Domestic Violence Act Cases Have No Penal Consequence Except For Breach Of Protection Order: Supreme Court Criticises Issuance Of Bailable Warrants

Learned counsel representing the petitioner

submits that the petitioner is having a specially

abled minor son who is suffering from hearing

impairment. She is unemployed and is fully

dependent on her father for her survival. It is

further pointed out that the Court below has issued

bailable warrants against the petitioner vide order

dated 06.02.2024.

This Court is constrained to observe that there

is no justification whatsoever for the Trial Court

to have issued bailable warrants in an application

filed under the provisions of the D.V. Act. The

proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi criminal

proceedings which do not have any penal consequence

except where there is a violation or breach of a

protection order. Therefore, the learned Magistrate

was absolutely unjustified in directing issuance of

bailable warrants against the petitioner.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

TRANSFER PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.856/2024

ALISHA BERRY  Vs  NEELAM BERRY 

Dated: JANUARY 03, 2025.

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Whether police can register offence U/S 31 of Domestic violence Act if respondent fails to pay maintenance amount in breach of protection order?

The "economic abuse" has been explained in clause (iv) of Explanation I of Section 3 of the Act wherein deprivation of all or any economic or financial resources to which the aggrieved person is entitled under any law or custom whether payable under an order of a court or otherwise or which the aggrieved person requires out of necessary is an expression of "domestic violence".{Para 16}

 The amount of maintenance awarded by the Magistrate is an amount which an aggrieved person requires to meet necessities of life and for survival. Such amount is not limited to household. It includes maintenance as well. Therefore, the order passed by the Magistrate granting maintenance is an affirmative order of protection in relation to domestic violence as defined in Section 3 of the Act. For such violation, the penalty is provided in Section 31 of the Act. {Para 16}

21. In the result this Court holds as follows:-

Section 31 of the DV Act is a key provision and heartbeat of the DV Act to regulate the violator of protection order passed under Section 18 of the DV Act. The question as to whether the law enforcing authority has jurisdiction to register the Criminal Case under Section 31 of the Act for non-payment of maintenance allowance which is deemed to be breach of protection order under Section 18 of the Act, is answered affirmatively and the law enforcing authority has jurisdiction to register the case and proceed in accordance with law for every breach of order without any legal bar for the reason that each breach of order amounts to a continuing offence.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS (MADURAI BENCH)

Crl. O.P. (MD) No. 15704 of 2018, Crl. M.P. (MD) Nos. 6953 and 6954 of 2018

Decided On: 06.03.2023

S. Amalraj Vs. State and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.K. Ramakrishanan, J.

Citation:  MANU/TN/4321/2023.

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Under what circumstances the court can pass protection order and residence order under Domestic violence Act?

 S 18 of Domestic violence Act:- Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from—

(a) committing any act of domestic violence;

(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;

(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;

(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;

(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;

(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;

(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.

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Important provisions on Domestic violence Act

2. Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) “aggrieved person” means any woman who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic violence by the respondent;

(e) “domestic incident report” means a report made in the prescribed form on receipt of a complaint of domestic violence from an aggrieved person;

(f) “domestic relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household, when they are related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family;

(q) “respondent” means any 2[adult male] person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:

3[Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage may also file a complaint against the relative of the husband or the male partner];

^2. Deleted vide Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165.

^3. Deleted vide Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165.

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Whether divorced wife is entitled to get protection order as per domestic violence Act?

  The third limb of argument of the learned counsel for the

petitioner was that when the domestic relationship between parties

stood severed, any application of the divorced wife thereafter can

only be considered as a relief sought against a stranger and does

not fall within the ambit of a domestic violence.         As mentioned

above, the scope of the Act is not confined within the limits of time

and space. Even though at blush, it may appear to be paradoxical to

argue that protection orders can be sought even after separation of

spouses, such a cause of action may not be rare, which arises

subsequent to the divorce, but relateable to the earlier matrimonial

relationship. It is not unusual that even after divorce, certain

obligations arising from past matrimonial relationship continue,

like, maintainance, custody of children, liability to pay amounts or

assets received, operation of bank accounts and personal safety of

divorced wife and children born in the wedlock. It will be illogical

and absurd to hold that the moment of divorce is granted, scope of

protection order also ceases.         It cannot be confined within the

barriers of time and space. Further, the scope of section 18 which

is wide enough to take in any violence which is likely to take place

in the place of employment of aggrieved person, or if the aggrieved



person is a minor, its school or any place frequented by child or

attempting to communicate with the aggrieved person by any

means, including electronic media, indicates that domestic violence

may spread outside, even beyond the four walls of the matrimonial

home. Hence, any act of violence which satisfies the definition of

section 3 of the Act and has a rational nexus to the past matrimonial

relationship, or which arises therefrom or as a sequel to that

relationship, should conceptually fall within the provisions of

Domestic Violence Act. In the above circumstance, considering the

wide scope of the Act, the object of the Act, I find reason to hold

that the ratio in Priya's case (supra) will extend to section 18 of the

D.V Act and other reliefs also.         Hence, even a divorced wife is

entitled to initiate proceedings under sections 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22

of D.V Act to seek appropriate reliefs.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                            PRESENT:

            MR. JUSTICE SUNIL THOMAS

    13TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2016

                   Crl.MC.No. 2990 of 2016 

           BIPIN, V  MEERA D.S.,
          Citation: 2017 CRL1171 Kerala

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Whether application made under DV Act for protection order can be viewed as complaint of offence u/s 31 of said Act?

 In the instant case, learned Magistrate passed an interim protection order granting maintenance which by itself does not constitute an offence. Section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act makes a breach of protection order, final or interim, an offence under the said Act. Issue of the applicability of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prescribing bar to taking cognizance after the lapse of the period of limitation prescribed therein would only arise at the time of taking cognizance of such an offence as spelt out under section 31 of the Domestic Violence Act. On the date of the alleged desertion of the respondents, there was no protection order and as such there could be no breach of it translating the said occurrence into a crime as spelt out under Section 31 of the said Act. Thus, the application made by the applicant under the Domestic Violence Act for protection order can not be viewed as a complaint of the offence u/s 31 of the Domestic Violence Act. Submission on behalf of the petitioner that the present proceedings are hit by Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is, therefore, without any merit. Learned Sessions Judge, Ahmednagar, therefore, rightly dismissed such submission made on behalf of the petitioners by making pertinent observations at para 22 of the impugned judgment.

10. Submissions as regards the nature of the action initiated by the respondents i.e. the counter blast to the action initiated by the petitioner to seek custody of the children, it can only be said that hunger knows no limitation and need for sustenance can arise any time

Bombay High Court

Shaikh Ishaq Budhanbhai vs (Original on 8 August, 2012

Bench: U. D. Salvi

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