Showing posts with label respondent. Show all posts
Showing posts with label respondent. Show all posts

Sunday, 25 August 2019

Whether cross objection filed by one respondent against other respondent is maintainable?

The Apex Court observed in Panna Lal Vs. State of Bombay MANU/SC/0240/1963 : AIR 1963 SC 1516

(C) In our opinion, the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that O.41 R. 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being reopened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under O.41 R. 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (AURANGABAD BENCH)

Civil Application No. 13940 of 2017, 

Decided On: 19.12.2018

Chhagan Trimbak Lokhande Vs. Dattatraya Krishna Patil and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.M. Dhavale, J.

Citation: 2019(3) MHLJ 780
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Sunday, 16 December 2018

Whether one respondent can file cross objection against co-respondent?

In our opinion, the view that has now been accepted by all the High Courts that Order 41, r. 22 permits as a general rule, a respondent to prefer an objection directed only against the appellant and it is only in exceptional cases, such as where the relief sought against the appellant in such an objection is intermixed with the relief granted to the other respondents, so that the relief against the appellant cannot be granted without the question being re-opened between the objecting respondent and other respondents, that an objection under Or. 41, r. 22 can be directed against the other respondents, is correct. Whatever may have been the position under the old s. 561, the use of the word "cross-objection" in Or. 41 r. 22 expresses unmistakably the intention of the legislature that the objection has to be directed against the appellant. As Rajammannar C.J., said in Venkateswarlu v. Ramamma I.L.R. (1950) Mad. 874..

"The legislature by describing the objection which could be taken by the respondent as a "cross-objection" must have deliberately adopted the view of the other High Courts. One cannot treat an objection by a respondent in which the appellant has no interest as a cross-objection. The appeal is by the appellant against a respondent, the cross-objection must be an objection by respondent against the appellant".

We think, with respect, that these observations put the matter clearly and correctly. That the legislature also wanted to give effect to the views held by the different High Courts that in exceptional cases as mentioned above an objection can be preferred by a respondent against a correspondent is indicated by the substitution of the work "appellant" in the third paragraph by the words "the party who may be affected by such objection."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeals Nos. 207 to 209 of 1961

Decided On: 11.02.1963

Pannalal Vs. State Bombay and Ors.
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Whether appellate court can give relief to respondent?

Even a bare reading of Order 41, rule 33 is a sufficient to convince any one that the wide wording was intended to empower the appellate court to make whatever order it thinks fit, not only as between the appellant and the respondent but also as between a respondent and a respondent. It empowers the appellate court not only to give or refuse relief to the appellant by allowing or dismissing the appeal but also to give such other relief to any of the respondent as "the case may require."
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeals Nos. 207 to 209 of 1961

Decided On: 11.02.1963

Pannalal Vs. State Bombay and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
J.C. Shah, K.C. Das Gupta, K.N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and P.B. Gajendragadkar, JJ.

Citation: AIR 1963 SC 1516
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Wednesday, 20 September 2017

Whether writ petition can be decided even if notice is not served to one of respondent?

Reverting to the case of Appellant (in C.A. arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 4886/2013) their predecessor in title had already expired on 20th October 2010. If so, the High Court could not have directed impleadment of a dead person as Respondent No. 26. Further, there is nothing in the impugned judgment to indicate that the High Court before proceeding to finally dispose of the Writ Petition, reassured itself that Respondent No. 26 has been duly served. All that is mentioned in paragraph 4, in the last sentence, is that, Akhilesh Kala, despite notice, has not responded. However, on the factum as to when such service was effected or whether the service was complete in all respects, no observation is found in the impugned judgment. The Appellants in the said appeal, however, asserted that no notice was received at the known residence of their predecessor. The fact remains that the Respondent No. 26 could not be represented, being a dead person. The concomitant is that, the Writ Petition proceeded for final hearing without hearing the said Respondent. This was against the spirit of the remand order passed by this Court.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6606/2016 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Civil) No. 39898/2012) 

Decided On: 22.07.2016

 The Energy and Resources Institute Vs. Suhrid Sudarshan Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
T.S. Thakur, C.J.I., A.M. Khanwilkar and D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
Citation:(2016) 14 SCC115
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Friday, 7 October 2016

Whether woman and minor can be respondent in domestic violence proceeding?

 Also, the expression “adult” would have the same effect of
stultifying orders that can be passed under the aforesaid
sections. It is not difficult to conceive of a non-adult 16 or 17
year old member of a household who can aid or abet the
commission of acts of domestic violence, or who can evict or
help in evicting or excluding from a shared household an
aggrieved person. Also, a residence order which may be
passed under Section 19(1)(c) can get stultified if a 16 or
17 year old relative enters the portion of the shared household

in which the aggrieved person resides after a restraint
order is passed against the respondent and any of his
adult relatives. Examples can be multiplied, all of which would
only lead to the conclusion that even the expression “adult” in
the main part is Section 2(q) is restrictive of the object sought to
be achieved by the kinds of orders that can be passed under
the Act and must also be, therefore, struck down, as this word
contains the same discriminatory vice that is found with its
companion expression “male”.
 We, therefore, set aside the impugned judgment of the
Bombay High Court and declare that the words “adult male” in
Section 2(q) of the 2005 Act will stand deleted since these
words do not square with Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Consequently, the proviso to Section 2(q), being rendered
otiose, also stands deleted. We may only add that the
impugned judgment has ultimately held, in paragraph 27, that

the two complaints of 2010, in which the three female
respondents were discharged finally, were purported to be
revived, despite there being no prayer in Writ Petition
No.300/2013 for the same. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10084 of 2016

HIRAL P. HARSORA  V KUSUM NAROTTAMDAS HARSORA
AND ORS.
Bench: Kurian Joseph, Rohinton Fali Nariman
Dated:October 6, 2016.
Citation: AIR 2016 SC4774, 2017(2) MHLJ 147 SC,2017 CRLJ
509 SC
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