standards of society and take note of social change. They are required to ensure that "artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed". The film must be "judged in its entirety from the point of view of its over-all impact". It must also be judged in the light of the period depicted and the contemporary standards of the people to whom it relates, but it must not deprave the morality of the audience. Clause 2 requires that human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity, that scenes degrading or denigrating women are not presented and scenes of sexual violence against women are avoided, but if such scenes are germane to the theme, they be reduced to a minimum and not particularised. {Para 25}

26. The guidelines are broad standards. They cannot be read as one would read a statute. Within the breadth of their parameters the certification authorities have discretion. The specific sub-clauses of Clause 2 of the guidelines cannot overweigh the sweep of Clause 1 and 3 and, indeed of Sub-clause (ix) of Clause (2). Where the theme is of social relevance, it must be allowed to prevail. Such a theme does not offend human sensibilities nor extol the degradation or denigration of women. It is to this end that Sub-clause (ix) of Clause 2 permits scenes of sexual violence against women, reduced to a minimum and without details, if relevant to the theme. What that minimum and lack of details should be is left to the good sense of the certification authorities, to the determined in the light of the relevance of the social theme of the film.

33. In sum, we should recognise the massage or a serious film and apply this test to the individual scenes thereof : do they advance the message ? If they do they should be left alone, with only the caution of an 'A' certificate, Adult Indian citizens as a whole may be relied upon to comprehend intelligently the message and react to it, not to the possible titillation of some particular scene.

34. A film that illustrates the consequences of a social evil necessarily must that social evil. The guidelines must be interpreted in that light. No film that extols the social evil or encourages it is permissible, but a film that carries the message that the social evil is evil cannot be made impermissible on the ground that it depicts the social evil. At the same time, the depiction must be just sufficient for the purpose of the film. The drawing of the line is best left to the sensibilities of the export Tribunal. The Tribunal is a multi-member body. It is comprised of persons who gauge public reactions to films and, except in cases of stark breach of guidelines, should be permitted to go about its task.

35. In the present case, apart from the Chairman, three members of the Tribunal were women. It is hardly to be supposed that three women would permit a film to be screened which denigrates women, insults Indian womanhood or is obscene or pornographic. It would appear from its order that the Tribunal took the view that it would do women some good to see the film.

36. We are of the opinion that the Tribunal had viewed the film in true perspective and had, in compliance with the requirements of the guidelines, granted to the film an "A" certificate subject to the conditions it stated. We think that the High Court ought not to have entertained the 1st respondent's writ petition impugning the grant of the certificate based as it was principally upon the slurs allegedly cast by the film on the Gujjar community. We find that the judgment under appeal does not take due note of the theme of the film and the fact that it condemns rape and the degradation of and violence upon women by showing their effect upon a village child, transforming her to a cruel dacoit obsessed with wreaking vengeance upon a society that has caused her so much psychological and physical hurt, an that the scenes of nudity and rape and the use of expletives, so far as the Tribunal had permitted them, were in aid of the theme and intended not to arouse prurient or lascivious thoughts but revulsion against the perpetrators and pity for the victim.

Headnote:
The recent judgment underscores the delicate balance between artistic expression and societal values in film censorship. It emphasizes that films depicting social evils must do so with the intent to condemn rather than glorify, allowing for necessary portrayals of sensitive subjects while ensuring they serve a greater message. The Tribunal's role is pivotal, as it comprises members who can gauge public sentiment, particularly regarding gender representation. The court affirmed the Tribunal's decision to grant an 'A' certificate to a film that, despite its challenging content, ultimately aims to evoke empathy and highlight the consequences of violence against women, thereby reinforcing the importance of context in film certification.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeals Nos. 7522 with 7523, 7525 and 7524 of 1996

Decided On: 01.05.1996

Bobby Art International and Ors. Vs. Om Pal Singh Hoon and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.M. Ahmadi, C.J.I., S.P. Bharucha and B.N. Kirpal, JJ.

Author: S.P. Bharucha, J.

Citation: AIR 1996 SC 1846,( 1996 ) 4 SCC 1, MANU/SC/0466/1996.

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Case Note on Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon and Others Judgment

 Citation

Bobby Art International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon and Others, Civil Appeal No. 7522 of 1996, Supreme Court of India, decided on May 1, 1996.

 Background

The case revolves around the film "Bandit Queen," which is based on the life of Phoolan Devi, a woman who faced extreme violence and humiliation, eventually becoming a dacoit. The film was submitted for certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952, and was initially granted an 'A' certificate by the Appellate Tribunal after modifications were made. However, this decision was challenged in the High Court by a respondent who claimed that the film denigrated women and misrepresented the Gujjar community.

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Tuesday, 17 September 2024

How the issue of obscenity is dealt by Supreme Court in Various decisions?

 Analysis: The central issue is whether the use of expletives and profane language in the titles and content of the episodes of the web-series 'College Romance' constitutes an offence of publication and transmission of obscene and sexually explicit content Under Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act. We will examine each of these provisions in the context of 'obscenity' for the purpose of Section 67 and 'sexually explicit material' for the purpose of Section 67A.


A. Whether the material is 'obscene':{Para 9}


10. We will first deal with the contention that the material is obscene. Section 67 of the IT Act is as follows:


67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene material in electronic form.-Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and with fine which may extend to five lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees.


11. This Court has laid down the meaning, test, standard, and method for determining whether some material is obscene in the context of Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code.


12. Section 292 defines 'obscene' as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object that is lascivious, appeals to the prurient interest, or has such effect, if taken as a whole, that tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or hear the matter contained in it. The provision criminalises the sale, distribution, public exhibition, circulation, import, export, etc of obscene material. The provision excludes such material when the publication is justified as being for public good on the ground that it is in the interest of science, art, literature, or learning or other objects of general concern; such material is kept or used for bona fide religious purposes; it is sculptured, engraved, painted or represented on or in ancient monuments and temples. The relevant portion of Section 292 has been extracted for reference:


292. Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc.-(1) For the purposes of Sub-section (2), a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object, shall be deemed to be obscene if it is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect, or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect of any one of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons, who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.


It is evident that "obscenity" has been similarly defined in Section 292 and Section 67 as material which is:


i. lascivious; or


ii. appeals to the prurient interest; or


iii. its effect tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.


However, the difference between them is only that Section 67 is a special provision that applies when the obscene material is published or transmitted in the electronic form.14 Since the alleged offending material is a web-series, the case must be considered Under Section 67 of the IT Act15 but the same test for obscenity as laid down Under Section 292 will apply since the provisions are similarly worded in that respect. In this context we will examine how obscenity is understood.


13. Recounting the development through judicial precedents: This Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 292 as a reasonable restriction on free speech and applied the Hicklin test (1868) LR 3 QB 360 to determine whether the book 'Lady Chatterley's Lover' was obscene in the decision of Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra   MANU/SC/0080/1964 : 1964:INSC:171 : AIR 1965 SC 881. As per the Hicklin test, a material is obscene if it has the tendency to deprave and corrupt the minds of those who are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands the publication is likely to fall:16


... I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall ... it is quite certain that it would suggest to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and libidinous character.


14. This test lays emphasis on the potentiality of the material to deprave and corrupt by immoral influences.17 To determine this, the Court must apply itself to consider each work at a time. It must take an overall view of the obscene matter in the setting of the whole work but also consider the obscene matter by itself and separately to find out whether it is so grossly obscene and it is likely to deprave and corrupt. A mere stray word or insignificant passage would not suffice to qualify the material as obscene.18 The Court also clarified that sex and nudity in art and literature cannot in and of themselves be regarded as evidence of obscenity without something more.19 Sex must be treated in manner that is offensive to public decency and morality, when judged by our national standards, and must be likely to pander to lascivious, prurient, sexually precocious minds, and appeal to or have the tendency to appeal to the "carnal side of human nature" for it to be obscene.20


15. The Court also emphasised its role in maintaining a delicate balance between protecting freedom of speech and artistic freedom on the one hand, and public decency and morality on the other. It held that when art and obscenity are mixed, the art must be so preponderating that the obscenity is pushed into the shadows or is trivial and insignificant and can be overlooked.21 Similarly, if the matter has a preponderating social purpose and gain that overweighs the obscenity of the content (such as medical textbooks), then such material is constitutionally protected by freedom of speech and cannot be criminalised as obscene.22


16. The Court followed the Hicklin test and Ranjit Udeshi (supra) in Shri Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra   MANU/SC/0147/1969 : 1969:INSC:202 : (1969) 2 SCC 687 but it also introduced certain caveats and refined the test to some extent. Considering the material in that case, a Marathi short story Shama, the Court held that the story read as a whole does not amount to pornography or pander to the prurient interest. Even if the work is not of high literary quality and is immature and of bad taste, there was nothing that could deprave or corrupt those in whose hands it is likely to fall, including adolescents.23 The Court also cautioned that the standard for the artist or the writer is not that the adolescent mind must not be brought in contact with sex or that the work must be expunged of all references to sex, irrespective of whether it is the dominant theme.24 The test for obscenity was stated as: "What we have to see is that whether a class, not an isolated case, into whose hands the book, Article or story falls suffer in their moral outlook or become depraved by reading it or might have impure and lecherous thoughts aroused in their minds."25


17. In K.A. Abbas v. Union of India   MANU/SC/0053/1970 : 1970:INSC:200 : (1970) 2 SCC 780, para 48 the Court summarised the test and process to determine obscenity as follows:


(1) Treating with sex and nudity in art and literature cannot be regarded as evidence of obscenity without something more.


(2) Comparison of one book with another to find the extent of permissible action is not necessary.


(3) The delicate task of deciding what is artistic and what is obscene has to be performed by courts and in the last resort, by the Supreme Court and so, oral evidence of men of literature or others on the question of obscenity is not relevant.


(4) An overall view of the obscene matter in the setting of the whole work would of course be necessary but the obscene matter must be considered by itself and separately to find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity is so decided that it is likely to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to influence of this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall.


(5) The interests of contemporary society and particularly the influence of the book, etc., on it must not be overlooked.


(6) Where obscenity and art are mixed, art must be so preponderating as to throw obscenity into shadow or render the obscenity so trivial and insignificant that it can have no effect and can be overlooked.


(7) Treating with sex in a manner offensive to public decency or morality which are the words of our Fundamental Law judged by our national standards and considered likely to pander to lascivious, prurient or sexually precocious minds must determine the result.


(8) When there is propagation of ideas, opinions and informations or public interests or profits, the interests of society may tilt the scales in favour of free speech and expression. Thus books on medical science with intimate illustrations and photographs though in a sense immodest, are not to be considered obscene, but the same illustrations and photographs collected in a book form without the medical text would certainly be considered to be obscene.


(9) Obscenity without a preponderating social purpose or profit cannot have the constitutional protection of free speech or expression. Obscenity is treating with sex in a manner appealing to the carnal side of human nature or having that tendency. Such a treating with sex is offensive to modesty and decency.


(10) Knowledge is not a part of the guilty act. The offender's knowledge of the obscenity of the book is not required under the law and it is a case of strict liability.


18. In Samaresh Bose (supra), which has been relied on by the Appellants, this Court differentiated vulgarity from obscenity. The material in question in this case was a Bengali novel titled 'Prajapati'. The Court noted that while slang and unconventional words had been used in the book along with suggestions of sexual acts, there was no description of any overt act of sex. The words are vulgar and create a feeling of disgust and revulsion and may shock the reader but this does not necessarily amount to obscenity, which is the tendency to deprave and corrupt.26 It held that the use of slang and unconventional words; an emphasis on sex; a description of female bodies; and narrations of feelings, thoughts and actions in vulgar language in the novel do not render the material obscene.27 Further, a mere reference to sex is insufficient for obscenity and does not make a material unsuitable for adolescents.28


19. The Court also summarised the process that must be followed to objectively assess whether some material is obscene. It held that the judge must first place himself in the position of the author to understand his perspective and what he seeks to convey and whether it has any literary or artistic value. The judge must then place himself in the position of a reader of every age group in whose hands the book (or material) is likely to fall and determine the possible effect or influence of the material on the minds of such persons. The relevant portion reads:


29. ...As laid down in both the decisions of this Court earlier referred to, "the question whether a particular Article or story or book is obscene or not does not altogether depend on oral evidence, because it is the duty of the court to ascertain whether the book or story or any passage or passages therein offend the provisions of Section 292 Indian Penal Code". In deciding the question of obscenity of any book, story or Article the court whose responsibility it is to adjudge the question may, if the court considers it necessary, rely to an extent on evidence and views of leading literary personage, if available, for its own appreciation and assessment and for satisfaction of its own conscience. The decision of the court must necessarily be on an objective assessment of the book or story or Article as a whole and with particular reference to the passages complained of in the book, story or article. The court must take an overall view of the matter complained of as obscene in the setting of the whole work, but the matter charged as obscene must also be considered by itself and separately to find out whether it is so gross and its obscenity so pronounced that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to influence of this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall. Though the court must consider the question objectively with an open mind, yet in the matter of objective assessment the subjective attitude of the Judge hearing the matter is likely to influence, even though unconsciously, his mind and his decision on the question. A Judge with a puritan and prudish outlook may on the basis of an objective assessment of any book or story or article, consider the same to be obscene. It is possible that another Judge with a different kind of outlook may not consider the same book to be obscene on his objective assessment of the very same book. The concept of obscenity is moulded to a very great extent by the social outlook of the people who are generally expected to read the book. It is beyond dispute that the concept of obscenity usually differs from country to country depending on the standards of morality of contemporary society in different countries. In our opinion, in judging the question of obscenity, the Judge in the first place should try to place himself in the position of the author and from the viewpoint of the author the Judge should try to understand what is it that the author seeks to convey and whether what the author conveys has any literary and artistic value. The Judge should thereafter place himself in the position of a reader of every age group in whose hands the book is likely to fall and should try to appreciate what kind of possible influence the book is likely to have in the minds of the readers. A Judge should thereafter apply his judicial mind dispassionately to decide whether the book in question can be said to be obscene within the meaning of Section 292 Indian Penal Code by an objective assessment of the book as a whole and also of the passages complained of as obscene separately. In appropriate cases, the court, for eliminating any subjective element or personal preference which may remain hidden in the subconscious mind and may unconsciously affect a proper objective assessment, may draw upon the evidence on record and also consider the views expressed by reputed or recognised authors of literature on such questions if there be any for his own consideration and satisfaction to enable the court to discharge the duty of making a proper assessment.


20. The Court then applied this test to the novel in question. By placing themselves in the position of the author and judging the work from his perspective, the Court found that his intention was to expose social evils and ills, for which the author has used his own technique. Similarly, the Court placed itself in the position of the readers who are likely to read the book. It held that the book was likely to be read by readers of "both sexes and all ages between teenagers and the aged" and found that while it may create a sense of shock and disgust, no reader would be depraved, debased, or encouraged to lasciviousness by reading the book.29


21. In Bobby Art International (supra) the question before the Court was whether certain scenes from the film 'Bandit Queen' that depicted rape and nudity were obscene. Here, obscenity was not considered Under Section 292 but under the 1991 Guidelines for Censor Board certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952.30 The Court did not cite or follow the Hicklin test as laid down in Ranjit Udeshi (supra) and Chandrakant Kalyandas (supra). Instead, it relied on the Guidelines and laid down the test for obscenity as follows:


22. The guidelines aforementioned have been carefully drawn. They require the authorities concerned with film certification to be responsive to the values and standards of society and take note of social change. They are required to ensure that "artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed". The film must be "judged in its entirety from the point of view of its overall impact". It must also be judged in the light of the period depicted and the contemporary standards of the people to whom it relates, but it must not deprave the morality of the audience. Clause 2 requires that human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity, that scenes degrading or denigrating women are not presented and scenes of sexual violence against women are avoided, but if such scenes are germane to the theme, they be reduced to a minimum and not particularised.


22. The Court first considered the plot and theme of the film as a whole and then considered the individual scenes of nudity and rape. Judging the work as a whole and the alleged offending material specifically, the Court held that the scenes are likely to evoke tears, pity, horror, and shame. Only a perverted mind might be aroused in such a situation, and the purpose of censorship is not to protect the pervert or assuage the susceptibilities of the over-sensitive.31 Further, the use of swear words and expletives that are heard everyday was also held to be harmless.32 The Court rather emphasised the overarching social purpose and message of the film - to condemn rape and violence against women by showing the trauma and emotional turmoil of a victim of rape and to evoke sympathy for her and disgust for the rapist.33 Thus, the material was held as not being obscene.


23. Similarly, in Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan   MANU/SC/3637/2006 : 2006:INSC:558 : (2006) 8 SCC 433, the Court applied the test of 'contemporary community standards' to determine whether a documentary is obscene for the purpose of certification and telecast on Doordarshan. A three-prong test for obscenity was formulated as follows:


(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;


(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and


(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.34


24. The Court relied on Ramesh v. Union of India   MANU/SC/0404/1988 : 1988:INSC:44 : (1988) 1 SCC 668, where it was held that the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of a reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous person, and not from the perspective of weak and vacillating minds or those who sense danger in every hostile point of view.35 Considering the documentary as a whole to determine its message, which cannot be conveyed by watching only certain bits, it was held that the film portrays social evils and does not seek to cater to the prurient interests of any person.36


25. The law on determining obscenity has been summarised and reiterated in Ajay Goswami v. Union of India   MANU/SC/5585/2006 : 2006:INSC:995 : (2007) 1 SCC 143 where the Court cited both Indian precedent and American jurisprudence. The principles that can be culled out from the judgment are as follows:


i. Obscenity must be judged with regard to contemporary mores and national standards.37


ii. The work must be judged as a whole and the alleged offending material must also be separately examined to judge whether they are so grossly obscene that they are likely to deprave and corrupt the reader or viewer.38 There must be a clear and present danger that has proximate and direct nexus with the material.39


iii. All sex-oriented material and nudity per se are not always obscene.40


iv. The effect of the work must be judged from the standard of an average adult human being.41 Content cannot be regulated from the benchmark of what is appropriate for children as then the adult population would be restricted to read and see only what is fit for children.42 Likewise, Regulation of material cannot be as per the standard of a hypersensitive man and must be judged as per an "ordinary man of common sense and prudence".43


v. Where art and obscenity are mixed, it must be seen whether the artistic, literary or social merit of the work overweighs its obscenity and makes the obscene content insignificant or trivial. In other words, there must be a preponderating social purpose or profit for the work to be constitutionally protected as free speech. Similarly, a different approach may have to be used when the material propagates ideas, opinions, and information of public interest as then the interest of society will tilt the balance in favour of protecting the freedom of speech (for example, with medical textbooks).44


vi. The Court must perform the task of balancing what is artistic and what is obscene. To perform this delicate exercise, it can rely on the evidence of men of literature, reputed and recognised authors to assess whether there is obscenity.45


26. In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal   MANU/SC/0310/2010 : 2010:INSC:247 : (2010) 5 SCC 600, the issue pertained to quashing of FIR filed against the Appellant, inter alia Under Section 292 of the Indian Penal Code, for an interview in a magazine where she called for the social acceptance of premarital sex, especially in live-in relationships, and cautioned women to take adequate protection to prevent unwanted pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections. The Court held that no offence was made out Under Section 292 as the content is not lascivious (i.e., expressing or causing sexual desire); does not appeal to the prurient interest (i.e., excessive interest in sexual matters); and does not have the effect of tending to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, hear, or see the material.46 It was reiterated that mere reference to sex does not make the material obscene without examining the context of such reference.47 The Court held that obscenity must be gauged with respect to "contemporary community standards that reflect the sensibilities as well as the tolerance levels of an average reasonable person."48 In this case, the Appellant had not described any sexual act or said anything that arouses sexual desire in the mind of a reasonable and prudent reader to make the content obscene.49 Hence the FIR was quashed by this Court.


27. A Division Bench of this Court in Aveek Sarkar (supra) also quashed an FIR Under Section 292 against the magazine cover of Sports World and Anandbazar Patrika that carried the image of Boris Becker, a tennis player, posing nude with his fiancee, who are an interracial couple. The Court held that while judging a photograph, Article or book to be obscene, "regard must be had to the contemporary mores and national standards and not the standard of a group of susceptible or sensitive persons".50 The Court held that the Hicklin test must not be applied as it "judged for obscenity based on isolated passages of a work considered out of context and judged by their apparent influence on most susceptible readers, such as children or weak-minded adults."51 Even in the United States, where the test was first formulated, the courts no longer apply the Hicklin test and instead apply the test formulated in Roth v. United States MANU/USSC/0157/1957 : 354 US 476 (1957) where the US Supreme Court held that sex-related material is obscene only when it has the tendency of exciting lustful thoughts when judged from the perspective of an average person by applying the community standards test. Similarly, in Canada, the dominant test is the 'community standards problem test' as per which a work qualifies as obscene when the exploitation of sex is its dominant characteristic and such exploitation is undue.52 Taking note of these jurisprudential developments, the Court in Aveek Sarkar markedly moved away from the Hicklin test to the "community standard test" where the material is considered as a whole to determine whether the specific portions have the tendency to deprave and corrupt.53


28. Applying this test, it was held that a picture of a nude/semi-nude woman is not per se obscene unless it arouses sexual desire or overtly reveals sexual desire or has the tendency of exciting lustful thoughts.54 In the present case, the posture and the background of the woman posing with her fiancee, whose photograph was taken by her father, does not have the tendency to deprave or corrupt those in whose hands the magazine would fall when considered in light of the broader social message of the picture against apartheid, racism, and to promote love and marriage across race.55 We may note that this Court followed the community standards test in Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar (supra).


29. Lastly, in N. Radhakrishnan v. Union of India   MANU/SC/0943/2018 : 2018:INSC:784 : (2018) 9 SCC 725, it was again held that the Court must not be guided by the sensitivity of a pervert viewer and the setting of the whole work, its purpose, and the constituent elements of the character must be kept in mind while judging for obscenity.56

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1694-1695/2024.

Decided On: 19.03.2024

Apoorva Arora and Ors. Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.S. Bopanna and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, JJ.

Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0218/2024.

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Landmark SC Judgment Apoorva Arora and Ors. Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) upholds Creative Expression in the Face of Obscenity Allegations

  In the judgment of Apoorva Arora and Ors. Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors dated 19.03.2024, the Supreme Court of India has quashed an FIR against the creators of the popular web series "College Romance," setting an important precedent for artistic expression and freedom of speech in the digital age.

The case, which involved allegations of obscenity under Sections 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, saw the apex court delve into the complex issue of determining what constitutes obscenity in the context of contemporary societal standards and artistic merit.

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Friday, 23 August 2024

Bombay HC: Objectionable Words Written In E-Mail Or On Social Media Can Be Penalized U/S 509 of IPC For Insulting Woman's Modesty

 Later, legislature found that a woman must be protected

not only from physical aggressions made in the course of

outraging her modesty, but she should also be shielded from

various other acts which do not involve even a touch. Legislature

was quite aware that a woman’s modesty can be insulted or

outraged in various ways. A mere word, a wink, a touch or even

a look would suffice to insult the modesty of a Woman. Physical

advances may not be necessary in all cases. Everything depends

on the intention of the mischief-maker and the manner in which

he conveys his intentions. It is evident that legislature intended

that any aggression into a woman’s modesty whether by any

word, deed, touch or look need be curbed and deterred. {Para 18}

19. That is why even a verbal attack on a woman, a gesture

and other acts stated in Section 509 I.P.C. were brought under

the said Section. It is clear from a reading of Section 509 I.P.C.

that by introducing the said provision, legislature intended that

any sort of aggression into a woman’s modesty whether by any

word, deed or act should be deterred, as evident from the title to

the Section itself. Thus, the acts which are done intending to

insult the modesty of a woman which may not necessarily involve

even any physical advances are also brought within the sweep of

a separate provision viz., Section 509 I.P.C.

20. In such circumstances, can it be for a moment presumed

that the legislature intended that a person who writes a letter to

a woman with the intention to insult her modesty should go

unpunished? If such a person, instead of uttering the insulting

words, puts in writing all what he determines to utter against a

woman and sends it to her, intending to insult her modesty, will

any Court be justified in holding that the legislature expected such person to escape safely? was it the intention of the legislature that such a culprit must go unhurt only because he used his pen and not his tongue, to insult the victim? After suffering all the trauma, when a woman comes before Court with the best proof for the assault or violence made on her modesty by producing the letter, can the Court refuse to look into the same on the ground that the legislature never intended to bring cases involving writings within the purview of Section 509 I.P.C.?


21. I find it extremely difficult to reach a conclusion which

will defeat the very object of Section 509 I.P.C. There can be

little doubt that the legislature would not have intended that a

person who insults the modesty of a woman by his writings must

be kept out of the province of Section 509 I.P.C. In a country like

India, legislature would not have ever intended that a person

who expresses his attitude or intention to insult modesty of a

woman by sending a letter should be absolved from criminal

liability. I am of view that the very object of the provision will be

defeated if a contrary view is taken. Thus, while interpreting the

meaning of the relevant expression in Section 509 I.P.C. in the

light of the relevant rules of interpretation, I find that ‘writing of

letter’ to a woman, intending to insult her modesty can be

construed as ‘making a gesture’ under Section 509 I.P.C. I feel

quite confident to hold that Indian legislature’s intention will not

be contrary to what I have already concluded.”

The transmission by the Petitioner of the offensive e-mails to her and other residents in the society demonstrates clear intent of the Petitioner to insultthe Respondent No. 2. As we have already discussed hereinabove that, no matter that the offensive material was transmitted through electronic media, it would still be ensconced in the interpretation of the words ‘utter’ and ‘gesture’ and ‘exhibit’. Alternatively, it intrudes on the Respondent No. 2’s privacy.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3480 OF 2011

WITH

INTERIM APPLICATION NO. 2355 OF 2023

IN

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 3480 OF 2011

Joseph Paul de Sousa, Vs  The State 

CORAM: A. S. GADKARI AND

DR. NEELA GOKHALE, JJ.

 PRONOUNCED ON: 21st  AUGUST 2024.

 JUDGMENT ( Per Dr. Neela Gokhale, J. ) :
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Saturday, 25 July 2020

Whether the court should release accused on anticipatory bail if she has uploaded video to teach sex education to the children in the society?

 I am of the opinion that the petitioner uses the
children for the purpose of sexual gratification
because the children are represented in the video
uploaded in an indecent and obscene manner because they
are painting on a naked body of their mother. The
Public Prosecutor made available the video to me with
the consent of the counsel for the petitioner. I
watched the video. The expression of the petitioner,
while the children are painting on her breast, is also
important. Whether that amounts to the use of the
children for the purpose of sexual gratification can be
finally decided only after a custodial interrogation of
the petitioner. The explanation to Section 13, it is
clearly stated that the expression of 'use a child'
shall include involving a child through any medium like
print, electronic, computer, or any other technology
for preparation, production, offering, transmitting,
publishing, facilitation and distribution of
pornographic material. These are the matters to be
investigated at the time of investigation. While
considering a Bail Application under Section 438 Cr.PC,

I am not in a position to say that, no offence under
Section 13, 14 and 15 of the POCSO Act is attracted in
this case.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
 MR. JUSTICE P.V.KUNHIKRISHNAN
 24TH DAY OF JULY 2020
Bail Appl..No.3861 OF 2020

FATHIMA A.S. Vs   STATE OF KERALA

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Friday, 2 December 2016

Whether person accused of posting of obscene messages through social networking site in account of woman can be discharged?

The gist of the allegations in the impugned first information report is to the
effect that the petitioner had posted obscene messages through a social
networking site in the account of the defacto complainant. It is further alleged
that father of the petitioner over his mobile phone requested the defacto
complainant not to take steps against the petitioner.
On the basis of the aforesaid allegations, FIR was registered and
investigation was initiated. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that
he was discharging his official duties at the relevant time when the said
messages are alleged to have been posted on the social networking profile of the
defacto complainant. It has further submitted that the seizure of the mobile
phone from the possession of the petitioner does not tally with the mobile phone
alleged to have been used for the purpose of dispatch of such electronic message.
 Learned Magistrate however rejected the application for discharge of the
petitioner.
I have considered the materials on record. Prima facie, the allegations in
the FIR disclose the ingredients of the alleged offences. It is alleged that the
petitioner posted obscene messages in order to harass the defacto complainant,
who is a lady. Plea of alibi, as claimed by the petitioner, is a question of fact
which may be agitated in the course of trial. However, it cannot be said with
absolute certainty that since the petitioner was employed at the material point of
time he had no access any electronic device so as to dispatch the electronic
messages as alleged in the FIR rendering such accusation patently absurd and
inherently improbable. The issue of discrepancy in the matter of seizure of the
mobile phone is also a question of fact which does not go to the root of the
jurisdiction of the Court to try the alleged offences.
In view of the aforesaid facts, I am of the opinion that the charge against
the petitioner cannot be said to be groundless and the prayer for discharge was
rightly turned down by the trial court. The factual defences of the petitioner are,
however, kept open to be agitated in accordance with law during trail, if so
advised.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Criminal Revision Jurisdiction
Appellate Side
BEFORE:
The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Joymalya Bagchi
C.R.R. 1711 of 2016
BINOY SARKAR @ BINAY SARKAR
V
THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ANR.

Judgement on : June 06, 2016
Citation: 2016 CRLJ4382 Cal
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Sunday, 9 October 2016

Whether reference to homosexuality and masturbation of women in movie will amount to obscenity or vulgarity?

As noted above, the impugned order is passed in

exercise of the power of the State to impose restrictions on the

fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression

guaranteed to the petitioner. Since the same is a restriction on

the fundamental right guaranteed to the petitioner under Article

19(1) (a) of the Constitution, the same has to be viewed with

suspicion, and the burden is heavy on the authorities to show

that the restrictions are reasonable and permissible under law.

Though the respondents have attempted to support the

impugned decision by supplementing reasons in the counter

affidavit, I do not propose to advert to the said reasons, for, it

is settled that the orders have to stand by the reasons stated


therein itself. The essence of the impugned decision is that the

contents of the film is insulting and humiliating Hindu religion

and that the film contains scenes which are vulgar and

obscene. To demonstrate the stand that the contents of the

film are insulting and humiliating Hindu religion, it is stated in

the impugned order that the Hindu God Hanuman is shown in

the film as coming in the books titled 'I am a Gay'. Likewise, to

demonstrate the vulgarity, it is stated in the impugned order

that the film refers to masturbating women and homosexuality.

There is no other reference in the impugned order with

reference to the specific scenes in the film which violate the

Guidelines. It is relevant to note that the impugned order bans

the exhibition of the film. If the objection concerns only the

depiction of the Hindu God Hanuman in the manner indicated in

the impugned order and the reference to masturbation of

women and homosexuality, there is no need to ban the

exhibition of the film altogether, for, the objectionable scenes

could be deleted or modified. It is thus evident that the basis of

the impugned order is not as disclosed in the impugned order.


Since the decision is that the film is not fit for public exhibition,

it has to be on the basis that the theme of the film offends the

Guidelines. There is no such statement in the impugned order.

Further, mere reference to homosexuality and masturbation of

women may not amount to obscenity or vulgarity. As stated by

the Apex Court, only if the entire theme is disclosed, the

question   whether    the   reference   to    homosexuality     and

masturbation of women would amount to vulgarity or obscenity

can be ascertained. There is nothing in the impugned order as

to the context in which those references have been made in the

film. True, some persons may hold an orthodox or conservative

view in matters like this, but that by itself is not sufficient to

come to the conclusion that the contents of the film are

contemptuous of religious groups. As held by the Apex Court,

the question whether a scene is vulgar or obscene is to be

determined in the context of the work as a whole. When the

respondents take the most extreme step of banning the

exhibition of the film, allegedly made spending approximately

one crore rupees, according to me, an order in the nature of


one impugned is far from satisfactory. In this context, we must

also bear in mind that freedom to think and act differently is an

essential feature of democracy. The said freedom includes

freedom to react and respond to same situations differently and

distinctly. One cannot expect everybody to express themselves

in the same manner. After all, film making is a creative work. If

freedom to express one's ideas is not conceded, there will not

be any creativity at all. Looking at one or two scenes or

expressions in the film, it cannot be said that the film offends

religious sentiments or that it is vulgar and obscene. In the said

view of the matter, according to me, the matter has to be

reconsidered by the Revising Committee, after affording the

petitioner an effective opportunity for hearing.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                             PRESENT:

                   THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE P.B.SURESH KUMAR

           27TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2016

                                WP(C).No. 27418 of 2016 (B)
                              

             JAYAN CHERIAN,
                  
Vs
            UNION OF INDIA,

                    
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Friday, 13 November 2015

Precaution to be taken by Magistrate while issuing process in criminal complaint case

 It is true that at the stage of issuance of process under
Section 204 of Cr.P.C., detailed enquiry regarding merit or demerit
of the cases is not required.   It is also true that the proposed
accused cannot participate at this stage before the Magistrate.  But
then there is a duty and responsibility of the Magistrate to find out
whether there is a legal evidence or materials to form an “opinion”
and existence of “sufficient ground” which are the key words used
in Section 204 of Cr. P. C. before making an order of issuance of
process.  Summoning an accused is a serious matter with serious
consequences   on   the   reputation   and   status   of   a   person   and
criminal law cannot be set in motion as a matter of course.  It is

the duty of the Magistrate to examine whether the complaint is
based under any law or whether there is any settled legal position
qua the allegations in the complaint.  In this case, the trial Judge
did not advert to provisions of the Cinematograph Act or decision
in the case of Raj Kapoor..vs..Laxman, AIR 1980 SC 605.In the light of the above pronouncement by the apex
Court and in the light of the fact that the trial Judge had hardly
applied   its   mind   to   the   settled   law   and   the   provisions   of   the
Cinematograph   Act   interpreted   by   the   Supreme   Court   before
issuing   the   order   of   process   coupled   with   the   fact   that   non

applicant no.2 also did not place the entire material before the
Court including the legal position as set out above and obtained
the order of issuance of process, I am satisfied that this Court
would be failing in its duty if the revisional power is not exercised
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR
CRIMINAL REVISION NO.140/2015
Mallika Sherawat alias Reema Lamba,
aged years, Occ. Film Actress, 
r/o Bandra East, Mumbai. 
V 
 State of Maharashtra,
­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­
CORAM:­ A. B. CHAUDHARI, J.
DATED :­ 29.10.2015

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