Whether landlord is bound by relinquishment deed executed by tenant in favour of his brother?

Next we examine the question as to whether defendants 2 and 3 became tenants by virtue of alleged assignment of tenancy rights by defendant No. 1 in their favour. There is nothing on record to support this contention. The release deed which is relied upon by the defendants for this purpose has no mention whatsoever about the tenancy rights released by defendant No. 1 in favour of defendants No. 2 and 3. The release deed only talks about business of printing press. After the release deed, defendant No. 1 ceased to have any interest in the business of the printing press. There is no proof of payment of rent by defendant 2 and 3 with respect to the suit premises to the landlord. There is no rent receipt in their favour. The landlord is not a party to the release deed. He is not bound by any recitals contained in the release deed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal Nos. 1811-13/1997

Decided On: 31.07.2003

 S.R. Radhakrishnan  Vs.  Neelamegam

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Delhi HC: Tests to determine when a deed can be treated as release deed or relinquishment deed

From a reading of the above judgments, the test to determine whether an instrument can be considered as a Release/Relinquishment Deed can be summarized as under:-

a. In determining whether the document is a release or Gift/Conveyance, the nomenclature used to describe the document or the language which the party may choose to employ in framing the document, is not a decisive factor. What is decisive is the actual character of the transaction intended by the executants;

b. Determination of the nature of the document is not a pure question of law;

c. Where a co-owner renounced his right in a property in favour of the other co-owner, mere use of word like 'consideration' and 'transfer' would not affect the true character of the transaction;

d. What is intended by a Release Deed is the relinquishment of the right of the co-owner;

e. Co-ownership need not be only through inheritance, but can also be through purchase;

f. Where the relinquishment of the right by the co-owner is only in favour of one of the co-owner and not against all, the document would be one of Gift/Conveyance and not of "release".

THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P. (C) 9193/2019 and 3560/2018

Decided On: 20.05.2020

Tripta Kaushik Vs. Sub Registrar VI-A, Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Navin Chawla, J.

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Whether consent letter can be treated as relinquishment deed?

However, defendant No. 1/appellant herein intends to deny the said share of the plaintiff by placing reliance on Ex. D-2. Ex. D-2 cannot be considered in law to be a relinquishment of plaintiff's right, tide and interest in the suit schedule properties. The said consent letter may have been given for the purpose of entering the name of defendant No. 1 in the revenue records. The said consent letter would not amount to a relinquishment of the right, tide and interest of the plaintiff in the suit schedule properties. Even the said consent letter has not been believed by the trial court, nor Ex. D-2 could be equated to a deed of relinquishment. Any deed of relinquishment would require registration as per Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908. In the absence of there being any deed of relinquishment which has been registered in accordance with law, it cannot be held that the plaintiff has given up her right, title and interest in the suit schedule properties.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Regular First Appeal No. 100377 of 2017

Decided On: 04.02.2019

 Lokappa  Vs. Shekavva and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and A.S. Bellunke, JJ.

Citation: AIR 2019 Karnat 119

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Whether relinquishment of leasehold interest in partnership firm constitute transfer of tenancy right prohibited under bombay rent Act?

 The legislative prohibition against the transfer of tenant's interest in the premises, operates "notwithstanding anything contained in any law". these words signify the overriding effect of the legislative command that a tenant shall not transfer his interest in the tenancy. After setting out the prohibition, the legislature enumerates two specific modes of the prohibited transfers. They are; subletting and assignments. In order to preclude transfer by a mode not named in the Section, the legislature employed the words "in any other manner".

35. The word "transfer" in the clause "transfer in any other manner" is used in its generic sense to denote the idea of making over property to another person. Rejecting the restricted meaning of "transfer" in the Transfer of Property Act , this court went so far as to hold that devolution of tenant's interest by bequest falls within the prohibition of Section 15(1) Dr. Anant Trimbak Sabnis v. Vasant Pratap Pandit MANU/MH/0173/1980 : AIR1980Bom69 . The broad generic sense, taking in its sweep all species of dealings with tenant's interest resulting in making over of property is consistent with the object of the Section.

36. The legislature has used the word "any" which is word with a wide meaning and is used to exclude all limitations. Clarke - Jerviose v. Scutt - (1920) I Ch. 382. The legislature could not have fore sent the modes that may be employed for the purpose of transferring tenancy. Aware of this, the legislature specified subletting and assignment, the two known modes of transfer; but it took care to use the words signifying exclusion of any other mode, arrangement or process of transfer. The significance of the word "any" is clear if one notices its meaning. It weans "in any degree, to any extent or at all". Therefore, when the legislature used the word "any" with reference to the transfer, it clearly intended to say that no transfer "at all " or "to any extent" or "in any degree" shall be made, New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language. The meaning of the word "other" in the context of transfer is also significant. It is used to denote a form of transfer "different or distinct from the ones mentioned or employed" New Webster's Dictionary of the English Language.

37. Whether a tenant sublets or assigns his interest - the obvious modes named by the statute - or the tenancy is made over to another through the medium of dissolution of a firm or retirement from the partnership, the result is identical; for, the tenant's interest's interest has been parted with. Aware of this possibility, the legislature used these words to mean that the tenant's interest in the premises shall not be made over to another persons by any mode at all.

38. In my opinion, therefore, having regard to the meaning of the words, "in any other manner", the transfer of tenant's interest through the mode of dissolution of partnership or retirement from partnership is a transfer forbidden by Section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act .

39. My conclusions on the question of the validity of the transfer of tenancy may be summarised as under.

The Partnership Act conceives the interests of partners in severalty. There is no community or unity of interest between partners. Therefore, they hold immovable property of the firm as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Having regard to the and not as joint tenants. Having regard to the incidents of tenancy-in-common, one partner has no interest in the share in the property of another partner. Where one partner transfers or relinquishment his share in the partnership business to another, the transfer partner has no antecedent title to the share of the transferring partner. Therefore the making over or relinquishment of leasehold interest as a part of the transferor's share in the assets of the firm constitutes transfer of such lease hold interest.

Section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act prohibits transfer of tenant's interest in the prohibits not only by subletting or assignment but also "in any other manner". The words "in any other manner" mean a manner other than by subletting and assignment. The effect of giving up of his share in the tenancy by a partner as a part of his share in the partnership is to make over his share in the tenancy. Such making over of tenancy or parting with tenancy constitutes transfer of tenant's interest "in any other manner". Such transfer of tenancy is forbidden by Section 15(1) of the Bombay Rent Act and is, therefore, void. The transferee partner does not, therefore acquire the transferor's interest in the tenancy.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Suit No. 756 of 1977

Decided On: 20.06.1989

Nariman Aspandiar Irani Vs. Adi Merwan Irani

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Whether relinquishment deed of leasehold interest in partnership firm is compulsorily registrable?

According to the Plaintiff, the ``gift`` is not valid as it is not made by registered instrument and attested by two witnesses as required by Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act . The Defendant, on the other hand, asserts that the share in the partnership property even if it includes immovable assets is not immovable property. In view of the Supreme Court's ruling in Addanki Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa MANU/SC/0281/1966 : [1966]3SCR400 . Followed in Commr. of Income Tax, West Bengal v. Juggilal Kamlapat MANU/SC/0130/1966 : [1967]63ITR292(SC) . I uphold the submission of Mr. Vyas, learned Counsel for the Defendant, that the interest of partners in a partnership firm, although it owns immovable property including leasehold interest, is movable property and, therefore, a document evidencing relinquishment of interest of one partner is not compulsorily registrable. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Suit No. 756 of 1977

Decided On: 20.06.1989

Nariman Aspandiar Irani Vs. Adi Merwan Irani

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.H. Guttal, J.

Citation: AIR 1989 Bom 362,1990 MHLJ 265

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To what extent unregistered family settlement can be relied on?

 Under Section 17 of the Registration Act, the documents which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, are to be registered. Under Section 49 of the Registration Act no document required by Section 17 or by any provision of the Transfer of Property Act to be registered shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting an immovable property. As provided by Section 49 of the Registration Act, any document, which is not registered as required under the law would be inadmissible in evidence and cannot therefore be produced and proved Under Section 91 of the Evidence Act.

17. Even though recitals in the Ex. D22 is to the effect of relinquishment of right in items No. 1 and 2, Ex. D22 could be taken as family arrangements/settlements. There is no provision of law requiring family settlements to be reduced to writing and registered, though when reduced to writing the question of registration may arise. Binding family arrangements dealing with immovable property worth more than rupees hundred can be made orally and when so made, no question of registration arises. If, however, it is reduced to the form of writing with the purpose that the terms should be evidenced by it, it required registration and without registration it is inadmissible; but the said family arrangement can be used as corroborative piece of evidence for showing or explaining the conduct of the parties. In the present case, Ex. D22 panchayat resolution reduced into writing, though not registered can be used as a piece of evidence explaining the settlement arrived at and the conduct of the parties in receiving the money from the Defendant in lieu of relinquishing their interest in items No. 1 and 2.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 5805 of 2016 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27268 of 2008)

Decided On: 05.07.2016

Subraya M.N. Vs. Vittala M.N. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kurian Joseph and R. Banumathi, JJ.

Citation: 2017(5) BomCR160

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Whether mutation entries in absence of registered relinquishment deed can be relied on?

Since this Court has already come to the conclusion, on the basis of aforesaid provision of law as well as material available on record, that no immovable property could be relinquished without there being registered document, mutation, if any, conducted on the basis of oral relinquishment/'Azadinama' as reflected in Ex. P-1 and Ex. DX has no bearing on the rights of plaintiff, who is absolute owner of the suit land.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA

Regular Second Appeal No. 23 of 2006

Decided On: 05.05.2017

 Piar Chand and Ors. Vs. Sant Ram and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sandeep Sharma, J.

Citation:AIR 2017(NOC) 918 HP

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Whether partition of joint family property can be proved by document thirty years old?

 Defendant No. 1 came with specific case that plaintiff
and Nandlal had separated from each other from prior to year
1944. He contended that in the year 1944, some writing was
done by plaintiff in favour of Nandlal to show that there was
separation. He contended that due to partition and writing, the

joint status had come to an end.

The learned counsel for appellants tried to use
section 90 of the Evidence Act in support of his submissions.

Section 90 of the Evidence Act runs as under :-
"90. Presumption as to documents thirty
years old.—Where any document, purporting or
proved to be thirty years old, is produced from
any custody which the Court in the particular case
considers proper, the Court may presume that the
signature and every other part of such document,
which purports to be in the handwriting of any
particular person, is in that person’s handwriting,
and, in the case of a document executed or
attested, that it was duly executed and attested
by the persons by whom it purports to be
executed and attested.
Explanation.—Documents are said to be in
proper custody if they are in the place in which,
and under the care of the person with whom, they
would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it
is proved to have had a legitimate origin, or if the
circumstances of the particular case are such as to
render such an origin probable.
This Explanation applies also to section 81"
The aforesaid provision shows that discretion is given to the
Court by using words 'may presume' to presume due execution
or due attesting of such document. If there are suspicious
circumstances, Court can refuse to raise presumption available
under section 90. In the present matter, the Trial Court refused

to raise such presumption by giving reasons that this document
was never used by Nandlal or even by defendant No. 1 for any
purpose prior to its production in the Court. The Courts below
have observed that there is convincing record to rebut the
presumption which could have been raised in view of section 90
in respect of Exh. 363. This Court has already quoted the
material showing that the family continued to remain joint in all
respects and this record is considered by the Courts below also.
When the finding of the Court is about proof of execution and
section 90 needs to be used for the proof of execution, it
becomes purely matter of discretion and the Appellate Court is
not expected to interfere lightly in finding given by the Trial
Court in such circumstances. The scope of this Court in Second
Appeal is further reduced. For this reason, this Court is not
expected to interfere in the findings given by the Courts below in
respect of proof of execution and admissibility of Exh. 363 in
evidence.
27) The proof of execution cannot lead to inference that
the contents are correct. Whether such document could have
been considered for proof of execution is other question. The
proof of execution of Exh. 363 could not have been allowed in
the Court for other reasons also. The contents of this document

purport relinquishment of right in coparcenery property, which is
immovable property. Though there was admittedly some charge
on the property like house No. 1285 or even on the share in the
property from Shevgaon, there was the other property like share
in house No. 1286-87 purchased under the registered document.
There was big agricultural land at Shevgaon. As per the
provisions of Transfer of Property Act and the provisions of Indian
Registration Act, such document ought to have been registered.
It was necessary to pay the stamp duty also, if due to this
document plaintiff was to relinquish his rights in immovable
property. For this reason even for collateral purpose the
document could not have been used and proof of execution
could not have been allowed. The provisions of not only Indian
Registration Act, but also the other Act like Stamp Act would

have proved to be obstacle.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT BOMBAY
APPELLATE SIDE, BENCH AT AURANGABAD
SECOND APPEAL NO. 215 OF 2002

Madanlal Nandlal Zawar V  Premsukh Ramdayal Zawar,

CORAM : T.V. NALAWADE, J.
DATED : 3rd May, 2016.
Citation: 2017(2) ALLMR 123

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Supreme Court: Unregistered relinquishment deed is not admissible in evidence

It is well settled that the nomenclature given to the document
is not decisive factor but the nature and substance of the transaction
has to be determined with reference to the terms of the documents
and that the admissibility of a document is entirely dependent upon
the recitals contained in that document but not on the basis of the
pleadings set up by the party who seeks to introduce the document
in question. A thorough reading of both Exhibits B-21 and B-22
makes it very clear that there is relinquishment of right in respect of
immovable property through a document which is compulsorily
registerable document and if the same is not registered, becomes
an inadmissible document as envisaged under Section 49 of the
Registration Act. Hence, Exhibits B-21 and B-22 are the documents
which squarely fall within the ambit of section 17 (i) (b) of the
Registration Act and hence are compulsorily registerable documents
and the same are inadmissible in evidence for the purpose of
proving the factum of partition between the parties. We are of the
considered opinion that Exhibits B 21 and B22 are not admissible in
evidence for the purpose of proving primary purpose of partition.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8441 OF 2015

YELLAPU UMA MAHESWARI  Vs  BUDDHA JAGADHEESWARARAO & ORS.

Dated;October 08, 2015
N.V. RAMANA, J.
Citation:(2015) 16 SCC787

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Whether there can be renunciation by one member of joint family in favour of one of several other members of family?

There is another Privy Council judgment which supports the proposition that there cannot be a renunciation by one member of a joint family in favour of one of several other members of the family while the family remains joint. In Vasantrao v. Anandrao (1914) 37 M.L.J. 872, one Madhawrao executed a release of his interest in the family property in favour of his father. The Bombay High Court held that the release must be treated, as being, not for the benefit of the father alone, but of the coparcenary and the shares were to be determined as though Madhawrao had died. This case went to the Privy Council as Anandrao v. Vasantraa (1936) 71 M.L.J. 558: L.R. 63 I.A. 397. Their Lordships held that the governing principles had been rightly applied by the High Court and dismissed the appeal.

Madras High Court

Chella Subbanna And Anr. vs Chella Balasubbareddi And Ors. on 12 December, 1944

Equivalent citations: (1945) 1 MLJ 140

JUDGMENT Alfred Henry Lionel Leach, C.J.

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Whether one member of joint Hindu family can relinquish his share in favour of only one coparcener?

In a Full Bench decision of this Court reported in Chella Subbanna v. Chella Balasubbareddi MANU/TN/0035/1944 : AIR 1945 Mad 142 , it was held as follows:

...The relinquishment by one coparcener of his interest in the family estate in favour of the members of the coparcenary does not amount to an alienation; it merely amounts to an extinction of his interest in favour of the others. The gift of his interest to one of several other coparceners would not mean the extinction of that interest. It would mean an alienation of it. It is well-settled law that there cannot be such a gift to a stranger and it is now clear that there cannot be a gift to a fellow coparcener if the family is to remain undivided.

There is another Privy Council judgment which supports the proposition that there cannot be a renunciation by one member of a joint family in favour of one of several other members of the family while the family remains joint. In Vasantrao v. Anandrao 6 B.L.R. 925 one Madhawaro executed a release of his interest in the family property in favour of his father. The Bombay High Court held that the release must be treated, as being, not for the benefit of the father alone, but of the coparcenary and the shares were to be determined as though Madhawrao had died. This case went to the Privy Council as Anandrao v. Vasantrao 9 B.L.R. 595their Lordships held that the governing principles had been rightly applied by the High Court and dismissed the appeal. At p. 497, 10th Edn. of Mayne the learned editor expresses the opinion that dicta in Pedayya v. Ramalingam I.L.R. 11 Mad. 406 and Thangavelu Pillai v. Doraiswami Pillai 27 M.L.J. 272 cannot be considered good law especially after the decision of the Privy Council in Venkatapathi Raju v. Venkatanarasimha Raju MANU/PR/0126/1936 : (1936) 71 M.L.J. 558 : I.L.R. 69 IndAp 307 :I.L.R. 1937 Mad. 1. It follows from what we have said that we are in full agreement with this opinion and that additional support for it is to be found in the judgment of their Lordships in Anandrao v. Vasantrao 9 B.L.R. 595. The answer which we give to the question referred is this : A member of a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law cannot give his interest in the family estate to one of several coparceners if they remain joint in estate. In such circumstances he can relinquish his interest but the relinquishment operates for the benefit of all the other members. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS

Decided On: 13.02.1997

P.R. Munuswamy Naidu Vs. V. Venkatesan and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
S.S. Subramani, J.

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Whether there can be valid relinquishment deed in favour of only one co-owner?

It is a settled legal proposition that one of the co-owners can relinquish his share in a co-owned property in favour of one or more of the co-owners. The document executed by him in this regard would continue to be a Relinquishment Deed irrespective of whether the relinquishment is in favour of one or all the remaining co-owners of the property. There is no basis in law for the proposition that if the Relinquishment Deed is executed in favour of one of the co-owners, it would be treated as a Gift Deed. The law of stamp duty as applicable in Delhi treats Relinquishment Deed and Gift Deed as separate documents, chargeable with different stamp duties. It is not necessary that in order to qualify as a Relinquishment Deed the document must purport to relinquish the share of the relinquisher in favour of all the remaining co- owners of the property. Even if the relinquishment is in favour of one of the co-owners it would qualify as a Relinquishment Deed.
Delhi High Court

Srichand Badlani vs Govt. Of N.C.T. Of Delhi & Ors. on 18 December, 2013

Author: V. K. Jain

Citation;AIR 2014(NOC)539 Delhi

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Whether divorce document can be treated as relinquishment deed for maintenance?

If the “Pharkat Patra” produced in this Court is treated as 
the proof of customary divorce, in that case also, in view of the aforesaid 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the husband cannot avoid 

the   liability.     If   there   there   was   the   divorce   under   the   document,   the 
husband   cannot   take   defence   that   the   wife   has   been   living   separate 
without sufficient cause.   If the wife was already living separate, there 
was   sufficient   cause   for   her   and   so,   this   document   cannot   help   the 
husband to avoid the liability.  It is not possible to draw inference that the 

parties are already living separate by mutual consent or the wife was 
living separate without sufficient reason.   It is already observed that in 
view   of   the   facts   of   the   case,   it   cannot   be   inferred   that   there   was 
relinquishment of right of maintenance.  If there was no divorce obtained 
under the document, then in view of the aforesaid provisions, it needs to 
be   held   that   there   was   no   question   of   relinquishment   of   the   right   of 
maintenance. 

THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD.
APPELLATE SIDE JURISDICTION
  CRIMINAL  WRIT PETITION NO.  4  OF  2011
Sau. Sindhubai Ramesh Landge,
Name after divorce
Sindhu D/o Ramdas More,
V 
Ramesh Dagaa Landge,

CORAM  : T.V. NALAWADE, J. 
Citation; 2014(2)crimes 351 Bom, 2013(4)ABR834, 2013ALLMR(Cri)3252, 2013(3)BomCR(Cri)627, 2013CriLJ3593, III(2013)DMC792, 2014(1)RCR(Criminal)817

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Whether the relinquishment deed is required to be registered and adequately stamped?

 I   have   considered   the   rival   submissions   made 
by learned counsel for the parties.   I have also 
perused the material on record and in particular, 
document dated 24th  June, 1980.   By that document, 
Vishwanath   and   Raosaheb   had   relinquished   their 
share in survey no.63.  In so far as the submission 
of Mr.Tungar that in the past,   an agreement was 
entered   into   among   the   brothers   is   concerned, 
perusal   of   document   does   not   indicate   the   said 
fact.     In   my   view,   by   that   document   itself, 
Vishwanath   and   Raosaheb   had   relinquished   their 
share   in   survey   no.63.     If   that   be   so,   as   per 
Section 17 of the Act, said document is required to 
be compulsorily registered and proper stamp duty is 
required   to   be   paid   thereon.     The   learned   trial 
Judge,   therefore,   declined   to   exhibit   the   said 
document.  
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO.1302 OF 2013

Santosh Motiram Solanke Vs Arjun Asaram Solanke

CORAM   : R.G.KETKAR, J.
DATE    : JULY 4, 2013 
Citation; 2014(2) ALL MR 273

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Whether unregistered relinquishment deed is admissible in evidence?

 By Exh.72, petitioner herein had objected to exhibit Relinquishment-Deed dated 21st December, 1996, copy whereof is at Annexure 'C' to this petition.

 This Court finds that in view of Section 34 read with Section 37 of the Bombay Stamps Act, 1958, and Section 17 read with Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, the document, in question, is rendered inadmissible in the following admitted premises:

[a] Suit is for partition and possession.

[b] Defendant's possession is admitted.

[c] Nothing is to be shown or proved for collateral purpose or issue from this document.

[d] Document is admittedly for Relinquishment of right in immovable property. for a disclosed consideration of Rs. 50,000/-.

[e] Document is on impressed stamp paper of Rs. 50/- which is admittedly insufficient.

[f] Document is not referred for compliance under Section 37 of the Bombay Stamps Act, 1958.

[g] Under Section 34, it is not admissible due to failure to comply with proviso to Section 34.

[h] Admittedly, it needs stamp chargeable as per law.

[i] This document is not registered.

11. In these premises of facts and law, namely statutory bar on Court falling from Section 17, read with Section 49[c] of the Registration Act, 1908, and Section 34 read with Section 37 of the Bombay Stamps Act, 1958, only conclusion, which emerges, is that application [Exh.72] objecting admissibility is liable to be allowed, and is hereby allowed, and this Court holds that the Relinquishment-Deed dated 21st December, 1996 is not admissible in evidence.

Bombay High Court

Nilkanth Son Of Sampat Khandade vs Bhaurao Son Of Sampat Khandade And ... on 11 March, 2008

Equivalent citations: 2008 (3) BomCR 282

Author: A Joshi

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