Gujarat HC: What is duty of the court when it comes to its knowledge that future maintenance right was relinquished on payment of illusory amount of maintenance?

 The principle underlying the lump sum payment as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bai Tahira's case (supra) can be equally applied to the facts and circumstances of this case. The basic principle is that the object of the lump sum payment to be made is to obviate the destitution of the divorcee and to provide her with the wherewithal to maintain herself. As laid down by the Supreme Court, there must be a rational relation between the sum so paid and its potential as provision for maintenance. In the instant case the petitioner-wife was forced to go to Court for claiming her maintenance. Under the circumstances, then prevailing she gave up her right to claim future maintenance "voluntarily" for lump sum amount and executed the deed of divorce. Now, when she has preferred an application for maintenance, it cannot be said that the application at the instance of the petitioner-wife claiming maintenance is not maintainable because she had surrendered her future right of maintenance. Whenever in application for maintenance it is contended that because lump sum amount is paid towards the claim of future maintenance and therefore the application is not maintainable, it would be the bounden duty of the Court to examine whether the lump sum amount of maintenance mentioned in the deed of divorce or claimed to have been paid otherwise, had any rational connection with the necessities of life to be provided for in future and was it not an illusory amount or was it sufficient amount to maintain herself for the entire life?{Para 7}

8. This principle has its roots in the public policy and the provisions of law. Underlying public policy, behind the provisions of law regarding maintenance is that one who is destitute should be provided maintenance by the person whose duty it is to maintain such person. This public policy cannot be circumvented and the object of law cannot be frustrated by making a payment of illusory amount of maintenance. As far as the surrender of future right to maintenance is concerned, answer is very simple. Agreement to surrender such right of future maintenance for illusory amount of maintenance would be unfair and unconscionable. Such agreement is entered into between two unequals. One (i.e. wife, child or parents, as the case may be) is destitute and helpless and another (i.e. husband, father or son as the case may be) relatively stronger and better placed in the society. Ordinarily this will be the position, though exception cannot be ruled out completely. In this background, if the amount determined for future maintenance is illusory, the agreement to surrender the right to maintenance also would be unlawful as it would be against the public policy and also unconscionable and unfair. 

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT

Decided On: 06.09.1985

Bai Laxmiben Vs. Bharatbhai Vechatbhai Patel and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

A.P. Ravani, J.

Citation: 1986 DMC 1 129,1986 CRI LJ 1418,1986 GLR 1 272,1985 SCC ONLINE GUJ 187, MANU/GJ/0123/1985.

Print Page

Whether Arbitrator can foist unilateral addition or alteration of a contract upon an unwilling party?

However, when it comes to the public policy of India argument
based upon “most basic notions of justice”, it is clear that this ground
can be attracted only in very exceptional circumstances when the
conscience of the Court is shocked by infraction of fundamental
notions or principles of justice. It can be seen that the formula that was
applied by the agreement continued to be applied till February, 2013 –
87
in short, it is not correct to say that the formula under the agreement
could not be applied in view of the Ministry’s change in the base
indices from 1993-94 to 2004-05. Further, in order to apply a linking
factor, a Circular, unilaterally issued by one party, cannot possibly bind
the other party to the agreement without that other party’s consent.
Indeed, the Circular itself expressly stipulates that it cannot apply
unless the contractors furnish an undertaking/affidavit that the price
adjustment under the Circular is acceptable to them. We have seen
how the appellant gave such undertaking only conditionally and
without prejudice to its argument that the Circular does not and cannot
apply. This being the case, it is clear that the majority award has
created a new contract for the parties by applying the said unilateral
Circular and by substituting a workable formula under the agreement
by another formula de hors the agreement. This being the case, a
fundamental principle of justice has been breached, namely, that a
unilateral addition or alteration of a contract can never be foisted upon
an unwilling party, nor can a party to the agreement be liable to
perform a bargain not entered into with the other party. Clearly, such a
course of conduct would be contrary to fundamental principles of
justice as followed in this country, and shocks the conscience of this
Court. However, we repeat that this ground is available only in very

exceptional circumstances, such as the fact situation in the present
case. Under no circumstance can any Court interfere with an arbitral
award on the ground that justice has not been done in the opinion of
the Court. That would be an entry into the merits of the dispute which,
as we have seen, is contrary to the ethos of Section 34 of the 1996
Act, as has been noted earlier in this judgment.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4779 OF 2019

Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd.Vs  National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) 

R.F. NARIMAN, J.
Dated:May 08, 2019.

Print Page

Whether illegal arbitration award is against public policy of India?

It was also held by the District Judge that the arbitral award was not even against the public policy of India and merely because some illegality has been pointed out it cannot be held that the award is against the public policy.

13. We are in agreement with the findings of the District Judge and since no ground exists under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside the arbitral award without re-appreciation of evidence, we are of the opinion that the judgment and order passed by the District Judge is not illegal rather perfectly valid. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

F.A.F.O. No. 2188 of 2018

Decided On: 02.05.2018

 Nathu Ram Sahu Vs. Arbitrator/Collector and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pankaj Mithal and Rajiv Joshi, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2018(NOC) 880 ALL

Print Page

Whether maintenance can be denied to daughter due to agreement between her father and mother?

 As per Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, any consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful, if it defeats the provisions of any law, or the court regards it as opposed to public policy. It cannot be disputed that a contract which has a tendency to injure public interests or public welfare is one against public policy. Where a contractual provision is against a specific statutory provision or if it would result in frustration of a right conferred by law, then it can be regarded as opposed to public policy. It shall not become valid even if the parties thereto agree to it. A statutory right which has been conferred on a person under public policy cannot be waived by the said person by an agreement. When the obligation on the father to maintain an unmarried daughter is recognised by a statute, it is a matter of public policy and not of an individual. The father cannot divest himself of his liability to maintain his child by an agreement with the mother of the child. It would definitely be the public policy that children should not be left dependent on public assistance or on charity. They should therefore be able to come to the court for maintenance, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary.

35. In the aforesaid factual and legal situation, the contention of the appellant that, the compromise decree passed by the court in the litigations between the father and the mother would preclude the daughters from claiming maintenance from the father, cannot be countenanced. The right of the daughters to get maintenance from the father was not forfeited by virtue of the agreement/compromise entered into between the mother and the father.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

Mat. Appeal No. 841 of 2014

Decided On: 08.10.2018

 Vikraman Nair Vs. Aishwarya and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.K. Abdul Rehim and R. Narayana Pisharadi, JJ.

Print Page

Whether unjust arbitration award can be set aside by court?

We are not in agreement with the approach adopted by the learned single Judge. The dispute in question had resulted in a reasoned award. It is not as if the arbitrator has not appreciated the evidence. The arbitrator has taken a plausible view and, an in our view, as per us the correct view, that the very nature of job to be performed would imply that there has to be an area for unloading and that too in the vicinity of 5 kilometres as that is all that the Appellant was to be paid for. The route was also determined. In such a situation to say that the Respondent owed no obligation to make available the site cannot be accepted by any stretch of imagination. The unpreparedness of the Respondent is also apparent from the fact that even post termination it took couple of years for the work to be carried out, which was meant to be completed within 45 days. The ability of the Appellant to comply with its obligations were inter dependent on the Respondent meeting its obligations in time to facilitate appropriate areas for unloading of the earth and for its compacting. At least it is certainly a plausible view.

11. It has been opined by this Court that when it comes to setting aside of an award under the public policy ground, it would mean that the award should shock the conscience of the court and would not include what the court thinks is unjust on the facts of the case seeking to substitute its view for that of the arbitrator to do what it considers to be "justice." (Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority MANU/SC/1076/2014 : (2015) 3 SCC 49)

12. The approach adopted by the learned Additional District Judge, Chandigarh was, thus, correct in not getting into the act of re-appreciating the evidence as the first appellate court from a trial court decree. An arbitrator is a chosen Judge by the parties and it is on limited parameters can the award be interfered with. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 20885 of 2017 

Decided On: 05.12.2017

 Sutlej Construction Limited Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jasti Chelameswar and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 1 SCC 718

Print Page

Whether public policy for purpose of arbitration proceeding means only law laid down by parliament?

It was also contended by Shri Divan, that
the newly added ground that the Tribunal under
the Arbitration Act, 1996 had no jurisdiction
to decide the dispute in question because the
jurisdiction lay with the Tribunal under the
M.P. Act of 1983, was a question which can be
agitated under sub-clause (ii) of clause (b)
of sub-section (2) of Section 34 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996. This provision enables
the court to set- aside an award which is in
conflict with the public policy of India.
Therefore, it is contended that the amendment
had been rightly allowed and it cannot be said
that what was raised was only a question which
pertained to jurisdiction and ought to have
been raised exclusively under Section 16 of
the Arbitration Act, 1996, but in fact was a
question which could also have been raised
under Section 34 before the Court, as has been
done by the Respondent. This submission must
be rejected. The contention that an award is
in conflict with the public policy of India
cannot be equated with the contention that
Tribunal under the Central Act does not have
jurisdiction and the Tribunal under the State
Act, has jurisdiction to decide upon the
dispute. Furthermore, it was stated that this
contention might have been raised under the
head that the Arbitral Award is in conflict
with the public policy of India. In other
words, it was submitted that it is the public
policy of India that arbitrations should be
held under the appropriate law. It was
contended that unless the arbitration was held
under the State Law i.e. the M.P. Act that it
would be a violation of the public policy of
India. This contention is misconceived since
the intention of providing that the award
should not be in conflict with the public
policy of India is referable to the public
policy of India as a whole i.e. the policy of
the Union of India and not merely the policy
of an individual state. Though, it cannot be
said that the upholding of a state law would
not be part of the public policy of India,
much depends on the context. Where the
question arises out of a conflict between an
action under a State Law and an action under a
Central Law, the term public policy of India
must necessarily be understood as being
referable to the policy of the Union. It is
well known, vide Article 1 of the
Constitution, the name 'India' is the name of
the Union of States and its territories
include those of the States.”
8. Both stages are independent. Observations in
Paragraphs 16 and 17 in MSP Infrastructure (supra) do not,
in our view, lay down correct law. We also do not agree
with the observation that the Public policy of India does
not refer to a State law and refers only to an All India
law.
9. In our considered view, the public policy of India
refers to law in force in India whether State law or
Central law. Accordingly, we overrule the observations to
the contrary in Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the judgment in MSP
Infrastructures Ltd. (supra).
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8984-8985 OF 2017
 M/S LION ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS 
 Vs
 STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 
Dated:March 22, 2018.

Print Page

Whether award passed by arbitrator can be set aside on ground award was unjust?

 It has been opined by this Court that when it comes to setting aside of an award under the public policy ground, it would mean that the award should shock the conscience of the court and would not include what the court thinks is unjust on the facts of the case seeking to substitute its view for that of the arbitrator to do what it considers to be "justice." (Associate Builders v. Delhi Development Authority MANU/SC/1076/2014 : (2015) 3 SCC 49)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 20885 of 2017 (Arising from SLP (Civil) No. 14451 of 2015)

Decided On: 05.12.2017

 Sutlej Construction Vs. Union Territory of Chandigarh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Jasti Chelameswar and Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ.

Citation:(2018) 1 SCC 718

Print Page

Whether Lok adalat can pass contingent award relating to pending matters before court?

In the case at hand, I see that the parties have agreed into the terms of the award on the happening of a specific contingency that this Court allow Crl.M.C. No. 295/2013. This was a matter of pure conjuncture and speculation. I am concerned that the Award did not provide for a prescription as to how the parties would be regulated, if the Court had dismissed Crl.M.C. No. 295/2013. Both parties appear to have been inexplicably confident that this Court would act. in a particular fashion and that the said Crl.M.C. would be allowed in future. I do not see how the parties could entertain such an impression in their minds, and how the Lok Adalath could have allowed the parties to enter in to such an award.

11. I see that the Lok Adalath has merely endorsed the terms of concurrence of the parties without considering the probable issues of violation of morals and public policy in permitting parties to settle on contingent terms which depends on the decisions of this Court in future. This is grossly inappropriate and I am of the view that the Lok Adalath misdirected itself in allowing the parties to enter in to a settlement which is contra bonos mores and contra public policy.

12. I am of the firm view that the Lok Adalaths have a duty to ensure that the settlements entered into by the parties confirm to law, morals and public policy of the Society and the Polity. Any settlement entered in contravention of these would be completely unsustainable and incompetent. If this Court notices that the settlement is one that offers undue advantage to one side on account of prescription of certain contingencies, it becomes a case of contravention of public morals as also of public policy and, therefore, this Court would obtain certain justification in interfering with such Awards under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it being null, void and non-est.

13. The unexpendable requirement of Lok Adalats to invest due care, attention and position while passing awards has already been spoken to about by a Division Bench of this Court in Rajagopala Rao v. State Police Chief, MANU/KE/0856/2016 : 2016 (3) KLT 358 : 2016 (3) KLJ 754 : 2016 ICO 379. The Bench had formatted certain guidelines and are very pertinent to read. I, therefore, deem it necessary to extract the relevant paragraph of the said judgment as under:

"18. In order to prevent the menace of passing awards without due care, attention and precision by Lok. Adalats, we intend to formulate some guidelines. We may hastily add that they are not exhaustive and may take in other things as well, depending on the facts of each case. The crucial points to be borne in mind by the persons presiding over the Lok Adalats and the lawyers appearing for the parties are thus:

(i) The persons presiding shall thoroughly study and clearly understand the facts of the case coming up for settlement.

(ii) They must have a clear understanding about the legal issues involved in the dispute between the parties.

(iii) If the parties have engaged lawyers, they shall also participate in the proceedings before the Lok Adalat so that a proper settlement could be arrived at.

(iv) The persons presiding over the Lok Adalat and the lawyers concerned shall bear in mind the fundamental principles, under the Indian Contract Act, 1872, essentially required for executing a legally enforceable agreement.

(v) They shall bear in mind the principles under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the code of Civil Procedure, 1908 also, so that the award must be in the form of an enforceable decree, if the parties so wish. This is all the more important because by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, every award made by Lok Adalats shall be final and binding on the parties to the dispute and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award.

(vi) The persons presiding over the Lok Adalat shall see that the award passed is clear in its terms and there shall be no room for any confusion in respect of the terms and conditions in the award. They shall take care to see that on account of ill-drafting of the compromise, no litigation in future arises in respect of the matters once settled.

(vii) They shall see that the awards passed are not only legal, but also conforming to the norms prescribed for a decree with all the required details in clear and explicit terms."

14. However, in spite of express declarations by this Court, it is extremely disheartening and disquieting that lessons are not being learnt requiring repeated interventions of this Court.

15. In the case at hand, I see that the absence of a Clause in Ext. P7 as to what would happen in the event this Court dismisses Crl.M.C. No. 295/2013, would render the settlement between the parties, as recorded by the Lok Adalath, inoperative and completely contingent and therefore, contrary to public morals. Contingent Awards cannot be countenanced, especially when such contingencies are relating to pending matters before Courts, especially this Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

W.P.(C) No. 35992 of 2015

Decided On: 07.04.2017

P.O. Thomas Vs. Kollam Taluk Legal Service Committee and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Devan Ramachandran, J.

Print Page

Whether contract to influence government to secure particular order is enforceable?

The G.V.K. Committee Report was considered by a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court in the case of Narayana Reddy v. State of Karnataka ILR 1991 Kar 2248, wherein it was held as under:

39. As regards the Agreements entered into between the six Respondent-Societies and their agents, inter alia, for the purpose of influencing the Government and to procure the preliminary and the final notifications Under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, which they did procure and which are subject matter of challenge in these Petitions, the questions which arises for consideration is, if the agreements are hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act on the ground that they were opposed to public policy whether the impugned notifications are liable to be quashed on the grounds that they were the result of exercise of influence by the agents on the Government which submission of the Petitioners stand substantiated by the approval given for acquisition is all such cases which has made the Government itself to realise that it has totally bungled in the matter as is evident from the G.V.K. Rao Committee ..... As far as the question that the agreements in question are opposed to public policy is concerned, it is seen that the real purpose of the Agreement entered into between the Respondent-Societies and their agents was that the agent should get the preliminary and the final notifications from the Government and for that purpose huge amounts were paid or agreed to be paid. Any power conferred on the Government under a statute like the power conferred Under Section 4 and 6 of the Act has to be exercised bona fide and for the purpose for which it is conferred, therefore an agreement under which a party to the agreement is required to influence the statutory authority and to procure a decision favourable to the other party, is certainly opposed to public policy.

(Emphasis laid by this Court)

The principle of law that an agreement under which a party to an agreement is required to influence a statutory authority and to procure a decision favourable to the other party, is certainly opposed to public policy, has been elaborated by this Court in the case of Rattan Chand Hira Chand v. Askar Nawaz Jung MANU/SC/0587/1991 : (1991) 3 SCC 67, wherein it was held as under:

The contract such as the present one which is found by the City Civil Court as well as the High Court to have been entered into with the obvious purpose of influencing the authorities to procure a verdict in favour of the late Nawab was obviously a "carrier" contract. To enforce such a contract although its tendencies to injure public wealth is manifest is not only to abdicate one's public duty but to assist in the promotion of a pernicious practice of procuring decisions by influencing authorities when they should abide by the law. To strike down such contracts is not to invent a new head of public policy but to give effect to its true implications. A democratic society is founded on the Rule of law and any practice which seeks to subvert or circumvent the law strikes at its very root. When the Court discountenances such practice, it only safeguards the foundation of the society. Even assuming, therefore, that the Court finds a new head of public policy to strike down such practice, its activism is not only warranted but desired.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 9091-9119 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 13656-13684 of 2004), 

Decided On: 15.09.2016

R. Rajashekar and Ors. Vs. Trinity House Building Co-operative Society and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V. Gopala Gowda and A.K. Goel, JJ.

Citation:(2016) 16 SCC 46.

Print Page

How to ascertain damages in case of breach of contract in respect of supply of goods in Arbitration proceeding?

In so far as the issue regarding measure of damages is concerned, Mr. Banerjee contended that the quantum of damages were considered by the arbitral tribunal under four heads, namely: (a) market price, (b) quantity, (c) duty to mitigate and (d) savings. He submitted that the matter regarding assessment of damages is a matter pertaining to the merits of the disputes and within the exclusive jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Thus, the said issue could not be re-agitated in the present proceedings.

 In cases where there is a ready market for the goods agreed to be purchased and sold, it is well established that the difference in the contracted price and the market price would be a reasonable measure of damages. In Barrow v. Arnaud: [1846] 8 QB 595, the court had articulated the said principleas under:—

“where a contract to delivergoodsat acertain price is broken, the proper measure of damages in general is the difference between the contract price and the market price of such goods at the time when the contract is broken, because the purchaser, having the money in his hands, may go into the market and buy. So, if a contract to accept and pay for goods is broken, the same rule may be properly applied, for the seller may take his goods into the market and obtain the current price for them.”

The above principle has also been accepted in the provisions of section 50 and 51 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1979 (U.K. Act). section 50 of the U.K. Act reads as under:

“50. Damages for non-acceptance.

(1) Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay for the goods, the seller may maintain an action against him for damages for non-acceptance.

(2) The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the buyer's breach of contract.

(3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question the measure of damages is prima facie to be ascertained by the difference between the contract price and the market or current price at the time or times when the goods ought to have been accepted or (if no time was fixed for acceptance) at the time of the refusal to accept.”

32. The above measure of damages is also accepted in India as is plainly clear from illustration (d) to section 73 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which reads as under:—

“(d) A contracts to buy B's ship for 60,000 rupees, but breaks his promise. A mustpay to B, by way of compensation, the excess, if any, of the contract price over the price whichB “obtain for the ship at the time of the breach of promise.”

33. Undisputedly, in certain cases a different measure of damages may be adopted and Mr. Dholakia is correct in his submission that section 50(3) of the UK Act expressly provides that the measure of damages would prima facie be determined in the manner as indicated therein. However, it is implicit in such submission that such measure, which has been accepted by the arbitral tribunal, cannot be considered to be perverse so as to render enforcement of the Award contrary to the public policy of India. In view of the above, the contention thatthe enforcementofthe Award is opposed to public policy or is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian law is unmerited.

In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi

(Before Vibhu Bakhru, J.)

Glencore International AG 

v.

Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Limited .

EX.P. 75/2015 and EX APPL. (OS) No. 1216-1217/2015

Decided on July 3, 2017

Citation:2017 SCC OnLine Del 8932

Print Page

Whether party can back out from concluded contract on the ground that terms of contract are opposed to public policy?

Mr. Sharan, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, also challenged the arbitral award on the ground that the same is in conflict with the public policy of India. We do not find any substance in the said submission. This Court, in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. (supra), observed that the term ‘public policy of India’ is required to be interpreted in the context of jurisdiction of the Court where the validity of award is challenged before it becomes final and executable. The Court held that an award can be set aside if it is contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law or the interest of India, or if there is patent illegality. In our view, the said decision will not in any way come into rescue of the appellant. As noticed above, the parties have entered into concluded contract, agreeing terms and conditions of the said contract, which was finally acted upon. In such a case, the parties to the said contract cannot back out and challenge the award on the ground that the same is against the public policy. Even assuming the ground available to the appellant, the award cannot be set aside as because it is not contrary to fundamental policy of Indian law or against the interest of India or on the ground of patent illegality.

Supreme Court of India

Swan Gold Mining Ltd vs Hindustan Copper Ltd on 22 September, 2014

Author: M Eqbal

Bench: M.Y. Eqbal, Pinaki Chandra Ghose

Citation;(2015)5 SCC 739

Print Page

Whether condition on reverse side of bill limiting liability of launderer to minimum is opposed to public policy?

Anantanarayanan, J. Officiating Chief Justice of the High Court dealt with a situation where on the reverse of a bill which was handed over by the firm of launderers to the customers there was a printed condition that the customer would be entitled to claim only 50 per cent of the market price or value of the article in case of loss. The High Court of Madras held that such a term was prima facie opposed both to the public policy and to the fundamental principles of the law of contract which cannot be enforced by a Court. The High Court of Madras observed in the said judgment that if such a clause was held to be enforceable, it would put a premium upon the obstraction of clothes, which was committed by the employee of a firm with an intention to make private gain. 1 am in respectful agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Madras in the above case. I hold that the alleged stipulation in this case is opposed to public policy and fundamental principles of law of contract and the same is thus void and of no legal effect.

Bombay High Court

R.S. Deboo, (Since Deceased By ... vs Dr. M.V. Hindlekar And Another on 10 June, 1994

Equivalent citations: AIR 1995 Bom 68, 1995 (1) BomCR 17, (1994) 96 BOMLR 60

Bench: D Dhanuka

Print Page