Whether wife can claim streedhan in proceeding U/S 27 of Hindu Marriage Act?

 That a wife has an independent right to recover "Stridhan " by filing a civil suit or by invoking any other independent remedy under the common law, can be no ground to oust the special jurisdiction conferred upon the matrimonial Court under Section 27 of the Act. There appears to be explicit legislative intendment behind Section 27 of the Act that all ancillary and allied disputes between a husband and wife should also be resolved along with the main controversy. Only the items with a definite life span like the clothes, shoes or other wearables, can fall within the scope of 'exclusive property' of either the husband or the wife and not the other valuable assets which can be utilized by any one of them. Traditionally, the gold ornaments are considered to be a valuable property and an addition to the joint assets of a family and, thus, can not be excluded from the purview of Section 27 of the Act even if it is a part of "Stridhan". The aforesaid conclusion stands fortified by the views taken by their Lordships of the Apex Court in Balkrishna Ramchandra Kadam's case (supra) where the wife's claim for return of jewelry was not turned down on the ground that it was an " Stridhan " or that a petition under Section 27 of the Act for recovery of those items was not maintainable, as also in Pratibha Rani's case (supra).

{Para 19}

20.A perusal of the list (Ex.PA) reveals that the "ornaments" include items like a 'gold ring' given to the appellant (Sr. No. 18 of the list). Similarly, several other items like the Television, Stablizer, Wall Clock, Alarm, Wrist Watch, Iron Press, Transistor, Table Fan and Suit case etc. are of common and joint use, though most of the jewelry items, (mentioned in the said list Ex.PA) are those which might be exclusively belonging to the respondent. However, all such items having been given by the parents of the respondent at or about the time of marriage, the same can not be segregated to compel the respondent to seek recovery thereof through multifarious legal proceedings.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH

F.A.O. No. 159-M of 1995

Decided On: 11.08.2006

Subhash Chander Rohila Vs. Asha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Surya Kant, J.

Citation:  MANU/PH/0657/2006.

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Under what circumstances the court can pass protection order and residence order under Domestic violence Act?

 S 18 of Domestic violence Act:- Protection orders.—The Magistrate may, after giving the aggrieved person and the respondent an opportunity of being heard and on being prima facie satisfied that domestic violence has taken place or is likely to take place, pass a protection order in favour of the aggrieved person and prohibit the respondent from—

(a) committing any act of domestic violence;

(b) aiding or abetting in the commission of acts of domestic violence;

(c) entering the place of employment of the aggrieved person or, if the person aggrieved is a child, its school or any other place frequented by the aggrieved person;

(d) attempting to communicate in any form, whatsoever, with the aggrieved person, including personal, oral or written or electronic or telephonic contact;

(e) alienating any assets, operating bank lockers or bank accounts used or held or enjoyed by both the parties, jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent or singly by the respondent, including her stridhan or any other property held either jointly by the parties or separately by them without the leave of the Magistrate;

(f) causing violence to the dependants, other relatives or any person who give the aggrieved person assistance from domestic violence;

(g) committing any other act as specified in the protection order.

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Whether court can refuse to release husband on anticipatory bail in an offence U/S 498A of IPC if stridhan is to be recovered from him?

 The Petitioner is accused of offence under Sections 498-A, 406

IPC. The perusal of the status report shows that the custodial

interrogation of the Petitioner is being sought only for recovery of Istridhan. The recovery of Istridhan alone cannot be a reason to deny anticipatory bail to the Petitioner. The police are vested with sufficient powers under the Cr.P.C to conduct searches of premises. Further, the material on record shows that there are cross-complaints. The petitioner had filed a complaint in 2018 stating that the complainant’s father is threatening him. There is nothing on record to show that the Petitioner and his family are in such a position that they would be able to threaten the witnesses. It is trite law that the Police Officer before arresting the accused who is accused of offence which is punishable with

imprisonment for a period of seven years has to be satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent a person from committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him by disclosing such facts to the Courts or the Police Officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever required

cannot be ensured. As Stated earlier, the mere fact that the recovery of Istridhan cannot be the sole ground for arresting a person for an offence under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC. {Para 9}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

IN THE MATTER OF: BAIL APPLN. 2029/2018

POORAN SINGH  Vs STATE OF DELHI 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD

Dated: 10th DECEMBER, 2021

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Whether concept of continuing offence is applicable to Domestic Violence Proceeding?

  In the present case, perusal of the contents of the

complaint would show that the wife has not only stated incidents

of physical and emotional abuse but she has also indicated the

economic abuse that she has suffered. The wife has also

specifically prayed for return of articles i.e. Stridhan. In the said

judgment in the case of Krishna Bhattacharjee Vs. Sarathi

Choudhury and another (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically held that the concept of continuing offence gets

attracted from the date of deprivation of Stridhan and that

therefore, an application in that context would have to be

entertained and it cannot be thrown out on the ground of

limitation. This Court is of the opinion that the definition of

domestic violence under Section 3 of the D.V. Act shows that

depriving an aggrieved person of not only Stridhan but also

shared household, maintenance, alienation from assets, banks

lockers etc, prevention from entering place of employment of the

aggrieved person, would all be covered, under the concept of

continuing offences. Therefore, merely because the wife in the

present case was, according to her, driven out on 03.02.2011 and

the complaint was filed after one year i.e. on 17.10.2012, it

cannot be said that the complaint is barred by limitation. The

concepts of continuing cause of actions and continuing offences

would apply and the contention raised on behalf of the husband

relying upon Section 468 Cr.P.C. cannot be accepted. Thus, it is

found that the complaint of the wife cannot be thrown out on the

ground of limitation, despite applicability of the Cr.P.C. as per

Section 28 of the D.V. Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION NO. 372 OF 2019

Sau. Aruna Omprakash Shukla Vs Omprakash S/o. Devanand Shukla,

CORAM : MANISH PITALE, J.

PRONOUNCED ON : 27.07.2021.

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What is difference between stridhan and dowry?

 Although ‘Stridhan’ and ‘Dowry’ are entirely different, they are generally misconceived to mean the same. Under Indian law, dowry means any property or valuable security that is given or agreed to be given by the bride’s side to the bridegroom’s family before, after or during the time of marriage. The main difference between ‘dowry’ and ‘Stridhan’ is the element of “demand, undue influence or coercion” that is present in the former but absent in the latter. Stridhan is a gift that is voluntarily given to the women and it is not the result of demand, undue influence or coercion.

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Whether wife can give up right to daughter to get maintenance?

Before we part with, we must also express our reservation
insofar as Term No.6 is concerned, which was incorporated in the
order on 08.11.2017 by the Principal Judge, Family Court,
Aurangabad. It was certainly open to the wife to give up any claim
so far as maintenance or permanent alimony or stridhan but she
could not have given up the rights which vest in the daughter
insofar as maintenance and other issues are concerned.

We, therefore, exercising our powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, set-aside Clause (6) of the Consent Terms.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4031-4032 OF 2019

GANESH  Vs  SUDHIRKUMAR SHRIVASTAVA

Dated:APRIL 22, 2019

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Whether property acquired by female from funds of joint family can be treated as her stridhan?

 It is evident from the materials on record that the property so acquired in the name of Ash Kuer from the joint family fund was treated as joint family property right from the very beginning and the family arrangement was made between the members of the family for avoiding any future disputes and for preserving peace and security of the family by avoiding litigation. The suit property acquired in the name of Ash Kuer even if the said property was to be as stridhan of Ash Kuer, the same had become part of the hooch pouch of the joint family property and evidently for the purpose of peace in the family and avoiding future litigation. The family arrangement was made on 13.12.1987. However, I find no legal infirmity in the concurrent findings recorded by the Courts below that the joint family fund was the source of the money used for the purchase of the suit property in the name of Ash Kuer. The same, therefore, has rightly not been held to be stridhan by the courts below.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF PATNA

Second Appeal No. 229 of 2002

Decided On: 04.07.2018

 Narendra Prasad Singh Vs. Ram Ashish Singh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Chakradhari Sharan Singh, J.

Citation: AIR 2018 Patna 205

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What is duty of court while deciding domestic violence proceeding?

 Regard being had to the nature of the legislation, a more sensitive approach is expected from the courts where under the 2005 Act no relief can be granted, it should never be conceived of but, before throwing a petition at the threshold on the ground of maintainability, there has to be an apposite discussion and thorough deliberation on the issues raised. It should be borne in mind that helpless and hapless "aggrieved person" under the 2005 Act approaches the court under the compelling circumstances. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise the facts from all angles whether a plea advanced by the Respondent to nullify the grievance of the aggrieved person is really legally sound and correct. The principle "justice to the cause is equivalent to the salt of ocean" should be kept in mind. The court of law is bound to uphold the truth which sparkles when justice is done. Before throwing a petition at the threshold, it is obligatory to see that the person aggrieved under such a legislation is not faced with a situation of non-adjudication, for the 2005 Act as we have stated is a beneficial as well as assertively affirmative enactment for the realisation of the constitutional rights of women and to ensure that they do not become victims of any kind of domestic violence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 1545 of 2015 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 10223 of 2014)

Decided On: 20.11.2015

Krishna Bhatacharjee Vs.  Sarathi Choudhury and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dipak Misra and Prafulla C. Pant, JJ.

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Whether wife is entitled to file proceeding under DV Act after decree for nullity is passed?

In my opinion, an application by an ‘aggrieved person’ or a
Protection Officer is essential for maintaining a proceeding in view
of the provisions of Section 12 of the P.W.D.V. Act. Here petitioner filed the application as ‘aggrieved person’. Question is whether her
right to claim herself as aggrieved person was ceased with effect
from 23.04.2012. ‘Aggrieved person’ has been defined in Section 2
(a) of the P.W.D.V. Act as- “aggrieved person” means any woman
who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the respondent
and who alleges to have been subjected to any act of domestic
violence by the respondent. In her application petitioner alleged
that she had been subjected to physical as well as mental torture by
her husband during her living with the O.P. No. 1 in a shared
household as wife of the opposite party no. 1 which attracts the
definition of “domestic violence” as per Section 3 of the Act.
Undisputedly petitioner was wife of the opposite party no. 1 till the
passing of the decree of nullity of marriage on 23.04.2012. In order
to establish herself as aggrieved person any woman must prove first
that she is or has been in a domestic relationship with the
respondent. As per definition in Section 2 (f) “domestic
relationship” means a relationship between two persons who live or
have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household,
when they are related by consanguinity, marriage, or through a
relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family
members living together as a joint family. According to factual
matrix in this case the petitioner and opposite party no. 1 have
lived together in a shared household till petitioner’s departure from
that house during her pregnancy stage as the petitioner and
opposite party no. 1 were related each other by marriage.
Significantly, it is mentioned that out of their such joint living a
child has born. Therefore, as per definition of “domestic
relationship” it can be said that even after passing the decree of
nullity of marriage the domestic relationship between petitioner and
the opposite party no. 1 for the purpose of P.W.D.V. Act subsists
out of their past joint living as legally wedded couple. In this
connection I like to note that petitioner’s application cannot be
treated as an application under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. The
P.W.D.V. Act is a special beneficial legislation to protect the rights
of women expanding the limited scope of Section 125, Cr.P.C. Suchwider scope is required to be kept in mind in course of dealing with
any matter under the provisions of the P.W.D.V. Act but certainly
within the ambit of the language used in the statute. Be it noted
that in a judgment in the case of D. Velusamy Vs. D.
Patchaiammal reported in (2010) 10 SCC 469 (cited by learned
counsel for the petitioner) extended scope in the P.W.D.V. Act has
been discussed. Said case, though not similar according to facts to
this case, but it throws light to understand the legal position on the
subject.
In the instant case, petitioner alleged physical and mental
torture upon her by opposite party no. 1 during continuation of
their marital relationship. She also alleged that opposite party no.
1 kept her ‘Stridhana’ property with him and she was not provided
maintenance for herself and her child by the opposite party
although the petitioner is unable to maintain herself and her child.
Since her marital relation with opposite party no. 1 has been
declared a nullity with effect from 23.04.2012, her right to claim
maintenance from opposite party no. 1 may not be proper under
Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. But she cannot be debarred from
seeking reliefs against the opposite party no. 1 ventilating her
grievances against opposite party no. 1 who is engaged in legal
profession as an advocate. In my opinion, the P.W.D.V. Act is the
proper enactment for her redress. In this regard the latin maxim,
“Ubi jus ibi remedium” (wherever there is a right there is a
remedy) may be mentioned.
 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
 CRIMINAL REVISIONAL JURISDICTION
Appellate Side
Present :
THE HON’BLE JUSTICE SANKAR ACHARYYA
 C.R.R. No. 3963 of 2013
 In the matter of :

Priti Dey (Chandra) Vs. Subhasish Dey & Anr.

Citation:2016 ALLMR(CRI)JOURNAL 554

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When prosecution for criminal misappropriation of stridhan is not tenable against IN-LAWS?

Giving of dowry and the traditional presents at or about
the time of wedding does not in any way raise a presumption that
such a property was thereby entrusted and put under the dominion
of the parents-in-law of the bride or other close relations so as to
attract ingredients of Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. As
noticed earlier, after marriage, Syamala Rani and first appellant
were living in Bangalore at their matrimonial house. In respect of
‘stridhana articles’ given to the bride, one has to take into
consideration the common practice that these articles are sent
along with the bride to her matrimonial house. It is a matter of
common knowledge that these articles are kept by the woman in
connection with whose marriage it was given and used by her in
her matrimonial house when the appellants 2 to 6 have been
residing separately in Vizianagaram, it cannot be said that the
dowry was given to them and that they were duty bound to return
the same to Syamala Rani. Facts and circumstances of the case
and also the uncontroverted allegations made in the complaint do
not constitute an offence under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act against appellants 2 to 6 and there is no sufficient ground for

proceeding against the appellants 2 to 6. Be it noted that
appellants 2 to 6 are also facing criminal prosecution for the
offence under Sections 498A, 304B IPC and under Sections 3 and 4
of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Even though the criminal proceeding
under Section 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is independent of the
criminal prosecution under Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, in the absence of specific allegations of entrustment of the
dowry amount and articles to appellants 2 to 6, in our view,
continuation of the criminal proceeding against appellants 2 to 6 is
not just and proper and the same is liable to be quashed.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 45 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 9344 of 2014)
BOBBILI RAMAKRISHNA RAJU YADAV & ORS. 
Versus
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP.
R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation;(2016) 3 SCC309
Dated;January 19, 2016

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What will be period of limitation for offenceU/ S 406 of IPC for misappropriation of streedhan?

So far as the ground relating to limitation is concerned, it is contended that Under Section 406,IPC punishment provided is three years' R.I. and fine; and therefore, Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 468, Cr. P.C. is attracted which envisages that after a lapse of period of limitation, there is a bar to take cognizance. In this context, it is argued that it was in the year 1973 according to the averments of the complainant, non-applicant, she was turned out from the marital home and her Stridhan was not given to her. Therefore, the period of limitation for purposes of Section 468, Cr. P.C. is to be computed from 1973 and the complainant having not filed the complaint within a period of three years from 1973, it is barred by limitation.

 No doubt, non-applicant daughter-in-law was turned out from the marital home in 1973 and accordingly, a report was lodged on 5-12-1973 and also on 17-12-1973 and demands after demands were also made for return of Stridhan but no heed was paid and ultimately on 2-11-1987, a registered notice with acknowledgement was also sent. Therefore, when the demand is made and the notice is served, from that date a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run and this will be a continuing offence and the provisions of Section 472, Cr. P.C. would be attracted which read as under :

"In the case of a continuing offence, a fresh period of limitation shall begin to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues."

In Bhagirath Kanoriya v. State of M.P., AIR 1984 SC 1688, where the accused persons were charge-sheeted for non-payment of employer's contribution towards provident fund before the due date, it has been held that the offence being a continuing offence, the period of limitation prescribed by Section 468, Cr. P.C. cannot have any application and under the circumstances, provisions of Section 472, Cr. P.C. will be attracted giving fresh period of limitation to run at every moment of the time during which the offence continues. In the instant case, whenever the demand is made, the period of limitation will be computed from that date. The last notice was served on 2-11-1987 and the complaint was filed on 12-1-1988 i.e. within three months from the date of notice. Therefore, the complaint is not barred by limitation. Besides this, provisions ofSection 473, Cr. P.C. are emphatic giving jurisdiction to the Court for extending the period of limitation in certain cases and where the trial Court is satisfied that the delay has been satisfactorily explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice, the trial Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence even after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed UnderSection 468, Cr. P.C. (hereinafter referred to as the Code). However, the facts of the instant case do not fall within the ambit of Section 473, Code but certainly fall within the ambit of Section 472of the Code being a continuous offence, as discussed above; and the submission made by the learned counsel in this regard is rejected being without any force.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Bairo Prasad And Anr. vs Smt. Laxmibai Pateria on 27 February, 1991

Equivalent citations: 1991 CriLJ 2535

Bench: B Lal

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When prosecution for misappropriation of streedhan can be quashed?

Para 4 of the complaint Annexure P. 1 reads "That immediately after the marriage the intention of all the accused became very clear when they started maltreating Inderpal Kaur and forced her to bring more dowry as the accused were not satisfied with the dowry which Inderpal Kaur received from her parents and entrusted the same to her husband and other accused. The property came 'Istri Dhan' and the accused with deceitful means have sold some of (he articles and the remaining converted to their own use. There is thus no specific allegation of entrustment of any particular article of dowry to any of the thee persons (Husband and both parents-in-law) arrayed as accused in the complaint. This Court has consistently held in Smt. Manna v. State of Haryana, 1987 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 219 and Shori Lal and others v. Smt. Nisha and another, 1989 (1) Recent Criminal Reports 276 that no case under Section 405 or Section 406,Indian Penal Code, is made out against the petitioner where the allegations regarding entrustment of articles are vague. Relevant observations read, "The matter does not rest here as the trial of the complaint leveals that no specific allegations regarding entrustment of the articles or maltreatment has been levelled against them. Simply because they were found wearing some ornaments of the complainant, it cannot be said that they have committed any offence underSections 405 and 406, Indian Penal Code, due to lack of prima facie proof of entrusting the property of them. Similarly, there is no specific allegation of entrustment of the articles forming Istri Dhan of the complainant to or against the parents of the husband. In this view of the matter complaint Annexure P. 1 needs to be quashed.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

Gurvel Singh vs Rajinder Singh on 21 November, 1989

Equivalent citations: I (1990) DMC 139

Bench: S Bajaj

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Whether wife can file Civil Suit for recovery of stridhan?

A. Family Courts Act (66 of 1984), Sections 7, 8 & 24--Suit for return of Stridhan--Suit for return of Stridhan without there being any relief as envisaged under Section 9, 10 or 13 of Hindu Marriage Act is maintainable.

5. Family Courts Act (66 of 1984), Sections 7, & 24--Suit for return of Stridhan--Maintainability of suit against relatives of husband Suit for return of stridhan filed against husband and in laws--Family Court has jurisdiction to consider the suit of the respondent in respect of return of stridhan and was not required to file two separate suits, i.e. one against her husband before Family Court and another before Ordinary Civil Court against, her in-laws.

Equivalent Citation: AIR2012MP142, I(2013)DMC268, ILR[2012]MP974

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH AT JABALPUR

F.A. No. 405/2011

Decided On: 06.03.2012

Om Prakash Tiwary Vs. Smt. Neetu Tiwary

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Mr. Justice K.K. Lahoti & Mrs. Justice Vimla Jain

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When suit filed by wife for recovery of stridhan is maintainable after passing of divorce decree?

Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the earlier suit in which decree was granted was instituted by the husband and not by the wife. While the present suit is filed by wife. As such, it cannot be said that the provision of Order II Rule 2 gets attracted to the present case. Sub-section (3) of Rule 2 of Order II of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, requires that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action may sue for all or any of such reliefs but if he so omits, except with the leave of the court to sue for all such reliefs, he shall not afterwards sue for any relief so omitted. Since in the present case, wife was not the plaintiff in the suit filed earlier there is no question of holding that the subsequent suit filed by her is not maintainable as the cause of action arisen to husband was different to the cause of action arisen to wife.

6. Apart from above error of law committed by the trial court, it has further committed the error of law by observing that in view of the fact that application under Section 27 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, was not moved in the suit decided, no fresh suit can be maintained. Perusal of Section 27 of Hindu Marriage Act clearly shows that it pertains to the disposal of property belonged jointly by both the husband and wife. The provision does not cover the Stridhan. Stridhan is wife's personal property owned exclusively by her.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

Decided On: 22.05.2008

Appellants: Meeta Salani D/o Sri Kailash Narayan Salani
Vs.
Respondent: Ravikant Sharma S/o Sri Dharm Dutt Sharma

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Prafulla C. Pant and Dharam Veer, JJ.

 Citation: II(2009)DMC194, 2008(3)UC1563, 2008(1)U.D.630

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Property in name of mother - whether it is joint family property or her stridhan property?

There is no presumption of a joint Hindu family but on the evidence if it is established that the property was joint Hindu family and the other properties were acquired out of that nucleus, if the initial burden is discharged by the person who claims joint Hindu family, then the burden shifts to the party alleging self-acquisition to establish affirmatively that property was acquired without the aid of the joint family property by cogent and necessary evidence.

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 clearly mandates that any property of a female Hindu is her absolute property and she, therefore, has full ownership. The Explanation to sub-section (1) further clarifies that a Hindu woman has full ownership over any property that she has acquired on her own or as stridhana. As a consequence, she may dispose of the same as per her wish, and that the same shall not be treated as a part of the joint Hindu family property.

In any event, whenever a mother is there and the properties are purchased in the name of the mother, the presumption is that it is for the benefit of the family. It is nobody's case that the lands purchased is for the intention and for the benefit of the mother alone and she also did not differentiate between her sons and daughters. This is a natural and human aspect which has not been considered by the trial court. 

 Therefore, in my opinion, the purchase made by the mother is only from and out of the income from the family and there is no evidence to show that she had any independent or individual income from the gifted property to purchase these properties. Therefore, irresistible inference shall be drawn that the property purchased in the name of the mother is for the benefit of all the members of the family. Now no doubt the plaintiff came forward with the case that suit lands A(4) to A(6) and A(8) to A(12) were purchased from and out of the family income and the income from the A(1) to A(3) lands. But once it is seen that the 1st defendant was managing the affairs of the family as `karta', the burden shifts on him to prove that the properties purchased was not for the benefit of the family, but they were exclusively belong to the mother.

The initial burden lies upon the plaintiff. But once such burden is discharged and shifts on the defendant, the trial court should have considered that whether the defendant has proved that the purchase was made from any other source of income excepting the income from A(1) to A(3). In the absence of any positive evidence spoken to by D.W. 2 or the witnesses examined on behalf of the defendant that the mother was trying to save the property either for herself or not for the benefit of the everybody, the irresistible conclusion is that the mother is always mother and the properties purchased in her name shall be the properties of the family. There is a clear evidence adduced by the plaintiff that the suit lands in A(1) to A(3) were the basis the income of which was utilized for acquisition of the lands in A(4) to A(6) and A(8) to A(12) lands. But the trial court has relied upon the gift in question and left it not been considered on erroneous approach. The mere fact that the mother has the son and ip-so-facto that the mother is cultivating the land when there admittedly sons who is professional agriculturist and whether it is mother alone or father himself cultivating the lands; everybody contri-butes (sic.) their right and labour to cultivate the land. It is nobody's case that Parwatevva kept her income separately or that income was not occrued (sic.) by the father Siddappa. 

Supreme Court of India

Marabasappa (D) By Lrs. & Ors. vs Ningappa & Ors on 8 September, 2011

Bench: G.S. Singhvi, H.L. Dattu

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Whether Gifts given to wife at the time of engagement ceremony is her stridhan property?

 Coming to the plea of wife which was negatived by the learned trial Judge that items given at the time of "engagement cannot be returned, in my opinion deserves to be upset. The Trial Court held that the items given at the time of engagement (Sagai) cannot be termed as Stridhan property of a woman. I do not agree. In my opinion, the Trial Court on this issue committed an error. Any item article given by parents of a woman i.e. mother or/and father to their daughter at the time of engagement is in fact the nature of a gift and partake a status of a Stridhan. It becomes her exclusive property. In Manu Smriti, while enumerating six kinds of Stridhan, it is recognised that gift made before nupital fire to mean gift made at the time of marriage and that gifts made at the bridal procession, i.e. before the bride is taken to the residence of her husband are Stridhan property of a woman. An engagement ceremony is in fact a part of marriage which takes place just prior to marriage.

 In my opinion, 1 have no reason to disbelieve the evidence of plaintiff as also that of her father on this issue. It is reasonable to infer that these items were given to girl (plaintiff) by her parents, whereas, Rs. 21,000/- was meant to husband. After all, in engagement ceremony, parents of girl do give some jewellery to their daughter and some to son-in-law. It has come in evidence that plaintiff's father had means to earn as also to spend. He had a capacity to purchase these gold and silver ornaments. Merely because no account were kept to show its purchase does not lead to a conclusion that they were not purchased. These are not purchases meant for running the business. In Hindu marriages these are the bear minimum that every parents of a girl are required to spend. In my opinion, the six silver glasses, one golden chain and ring were gifted to plaintiff by her parents and the same become plaintiff's Stridhan property entitling her to claim back from the defendant either in specie or in the alternative its value which works out to Rs. 5,750/-. So far as payment of Rs. 21,000/- is concerned, the same was negatived by the Trial Court. In my opinion, even assuming it is held to be proved then it was meant for defendant and hence no claim can be made by the plaintiff on Rs. 21,000/- as her Stridhan property.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Rajkumar Patni vs Smt. Manorama Patni on 14 July, 2000

Equivalent citations: II (2000) DMC 702

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on streedhan of married woman

The stridhan property of a married woman cannot acquire the character of a joint property of both the spouses as soon as she enters her matrimonial home so as to eliminate the application of section 406 IPC. The position of stridhan of a Hindu married woman's property during coverture is absolutely clear and unambiguous; she is the absolute owner of such property and can deal with it in any manner she likes-She may spend the whole of it or give it away at her own pleasure by gift or will without any reference to her husband. The entrustment to the husband of the stridhan property is just like something which the wife keeps in a bank and can withdraw any amount when ever she likes without any hitch or hindrance. Ordinarily, the husband has no right or interest in it with the sole exception that in times of extreme distress, as 193

in famine, illness or the like, the husband can utilize it but he is morally bound to restore it or its value when he is able to do so. This right is purely personal to the husband and the property so received by him in marriage cannot be proceeded against even in execution of a decree for debt. 

Equally, the common use and enjoyment of certain articles of dowry and traditional presents, by the other members of a joint family with the leave and licence of a Hindu wife, cannot have the effect of extending the jointness Of control and custody of the couple to undefined and unreasonable limits. Consequently, there is no reason to assume that the mere user or enjoyment of the dowry by other members of the house-hold, would have the effect of passing the possession and control thereof jointly to the Hindu Undivided Family as such."

Supreme Court of India

Pratibha Rani vs Suraj Kumar & Anr on 12 March, 1985

Equivalent citations: 1985 AIR 628, 1985 SCR (3) 191

Bench: Fazalali, S Murtaza

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How to ascertain limitation in case of misappropriation of Stri-dhan?

 The next question that needs to be answered is: whether the complaint filed by the appellant in September 1990 is time barred? Section 468 of the Code prescribes period of limitation. Under Sub-section (3) thereof, the period of limitation shall be three years if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. Since the offence alleged to have been committed by the respondent is punishable under Section 406, viz., criminal breach of trust, and the punishment of imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine or with both, the complaint is required to be filed within three years from date of the commission of the offence. It is seen that the appellant has averred in paragraphs 21 and 22 of the complaint that she demanded from the respondent return of jewellery detailed in Annexure I and household goods mentioned in Annexure II on December 5, 1987 and the respondent flatly refused to return the stridhana of the complainant-wife. In paragraph 22 of the complaint, it is stated that the complainant was forced to leave the matrimonial home in the manner described and the stridhana mentioned in Annexures I and II belonging to the complainant was entrusted to the respondent-accused which he refused to return to the complainant. Thus she has averred that the respondent "has illegally, dishonestly and mala fldely retained and converted it to his own use which is clearly a criminal breach of trust in respect of the aforesaid property". The complaint was admittedly filed on September 10, 1990 meaning within three years from the date of the demand and refusal by the respondent. The learned Judge relied upon her evidence recorded under Section200 of the Code. The learned Counsel for the respondent read out the text of the evidence to establish that the appellant had demanded in October 1986 for return of the jewellery and that the respondent refused to do the same. Thus it constitutes refusal from which date the limitation period began to run and the complaint having been filed in September 1990, is time barred, i.e., beyond three years. That view of the learned Judge is clearly based on the evidence torn of the context without reference to the specific averments made in the complaint and the evidence recorded under section 200 of the Code. As stated earlier, the sequence in which the averments came to be made was the voluntary promise of the respondent and his failure to abide by the promise. It is incongruous to comprehend the demand for return of jewellery etc. at the stage when she was persuading him to take her into matrimonial home. Accordingly, we hold that the complaint was filed within the limitation.

Supreme Court of India

PETITIONER:
SMT. RASHMI KUMAR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
MAHESH KUMAR BHADA
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/12/1996
BENCH:
K. RAMASWAMY, S.B. MAJUMUDAR, G.T. NANAVATI
 Citation: 1997(99(3))BOMLR465, JT1996(11)SC175, 1996(9)SCALE388, (1997)2SCC397,

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