Showing posts with label right to privacy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label right to privacy. Show all posts

Tuesday, 14 July 2026

Bombay High Court Reinforces Limits on Police Search Powers regarding residential Home and seizure of mobile of accused

 The right to privacy has now been recognised as an

inseparable facet of the right to life and personal liberty

guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Entry

into the residential premises of a citizen, more particularly into

the bedroom occupied by a woman, without adherence to the

statutory safeguards and the forcible seizure of her mobile

phone without following the procedure prescribed under the

BNSS, constitute a serious invasion of the petitioner's privacy

and dignity. The explanation offered by the respondents that

the search was undertaken in connection with the investigation

of Crime No.26/2026 cannot justify a departure from the

mandatory safeguards enacted by the legislature. The

investigating agency is expected to act strictly within the

bounds of law, and the object of investigation cannot legitimise

an otherwise illegal search or seizure. {Para 22}.

Key Legal Takeaways:

• Section 185 BNSS is mandatory, not directory. Before conducting a warrantless search, the Investigating Officer must record reasons in writing, specify the articles sought, and comply with statutory safeguards. Audio-video recording of the search is also an important statutory requirement.

• Section 105 BNSS governs lawful seizure. A mobile phone or any property cannot be seized casually. A lawful seizure requires a contemporaneous seizure memo, independent witnesses, acknowledgment to the person concerned, proper documentation, and procedural transparency.

• A mobile phone is not merely a device it is a repository of a person’s private life. Arbitrary seizure without following due process directly impacts the constitutional right to privacy under Article 21.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

NAGPUR BENCH AT NAGPUR

CRIMINAL WRIT PETITION No. 128/2026

 Khushbu W/o. Iddrish Khan VS. State of Maharashtra,

CORAM: URMILA JOSHI PHALKE AND

NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ.

JUDGMENT (PER : Nivedita P. Mehta, J.) :

Dated: 03.07.2026

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Sunday, 24 May 2026

Criminal Intimidation, Digital Sexual Threats and Evolving Notions of Chastity: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court’s 2026 Decision on Section 506 IPC


 
I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s judgment VIJAYAKUMAR Vs STATE OF TAMIL NADU 2026 INSC 525 dated 22 May 2026, affirming the conviction of a police constable under Part II of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), marks a significant doctrinal development in the law of criminal intimidation, reputation‑based harm, and the constitutional understanding of women’s sexual autonomy. The Court upheld the conviction for threatening to upload a secretly recorded bathing video of the prosecutrix on social media, while the same accused stood acquitted of rape, deceitful inducement of marriage and voyeurism under Sections 376, 493 and 354C IPC respectively. This separation of liability—acquittal on sexual offences but conviction on aggravated criminal intimidation—invites critical analysis for trial courts, appellate courts and scholars.

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Supreme Court Expands Meaning Of 'Unchastity', Says Threat To Leak Woman's Bathing Video Punishable Under S.506 IPC



The Court made the observation while upholding the conviction of a man under Part II of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code for threatening to upload a woman's private bathing video on Facebook, holding that such conduct amounts to “imputing unchastity” to a woman within the meaning of the provision which penalises criminal intimidation.

…the act of video-recording the victim in a naked state while she was taking a bath and the threat to upload it on digital social media can be construed to be an act amounting to a threat to impute unchastity within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC.”, observed a bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2859 OF 2025

VIJAYAKUMAR Vs STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED

BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE 

Author: NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 525

Dated: May 22, 2026.

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Wednesday, 26 November 2025

Madhya Pradesh HC: 𝑺𝒉𝒂𝒉 𝑩𝒂𝒏𝒐’𝒔 π’“π’Šπ’ˆπ’‰π’• 𝒕𝒐 π’‘π’“π’Šπ’—π’‚π’„π’š 𝒂𝒏𝒅 π’“π’†π’‘π’–π’•π’‚π’•π’Šπ’π’ 𝒄𝒂𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒕 𝒃𝒆 π’Šπ’π’‰π’†π’“π’Šπ’•π’†π’… by her descendants.

 The primary contention of the petitioner is that the film has violated the right of privacy, dignity and reputation of Smt. Shah Bano. It explicitly dramatizes the personal and matrimonial life of late parents of the petitioner without her knowledge or consent. The film intrudes into marital life of Smt. Shah Bano and violates her posthumous dignity. The violation of right of privacy is hence alleged to be that of Smt. Shah Bano. In K.S. Puttaswamy (Supra) it has been held by the Apex Court that right to privacy of any individual extinguishes with the human being. It has been held as under:

"557. In my considered opinion, “right to privacy of any individual” is essentially a natural right, which inheres in every human being by birth. Such right remains with the human being till he/she breathes their last. It is indeed inseparable and inalienable from human being. In other words, it is born with the human being and extinguishes with human being." {Para 8}

09. In Deepa Jaya Kumar Vs. A.L. Vijay and Others AIR 2021 Mad

167 it has been held by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court that privacy or reputation earned by a person during his or her lifetime extinguishes with his or her death. It cannot be inherited like a movable or immovable property. It comes to an end after his or her lifetime. Posthumans right is not an alienable right. It has been held as under:

"38. On an analysis of the aforesaid judgment(s), it is clear that a privacy or reputation earned by a person during his or her life time, extinguishes with his or her death. After the death of a person, the reputation earned cannot be inherited like a movable or immovable property by his or her legal heirs. Such personality right, reputation or privacy enjoyed by a person during his life time comes to an end after his or her life time. Therefore, we are of the opinion that “posthumous right” is not an “alienable right” and the appellant/plaintiff is not entitled for an injunction on the ground that the “posthumous right” of her aunt is sought to be sullied by the respondents/defendants by reason of the release of the film titled as“Thalaivi”. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH

AT INDORE

WRIT PETITION No. 42708 of 2025

MS. SIDDIQUA BEGUM KHAN Vs UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

BEFORE

HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE PRANAY VERMA

ON THE 4th OF NOVEMBER, 2025

 CITATION NO. 2025:MPHC-IND:32075
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Tuesday, 7 October 2025

Beyond Deepfakes: How AI’s “Hallucinated Truths” Will Rewire Legal Personhood, Evidence, and Equality in India


 
Bold takeaway: The next AI challenge for courts is not merely detecting fakes but deciding what it means to be a person in law when synthetic outputs can generate biometric “truths” that rival or surpass human testimony. India needs synthetic-aware evidence rules, constitutional protection for ontological autonomy under Article 21, and equality safeguards against algorithmic arbitrariness under Article 14—especially as AI-assisted judicial systems expand their footprint.

The Case That Changed the Question: From Authenticity to Ontology

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Sunday, 5 October 2025

Judging the Machine: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Indian Judiciary and Privacy Rights

 


Abstract

This article examines the intersection of artificial intelligence and the constitutional right to privacy in India, analyzing emerging challenges and proposing novel legal frameworks for the digital age. Drawing from extensive jurisprudential analysis and contemporary developments, this study explores how AI technologies challenge traditional privacy paradigms while simultaneously transforming India's legal landscape. The article presents new perspectives on algorithmic constitutionalism, quantum-era privacy rights, and the emergence of "digital dignity" as a fundamental concept. It proposes innovative regulatory approaches including algorithmic auditing mandates, AI-specific constitutional amendments, and hybrid public-private governance models. Special emphasis is placed on analyzing how artificial intelligence will fundamentally reshape judicial decision-making processes, examining both the promises and perils of algorithmic assistance in courts. The research demonstrates that India's legal system must evolve beyond traditional privacy concepts to address AI-driven challenges while preserving constitutional values of dignity, equality, and liberty.

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Sunday, 31 August 2025

Supreme Court: Spying in Matrimony: When Privacy Gives Way to Fair Trial Rights Under Section 122 of Evidence Act

 In matrimonial disputes under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Section 122, the court held that the provision comprises two parts: “compellability” and “permissibility” of spousal communications. A spouse cannot be compelled to disclose confidential communication made by the other, and consent for disclosure lies with the spouse who made the communication. The provision aims to protect the sanctity of marriage, not individual fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, the right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes. Secretly recorded telephonic conversations between spouses are admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings under the exception carved out within Section 122, which must be balanced with the right to a fair trial, also guaranteed by Article 21. Section 122 does not apply horizontally and recognizes the rights to a fair trial, to produce relevant evidence, and to prove one’s case against the spouse. The court rejected the argument that such evidence would disturb domestic harmony, noting that snooping between spouses indicates a broken relationship. The court clarified that while the content of a common law right may resemble a fundamental right, they are differentiated by the duties’ incidence—on private entities versus the State. Admissibility of secretly obtained evidence requires satisfying a three-fold test of relevance, identification, and accuracy. Recording conversations without the speaker’s consent or knowledge does not per se bar admissibility. Appeal allowed. (Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37; R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCR 417).

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 9489 of 2025 

Decided On: 14.07.2025

Vibhor Garg Vs. Neha

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and S.C. Sharma, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/0902/2025,2025 INSC 829

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The Great Divide: Decoding the Distinction Between Common Law and Fundamental Privacy Rights in India's Constitutional Framework


The Conceptual Dichotomy: Understanding the Fundamental Distinction

The right to privacy in India exists in a fascinating dual form—simultaneously operating as both a common law right and a fundamental right. This distinction, articulated most clearly in the landmark K.S. Puttaswamy case and later refined in Kaushal Kishor, represents one of the most significant conceptual developments in Indian constitutional jurisprudence.

Justice Bobde's seminal observation in Puttaswamy provides the foundational framework for understanding this dichotomy: "The only material distinctions between [common law rights and fundamental rights] lie in the incidence of the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which a failure to do so can be redressed". This distinction fundamentally reshapes how privacy rights are conceptualized and enforced in the Indian legal system.

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Monday, 25 August 2025

The Constitutional Dialectic: Reconciling Privacy, Fairness, and Marital Sanctity in India's Digital Age


 
Abstract

The Supreme Court of India's recent landmark judgment in Vibhor Garg vs. Neha (2025) represents a pivotal constitutional moment that redefines the delicate equilibrium between fundamental rights within the matrimonial domain. This decision transcends traditional evidence law principles, offering profound insights into the evolving jurisprudence of privacy rights, fair trial guarantees, and the constitutional architecture governing private relationships in contemporary India. This article examines the Court's nuanced approach to balancing competing constitutional imperatives while addressing the complex interplay between vertical and horizontal application of fundamental rights.

Introduction: The Constitutional Crossroads

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Sunday, 24 August 2025

Secretly Recorded Spousal Conversations in Matrimonial Proceedings: Supreme Court’s Landmark Judgment Balances Privacy and Fair Trial Rights

 

The Supreme Court of India, in a landmark judgment dated July 14, 2025, in Vibhor Garg vs. Neha, has decisively addressed the contentious issue of the admissibility of secretly recorded conversations between spouses in matrimonial disputes. This ruling marks a significant turning point at the crossroads of privacy rights, evidence law, and matrimonial justice, offering much-needed clarity for courts, advocates, and litigants navigating these sensitive terrains.

Background: Privacy vs. Evidence in Matrimonial Litigation

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Friday, 30 May 2025

Constitutional Privacy vs. State Surveillance: IRAC Analysis of Vinit Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2019)

 Issue

The primary issues before the Bombay High Court were:

  • Whether the three interception orders issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs under Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 violated the petitioner's fundamental right to privacy under Article 21 of the Constitution.

  • Whether the Central Bureau of Investigation failed to follow due procedure established under Section 5(2) of the Telegraph Act and Rule 419A of the Telegraph Rules

  • Whether evidence obtained through allegedly unlawful interception could be used in criminal proceeding.

Rule

The legal framework governing telephone interception includes:

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Unlawful Interception and Evidence Admissibility: Lessons from Vinit Kumar v. CBI

 The first step under Section 5(2) of the Act, therefore, is the occurrence of any public emergency of the existence of a public-safety interest. Thereafter the competent authority under Section 5(2) of the Act is empowered to pass an order of interception after recording its satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of (i) sovereignty and integrity of India, (ii) the security of the State, (iii) friendly relations with foreign States, (iv) public order or (v) for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence. When any of the five situations mentioned above to the satisfaction of the competent authority require then the said authority may pass the order for interception of messages by recording reasons in writing for doing so. {Para 9}

30. The above analysis of Section 5(2) of the Act shows that so far the power to intercept messages/conversations is concerned the Section clearly lays-down the situations/conditions under which it can be exercised. But the substantive law as laid down in Section 5(2) of the Act must have procedural backing so that the exercise of power is fair and reasonable. The said procedure itself must be just, fair and reasonable. It has been settled by this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, that "procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Article 21 has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself". Thus, understood, "procedure" must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish or bizarre. A valuable constitutional right can be canalised only by civilised processes".

6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in PUCL (Supra) thus categorically held and directed that:-

I. Right to privacy would certainly include telephonic conversation in the privacy of one's house or office. Telephone tapping would, thus, infract Article 21 of the Constitution of India unless it is permitted under the procedure established by law.

II. "Occurrence of public emergency" or "in the interest of public safety" are the "sine qua non" for the application of the provisions of Section 5(2) of the 1885 Act, and without them, the authorities have no jurisdiction to exercise the powers under the said Section to take resort to telephone tapping even though there is satisfaction that it is necessary or expedient so to do in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India etc.

III. The expression "public safety" means the State or Condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large.

IV. Neither the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest of public safety are secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situation would be apparent to a reasonable person.

V. The substantive law as laid down in Section 5(2) of the Act must have procedural safeguards for this valuable constitutional right as settled in Maneka Gandhi versus Union of India, that "procedure which deals with the modalities of regulating, restricting or even rejecting a fundamental right falling within Article 21 of the Constitution of India has to be fair, not foolish, carefully designed to effectuate, not to subvert, the substantive right itself", and the 'procedure' must rule out anything arbitrary, freakish and bizarre.

8. The proposition that illegal tapping of telephone conversation violates right to privacy is now accepted and reinforced as guaranteed fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, by a nine Judge Constitution Bench decision in K.S. Puttaswamy versus Union of India [MANU/SC/1044/2017 : (2017) 10 SCC 1]. by overruling the earlier Constitution Bench judgments, which did not consider right to privacy as fundamental rights, analogues to the American Fourth Amendment, viz. M.P. Sharma versus Satish Chandra [MANU/SC/0018/1954 : AIR 1954 SC 300]. or held that invasion of privacy is not an infringement of fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution viz. Kharak Singh [MANU/SC/0085/1962 : AIR 1963 SC 1295] It has now been held by the Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) that the right to privacy is protected by the Constitution as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and as a part of the freedom guaranteed by Part-Ill of the Constitution of India.

9. Moreover, the view taken in PUCL's case (supra) was affirmed by the said nine Judge Bench in K.S. Puttaswamy (supra) with following observations:

68. In a decision of a Bench of two judges of this Court in PUCL, the Court dealt with telephone tapping. The petitioner challenged the constitutional validity of Section 5(2) of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 and urged in the alternative for adopting procedural safeguards to curb arbitrary acts of telephone tapping.


69. ............. Telephone conversations were construed to be an important ingredient of privacy and the tapping of such conversations was held to infringe Article 21, unless permitted by 'procedure established by law'.


The Court also held that telephone tapping infringes the guarantee of free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) unless authorized by Article 19(2). The judgment relied on the protection of privacy under Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (and a similar guarantee under Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) which, in its view, must be an interpretative tool for construing the provisions of the Constitution. Article 21. in the view of the Court, has to be interpreted in conformity with international law. 

578. It is not India alone, but the world that recognises the right of privacy as a basic human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which India is a signatory, recognises privacy as an international human right. The importance of this right to privacy cannot be diluted and the significance of this is that the legal conundrum was debated and is to be settled in the present reference by a nine-Judges Constitution Bench.

Test: Principle of proportionality and legitimacy

12. In view of the aforesaid clear and emphatic pronunciation of law on the subject by the Nine Judge Constitution Bench in K.S. Puttaswami (supra), it is no longer res-integra that:-

(a) The right to privacy is recognised by the Nine Judge Bench as inherent fundamental right having protection as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedom guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution which is subject to specified restrictions;

(b) Any infringement of the right to privacy by State Authorities will have to meet the following four tests based on the "Principle of proportionality and legitimacy":

1. The action must be sanctioned by law;

2. The proposed action must be necessary in a democratic society for a legitimate aim;

3. The extent of such interference must be proportionate to the need for such interference;

4. There must be procedural guarantees against abuse of such interference.

(c) All earlier judgments suggesting to the contrary, are no longer binding precedents. The matters of infraction of the fundamental right to privacy would now have to necessarily satisfy the aforesaid tests, and cannot be dealt with on the basis of the overruled judgments in M.P. Sharma (supra) or Kharak Singh (supra) or based thereon or on the same line of reasoning like R.M. Malkani (supra).

13. It is at this stage, it is pertinent to note that directions contained in PUCL (supra) are in consonance with the aforesaid 4 tests.


15. The petitioner before us is a businessman and is accused No. 2 in Special CBI Case No. 99 of 2011 arising out of FIR No. RC. 0682010003 of 11th April, 2011, lodged by CBI. In brief, the case of CBI alleges that the petitioner is a bribe-giver, who gave a bribe of Rs. 10,00,000/- to accused No. 1 (Public Servant-Bank Official) for getting certain credit related favour. We are not going into the merits or otherwise of the allegations levelled by CBI. The same can be assailed by the petitioner in his discharge application before the Trial Court.

16. We are of the view that as per Section 5(2) of the Act, an order for interception can be issued on either the occurrence of any public emergency or in the interest of the public safety. The impugned three interception orders were issued allegedly for the reason of 'public safety'. As held in PUCL (supra), unless a public emergency has occurred or the interest of public safety demands, the authorities have no jurisdiction to exercise the powers under the said section. The expression "Public Safety" as held in PUCL (supra) means the state or condition of freedom from danger or risk for the people at large. When either of two conditions are not in existence, it was impermissible to take resort to telephone tapping.

17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in PUCL case (supra) has observed that neither the occurrence of public emergency nor the interest of public safety are secretive conditions or situations. Either of the situations would be apparent to the reasonable person.

18. Even at this stage, from the affidavits filed by the Respondents or the charge-sheet, the Respondents could not justify any ingredients of risk to the people at large or interest of the public safety, for having taken resort to the telephonic tapping by invading the right to privacy. Neither from the impugned orders nor from the record any situation showing interest of public safety is borne out.

19. We are satisfied that in peculiar fact of the instant case, the impugned three interception orders neither have sanction of law nor issued for legitimate aim, as sought to be suggested. The impugned three interception orders could not satisfy the test of "Principles of proportionality and legitimacy" as laid down by the nine judges' constitution bench decision in K.T. Puttaswamy (supra). We, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that all three impugned orders are liable to be set aside. Accordingly, we quash and set aside the same.

20. Having held so, the next question arises is as to whether any directions for destroying the intercepted messages are warranted in a particular case or the instant case. The answer to the said issue would lie in ascertaining whether following directions contained in PUCL case (supra) which are now upheld by the constitution bench decision in K.T. Puttaswamy (supra) are mandatory:

21. We find that there is no scope to presume that aforesaid directions are not mandatory. It is an admitted position that Rule 419(A)(17) which provides for destruction of intercepted messages also adopt the said directions. We can neither permit the Respondents to continue to ignore the directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court nor can we ignore the same. Having held that the impugned interception orders have been issued in contravention of the provisions of section 5(2) of the Act, we have no option but to further direct the destruction of intercepted messages.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 2367 of 2019

Decided On: 22.10.2019

Vinit Kumar Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.V. More and N.J. Jamadar, JJ.

Author: R.V. More, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/2931/2019.

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Tuesday, 29 April 2025

LLM Notes: Beyond Character: Supreme Court Safeguards Women’s Rights in Mardikar Case

 Even a woman of easy virtue is entitled to privacy and no one can invade her privacy as and when he likes. So also it is not open to any and every person to violate her person as and when he wishes. No one has a right to rape a woman, not even a woman of easy virtue.

Supreme Court of India

Overview of the Mardikar Case

The State of Maharashtra v. Madhukar Narayan Mardikar is a landmark Supreme Court case from 1991 that addressed police misconduct, the evidentiary value of a woman's testimony, and the right to privacy and dignity for women, regardless of their background.

Facts of the Case

  • Madhukar Narayan Mardikar was a Police Inspector at Bhiwandi Town Police Station, Maharashtra, in November 1965.

  • On November 13, 1965, Mardikar allegedly visited the hut of Banubi, the wife of Babu Sheikh, in uniform and demanded to have sexual intercourse with her. When she refused, he attempted to force himself on her. She resisted and raised a hue and cry, drawing the attention of her husband and neighbors.

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Sunday, 16 February 2025

DelhI HC: Passport & Personal Identification Details Cannot Be Disclosed Under RTI Act to third party as it is invasion of Privacy

 Further, the observations of learned Single Judge in the aforesaid batch of writ petitions are contrary to the judgment of another learned Single Judge in Suhas Chakma v. Central Information Commission, W.P.(C) 9118/2009 decided on 2nd January, 2010 as well as a Division Bench's judgment in Harish Kumar v. Provost Marshal-Cum-Appellate Authority, LPA 253/2012 decided on 30th March, 2012. In Suhas Chakma (supra) another learned Single Judge has held as under:

"5. The Court is of the considered view that information which involves the rights of privacy of a third party in terms of Section 8(1)(j) RTI Act cannot be ordered to be disclosed without notice to such third party. The authority cannot simply come to conclusion, that too, on a concession or on the agreement of parties before it, that public interest overrides the privacy rights of such third party without notice to and hearing such third party." {Para 12}

13. The relevant portion of the Division Bench in Harish Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow:-

9. What we find in the present case is that the PIO had not refused the information. All that the PIO required the appellant to do was, to follow third party procedure. No error can be found in the said reasoning of the PIO. Under Section 11 of the Act, the PIO if called upon to disclose any information relating to or supplied by a third party and which is to be treated as confidential, is required to give a notice to such third party and is to give an opportunity to such third party to object to such disclosure and to take a decision only thereafter.

10. There can be no dispute that the information sought by the appellant was relating to a third party and supplied by a third party. We may highlight that the appellant also wanted to know the caste as disclosed by his father-in-law in his service record. The PIO was thus absolutely right in, response to the application for information of the appellant, calling upon the appellant to follow the third party procedure under Section 11. Reliance by the PIO on Section 8 (1) (j) which exempts from disclosure of personal information and the disclosure of which has no relationship to any public activity or interest and which would cause unwanted invasion of the privacy of the individual was also apposite. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

W.P.(C) 5836/2018

Decided On: 28.01.2025

Rakesh Kumar Vs. Central Public Information Officer and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sachin Datta, J.

Citation: 2025DHC 618: MANU/DE/0639/2025.

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Friday, 1 November 2024

Madras HC: Privacy as a fundamental right includes spousal privacy also and evidence obtained by invading this right is inadmissible

 This is primarily because there has been a clear invasion of theprivacy right of the wife. It is obvious that the husband had stealthily obtained the information pertaining to the call history of his wife. He was not the owner of the mobile device or the registered user of the sim card. He had clandestine custody of the same for probably a brief while. There has been a clear breach of the privacy of the wife. In Justice K.Puttaswamy (Retd) v. UOI (AIR 2017 SC 4161), it was held that privacy is a fundamental right. Can evidence procured in violation of this right be admissible in evidence?. This question does not admit of an easy answer. The learned amicus has tabulated the dichotomy of judicial opinion :

Admissible Inadmissible

Kethana Lokes v. Rahul Bettakotte

2024 Karnataka HC 21752

Asha Latha v. Durgesh

2023 SCC OnLine Chh 3959

Deepti Kapur v. Kunal Julka

AIR 2020 Del 156

Rayala Bhuvanewari v.

Naggaphanender AIR 2008 AP 98

Preeti v. Kunal

AIR 2016 Raj 153

Neha v. Vibhor Garg (2021)

(Punjab & Haryana HC)

Sachin Arora v. Manju

2023 DHC 3197

Sankarram v. Kalaiselvi

CMSA(MD)No.54 of 2021 (Madurai

Bench of the Madras High Court).

Neha v. Vibhor Garg has been challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SLP (C) No.21195 of 2021. Vide order dated 28.04.2022, the proceedings before the Family Court have been stayed. The order of the High Court had not been stayed. {Para 9}

10.The following observations and ratio laid down by the Court of

Appeal in Imerman v. Technquiz (2010 EWCA Civ 908) are relevant : “it was a breach of confidence for a person intentionally to obtain another person’s information secretly and without authorisation, knowing that he reasonably expected it to be private, and, without that other persons authority, ...... that the husband had an expectation of privacy at common law and in accordance with article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in respect of the majority of documents stored on the server which had been accessed without his authority at a stage in the divorce proceedings ....

Why should one spouse have no right of confidentiality

enforceable against the other in relation to their separate lives and personalities?...

Each spouse is entitled to a separate life, distinct from the

shared matrimonial life.

Legal protection applies to protect the confidence itself, not merely to prevent the dissemination of information. It does not need to be shown that the information will be misused; merely that it has been obtained in breach of confidence would be sufficient.”

In Katz v. United States (389 U.S 347 (1967), Justice Harlan propounded the reasonable expectation of privacy test to determine whether an action by the government has violated an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. It was a two part test ; the individual has exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognise as reasonable. If both requirements are met and the government has taken an action which violates this 'expectation', then the government's action has violated the individual's right. In a research paper titled “My Diary is Your Diary : The Right to Privacy in a Marriage” by Turkish author Dr.Nadire Ozdemir, it was recommended that the Harlan test laid down in the context of state surveillance should be extended to matrimonial relationships also and that the spouses should be entitled to claim right of privacy against each other.

11.Some of the courts which leaned in favour of admissibility of

evidence obtained in breach of privacy relied on Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984. The said provision is as follows :

“Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872:—A

Family Court may receive as evidence any report, statement,

documents, information or matter that may, in its opinion, assist it

to deal effectually with a dispute, whether or not the same would

be otherwise relevant or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act,

1872 (1 of 1872).”

I am however not able to agree with such an approach. Though privacy like any other fundamental right is not absolute, it was held in Justice K.Puttaswamy case by Justice D.Y.Chandrachud for himself and three other Hon'ble Judges that any curtailment or deprivation of the privacy right would have to take place under a regime of law and that the procedure must be fair, just and reasonable and subject to constitutional safeguards. The expression

“regime of law” requires some elaboration. Taking inspiration from the title of the book “Legislating Privacy” by Priscilla M Regan, I hold that “regime of law” envisages a special and comprehensive legislation dealing with the subject of privacy. Such a parliamentary legislation would also deal with the question relating to admissibility of evidence procured in breach of one's privacy. Exceptions may be created. National security and supreme public interest could be overriding considerations. In the absence of such a

comprehensive legislation, one has to conclude that there is no “regime of law” dealing with the subject of privacy as of now. The Family Courts Act, 1984 was enacted more than three decades prior to Justice Puttaswamy judgment. The discretionary power conferred on the Family Court under Section 14 of the Family Courts Act cannot be said to fall within the meaningof the aforesaid expression “regime of law”. There is no legislative validation of evidence obtained by violating the fundamental right to privacy. In this background, it would not be proper for the courts to carve out exceptions on their own.

12.The observations made by the High Court of Harare, Zimbabwe

in CRB 57 of 2016 (S. v Nsoro) dated 25.02.2016 are apposite though rendered in a criminal case. The deceased husband refused to let the accused wife read a text message which the husband had received on his phone. Out of anger over the deceased’s refusal to divulge the message, the wife had stabbed the husband causing his death. Justice Chitapi has the following take on the right to privacy between spouses :

“...Section 57 (d) of the Constitution provides that

every person has the right to privacy of their

communications. There is no law which provides that

a husband or wife has a right to infringe on the

privacy of the other’s communications. The accused’s

insistence that the deceased should divulge a

communication made to him on his phone was in

itself an infringement upon the right of the deceased

to privacy of communication. The deceased was

lawfully entitled to refuse to divulge the message he

had received on his phone to the accused albeit the

accused being his wife....

It is the court’s view that society should learn to

respect privacy of communications. Many a time, the

cellphone has been cause of ‘matrimonial quarrels

and domestic disputes because couples do not respect

each others' right to communications made or

received. A cellphone is materially a gadget which is

intended to ease communications between persons. A

lot of cases come before the courts in which a spouse

will have invaded the private communications of

another by going through messages and other

communications on the other spouse’s phone. This

practice should be deprecated. It amounts to

investigating or eavesdropping on one another.

Usually, spouses who do this will be aiming to find

evidence of wrongful conduct by the other.

Eavesdropping on another’s cellphone is evidence of

lack of trust in that other person. Courts are flooded

with cases where couples or spouses seek to prove

wrongful conduct by the other using evidence in the

form of messages retrieved from another spouse’s

phone. Such evidence unless obtained with the

consent of the owner of the phone would have been

illegally obtained in contravention of the rights of

every person to the privacy of communication as

guaranteed by Section 57 of the constitution and

evidential rules relating to admissibility of illegally

obtained evidence should be applied....”

13.I came across an interesting article titled “Rethinking the ‘Fruits

of the poisonous tree’ doctrine: Should the ‘ends’ justify the

‘means’?” (2020 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 76). The authors Bharat Chugh & Taahaa Khan lament the consequentialist approach that ‘the tree may be poisonous but the fruit is fine’. To them, the concept of ends justifying the means is deeply troubling and calls for judicial intervention. They also invoke the “Unfair Operation Principle” applied by the UK Courts. This principle prohibits admission of evidence if in the given case, its reception runs contrary to the principles of basic fairness. The principle gives courts the discretion to decide, on a case to case basis, as to what would operate fairly or unfairly against the accused, and in appropriate cases, exclude such evidence. Theauthors refer to 94th Report of the Law Commission of India which suggests exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained in criminal cases.

14.Trust forms the bedrock of matrimonial relationships. The

spouses must have implicit and total faith and confidence in each other. Snooping on the other destroys the fabric of marital life. One cannot pry on the other. Coming specifically to the position of women, it is beyond dispute that they have their own autonomy. They are entitled to expect that their private space is not invaded. The wife may maintain a diary. She may jot down her thoughts and intimate feelings. She has every right to expect that her husband will not read its contents except with her consent. What applies to diary will apply to her mobile phone also. The Hon'ble Supreme Court is now considering the question whether forcible sexual intercourse by the husband against the wife's will would constitute marital rape. Obtaining of information pertaining to the privacy of the wife without her knowledge and consent cannot be viewed benignly. Only if it is authoritatively laid down that evidence procured in breach of the privacy rights is not admissible, spouses will not resort to surveillance of the other. One may wonder if marital misconduct which has to be made out for obtaining relief may become impossible of proving. It is not so. It can very well be established and proved by appropriate means. Interrogatories can be served. Adverse inference can be drawn. The charged spouse can be called upon to file affidavit with the express warning that falsity will lead to prosecution for perjury. In exceptional cases, the court can even take it upon itself to unearth the truth. Law cannot proceed on the premise that marital misconduct is the norm. It cannot permit or encourage snooping by one spouse on the other. Privacy as a fundamental right includes spousal privacy also and evidence obtained by invading this right is inadmissible.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

CRP(MD)No.2362 of 2024

R..... ... Petitioner/Petitioner/Respondent

vs.

1.B..... ...Respondent/Respondent/Petitioner

2.The Secretary to Government,

 Ministry of Electronics and

Information Technology

(MEITY), Government of India,

 New Delhi. ... 2nd respondent

CORAM

 MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN

Pronounced on : 30.10.2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Madras high court directs MEITY to expeditiously notify experts as per S 79A of Information technology Act for authenticating electronic evidence

 Section 63 of BSA, 2023 deals with the admissibility of electronic records. Sub-section (4) of the said provision is as follows :

“(4)In any proceeding where it is desired to give a

statement in evidence by virtue of this section, a certificate doing

any of the following things shall be submitted along with the

electronic record at each instance where it is being submitted for

admission, namely:—

(a) .....

(b) ...

 (c)....

and purporting to be signed by a person in charge of the

computer or communication device or the management of the

relevant activities (whichever is appropriate) and an expert shall

be evidence of any matter stated in the certificate; and for the

purposes of this sub-section it shall be sufficient for a matter to be

stated to the best of the knowledge and belief of the person stating it

in the certificate specified in the Schedule.”

The effect of the above provision is that filing of the certificate is mandatory along with the electronic record. The certificate is to be signed by the person in charge of the computer system and an expert. The sub-section itself refers to a schedule annexed to the Act which is in two parts, Part A and Part B.Part A is to be filled by the party and Part B is to be filled by the expert. Section 39 of the BSA, 2023 deals with opinions of experts. Section 39(2) deals with experts in relation to electronic evidence. Section 39(2) is as follows :

“(2) When in a proceeding, the court has to form an opinion on

any matter relating to any information transmitted or stored in any

computer resource or any other electronic or digital form, the opinion of the Examiner of Electronic Evidence referred to in section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, is a relevant fact.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, an

Examiner of Electronic Evidence shall be an expert .”

The above provision takes us to Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. It reads as follows :

“79A.Central Government to notify Examiner of Electronic Evidence.–The Central Government may, for the purposes of providing expert opinion on electronic form evidence before any court or other authority specify, by notification in the Official Gazette, any Department, body or agency of the Central Government or a State Government as an Examiner of Electronic Evidence.

Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, -electronic form evidence? means any information of probative value that is either

stored or transmitted in electronic form and includes computer

evidence, digital audio, digital video, cell phones, digital fax

machines.”

In the light of the above three provisions, namely, Section 63 and Section 39 of BSA, 2023 and Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, one can conclude that a person desirous of relying on any electronic record as a document in evidence must submit a certificate at the time of filing the electronic record. The certificate must be in two parts, Part A and Part B. Part B must be filled up by the expert notified under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

6.It is admitted by the Central Government that only a handful of entities have been notified till date as experts under Section 79A of the Act. It is surprising to note that no expert has been notified in the State of Tamil Nadu. It is beyond dispute that Tamil Nadu has good I.T infrastructure and skilled manpower. Since BSA has already come into force, very soon there will be need for certificates under Section 63(4) of BSA for securing admission of electronic records. If experts are not available in Tamil Nadu, that would result in denial of the right of access to justice which is a fundamental right. I,therefore, direct the second respondent to expeditiously notify sufficient number of persons/bodies/entities as experts in the State of Tamil Nadu.The number to be so notified will have be commensurate with the possible demand. It would be advisable to have such experts in each district in Tamil Nadu. This exercise of assessment and notification shall be carried out within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Since the position as on date is that meeting the statutory requirement is not possible of compliance, the learned amicus wanted me to read down the Section so that any person who is specially skilled in computer science can be recognised as an expert for the purpose of filling up Part B of the certificate. I do not want to travel that far as that would amount to re-writing Section 79A of the I.T Act. But such an occasion may arise if the notification directed to be issued under Section 79A of the I.T Act, 2000 is not issued by the Central

Government.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

CRP(MD)No.2362 of 2024

R..... ... Petitioner/Petitioner/Respondent

vs.

1.B..... ...Respondent/Respondent/Petitioner

2.The Secretary to Government,

 Ministry of Electronics and

Information Technology

(MEITY), Government of India,

 New Delhi. ... 2nd respondent

CORAM

 MR.JUSTICE G.R.SWAMINATHAN

Pronounced on : 30.10.2024.

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Monday, 22 April 2024

Under which circumstances the court must give interim injunction against defamation publication?

 Under the Law of Defamation, the test of defamatory nature

of a statement is its tendency to insight an adverse opinion on

feeling of other persons towards the Plaintiff. The words must

result in the Plaintiff to be looked upon with the feeling of hatred, contempt, ridicule, dislike or to convey an imputation to him or disparaging him or his office, profession, calling, trade or

business. {Para 19}

In India, like most other common law countries the burden

is proof is on the Defendant to show that the statement is true or

the publication was not intentional.

In S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1, a 9 Judge Bench of the Highest Court has authoritatively held that right of privacy is a fundamental right and the only permitted exception is where, there is counter veiling public interest, which in particular

circumstances is strong enough to outweigh it.

20] What the Defendant No.1 is attempting, is investigative

journalism, which is definitely not in the interest of general public

at large, as a Journalist, though he may be duty bound to appraise

the public, of the facts and data which is in their interest, it

definitely cannot be attempted at the cost of defaming the

Plaintiff. The freedom of press, which is being evolved as a species of speech, definitely will have to be balanced against a right, which an individual has to his reputation. Justification by truth is a well accepted defence, which is available to answer the action, as truth of defamatory words, is accepted as defence to an action of libel or slander, though not in a criminal trial. However, what is important is, that the Defendant must make clear, the particulars of justification and the the case which he is seeking to set up and justify.

21] In the present case, Mr. Waahiid Khan has not offered a

single justification of truth, but what is asserted by him, is the

right to give his audience an objective and fair view.

A reference is made to an interview with accused No.13

Amit Majethia, but in any case, such disclosure is merely hearsay.

In fact, in the reply filed,what is disclosed is the FIR

registered with Matunga Police Station, where the Plaintiff is one

of the accused and reference is also made to revelations by Mr.

Amit Majethia to him, where he exposed the Plaintiff as gambling

tycoon of India and disclosed that the Plaintiff was in charge of the

alleged criminal activities in Dubai and his uncle was in charge of

the same in Mumbai.

22] It is highly surprising, that a responsible Journalist,

without asserting the truthfulness of the statement, from Amit

Majethia who was interviewed by him, has thought it fit to put

the revealation on public platform and in public domain

including Shawn TV, instagram account. Though a feeble attempt

is made by Defendant No.1 to assert that he had no intention to

defame or harm the reputation of the Plaintiff, but he has

accepted to bring some important facts to light, burden is upon

him to establish that the Plaintiff is associated with criminal

activities or that he is involved in any sort of hooking. Obviously,

the Defendant has not taken a reasonable precaution of

ascertaining the truth before publication of the interview, by

casting imputations which prima facie amount to defamatory

statement.

23] The question as regards grant of interim relief in form of an

injunction restraining the Defendants from publishing the

defamatory Article on the public platform, it is a trite position of

law in India, that a mere plea of justification would not be

sufficient for denial of interim relief and the Defendant No.1 apart

from it will have to show that the statements were made bonafide

and were in public interest and reasonable precaution was taken

to ascertain the truth and the statements were based on sufficient

material which could be tested for its veracity.

24] The above position of law is well settled in India and is at

variance with the principles of law in England, where in an action for defamation once a Defendant raise a plea of justification, at interim stage, the Plaintiff is not entitled for an interlocutory injunction, but the same not being the position in India, where the Court is entitled to scrutinize the material tendered by the Defendant, so as to test its veracity and to ascertain, whether the statements are made bonafide and whether they are in public interest.

Thus, in India, even at the interlocutory stage, the Court is

very much entitled to look at the material which is alleged to be

defamatory in nature.


25] As a result of position of Law which has evolved in India,

the truth of defamatory words is a complete defence to an action

of libel and slander, but a Journalist or Reporter is not expected to transgress the limits of his right of speech and expression and

cannot claim protection by simply stating that the information,

was provided to him by someone and it is in public interest to

divulge the same, on the pretext that duty lies in giving out that

information to the public.

Investigative Journalism definitely does not enjoy any

special protection and the umbrage of public interest definitely do not permit a publication, which would amount to lowering down the reputation of any person , in any manner particularly without justifying the publication on the basis of its truthfulness. Just because, the Defendant No.1 is interested in ascertaining the

truth or is interested in going to roots of the complaint that is

filed, resulting into an FIR, do not necessarily mean that the

publication is in public interest and particularly when the

complaint is under investigation.

26] A write up which contain imputations and insinuations

against the character of the Plaintiff, particularly when they are

baseless and reckless, as in response to the Interim Application,

except stating that it is based on the First Information Report

and an interview of some third person, no justification is offered,

by the First Defendant.

A publication by a Journalist who claim to have exposed

many scams definitely do not authorize him to publish a column/

article, which may result into hatred, ridicule or contempt of the

Plaintiff and he may not escape the consequences, merely on the

pretext that it is in public interest.

If a CR is registered on a complaint and it is under

investigation, the Defendant No.1 has offered no justification for

running a story, which according to the Plaintiff tends to lower

his image in the public.

29] The position in India, being evolved to the effect that it is

open for the Court to pass a restraint order, but it shall be passed

with great caution and the Plaintiff must prove that the words

complained of, are untrue and any subsequent publication would

be malafide. The case of the Plaintiff falls within these four corners, as the defence of truth if permitted to be availed at the stage of trial, which in this country will be long wait, would have the desired effect of maligning the image of the Plaintiff and without any sufficient cause/justification being offered by any supporting material.

30] For the above reasons, I am convinced to grant the reliefs

in the Interim Application

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION

INTERIM APPLICATION (L) NO.399 OF 2024

IN  SUIT (L) NO.398 OF 2024

Khanjan Jagadishkumar Thakkar Vs Waahiid Ali Khan & Ors. 

CORAM : BHARATI DANGRE, J

DATE : 2nd April, 2024.

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