Showing posts with label principal. Show all posts
Showing posts with label principal. Show all posts

Tuesday, 14 January 2025

Supreme Court: Power Of Attorney Impliedly Revoked When Principal Acts Independent Of Agency With Knowledge To Agent & Third Parties

 A con-joint reading of Sections 201 and 207 of the Contract Act and especially the illustrations appended to these Sections, I am of the view that the principal viz., Thelma Cecelia Pereira was well within her right and authority to deal with the suit property, dehors the Power of Attorney and during its subsistence and the moment the settlement deed was executed by the principal herself, it resulted in an automatic implied termination of the Power of Attorney given to the power agent.(Emphasis supplied) {Para 27}


21. In the absence of a particular mode suggested for revocation of the authority of an agent, the manner adopted by the principal to revoke the authority of the agent must be one which clearly and unequivocally communicates to the parties i.e., to be affected by such revocation, that the agent's authority has been withdrawn. In the framework of Sections 207 and 208 of the Act, the revocation/renunciation of authority may be made by express words or may be implied from the words and conduct of the principal, viz., which is inconsistent with the continuance of the agency. This is one facet of renunciation or revocation of authority of an agent; the other facet is governed by Section 208 of the Act. Section 208 provides for the effective time and date of termination of the agent's authority and third parties. From a plain reading, Section 208 infers and gives effect to revocation upon the twin conditions being satisfied, (i) communication to the agent and (ii) knowledge to a third party i.e., one who deals with or is likely to deal with the agent. Then, the revocation of authority becomes known to the agent and the said third parties. In other words, an idea in the mind of the principal to revoke cannot be construed as implied revocation or renunciation of agency. There ought to be an act or conduct of the principal which implies that the agency is revoked or withdrawn. If the revocation is expressed, such as by publication in newspapers, public notice or advertisement, communication to the agent etc., the parties who deal with the agent have a reasonable opportunity to know the revocation of agency by the principal. Two stages of revocation are, firstly, one dealing with the agent, and secondly, one which applies to the third parties. For attracting the consequence of revocation to either of the situations, the revocation of the agent's authority is made by the principal in a manner that clearly implies that the principal has withdrawn the authority to act on his or her behalf by the agent. Followed by knowledge to third parties, let us examine the circumstances of the case on whether implied revocation coupled with communication is established.


22. The Power of Attorney (Ex. A-4) was executed on 04.12.2003. The Appellant, on 30.11.2007, claims to have retired from service and settled in India. A power of attorney confers power for the execution of deeds in situations of necessity, including in the absence of the Appellant in the country. From the record, it can be noted that from 2007 onwards, the Appellant was not entirely absent from India or residing exclusively in the U.S.A. Therefore, the Appellant and Respondent No. 1 executed the sale deed dated 18.01.2008 (Ex. A-3). Respondent No. 2 is one of the witnesses to Ex. A-3. The execution of sale deed dated 16.04.2008 (Ex. A-5) is inconsistent with and contradictory to the power granted to Respondent No. 1 in Ex. A-4. This is an explicit conduct of the Appellant to act for herself on the share she holds in the property purchased in 1991. In Deb Ratan Biswas (supra), this Court held that the signing of a compromise by the Defendants themselves would amount to implied revocation of power of attorney. In a case where the principal chooses to act for himself, particularly to the agent's knowledge and a person to be affected, then it can be held that Section 207 of the Act is attracted. We have no doubt in holding that the Appellant, in terms of Section 207, impliedly revoked the authority of Respondent No. 1, and as required by Section 208, Respondent No. 2 had the knowledge of the independent dealing with the property by the Appellant. Therefore, the revocation takes effect on 18.01.2008. Ex. A-5 was executed on 16.04.2008. Thus, with the operation of implied revocation of authority, Respondent No. 1 cannot act as an agent of the Appellant and, hence, the sale deed insofar as the Appellant's share in the suit Schedule is held void ab initio.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6495 of 2023

Decided On: 09.07.2024

Thankamma George Vs. Lilly Thomas and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

C.T. Ravikumar and S.V. Bhatti, JJ.

Author: S.V. Bhatti, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0582/2024,2024 INSC 494.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Saturday, 29 June 2024

Important Notes on contract law

 

1) Twelve Golden Rules governing ratification of act of agent by principal.



2) Difference between Liquidated and unliquidated damages




3) What is basic concept of doctrine of frustration with reference to Indian contract act? 



4) What are the basic concept of indemnity and guarantee with reference to Indian Contract Act?


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Wednesday, 13 April 2022

Whether any unauthorized sale made by the agent will tantamount to the Principal parting with possession of immovable property?

 The reasoning given by the High Court for holding that the appellant ought to have challenged the alienations, is that the appellant was out of possession. Here again, the High Court failed to appreciate that the possession of an agent under a deed of Power of Attorney is also the possession of the Principal and that any unauthorized sale made by the agent will not tantamount to the Principal parting with possession. {Para 14}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

Civil Appeal No. 2592 of 2022 

MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR Vs THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE 

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Sunday, 13 December 2020

Whether the principal is liable for the unauthorized act of agent if he fails to repudiate the action of agent or he must ratify said act?

 Section 182 of the Contract Act defines an "agent" as a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with a third person. The authority of the agent, as Section 186 provides, may be express or implied. Section 187 defines express and implied authorities. An authority is said to be express when it is given by words spoken or written. It is implied when it is to be inferred from the circumstances of the case. Things spoken or written or the ordinary course of dealing may be considered as these circumstances. So far as the extent of the agent's authority is concerned, Section 188 provides that the agent, having an authority to do an act, has authority to do every lawful thing which is necessary in order to do such act. If the agent has done any act on behalf of his principal, without the latter's authority, under Section 196, the latter may elect to ratify or disown such act; if he ratifies the act, the same effects follow as if it had been performed by his authority. Ratification, as provided in section 197, may itself be express or may be implied by the conduct of the person on whose behalf the act is done. The ratifier must, however, have knowledge of the facts of the case, without which, as Section 198 provides, no valid ratification is possible. These provisions give rise to a whole lot of questions, particularly in the light of the facts of our case where the Petitioner's wife is claimed to have acted as his agent so as to make him responsible for her acts, which questions appear to have escaped the arbitrator's attention altogether. Was the Petitioner's wife acting for him in the particular act, namely, addressing of the two subject mails, or was she generally representing him in his dealings with the Respondent or involving the others to whom the emails were copied? Was her authority to do so express or was it to be implied from the circumstances of the case (including words spoken or written by the Petitioner)? Was calling the Respondent a "forger", which may be a criminal act involving an offence under Section 499 of IPC, a matter within or without her authority? If without her authority, did the Petitioner ratify the act? Did he do so expressly or by implication? If he might be said to have ratified it, did he have the full knowledge so as to make the ratification valid? These and other pertinent questions either appear to have escaped the arbitrator's attention altogether or to have been considered by him only in an unacceptably tentative manner, as I shall presently point out.


12. It was nobody's case that the Petitioner's wife had his express authority (i.e. by spoken or written words) to act on his behalf when she wrote the two subject emails. The only circumstance, which the arbitrator appears to have considered in this behalf, is that the Petitioner, despite knowledge of the email of 15 June 2011, did not repudiate his wife's statement or clarify that it was not his opinion. The law does not put the burden of repudiation on the principal, when the agent acts beyond his authority. The law requires a positive act of ratification on his part so as to fasten him with the consequences of that act. Once again, the arbitrator appears to have missed the plot, resulting into a complete miscarriage of justice.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Arbitration Petition No. 167 of 2015

Decided On: 19.05.2020


 Jackie Kukubhai Shroff  Vs.  Ratnam Sudesh Iyer


Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.C. Gupte, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0633/2020,2020(5) MHLJ 524

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Thursday, 30 July 2020

Twelve Golden Rules governing ratification of act of agent by principal.



There are twelve rules governing ratification of act of agent by principal.
1) The contract must be made by the agent for or on account of the principal,and not on his own account.
2) The principal must be in existence at the time of the act.Thus, a newly formed Company can not ratify an act done in its name before its incorporation.
3) A transaction which is void ab initio can not be ratified.A principal can ratify only those acts which he is legally competent to do.Thus,there can not be ratification of a void contract.A minor,can not after attaining majority,ratify a contract made during his minority,because a minor's contract is absolutely void.
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Saturday, 27 October 2018

Whether agent can delegate his powers or duties without authority of principal?

 At this juncture, a nice legal question arises as to whether a delegate can further delegate. The axiomatic maxim is "Delecata protest as non protest delegari" The maximum lays down the general rule that an agent cannot delegate his powers or duties to another, in whole or in part, without the express authority of the principal or authority derived from the statute.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Crl. R.C. Nos. 98 to 103 of 2009 and Connected M.Ps.

Decided On: 20.12.2012

 Vadivel Sizing and Weaving Mills (P) Limited Vs Fenner (India) Limited Textile Division

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
B. Rajendran, J.


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Tuesday, 11 September 2018

Whether principal can ratify previous act done by agent by executing second power of attorney?

That an act done, for another, by a person though without any precedent authority whatever, becomes the act of the principal, subsequently ratified by him, is the known and well-established rule of law. In that case the principal is bound by the act, whether it be for the detriment or his advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or on a contract, to the same effect as by, and with all the consequences which follow from, the same act done by his previous authority. And so by a wholesome and convenient fiction, a person ratifying the act of another, who, without authority, has made a contract openly and avowedly on his behalf, is deemed to be, in fact he was not, a party to the contract.
Relation back of an act of ratification was expressly accepted in this case. Other cases have been summarised in the manual of the Law and Practice of Powers of Attorney issued by the Council of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries; This follows from the maxim of law "Canis ratihabitio retrotrahitur at mandate priori aequiparatur"--that is to say, ratification is thrown back to the date of the act done, and the agent is put in the same position as if he had authority to do the act at the time the act was done by him. The learned authors quote the case of the House of Lords which we have above cited and add to it certain other cases with which we do not consider necessary to encumber this judgment.

9. It therefore follows that the second power of attorney was a valid document and it authorised Mr. Chawla to execute the document as well as to present it for registration. This being a document ratifying a former inconclusive act related back to the time when the first document was made and cured the illegality in the presentation for registration which had taken place.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 198 of 1967

Decided On: 16.03.1970

Jugraj Singh Vs. Jaswant Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
M. Hidayatullah, C.J., A.N. Ray and I.D. Dua, JJ.

Citation: UJ 1971 (SC) 197
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Saturday, 24 March 2018

Whether power of attorney holder can give evidence in place of principal in suit for specific performance of contract?

We may now summarise for convenience, the position as to who should give evidence in regard to matters involving personal knowledge:

(a) An attorney holder who has signed the plaint and instituted the suit, but has no personal knowledge of the transaction can only give formal evidence about the validity of the power of attorney and the filing of the suit.

(b) If the attorney holder has done any act or handled any transactions, in pursuance of the power of attorney granted by the principal, he may be examined as a witness to prove those acts or transactions. If the attorney holder alone has personal knowledge of such acts and transactions and not the principal, the attorney holder shall be examined, if those acts and transactions have to be proved.

(c) The attorney holder cannot depose or give evidence in place of his principal for the acts done by the principal or transactions or dealings of the principal, of which principal alone has personal knowledge.

(d) Where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by an attorney holder, necessarily the attorney holder alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. This frequently happens in case of principals carrying on business through authorized managers/attorney holders or persons residing abroad managing their affairs through their attorney holders.

(e) Where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular attorney holder, the principal has to examine that attorney holder to prove the transaction, and not a different or subsequent attorney holder.

(f) Where different attorney holders had dealt with the matter at different stages of the transaction, if evidence has to be led as to what transpired at those different stages, all the attorney holders will have to be examined.

(g) Where the law requires or contemplated the plaintiff or other party to a proceeding, to establish or prove something with reference to his 'state of mind' or 'conduct', normally the person concerned alone has to give evidence and not an attorney holder. A landlord who seeks eviction of his tenant, on the ground of his 'bona fide' need and a purchaser seeking specific performance who has to show his 'readiness and willingness' fall under this category. There is however a recognized exception to this requirement. Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or 'readiness and willingness'. Examples of such attorney holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 147-148 of 2001

Decided On: 05.10.2010

 Man Kaur (dead) by LRS. Vs. Hartar Singh Sangha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
R.V. Raveendran and Aftab Alam, JJ.

Citation: JT 2010(10) 565
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Sunday, 17 September 2017

Whether principal can deny receipt of money by his agent?

From the foregoing findings arrived at by the Courts below, it has been held that there was an Agreement to construct a flat for the appellant dated 2-8-1995 whereby a substantial amount of the costs of the consideration was duly paid to the respondent No. 1. There is a dispute with regard to an amount of ` 1,79,995/- which the appellant claims to have paid to the representative of the respondent No. 1 G. A, Naik and Y.G. Naik. It is contended by the respondent No. 1 that no payment was received by the said two persons on behalf of the respondent No. 1 nor were they authorised to receive such amount. The appellant is admittedly occupying the subject premises from 5-4-1998. It is contended by the respondent No. 1 that it was only a permission to keep the furniture and as the respondents began erecting a gate at the entrance where the suit Flat was located, the appellant filed the suit on 30-6-1998 and obtained an interim relief which was served on 1-7-1998 on the respondents. The subject termination by the respondent No. 1 was by notice dated 7-7-1998 addressed to M/s. Straight Deals which the appellant alleged have not received till date. The Order of injunction granted was confirmed on 15-9-1998 and an Appeal was preferred before the learned Addl. District Judge which came to be disposed of on 9-9-1999. A revision was preferred before this Court which came to be dispose of by Order dated 27-7-2000 with a direction that the amount which has been deposited by the appellant in the High Court be paid to the party which is found entitled to receive at the end of the trial. What emerges from the findings on facts is that the respondent No. 1 disputes the payment of a sum of ` 2,07,000/- which the appellant admittedly paid in the hands of Mr. G.A. Naik and Mr. Y.G. Naik, who the respondent No. 1 claims to be not authorised to receive the amounts on behalf of the respondent No. 1. The learned Trial Judge has in fact found that though the payments were made to the said two persons by the appellants, there was no material on record to show that the said persons were authorised by the respondent No. 1 to receive payments on their behalf towards the subject Flat. The Lower Appellate Court has also found that the letter produced on record of the said Shri G.A. Naik at exhibit Pw. 1/P which shows that the said Mr. G.A. Naik had stated that he had not received any amount on behalf of the respondent No. 1 would show that the amounts paid to said Mr. G.A. Naik and Mr. Y.G. Naik, were not part of the consideration of the suit Flat as it was claimed that such amounts were paid by the appellant in repayment of the amounts towards customs duty payable by the appellant. Both the Courts have also noted that said Mr. G.A. Naik was in fact authorised to take bookings on behalf of the respondent No. 1. The Lower Appellate Court found that non-examination of Mr. G.A. Naik was irrelevant as the appellant has failed to establish that he was duly authorised to receive amounts on behalf of the respondent No. 1. But, however, the fact remains that a sketch is placed on record prepared in the handwriting of the respondent No. 5/defendant No. 5 disclosing to the appellant the road they would have to take to reach the residence of said Mr. G.A. Naik who is the father of Mr. Y.G. Naik. The fact that amounts were transferred from the NRI Account of the appellant in favour of the said Mr. G.A. Naik and Mr. Y.G. Naik, has been duly established. The defendant No. 5-respondent No. 5 has not been examined in the Court. The sketch produced on record in the handwriting of respondent No. 5 was delivered to the appellant. Once it is established that Mr. G.A. Naik was the booking Agent for Flats in the subject building in Mumbai appointed by the respondent No. 1 and when the appellants have established a payment of a sum of ` 2,07,000/- in the hands of said Mr. G.A. Naik and Mr. Y.G. Naik and the sketch prepared by the respondent No. 5 is established, the burden shifted on the respondents to establish that Mr. G.A. Naik had limited powers or exceeded the power whilst dealing with the prospective Flat purchases of the respondent No. 1. In the written statement filed by the respondents, it has been admitted that the said G.A. Naik, was an agent in Mumbai but contending that he was only a booking agent and had no authority to collect money on behalf of the respondent No. 1. In fact, the appellant sought clarification from the said G.A. Naik that such amounts were paid towards the part consideration of the cost of constructing the subject Flat. The contents of the letter addressed by the said G.A. Naik at Exhibit PW1/P are seriously disputed by the appellant and, as such, cannot by itself support the case of the respondents that such amount was paid towards the custom duty. What has to be noted is that the appellant proceeded to the address drawn on the sketch by the respondent No. 5 to contact the said G.A. Naik to make such payment. In terms of section 186 of the Contract Act, the authority of an agent may be express or implied. Once it is established that the appellant proceeded to hand over the amount at the instance of the respondent No. 5 who is one of the partners of the respondent No. 1 and when the said G.A. Naik is admitted to be an agent though claimed to be only a booking agent, the circumstance can clearly imply that he was authorised to receive such payment specially when neither the said G.A. Naik nor the respondent No. 5 who has prepared the sketch have entered the witness box to show that such amount has been received towards the payment of custom duty as claimed by the respondents. In such circumstances, the Courts below were not justified to come to the conclusion that the amounts so paid were not in connection with the suit agreement. But the fact remains that this Court whilst disposing of the application for temporary injunction, had directed the deposit of the disputed amount of ` 1,79,995/- which included the amount towards extra work, by the appellant which has been duly complied with.

10. Mr. S.D. Lotlikar, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the appellant, upon instructions, states that in view of the said Order of this Court, the appellant has not challenged the directions to pay such amount to the respondent No. 1 herein. In such circumstances, though the Courts below have erroneously found that the appellant has failed to establish that the said amount of consideration was not paid by the appellant, nevertheless, I find that the non-examination of the defendant No. 5/respondent No. 5 and said Mr. G.A. Naik to prove the contents of the said two documents Pw. 1/F and Pw. 1/P, the Court would have to draw an adverse inference against the respondent No. 1 herein. No doubt, the Courts below have concurrently found that the appellant has failed to establish that the said Mr. G.A. Naik was duly authorised by the respondent No. 1 to receive the amount from the appellant on their behalf but, however, the fact remains that as said Mr. G.A. Naik was a booking Agent representing the respondent No. 1 in Mumbai, the Courts below were not justified to cast the burden on the appellant to establish the extent of such authority.

11. The extent of the authority of Mr. G.A. Naik would be an aspect to be established by the respondent No. 1 herein. Once it is admitted position that Shri G.A. Naik was a booking Agent for the respondent No. 1 and the appellant had in fact claimed that a substantial sum of money was paid to said G.A. Naik and his son towards the balance amount payable by the appellant towards the consideration of the subject Flat, the burden had shifted on the respondent No. 1 to establish that he had exceeded his authority in receiving such amount. The contention of the respondents based on the said letters addressed by said G.A. Naik to the appellant cannot be accepted as the contents whereof are not admitted by the appellant in the Court nor the respondent No. 5 who had guided the appellant to the residence of G.A. Naik, was also not examined in Court. Such payments were effected by the appellant in the course of the business relationship between the respondent No. 1 and the said G.A. Naik who was admittedly a booking agent. The respondent No. 1 has not produced the terms of authority upon which the said G.A. Naik was authorised to function as a booking agent in Mumbai. In such circumstances, the Courts below have taken an erroneous view with that regard by placing the burden on the appellant to establish that said G.A. Naik and his son were entitled to receive the amounts on behalf of the respondent No. 1.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

S.A. No. 23 of 2003

Decided On: 31.03.2017

 Sharad Prabhudas Vs. Sapana Real Estates and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
F.M. Reis, J.

Citation:2017(4) MHLJ 227
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Friday, 14 April 2017

Whether irrevocable power of attorney can be revoked by principal?

 This case on hand from the above facts comes only
under Section 201 and not with any bar under Section 202 of the
Act to revoke the GPA.  It is thus rightly concluded by the lower
appellate Court of the GPA given for Ac.6-00 guntas of land to sell,
as already sold and the transaction is completed even with third
party and for nothing remained thereunder and from any of the
terms of the GPA there is nothing to show any consideration or
obligation of the agent involved to be fulfilled by principal with any
express contract therefrom to make it irrevocable till then and
thereby even the nomenclature mentions as irrevocable including
in the title as laid down in John Kotaiah supra that wording does
not make the GPA irrevocable for the principal got always absolute
power to revoke. Thereby there is nothing to interfere by sitting in
revision against the impugned order of the lower appellate Court.

HYDERABAD HIGH COURT
HONBLE DR. JUSTICE B. SIVA SANKARA RAO         

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.4219 of 2016    

Dated:19-01-2017 

Siddareddy Venkatanagaraja Reddy Vs  Mir Shahamat Ali Khan 

Citation: AIR 2017 Hydera 59
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Saturday, 28 January 2017

Whether power of attorney holder can get personal benefits by doing any act on behalf of principal?

 The law relating to power of attorney is governed by the provisions of the Power of Attorney Act, 1982. It is well settled therein that an agent acting under a power of attorney always acts, as a general rule, in the name of his principal. Any document executed or thing done by an agent on the strength of power of attorney is as effective as if executed or done in the name of principal, i.e., by the principal himself. An agent, therefore, always acts on behalf of the principal and exercises only those powers, which are given to him in the power of attorney by the principal. Any act or thing done by the agent on the strength of power of attorney is, therefore, never construed or/and treated to have been done by the agent in his personal capacity so as to create any right in his favour but is always construed as having done by the principal himself. An agent, therefore, never gets any personal benefit of any nature. Applying the aforesaid principle, this Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Private Limited (2) vs. State of Haryana & Anr., (2012) 1 SCC 656 held in paragraphs 20 and 21 as under:
“20. A power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the grantor authorises the grantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of grantor, which when executed will be binding on the grantor as if done by him (see Section 1-A and Section 2 of the Powers of Attorney Act, 1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the grantee.
21. In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata, (2005) 12 SCC 77, this Court held: (SCC pp. 90 & 101, paras 13 & 52) “13. A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known, a document of convenience.
* * *
52. Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the Contract Act as also thePowers of Attorney Act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed hereinbefore, is executed by the donor so as to enable the donee to act on his behalf. Except in cases where power of attorney is coupled with interest, it is revocable. The donee in exercise of his power under such power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the donee.” An attorney-holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the grantor.” This was followed by this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706 (para 20)
43) When we apply this well settled principle of law to the facts of the case in hand, we are of the considered view that when Dhanapal, who was acting as an agent of A. Radhakrishnan on the strength of power of attorney, executed the tenancy agreement with respondent No. 1 in relation to the suit premises then he did such execution for and behalf of his principal - A Radhakrishnan, which resulted in creating a relationship of landlord and tenant between A. Radhakrishnan and respondent No. 1 in relation to the suit premises. In this execution, Dhanapal being an agent did not get any right, title and interest of any nature either in the suit premises or in tenancy in himself. The effect of execution of tenancy agreement by an agent was as if A. Radhakrishnan himself had executed with respondent No.1.
44) In view of the foregoing discussion, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not right in holding that the tenancy in relation to suit premises was with Dhanapal. We cannot thus concur with the finding of the High Court and accordingly reverse the finding and hold that the appellants were able to prove that the tenancy in relation to the suit premises was between A. Radhakrishnan and respondent No.1 and on the death of A. Radhakrishnan, it was created between the appellants and respondent No.1 by operation of law which entitled the appellants to maintain the eviction petition against respondent No.1 seeking his eviction on the grounds available to them under the Act.
Reportable
Supreme Court of India
Tmt. Kasthuri Radhakrishnan & Ors vs M.Chinniyan & Anr on 28 January, 2016

Bench: J. Chelameswar, Abhay Manohar Sapre

   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

   CIVIL APPEAL No.5158 OF 2009

Citation;(2016)3 SCC296
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Friday, 28 October 2016

Whether non examination of principal is fatal to case if agent was examined who was having knowledge of facts of case?

The appellant contended that none of the three vendors (defendants 1, 2 and 3) stepped into the witness box to give evidence and therefore an  adverse inference should be drawn against them that the case put forth by them is incorrect. Reliance was also placed on the decisions of this court in Vidhyadhar v. Mankikrao & Anr. (1999) 3 SCC 573 and Balasaheb Dayandeo Naik (Dead) through LRs. and Ors. v. Appasaheb Dattatraya Pawar (2008 ) 4 SCC 464 in that behalf. There were four defendants in the suit. Defendants 1,2 and 3, who were the owners of the lands were respectively the wife, son and daughter of the fourth defendant. It is an admitted position that the entire transaction was done on behalf of the defendants 1,2 and 3 by defendant No.4 who alone had complete knowledge of the entire transaction. Fourth defendant has given evidence on behalf of all the other defendants. When one of the defendants who is conversant with the facts has given evidence, it is not necessary for the other defendants to be examined as witnesses to duplicate the evidence.
The legal position as to who should give evidence in regard to the matters involving personal knowledge have been laid down by this court in Man Kaur (dead) by LRS. v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010) 10 SCC 512. This court has held that where the entire transaction has been conducted through a particular agent or representative, the principal has to examine that agent to prove the transaction; and that where the principal at no point of time had personally handled or dealt with or participated in the transaction and has no personal knowledge of the transaction, and where the entire transaction has been handled by the agent, necessarily the agent  alone can give evidence in regard to the transaction. This court further observed:
"Where all the affairs of a party are completely managed, transacted and looked after by an attorney (who may happen to be a close family member), it may be possible to accept the evidence of such attorney even with reference to bona fides or 'readiness and willingness'. Examples of such attorney holders are a husband/wife exclusively managing the affairs of his/her spouse, a son/daughter exclusively managing the affairs of an old and infirm parent, a father/mother exclusively managing the affairs of a son/daughter living abroad."
Therefore the evidence of the fourth defendant (examined as DW2) was sufficient to put forth the case of the defendants and there was no need to examine the other three defendants who did not have full or complete knowledge of the transactions. In the circumstances we find no merit in the contention that the suits ought to have been decreed, as defendants 1,2 and 3 did not step into the witness box.

Reportable
Supreme Court of India

Saradamani Kandappan vs S. Rajalakshmi & Ors on 4 July, 2011
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Monday, 9 November 2015

Whether there can be transaction of sale of goods between agent and principal?

All the above referred terms and conditions show nothing but authority of respondent no. 2 to sell the goods in it's own right and pass on the title to the goods in it's own right to the specified buyer. The essence of contract of sale under Section 4 of The Sale of Goods Act, 1930 lies in transfer of the property in goods by the seller to a buyer for a price. Whenever the seller transfers or agrees to transfer the property in goods to a buyer for a price, the contract is of sale. As against this, in a contract under which a relationship of agent and principal is created, an agentwp4383.08.odt cannot deal with the goods as if they are his own goods and cannot pass on the title in his own right to the buyer for a price. These attributes of agency are absent in the said agreements which rather fulfill the characteristics of contract of sale and, therefore, the argument that respondent no. 2 acted only as an agent for importing edible oil on behalf of Government and that there was no sale effected between respondents 2 and 3, cannot be accepted.
Bombay High Court
Mumbai Agricultural Produce ... vs The Hon\'Ble Minister For ... on 20 July, 2015
Citation;AIR 2015 Bombay 234
CORAM : Naresh H. Patil and S.B. Shukre, JJ.
Read full judgment here;click here
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Whether agent can act in his own right and for himself?

Now, let us deal with the first question. Under Section 182 of The Indian Contract Act, 1872, an "agent" is a person employed to do any act for another or to represent another in dealings with third persons. The person for whom something is done or who is so represented is called the principal. Thus, a contract of agency is created only when authority is given to a person called the agent to represent the principal in dealing with third persons or to do something for the principal. Whatever is done by the agent in pursuance of such an authority or employment, would be for and in the name of the principal and, therefore, could be said in law to be done by the principal only.
AIR 2012 SC 264, in paragraph 22, the Hon'ble Apex Court described the relationship between agent and principal in these words -
"...... An agent is merely an extended hand of the principal and cannot claim independent rights."
10. In the case of Sourthern Roadways Ltd., Madurai v.
S.M. Krishnan - AIR 1990 SC 673 while examining the issue as to whether the possession of the agent can be termed to be the possession of the principal for all purposes including the acquisition of title and the Hon'ble Apex Court held that agent who receives property from or for his principal, obtains no interest for himself in the property for the reason that possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fiduciary relationship the agent cannot claim his own possession.
11. In the case of Kalyanji Kuwarji v. Tirkaram Sheolal & ors. - AIR 1938 Nagpur 254 Single Bench of Nagpur High Court dealt with the question as to whether a commission agent engaged by a principal for selling the goods on his behalf on commission could be considered as his agent. The facts of the case were that the plaintiff, a merchant from Khamgaon dealing in the purchase and sale of grain and cotton seed, had engaged the defendants, also merchants carrying on their business at Sonpat in Punjab to act as commission agents for selling of goods on plaintiff's instructions being received by them at Sonpat. The arrangement was this; plaintiff was to send to the defendants consignment of goods from time to time from Khamgaon; defendants were to keep the goods with them and await instructions from the plaintiff about the sale; then as soon as the plaintiff gave them the word, they were to sell and in due course hand over the sale proceeds to the plaintiff less their commission charges. The money, however, was not to be paid at Khamgaon but at Delhi. Vivian Bose, J. (as his Lordship then was) delivering the judgment devised a twin test for answering the question when his Lordship observed thus :
"The test to my mind is this ..... does the commission agent when he sells have authority to sell in his own name? Has he authority in his own right to pass a valid title? If he has then he is acting as a principal vis- a-vis the purchasers and not merely as an agent and therefore from that point on he is a debtor of his erstwhile principal and not merely an agent. Whether this is so or not must of course depend upon the facts in each particular case."
12. It would be clear from the above-referred cases governing the field that an agent cannot perform an act in his own right and for himself. He is essentially a person who does something on instructions or under the authority given to him by his principal and his such performance binds the principal. In other words, it is the principal who, in law, is answerable to the third person for the acts done by his agent as long as the acts so performed fall within the scope of employment or authority of the agent. It would then mean that a commission agent would have no authority to sell in his own name and would have no authority in his own right to pass on a valid title.
Bombay High Court
Mumbai Agricultural Produce ... vs The Hon\'Ble Minister For ... on 20 July, 2015
Citation;AIR 2015 Bombay 234
CORAM : Naresh H. Patil and S.B. Shukre, JJ.
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Friday, 31 July 2015

Whether agent can be sued when principal is known?

It is a settled legal proposition that an agent cannot be sued where the principal is known. In the instant case, the appellant has not taken plea before either of the courts below. In view of the provisions of Order VIII Rule 2 CPC, the appellant was under an obligation to take a specific plea to show that the suit was not maintainable which it failed to do so. The vague plea to the extent that the suit was bad for non-joinder and, thus, was not maintainable, did not meet the requirement of law. The appellant ought to have taken a plea in the written statement that it was merely an `agent' of the Central Government, thus the suit against it was not maintainable. More so, whether A is an agent of B is a question of fact and has to be properly pleaded and proved by adducing evidence. The appellant miserably failed to take the required pleadings for the purpose.
Supreme Court of India
National Textile Corp.Ltd vs Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad & ... on 5 September, 2011

Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan
Citation;(2011) 12 SCC 695.
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Sunday, 5 July 2015

Whether agent is liable for giving of accounts if he sell property of principal unauthorisedly?


Commercial - recovery - suit for recovery - it was proved that some bales of cloth were undoubtedly entrusted to defendant for being deposited in their godown were sold by defendants - sale proceeds not paid to plaintiff - once it was proved that defendant was in possession of bales in question which formed part of bales of cloth it was duty of defendant to account for same - defendant has given no explanation for same - oral as well as documentary evidence led by plaintiff showed that goods in question were sold by defendant but sale proceeds were not paid to plaintiff - claim of plaintiff as regards to goods in question justified and cannot be disallowed.
Supreme Court of India
Madan Gopal Kanodia vs Mamraj Maniram And Ors. on 15 January, 1976
Equivalent citations: AIR 1976 SC 461, (1977) 1 SCC 669

Bench: R Sarkaria, S M Ali
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Sunday, 19 April 2015

When principal is liable jointly and severally with agent to restore amount received from third party?


 In Goolabchand v. Miller (1938) 2 M.L.J. 688 a Bench of this Court consisting of Varadachariar and|Pandrang Row, JJ., observed as follows at pages 694-695:
It is only when the contract as such cannot be enforced against the principal, that the lender has to fall back on the equitable rule founded on the theory of 'unjust enrichment'. Though the authorities have not been uniform as to the precise basis of the rule, the rule itself is now well established that, where by any wrongful or unauthorised act of an agent the money or property of a third person comes to the hands of the principal or is applied for his benefit, the principal is liable jointly and severally with the agent to restore the amount or the value of such money or property (see Bowstead, Article 103). In some cases, the plaintiff's right was based on the count for money had and received or the theory of failure of consideration, and sometimes on the analogy of the count for money paid to the use of the defendant. Again the theory of subrogation was at one time suggested as the analogy but it was later on pointed out that the analogy was not true. In re Wrexham Mold and Connahs' Quay Railway Co. L.R. (1890) 1 Ch. 440. It was also suggested that in such cases, there was really no borrowing at all, because there was no addition to the principal's total liability but merely a substitution of liability to another (the lender) in place of the pre-existing liability to another (the person paid off). Other cases have supported the claim only on grounds of equity ; and in In re Wrexham Mold and Connah's Quay Railway Co. L.R. (1890) 1 Ch. 440, two of the Lords Justices observed that the effect of the rule was to make the borrowing valid to the extent to which the principal has received the money or the benefit of its application.
In Mahalingam Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar and Ors. Appeal No. 665 of 1948, it was held:
It was first contended that the case fell within the doctrine of unjust enrichment. The basis of the doctrine is that if a person has received any property or benefit from another it is just that he should make restitution as otherwise he would be unjustly enriched at the expense of the other. This doctrine so far as we are concerned is embodied in Sections 69 and 70 of the Indian Contract Act and it is generally recognised that these Sections are much wider in scope than the doctrine as applied in England and go far beyond it. Mr. Rajah Ayyar referred to the following passage in Leake on Contracts (8th edition) which may be taken as an accurate statement of the English Law, 'A debt for money paid arises where a person has paid money for another under circumstances and upon occasions which make it just and equitable that it should be repaid ; a debt or promise to pay is then implied in law, without any actual agreement to that effect.
Madras High Court
Govindarajulu Naidu And Ors. vs S.S. Naidu Alias Soundararajulu ... on 17 January, 1958
Equivalent citations: (1958) 2 MLJ 148
Author: Ramaswami


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Thursday, 4 December 2014

Whether there can be valid registration of document by power of attorney when principal is dead?

 In the interval between the execution of the completed deed and its presentation to the registrar the munshi died. The legal question now to be considered turns on this last fact. The narrative, however, may be completed by mentioning that the registrar accepted the deed and registered it, recording in writing that the man who had executed it and whose attorney presented it for registration was dead.
 It was not attempted on the part of the appellant to justify the registration of the deed, as regularly done in accordance with the Act. The departure from the Act is indeed palpable, and the only question is whether it invalidates the registration. The Act, by Section 32, enacts that every document to be registered under it, whether such registration be compulsory (as in the present case) or optional (as in the case of other classes of instruments), shall be presented by some person executing or claiming under the same, or by the representative or assign of such person, or by the agent of such person, representative or assign, duly authorized by power of attorney. Now the case in hand is that of a person who, when he presented the deed for registration, as he Bays he did, on November 4, 1889, stood in no other relation to the deed than that, before the death of the person executing it, he had held his power of attorney. It is perfectly plain, not merely from the general law, but from the terms of this Section 32 itself, that after the man's death the only attorney who would have any locus standi would have been the attorney of the representative or assign of the deceased. It has been suggested, however, that the error of the registrar was a defect in his procedure only, and accordingly, under Section 87, does not invalidate the act of registration. To their Lordships the error appears to be of a more radical nature. When the terms of Section 32 are considered with due regard to the nature of registration of deeds, it is clear that the power and jurisdiction of the registrar only come into play when he is invoked by some person having a direct relation to the deed. It is for those persons to consider whether they will or will not give to the deed the efficacy conferred by registration. The registrar could not be held to exercise the jurisdiction conferred on him, if, hearing of the execution of a deed, he got possession of it and registered it; and the same objection applies to his proceeding at the instigation of a third party, who might be a busybody. Now, it seems to their Lordships that when the deed was presented on November 4, 1889, it was presented by a volunteer, and the registrar's minute shows that he proceeded to register at the request of one whom he knew to derive his power of attorney from a dead man. Nor is it possible to treat this action of the registrar as compliance with the request made on October 16, 1889, when the principal was alive. Not only had the deed in fact been executed afresh on October 24, but it was presented afresh on November 4, as the minute itself bears; and, even assuming the continuity of the proceeding, the death of the applicant brought it to an end. The registrar, indeed, did not merely disregard Section 32, for he proceeded to accept the admission of the alleged attorney as a good admission of the execution of the deed, although Section 34 requires in the case of a decease the admission of the representative or assign.
Their Lordships were referred to two decisions of this Committee in support of the appellants' contention. Neither case gives any countenance to the view that the absence of any party legally entitled to present a deed for registration is a defect in procedure falling under Section 87. In both those cases the registrar was throughout moved by a person having title, and was exercising his jurisdiction. The difference is, in their Lordships' judgment, vital. They therefore hold the registration of this deed to have been illegal.
BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Decided On: 08.12.1900
Appellants: Mujibunnissa and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Abdul Rahim and Abdul Aziz

 Citation: 1912(14)BOMLR295, 14Ind. Cas.988

Robertson, J.
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Wednesday, 3 December 2014

Whether there can be valid registration of document presented by power of attorney when principal is dead?



Property - settlement deed - Sections 32 and 87 of Registration Act, 1908 - respondent in second appeal challenged validity of settlement deed on ground that it was obtained by settees fraudulently and collusively - question of validity of presentation for registration after death of executant by power of attorney agent whose power had come to an end by death of principal has to be decided with reference to provisions of Act - if presentation for registration was ab initio defective in that it did not conform to requirements of Act - initial defect in presentation for registration affected jurisdiction of registering officer - where document presented by person not empowered to do so then there is initial defect as contemplated under Section 32 (c) - in event of proper presentation of document registering officer is enjoined to further proceed with subsequent steps - held, impugned presentation is invalid and does not pass title.
Madras High Court
Sekar Mudaliar And Etc vs Shajathi Bi And Anr. on 4 August, 1986
Equivalent citations: AIR 1987 Mad 239, (1987) IMLJ 248
Bench: Ratnam
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Thursday, 7 August 2014

Leading Supreme court Judgment on admissibility of deposition given by power of attorney on behalf of principal in cheque dishonour case


While holding that there is no serious conflict between the decisions in MMTC (supra) and Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani (supra), we clarify the position and answer the questions in the following manner:
i. Filing of complaint petition under Section 138 of N.I Act through power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent.
ii. The Power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions.
iii. It is required by the complainant to make specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint and the power of attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a witness in the case.
iv. In the light of section 145 of N.I Act, it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I Act and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to examine the complainant of his witness upon oath for taking the decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act.
v. The functions under the general power of attorney cannot be delegated to another person without specific clause permitting the same in the power of attorney. Nevertheless, the general power of attorney itself can be cancelled and be given to another person.
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
A.C. Narayanan Vs. State of Maharashtra & ANR.
[Criminal Appeal No. 73 of 2007]
Shri G. Kamalakar Vs. M/s. Surana Securities Ltd. & ANR.
[Criminal Appeal No. of 2013 arising out of S.L.P. (CRL.) No.2724 of 2008]
Dated; 13 sept 2013
P. Sathasivam, CJI.
Citation;AIR2014SC630,2013ALLMR(Cri)4048, 2014CriLJ576, (2014)11SCC790
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