Supreme Court: Under which circumstances a subsequent change of law will not render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata

The second limb of the High Court's reasoning, that Vineeta Sharma constitutes a 'change in law' which overrides res judicata is equally unsustainable. It is true that in Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal (supra), this Court in Para 9 held that a subsequent change in law can render an earlier decision on a pure question of law ineffective as res judicata. However, this exception applies only where the legal basis of the earlier decision has been undermined by the subsequent pronouncement. {Para 40}

41. The question, therefore, is whether Vineeta Sharma effects any change in the law relevant to the 2013 order. The answer, in our view, is in the negative. The 2013 order proceeded on the basis that even assuming the daughters are not coparceners and the partition is valid, the father died intestate and the daughters have a right in the father's share Under Section 8 of the H.S. Act. Vineeta Sharma (supra) deals with the scope of the 2005 Amendment vis-à-vis coparcenary rights and the saving clause for pre-2004 partitions. It holds, inter alia, that daughters become coparceners by birth, that the 2005 Amendment is retroactive in nature, and that Section 6(5) saves only partitions effected before 20.12.2004 by registered deed or court decree. What Vineeta Sharma (supra) does not do is alter the settled position which was the foundation of the 2013 order, that where a Hindu male dies intestate, his property devolves Under Section 8 on all Class I heirs including daughters. The "basis" of the 2013 judgment remains entirely undisturbed by Vineeta Sharma. The High Court's reasoning that Vineeta Sharma (supra) did away with the basis of the 2013 order is, with respect, erroneous.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7939 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 23709 of 2024)

B.S. Lalitha and Ors. Vs. Bhuvanesh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Augustine George Masih and Sanjay Karol, JJ.

Author: Augustine George Masih, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 499, MANU/SC/0483/2026

Dated: MAY 15, 2026.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Under which circumstances Judgment of court will not operate as res judicata?

  One other aspect which has to be considered in this connection is whether the finding in the civil proceedings that the zoning regulations of 1981 and multi-storeyed building regulations, 1981 are not retrospective and they will not be applicable to the application of the petitioner filed on 28-6-1980 operates as res judicata or not and in any event binding on the parties. In this connection, it would be necessary to understand the scope and ambit of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well settled that a decision rendered on questions of fact between the parties in a former suit will operate as res judicata and binds the parties or persons claiming under it in a subsequently instituted proceeding. Similar is the position insofar as findings recorded in the former suit in respect of mixed questions of law and fact. It is also well settled that pure questions of law relating to the jurisdiction of the Court/Tribunal will not operate as res judicata, and cannot be deemed to have been finally determined. This is because of the fact that if erroneous interpretation of statute, the Court which has no jurisdiction holds that it has jurisdiction, that decision will not operate as res judicata between the parties, even if the cause of action in the subsequently instituted proceeding is the same. What is the position with regard to a decision rendered on a pure question of law? On the said question, it has been held in Mathura Prasad v. Dossibai, MANU/SC/0420/1970 : [1970] 3 SCR 830 that if the cause of action is the same both in the former and subsequent proceedings, then the decision on an issue of law will be res judicata between the same parties, if the cause of action is not the same in both the proceedings, it will not operate as res judicata. It is also held therein that when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority, that will not operate as res judicata.

Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity, of the order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.

Therefore, from this decision, it is clear that a decision on pure question of law will not operate as res judicata if the law has changed or altered by a competent Court or authority subsequent to the earlier decision. In fact, the learned Judges in para 7 of their Judgment reiterate the decision in the following manner.

Where the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata between the same parties.

This is based on the premise that the rule of procedure indicated in Section 11, C.P.C. cannot supersede or override the law. This view has been followed and reiterated in the decisions reported in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra, MANU/SC/0593/1989 : (1990) 1 SCC 193 and in Isabella Johnson v. M.A. Susai MANU/SC/0228/1991 : AIR 1991 SC 993 

{Para 18}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Writ Petn. No. 10019 of 1993

Decided On: 02.09.1994

3 Aces, Hyderabad Vs.  Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad

Hon'ble Judges:

S.S.M. Quadri, P.L.N. Sarma and B.S. Raikote, JJ.

Author: P.L.N. Sarma, J.

Citation:  MANU/AP/0002/1995.

Read full Judgment here: Click here

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Guidelines of Andhra Pradesh High Court (Full bench) for demolition of unauthorized construction by Municipal Corporation

 Having regard to the rampant, illegal and unauthorised constructions raised in the country as observed in State of Maharashtra's case MANU/SC/0335/1991 : [1991] 2 SCR 745 a (supra) before parting with this case, we would like to formulate the following guidelines to be followed by the respondent in respect of illegal constructions. The guidelines should not be treated as exhaustive but only illustrative and the discretion to be exercised by the Corporation in any given case should not be arbitrary or, capricious.

1) In cases where applications having been duly filed in accordance with law, after fulfilling all requirements, seeking permission to construct buildings and permission was also granted by the Corporation, the power of demolition should be exercised by the Corporation only if the deviations made, during the construction are not in public interest or cause public nuisance or hazardous or dangerous to public safety including the residents therein. If the deviations of violations are minor, minimal or trivial which do not affect public at large, the Corporation will not resort to demolition.

2) whatever is stated in guideline number (1) will also equally apply to the permissions deemed to have been granted under Section 437 of "The Act".

3) If no application has been filed seeking permission and the construction is made without any permission whatsoever, it is open to the Corporation to demolish and pull down or remove the said unauthorised structure in its discretion. Otherwise, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it will be putting a premium on the unauthorised construction.

When the Corporation comes to the conclusion, keeping the above guidelines in view, that the construction in question is required to be demolished or pull down, it should follow the procedure indicated below:

(i) The demolition should not be resorted to during festival days declared by the State Government as public holidays excluding Sundays. If the festival day declared by the Government as a public holiday falls on a Sunday, on that Sunday also, the Corporation should not resort to demolition.

(ii) In any case, there should not be any demolition after sun set and before sun rise.

(iii) The Corporation should give notice of demolition as required by the statute fixing the date of demolition. Even on the said date, before actually resorting to the demolition, the Corporation should give reasonable time, depending upon the premises sought to be demolished, for the inmates to withdraw from the premises. If within the time given the inmates do not withdraw, the Corporation may proceed with actual demolition;

These guidelines are laid down in view of the fact that the Corporation is a public authority and its action must be tested on the touchstone of fairness and reasonableness. {Para 36}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Writ Petn. No. 10019 of 1993

Decided On: 02.09.1994

3 Aces, Hyderabad Vs.  Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad

Hon'ble Judges:

S.S.M. Quadri, P.L.N. Sarma and B.S. Raikote, JJ.

Author: P.L.N. Sarma, J.

Citation:  MANU/AP/0002/1995

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When court can decide issue of res judicata as preliminary issue?

 E.1 Res Judicata as a Preliminary issue

19. Before we undertake an analysis on the applicability of the principles of res judicata vis-à-vis the three suits that were initiated with regard to the suit property it is necessary to discuss the submission of counsel for the appellant that res judicata, being a mixed question of law and facts ought not to have been decided as a preliminary issue by the trial court. It was contended that any determination of the application of the principle of res judicata can only be made after evidence is adduced pursuant to a full-fledged trial. 

21. Order 14 Rule 2 CPC states that if questions of fact and law arise in the same suit, the court can dispose the case on the question of law alone if it relates to the following:

“(a) the jurisdiction of the Court, or

(b) a bar to the suit created by any law for the time being in force, and for that purpose may […]”

(emphasis supplied)

22.Justice K. Ramaswamy writing for a three judge bench of this court in Sushil Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra(1990) 1 SCC 193 held that the principle of res judicata cannot be fit into the pigeon hole of ‘mixed question of law and facts’ in every case. Rather, the plea of res judicata would be a question of law or fact or a mixed question of both depending on the issue that is claimed to have been previously decided. The court while determining the applicability of the plea of res judicata would determine if there has been any material alteration in the facts and law applicable:

“26. The doctrine of res judicata under Section 11 CPC is founded on public policy. An issue of fact or law or mixed question of fact and law, which are in issue in an earlier suit or might and ought to be raised between the same parties or persons claiming under them and was adjudicated or allowed uncontested becomes final and binds the parties or persons claiming under them. Thus, the decision of a competent court over the matter in issue may operate as res judicata in subsequent suit or proceedings or in other proceedings between the same parties and those claiming under them. But the question relating to the interpretation of a statute touching the jurisdiction of a court unrelated to questions of fact or law or mixed questions does not operate as res judicata even between the parties or persons claiming under them. The reason is obvious; a pure question of law unrelated to facts which are the basis or foundation of a right, cannot be deemed to be a matter in issue. The principle of res judicata is a facet of procedure but not of substantive law. The decision on an issue of law founded on fact in issue would operate as res judicata. But when the law has since the earlier decision been altered by a competent authority or when the earlier decision declares a transaction to be valid despite prohibition by law it does not operate as res judicata. Thus a question of jurisdiction of a court or of a procedure or a pure question of law unrelated to the right of the parties founded purely on question of fact in the previous suit, is not res judicata in the subsequent suit. A question relating to jurisdiction of a court or interpretation of provisions of a statute cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an erroneous decision of a court. Therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to a case of decree of nullity. If the court inherently lacks jurisdiction consent cannot confer jurisdiction. Where certain statutory rights in a welfare legislation are created, the doctrine of waiver also does not apply to a case of decree where the court inherently lacks jurisdiction.”

23. In Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B Jeejeebhoy (1970) 1 SCC 613, the application of the plaintiff in the Court of the Civil Judge for the determination of Standard Rent under Section 11 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 was dismissed on the ground that the statute did not apply to a case of open land let for the construction of buildings. This decision was affirmed in appeal. However, in view of another decision of the Bombay High Court which held that the statute would be applicable to leased land, the plaintiff filed a fresh proceeding in the Court of Small Causes. The Trial Court and the High Court held that the subsequent suit was barred by res judicata. However, Justice J C Shah writing for a 3-judge bench held that the subsequent suit was not barred by res judicata:

“5. But the doctrine of res judicata belongs to the domain of procedure: it cannot be exalted to the status of a legislative

direction between the parties so as to determine the question relating to the interpretation of enactment affecting the jurisdiction of a Court finally between them, even though no question of fact or mixed question of law and fact and relating to the right in dispute between the parties has been determined thereby. A decision of a competent Court on a matter in issue may be res judicata in another proceeding between the same parties: the “matter in issue” may be an issue of fact, an issue of law, or one of mixed law and fact. An issue of fact or an issue of mixed law and fact decided by a competent Court is finally determined between the parties and cannot be re-opened between them in another proceeding. The previous decision on a matter in issue alone is res judicata: the reasons for the decision are not res judicata.

11. The matter in issue, if it is one purely of fact, decided in the earlier proceeding by a competent Court must in a subsequent litigation between the same parties be regarded as finally decided and cannot be reopened. A mixed question of law and fact determined in the earlier proceeding between the same parties may not, for the same reason, be questioned in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties. But, where the decision is on a question of law i.e. the interpretation of a statute, it will be res judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties where the cause of action is the same, for the expression “the matter in issue” in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure means the right litigated between the parties i.e. the facts on which the right is claimed or denied and the law applicable to the determination of that issue. Where, however, the question is one purely of law and it relates to the jurisdiction of the Court or a decision of the Court sanctioning something which is illegal, by resort to the rule of res judicata a party affected by the decision will not be precluded from challenging the validity of that order under the rule of res judicata, for a rule of procedure cannot supersede the law of the land.

(emphasis supplied)

The court while undertaking an analysis of the applicability of the plea of res judicata determines first, if the requirements of section 11 CPC are fulfilled; and if this is answered in the affirmative, it will have to be determined if there has been any material alteration in law or facts since the first suit was decreed as a result of which the principle of res judicata would be inapplicable. We are unable to accept the submission of the appellants that res judicata can never be decided as a preliminary issue. In certain cases, particularly when a mixed question of law or fact is raised, the issue should await a full-fledged trial after evidence is adduced. In the present case, a determination of the components of res judicata turns on the pleadings and judgments in the earlier suits which have been brought on the record. The issue has been argued on that basis before the Trial court and the first appellate court; followed by two rounds of proceedings before the High Court (the second following upon an order of remand by this court on the ground that all parties were not heard). All the documentary material necessary to decide the issue is before the court and arguments have been addressed by the contesting sides fully on that basis.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 10946 of 2014

The Jamia Masjid Vs  Sri K V Rudrappa

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Supreme court: Three exceptions to rule of res judicata

Principle of res judicata is undoubtedly a salutary principle. Even a wrong decision would attract the principle of res judicata. The said principle, however, amongst others, has some exceptions, e.g., when a judgment is passed without jurisdiction, when the matter involves a pure question of law or when the judgment has been obtained by committing fraud on the court.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5308 of 2008 
Decided On: 29.08.2008

 Raju Ramsing Vasave Vs.  Mahesh Deorao Bhivapurkar and Ors.

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Whether pure question of law can be raised at appellate stage?

In our opinion, though the question was not raised before
the High Court, the appellant need not be barred from raising
this question before us because it is a pure and substantial
question of law. No enquiry into any fact is really necessary to
decide the said question of law. The only fact which is not
clearly established on record is the point of time at which the
title in the goods passed to the appellant. But, in our opinion
(for the reasons to be given later), that fact is wholly irrelevant
for determining the authority of the 1st respondent to collect
demurrage from the appellant. We, therefore, proceed to
examine the correctness of the submission.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5968 OF 2011
M/S. RASIKLAL KANTILAL & CO.
V
BOARD OF TRUSTEE OF PORT OF
BOMBAY & OTHERS.

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Whether pure question of law can be raised at any stage of proceeding?

There is No. quarrel to the settled legal proposition that a new plea cannot be taken in respect of any factual controversy whatsoever, however, a new ground raising a pure legal issue for which No. inquiry/proof is required can be permitted to be raised by the court at any stage of the proceedings. (See: M/s Sanghvi Reconditioners Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/0087/2010 : AIR 2010 SC 1089; and Greater Mohali Area Development Authority and Ors. v. Manju Jain and Ors. MANU/SC/0627/2010 : AIR 2010 SC 3817).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7448 of 2011

Decided On: 05.09.2011

 The National Textile Corporation Ltd.

Vs.

 Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

P. Sathasivam and B.S. Chauhan, JJ.

Citation:(2011) 12 SCC 695

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Whether erroneous determination of pure question of law in previous judgment will operate as res judicata in subsequent proceeding?

The distinction drawn by the High Court in the impugned judgment that an erroneous determination of a pure question of law in a previous judgment will not operate as res judicata in the subsequent proceeding for different property, though between the same parties, is clearly in accord with Section 11 of the CPC. Strictly speaking, when the cause of action as well as the subject matter i.e, the property in issue in the subsequent suit are entirely different, res judicata is not attracted and the competent Court is therefore not debarred from trying the subsequent suit which may arise between the same parties in respect of other properties and upon a different cause of action. In such a situation, since the Court is not debarred, all issues including those of facts remain open for adjudication by the competent Court and the principle which is attracted against the party which has lost on an important issue of fact in the earlier suit is the principle of estoppel, more particularly “issue estoppel” which flows from principles of evidence such as fromSections 115, 116 and 117 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and from principles of equity. As a principle of evidence, estoppel is treated to be an admission or in the eyes of law something equivalent to an admission of such quality and nature that the maker is not allowed to contradict it. In other words it works as an impediment or bar to a right of action due to affected person’s conduct or action. “Estoppel by judgment” finds reference in the case of Ahsan Hussain Abdul Ali Bohari, Proprietor Abidi Shop v. Maina W/o Nathu Telanga[11]. It is taken as a bar which precludes the parties after final judgment to reagitate and relitigate the same cause of action or ground of defence or any fact determined by the judgment. If the determination was by a Court of competent jurisdiction, the bar will remain operative even if the judgment is perceived to be erroneous. If the parties fail to get rid of an erroneous judgment, they as well as persons claiming through them must remain bound by it.

However, as explained and held by this Court in the case of Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal (supra), where the decision is on a pure question of law then a Court cannot be precluded from deciding such question of law differently. Such bar cannot be invoked either on principle of equity or estoppel. No equitable principle or estoppel can impede powers of the Court to determine an issue of law correctly in a subsequent suit which relates to another property founded upon a different cause of action though parties may be same. As explained earlier, in such a situation the principle of res judicata is, strictly speaking, not applicable at all. So far as principle of estoppel is concerned, it operates against the party and not the Court and hence nothing comes in the way of a competent court in such a situation to decide a pure question of law differently if it is so warranted. The issues of facts once finally determined will however, stare at the parties and bind them on account of earlier judgments or for any other good reason where equitable principles of estoppel are attracted.
REPORTABLE

Supreme Court of India

Satyendra Kumar & Ors vs Raj Nath Dubey & Ors on 6 May, 2016

Bench: Dipak Misra, Shiva Kirti Singh

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4083-4084 OF 2016

[Arising out of S.L.P.(C)Nos.12915-12916 of 2014]

Citation:AIR 2016 SC 2231

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How to prove plea of adverse possession?

 The finding of reversal recorded under issue No.6 by the Lower Appellate Court was lawful and had its root in basic interpretation of maxim 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario'. The mere possession or permissive possession does not demonstrate spectrum of adverse possession. For claiming adverse possession defendant must prove his possession to be peaceful, open and continuous. Such possession should be actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous for required time. The possession should be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that his possession is adverse to the very knowledge of the true owner. The possession must start with a wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and should be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued for a statutory period. The plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law, it is the interpretation based on the following text mechanism:-

(a) On what date defendant came into possession?

(b) What was the nature of his possession?

(c) Whether the factum of possession was known to  the plaintiffs?

(d) How long his possession had continued?

(e) Is possession was open and undisputed? 

[23]. Plea of adverse possession has no equities, this has same instinct of piratical rights. Necessary ingredients on the subject issue can be viewed from the authoritative judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Karnataka Wakf Board vs. Government of India (2004) Volume 2 RCA Civil 702.

Punjab-Haryana High Court

 Rupinder Singh Etc vs Naranjan Singh on 11 February, 2015

RSA No.2049 of 1989 (O&M)

CORAM: MR. JUSTICE RAJ MOHAN SINGH

Citation;2016(1) ALLMR(JOURNAL)27

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Whether court can consider plea when facts pleaded give rise to a pure question of law going to root of matter?

Mr. Shankaranarayanan has taken an extreme stand before this Court and contends that the Company Law Board has no jurisdiction to compound an offence punishable under Section 211(7) of the Act as the punishment provided is imprisonment also. Mr. Bhushan, however, submits that imprisonment is not mandatory punishment under Section 211(7) of the Act and, hence, the Company Law Board has the authority to compound the same. He also points out that this submission was not at all advanced before the Company Law Board and, therefore, the appellant cannot be permitted to raise this question for the first time before this Court. We are not in agreement with Mr. Bhushan in regard to his plea that this question cannot be gone into by this Court at the first instance. In our opinion, in a case in which the facts pleaded give rise to a pure question of law going to the root of the matter, this Court possesses discretion to go into that. The position would have been different had the appellant for the first time prayed before this Court for adjudication on an issue of fact and then to apply the law and hold that Company Law Board had no jurisdiction to compound the offence.

Supreme Court of India

V.L.S.Finance Ltd vs Union Of India & Ors on 10 May, 2013

Bench: Chandramauli Kr. Prasad, V. Gopala Gowda

Citation;(2013) 6 SCC 278;

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