Showing posts with label reasons. Show all posts
Showing posts with label reasons. Show all posts

Sunday, 24 April 2022

Can the court remit an award to the arbitrator in the absence of findings on contentious issues?

When it is the specific case of the Respondent that there is no finding at all, on point No. 1 viz. "whether the contract was illegally and abruptly terminated by the Respondent?", remission Under Section 34(4) of the Act, is not permissible. In our view, Section 34(4) of the Act, can be resorted to record reasons on the finding already given in the award or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning of the award. There is a difference between 'finding' and 'reasons' as pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent in the judgment in the case of Income Tax Officer, A Ward, Sitapur v. Murlidhar Bhagwan Das MANU/SC/0097/1964 : AIR 1965 SC 342. It is clear from the aforesaid judgment that 'finding is a decision on an issue'. Further, in the judgment in the case of J. Ashoka v. University of Agricultural Sciences and Ors. MANU/SC/1613/2016 : (2017) 2 SCC 609, this Court has held that 'reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions'. In absence of any finding on point No. 1, as pleaded by the Respondent and further, it is their case that relevant material produced before the Arbitrator to prove 'accord and satisfaction' between the parties, is not considered, and the same amounts to patent illegality, such aspects are to be considered by the Court itself. It cannot be said that it is a case where additional reasons are to be given or gaps in the reasoning, in absence of a finding on point No. 1 viz. "whether the contract was illegally and abruptly terminated by the Respondent?"


21. Further, Section 34(4) of the Act itself makes it clear that it is the discretion vested with the Court for remitting the matter to Arbitral Tribunal to give an opportunity to resume the proceedings or not. The words "where it is appropriate" itself indicate that it is the discretion to be exercised by the Court, to remit the matter when requested by a party. When application is filed Under Section 34(4) of the Act, the same is to be considered keeping in mind the grounds raised in the application Under Section 34(1) of the Act by the party, who has questioned the award of the Arbitral Tribunal and the grounds raised in the application filed Under Section 34(4) of the Act and the reply thereto. Merely because an application is filed Under Section 34(4) of the Act by a party, it is not always obligatory on the part of the Court to remit the matter to Arbitral Tribunal. The discretionary power conferred Under Section 34(4) of the Act, is to be exercised where there is inadequate reasoning or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning, in support of the findings which are already recorded in the award. Under guise of additional reasons and filling up the gaps in the reasoning, no award can be remitted to the Arbitrator, where there are no findings on the contentious issues in the award. If there are no findings on the contentious issues in the award or if any findings are recorded ignoring the material evidence on record, the same are acceptable grounds for setting aside the award itself. Under guise of either additional reasons or filling up the gaps in the reasoning, the power conferred on the Court cannot be relegated to the Arbitrator. In absence of any finding on contentious issue, no amount of reasons can cure the defect in the award. A harmonious reading of Section 31, 34(1), 34(2A) and 34(4) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, make it clear that in appropriate cases, on the request made by a party, Court can give an opportunity to the arbitrator to resume the arbitral proceedings for giving reasons or to fill up the gaps in the reasoning in support of a finding, which is already rendered in the award. But at the same time, when it prima facie appears that there is a patent illegality in the award itself, by not recording a finding on a contentious issue, in such cases, Court may not accede to the request of a party for giving an opportunity to the Arbitral Tribunal to resume the arbitral proceedings. Further, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent, that on the plea of 'accord and satisfaction' on further consideration of evidence, which is ignored earlier, even if the arbitral tribunal wants to consciously hold that there was 'accord and satisfaction' between the parties, it cannot do so by altering the award itself, which he has already passed.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 7 of 2022 

Decided On: 03.01.2022

I-Pay Clearing Services Private Limited Vs.  ICICI Bank Limited

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Subhash Reddy and Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.

Author: R. Subhash Reddy, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0005/2022

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Sunday, 18 February 2018

Whether appellate bench of small causes is bound to give reasons while summarily dismissing appeal?

Apart from this, matters which arise under the Rent act are very importance and often involve large claims important, rights. Even court it has got revision jurisdiction in the such matters. If no reasons are assigned the High Courts is not in a position to ascertain how the court without assistance from the judgment of the subordinate court has to waste much time in investigating the matter which can hardly be justified. In order that the appeal court should assist the High court it ought to record its reasons in short even when it dismisses the appeal summarily.

(9) The effect of not requiring to give reasons can be appreciated in case like the present. The trial court held that the notice was bad on the ground that it was only by the notice that the permitted increases were demanded by the landlord. In the view of the trial court, before a notice is given there must be an earlier intimation of the increase in the standard rent which apparently, is not warranted by the Rent Act. Certainly the question is very important question and unless the Appellate court gave it reasons why it agreed with the trial court the High court would not be in apposition to know how the appeal was disposed of. We may also incidentally point out that in Rajpati Sudama v. Taj Mohamed Rustom Khan 66 Bom LR 258, this court disagreed with the small causes court and held after considering the relevant provisions of the Rent act that it is not necessary to give intimation of the permitted increases and of the permitted incensing before sending a formal notice to the before the filing of suit.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Civil Revn. Appln No. 953 of 1960

Decided On: 27.11.1964

 Gangabai Tokarsy Vs. Gaurishankar Chhintarmal Gupta

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
D.V. Patel and V.D. Tulzapurkar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1966 Bom 34
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Saturday, 28 January 2017

Whether court should pronounce final order without reasoned Judgment?

In this context, we may
refer to a passage from State of Punjab and others v.
Jagdev Singh Talwandi (1984) 1 SCC 596
 wherein expressing the opinion for
the Constitution Bench, Chandrachud, C.J. observed thus:-
“30. We would like to take this opportunity to point
out that serious difficulties arise on account of the
practice increasingly adopted by the High Courts, of
pronouncing the final order without a reasoned
judgment. It is desirable that the final order which
the High Court intends to pass should not be


announced until a reasoned judgment is ready for
pronouncement. Suppose, for example, that a final
order without a reasoned judgment is announced by
the High Court that a house shall be demolished, or
that the custody of a child shall be handed over to
one parent as against the other, or that a person
accused of a serious charge is acquitted, or that a
statute is unconstitutional or, as in the instant
case, that a detenu be released from detention. If
the object of passing such orders is to ensure
speedy compliance with them, that object is more
often defeated by the aggrieved party filing a special
leave petition in this Court against the order passed
by the High Court. That places this Court in a
predicament because, without the benefit of the
reasoning of the High Court, it is difficult for this
Court to allow the bare order to be implemented.
The result inevitably is that the operation of the
order passed by the High Court has to be stayed
pending delivery of the reasoned judgment.
31. It may be thought that such orders are passed
by this Court and therefore there is no reason why
the High Courts should not do the same. We would
like to point out respectfully that the orders passed
by this Court are final and no appeal lies against
them. The Supreme Court is the final court in the
hierarchy of our courts. Besides, orders without a
reasoned judgment are passed by this Court very
rarely, under exceptional circumstances. Orders
passed by the High Court are subject to the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136
of the Constitution and other provisions of the
concerned statutes. We thought it necessary to
make these observations in order that a practice
which is not very desirable and which achieves no
useful purpose may not grow out of its present
infancy.”
18. We have reproduced the aforesaid two passages as the
larger Bench has made such observations with regard to
unreasoned judgments passed by the High Courts. The
learned Chief Justice had noted that the practice is not
desirable and does not achieve any useful purpose and it
should not grow out of its present infancy. Despite the said
observations, sometimes this Court comes across judgments
and orders where the High Courts have announced the result
of the case by stating “reasons to follow”. We can only reiterate
the observations of the Constitution Bench.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 32-33 OF 2017
(@ S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 7694-7695 of 2016)
Ajay Singh and Anr and Etc.
V
State of Chhattisgarh and Anr.
Dated:January 06, 2017
Citation:AIR 2017 SC 310,(2017)3 SCC 330
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Friday, 2 December 2016

Whether wife who is residing separate from husband without any reason can get maintenance?

I would like to refer to the judgment of this Court in the
case of Savita Bai (Supra) in which after marriage Savita
Bai resided only for 8 days in the house of her husband and
thereafter, she left the house without any reason and unable
to prove the charge of harassment. Under such
circumstances, this Court has held that “the applicant-wife
is not entitled for maintenance.” In the present case also
non-applicant-wife resided in her matrimonial home for the
first time for 7 days and second time for 12 days and it is
alleged that in these 12 days she was harassed. It is
practically impossible that she could have been so harassed
that it is impossible for her to live in her matrimonial home.
After 12 days she had voluntarily gone with her brother with
a view to select a girl for marriage of her brother. Thus, it
can not be held that she was thrown with force from her
matrimonial home or she was forced to leave her matrimonial
home.[12] Learned counsel for the non-applicants placed reliance
on the judgment of Laxmi Bai Patel (Supra) and Dalibai
(Supra). Facts of these cases are quite different, therefore,
these cases are not helpful to the non-applicants.
[13] With the aforesaid, I am of the view that the finding of
the Trial Court that non-applicant/wife has sufficient reason
to live separately is not sustainable in law. Nonapplicant/wife
is residing separately without any reason,
hence, she is not entitled for maintenance under Section 125
of Cr.P.C.
HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH, JABALPUR
BENCH INDORE
( Single Bench )
( Hon'ble Shri Justice Jarat Kumar Jain )
Criminal Revision No.829 of 2014
Anil  Jain
V
Smt. Sunita 

( Passed on this th day of November, 2016 )
Citation: 2016 SCC ONLINE MP6368
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Whether order for framing of charge can be quashed on ground that it does not contain reasons?

 In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of Bengal, MANU/SC/0004/2000 : AIR 2000 SC 522, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that "the discharge order must contain reasons but an order of framing charge cannot be quashed merely because it does not contain reasons".
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD
Criminal Revision No. 138 of 2013
Decided On: 28.08.2015
 Raju Vs.
 State of U.P. and Ors.
Coram:Vijay Lakshmi, J.
Citation:2016 CRLJ(NOC)324 ALL
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Sunday, 13 November 2016

What is importance of giving of reasons while passing judgment?

In Hindustan Times Ltd. Vs. Union of India; (1998) 2 SCC
242, this Court made pertinent observation in the context:
“In an article on Writing Judgments, Justice Michael Kirby
(1990) 64 Austr L.J p.691) of Australia, has approached the
problem from the point of the litigant, the legal profession, the
subordinate Courts/tribunals, the brother Judges and the Judge’s
own conscience. To the litigant, the duty of the Judge is to
uphold his own integrity and let the losing party know why he
lost the case. The legal profession is entitled to have it
demonstrated that the Judge had the correct principles in mind,
had properly applied them and is entitled to examine the body
of the judgment for the learning and precedent that they provide
and for the reassurance of the quality of the judiciary which is
still the centre-piece of our administration of justice. It does not

take long for the profession to come to know, including through
-
the written pages of published judgments, the lazy Judge, the
Judge prone to errors of fact, etc. The reputational
considerations are important for the exercise of appellate rights,
for the Judge’s own self discipline, for attempts at improvement
and the maintenance of the integrity and quality of our
judiciary. From the point of view of other Judges, the benefit
that accrues to the lower hierarchy of Judges and tribunals is of
utmost importance. Justice Asprey of Australia has even said in
Petit v. Dankley (1971) (1) NSWLR 376 (CA) that the failure of
a Court to give reasons is an encroachment upon the right of
appeal given to a litigant.
It was finally stated:
“In our view, the satisfaction which a reasoned judgment
gives to the losing party or his lawyer is the test of a good
judgment. Disposal of cases is no doubt important but quality of
the judgment is equally, if not more, important. There is no
point in shifting the burden to the higher Court either to support
the judgment by reasons or to consider the evidence or law for
the first time to see if the judgment needs a reversal.
In that case, the order of dismissal of the writ petition by
the High Court was affirmed by us but the task fell on the
Supreme Court, to inform the appellant why it had lost the case
in the High Court.”
11. In the present case, we have avoided to do this exercise and have not
gone into the merits of the case to find out whether the conclusion of the
High Court is correct or not, as the counsel for both the parties have agreed
for remand of the matter.

12. It is no where suggested by us that the judgment should be too
lengthy or prolix and disproportionate to the issue involved. However, it is
to be borne in mind that the principal objective in giving judgment is to
make an effective, practical and workable decision. The court resolves
conflict by determining the merits of conflicting cases, and by choosing
between notions of justice, convenience, public policy, morality, analogy,
and takes into account the opinions of other courts or writers (Precedents).
Since the Court is to come to a workable decision, its reasoning and
conclusion must be practical, suit the facts as found and provide and
effective, workable remedy to the winner.
13. We are of the opinion that while recording the decision with clarity,
the Court is also supposed to record sufficient reasons in taking a particular
decision or arriving at a particular conclusion. The reasons should be such
that they demonstrate that the decision has been arrived at on a objective
consideration.
14. When we talk of giving “reasons” in support of a judgment, what is
meant by “reasons”? In the context of legal decision making, the focus is to
what makes something a legal valid reason. Thus, “reason would mean a
justifying reason, or more simply a justification for a decision is a

consideration, in a non-arbitrary ways in favour of making or accepting that
-
decision. If there is no justification in support of a decision, such a decision
is without any reason or justifying reason.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1875/2013
(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 2509/2012)
M/s. Shree Mahavir Carbon Ltd. 
Versus
Om Prakash Jalan (Financer) & Anr.
Dated:October 28, 2013
Citation:(2016) 1 SCC(Cri); (2016) 1 SCC
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Sunday, 18 September 2016

Leading judgment on grant of exparte temporary injunction

What are the guiding principles in relation to the grant of an ad interim injunction in such areas of the functioning of the capital market and public issues of the corporate sector and whether certain 'venue restriction clauses' would require to be evolved.judicially as has been done in cases such as Sanchaita case I etc. ?
36. As a principle, ex parte injunction could be granted only under exceptional circumstances. The factors which should weigh with the court in the grant of ex parte injunction are-
(a) whether irreparable or serious mischief will ensue to the plaintiff;
(b) whether the refusal of ex parte injunction would involve greater injustice than the grant of it would involve;

(c) the court will also consider the time at which the plaintiff first had notice of the act complained so that the making of improper order against a party in his absence is prevented;
(d) the court will consider whether the plaintiff had acquiesced for sometime and in such circumstances it will not grant ex parte injunction;
(e) the court would expect a party applying for ex parte injunction to show utmost good faith in making the application.
(f) even if granted, the ex parte injunction would be for a limited period of time.
(g) General principles like prima facie case balance of convenience and irreparable loss would also be considered by the court.
37. In United Commercial Bank v. Batik of India5, this Court observed: (SCC pp. 787-88, paras 52-53) "No injunction could be granted under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code unless the plaintiffs establish that they had a prima facie case, meaning thereby that there was a bona fide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried. The question that must necessarily arise is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is a prima facie case and, if so, as between whom? In view of the legal principles applicable, it is difficult for us to say on tile material on record that the plaintiffs have a prima facie case. It cannot be disputed that if the suit were to be brought by the Bank of India, the High Court would not have granted any injunction as it was bound by the terms of the contract. What could not be done directly cannot be achieved indirectly in a suit brought by the plaintiffs.

38. This Court had occasion to emphasise the need to give reasons before passing ex parte orders of injunction. In Shiv Kumar Chadha v. 5 (1981) 2 SCC 766 Municipal Corpn. of Delhi6, it is stated as under: (SCC pp. 176-77, paras 34-35) "... the court shall 'record the reasons' why an ex parte order of injunction was being passed in the facts and circumstances of a particular case. In this background, the requirement for recording the reasons for grant of ex parte injunction, cannot be held to be a mere formality. This requirement is consistent with the principle, that a party to a suit, who is being restrained from exercising a right which such party claims to exercise either under a statute or under the common law, must be informed why instead of following the requirement of Rule '1, the procedure prescribed under the proviso has been followed. The party which invokes the Jurisdiction of the court for grant of an order of restrain against a party, without affording an opportunity to him of being heard, must satisfy the court about the gravity of the situation and court has to consider briefly these factors in the ex parte order. We are quite conscious of the fact that there are other statutes which contain similar provisions requiring the court or the authority concerned to record reasons before exercising power vested in them. In respect of some of such provisions it has been held that they are required to be complied with but non-compliance therewith will not vitiate the order so passed. But same cannot be said in respect of the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39. The Parliament has prescribed a particular procedure for passing of an order of injunction without notice to the other side, under exceptional circumstances. Such ex parte orders have far-reaching effect, as such a condition has been imposed that court must record reasons before passing such order. If it is held that the compliance with the proviso aforesaid is optional and no t obligatory, then the introduction of the proviso by the Parliament shall be a futile exercise and that part of Rule 3 will be a surplusage for all practical purposes. Proviso to Rule 3 of Order 39 of the Code, attracts the principle, that if a statute requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it should be done in that manner or not all. This principle was approved and accepted in well-known cases of Taylor v. Taylor', and Nazir Ahmed v. Emperor8. This Court has also expressed the same view in respect of procedural requirement of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act in the case of Ramchandra Keshav Adke v. Govind Joti Chavare9.
As such whenever a court considers it necessary in the facts and circumstances of a particular case to pass an order of injunction without notice to other side, it must record the reasons for doing so and should take into consideration, while passing an order of injunction, all relevant factors, including as to how the object of granting injunction itself shall be defeated if an ex parte order is not passed."
6    (1993) 3 SCC 161, 176
7    (1875) 1 Ch D 426: 45 LJ Ch 373
8    AIR 1936 PC 253(2): 63 IA 372: 37 Cri LJ 897
9    (1975) 1 SCC 915

Supreme Court of India
Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund vs Kartick Das on 20 May, 1994
Equivalent citations: 1994 SCC (4) 225, JT 1994 (3) 654
BENCH:
MOHAN, S. (J)
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N.(CJ)
ANAND, A.S. (J)
Read full judgment here:click here

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Saturday, 25 June 2016

Town planning board deciding appeal without giving reasons amounts to violation of principles of natural justice

Normally the Board does give reasons in support of
its decision, however, in the present case, there are absolutely
no reasons given. In view of this position, the Member
Secretary was called upon to place on record his explanation
as to why in this matter a deviation was made. Reply dated 24
February, 2015 has been filed by the Chief Town Planner. The
reply seeks to justify the decision on merits and states that the
Board will henceforth pass speaking orders. No explanation is
placed on record as to why there was a deviation. The Town
Planner has not even bothered to say that it is a mistake nor
any apology is tendered. It is not even the stand that it was an
oversight or it was due to pressure of work. The affidavit only
states that point made by the Court is noted and henceforth
Board will give reason.
 There is an important angle that must be
emphasized. The usual consequence of such orders is remand
for fresh hearing. While doing so, this Court has to protect the
structure, which in the opinion of the Board, should be
demolished. Therefore, if the Board is of the opinion that the
structure does not deserve to be protected, by passing
unreasoned order, it in fact extends protection to such
structure in view of the usual consequences that follow from
such order. By not giving reason in the cases of unauthorized
construction,the board in fact end up extending protection to
them.
 The Board is presumed to be aware of this
consequence. It is for this very reason that an explanation was
sought, but has not been given. The action of the Board is not
only in violation of the principles of natural justice but is
against public interest. The Board not only exercises power
that affect right of the parties, but the Board decides matters
affecting town planning, in which all residents have a interest.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA
 WRIT PETITION NO. 766 OF 2013
 Smt. Sebastiana Cardozo,

 V e r s u s
State of Goa 
 CORAM: N. M. JAMDAR, J.
 DATE: 24 FEBRUARY, 2015.
Citation:2016(3) MHLJ653
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Sunday, 29 March 2015

What constitute finding of court?



 Keeping the above in view, we may turn to the Oxford Dictionary which gives the following meaning to the word ‘finding’:
“the conclusion reached by judicial or other inquiry”.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘find’ and ‘finding of fact’ thus:
“find - to determine a fact in dispute by verdict or decision.
and, finding of fact: A determination by a judge, jury, or administrative agency of a fact supported by the evidence in the record, usually presented at the trial or hearing.” Webster Comprehensive Dictionary defines the expression ‘finding’ as under:
“the act of finding; that which is found; discovery; 2. Law A conclusion arrived at before an official or a court. 3 Support; expense.” P. Ramanathan Aiyar’s Law Lexicon (Second Ed.) assigns the following meaning to the term “finding”:
“The decision of a judge, arbitrator, jury, or referee.” It further explains the term thus:
“A term used by the profession and by the courts as meaning the decision of a trial court upon disputed facts.”
13. It is evident from the above that English language and law dictionaries and the Law Lexicons give a wide range of meaning to the expression ‘finding’. The predominant use of the expression is in relation to determination by a Judge, Jury, Administrative Agency, Arbitrator or a Referee. The determination is described either as a finding, decision or conclusion; upon disputed facts. It is also described as a determination of a fact supported by evidence on the record. It is interchangeably used as a conclusion or decision a term used by the legal profession and by Courts. The term “conclusion” is in turn defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as under:
“The final part of a speech or writing (such as jury argument or a pleading);
a judgment arrived at by reasoning;
an inferential statement;
the closing, settling, or final arranging of a treaty, contract, deal, etc.”
14. It is trite that a finding can be both; a finding of fact or a finding of law. It may even be a finding on a mixed question of law and fact. In the case of a finding on a legal issue the Arbitrator may on facts that are proved or admitted explore his options and lay bare the process by which he arrives at any such finding. It is only when the conclusion is supported by reasons on which it is based that one can logically describe the process as tantamount to recording a finding. It is immaterial whether the reasons given in support of the conclusion are sound or erroneous. That is because a conclusion supported by reasons would constitute a “finding” no matter the conclusion or the reasons in support of the same may themselves be erroneous on facts or in law. It may then be an erroneous finding but it would nonetheless be a finding. What is important is that a finding presupposes application of mind. Application of mind is best demonstrated by disclosure of the mind; mind in turn is best disclosed by recording reasons. That is the soul of every adjudicatory process which affects the rights of the parties.
Supreme Court of India

M/S Anand Brothers P.Ltd.Tr.M.D vs Union Of India & Ors on 4 September, 2014

Bench: T.S. Thakur, C. Nagappan, Adarsh Kumar Goel
Citation2014 ALLSCR3698
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Thursday, 20 December 2012

Whether court is supposed to give reasons in exparte judgment?


"Judgment" as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds for a decree or order. What a judgment should contain is indicated in Order 20, Rule 4 (2) which says that a judgment :
"shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision."
It should be a self-contained document from which it should appear as to what were the facts of the case and what was the controversy which was tried to be settled by the Court and in what manner. The process of reasoning by which the Court came to the ultimate conclusion and decreed the suit should be reflected clearly in the judgment.
In an old case, namely, Nanhe vs. Saiyad Tasadduq Husain (1912) 15 Oudh Cases 78, it was held that passing of a mere decree was material irregularity within the meaning of Section 115 of the Code and that even if the judgment was passed on the basis of the admission made by the defendant, other requirements which go to constitute "judgment" should be complied with.
In Thippaiah and others vs. Kuri Obaiah, ILR 1980 (2) Karnataka 1028, it was laid down that the Court must state the grounds for its conclusion in the judgment and the judgment should be in confirmity with the provisions of Section 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Dineshwar Prasad Bakshi vs. Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, AIR 1989 Patna 139, it was held that the judgment pronounced under Order 8 Rule 10 must satisfy the requirements of "judgment" as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code.
Learned counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the provisions of Order 20, Rule 1 (2) would apply only to contested cases as it is only in those cases that "the points for determination" as mentioned in this Rule will have to be indicated, and not in a case in which the written statement has not been filed by the defendants and the facts set out in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted. We do not agree. Whether it is a case which is contested by the defendants by filing a written statement, or a case which proceeds ex-parte and is ultimately decided as an ex-parte case, or is a case in which the written statement is not filed and the case is decided under Order 8 Rule 10, the Court has to write a judgment which must be in conformity with the provisions of the Code or at least set out the reasoning by which the controversy is resolved.

Supreme Court of India
Balraj Taneja & Anr vs Sunil Madan & Anr on 8 September, 1999
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