Criminal Intimidation, Digital Sexual Threats and Evolving Notions of Chastity: A Critical Analysis of the Supreme Court’s 2026 Decision on Section 506 IPC

 I. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s judgment VIJAYAKUMAR Vs STATE OF TAMIL NADU 2026 INSC 525 dated 22 May 2026, affirming the conviction of a police constable under Part II of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), marks a significant doctrinal development in the law of criminal intimidation, reputation‑based harm, and the constitutional understanding of women’s sexual autonomy. The Court upheld the conviction for threatening to upload a secretly recorded bathing video of the prosecutrix on social media, while the same accused stood acquitted of rape, deceitful inducement of marriage and voyeurism under Sections 376, 493 and 354C IPC respectively. This separation of liability—acquittal on sexual offences but conviction on aggravated criminal intimidation—invites critical analysis for trial courts, appellate courts and scholars.

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Supreme Court Expands Meaning Of 'Unchastity', Says Threat To Leak Woman's Bathing Video Punishable Under S.506 IPC

The Court made the observation while upholding the conviction of a man under Part II of Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code for threatening to upload a woman's private bathing video on Facebook, holding that such conduct amounts to “imputing unchastity” to a woman within the meaning of the provision which penalises criminal intimidation.

…the act of video-recording the victim in a naked state while she was taking a bath and the threat to upload it on digital social media can be construed to be an act amounting to a threat to impute unchastity within the meaning of Part II of Section 506 IPC.”, observed a bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2859 OF 2025

VIJAYAKUMAR Vs STATE OF TAMIL NADU, REPRESENTED

BY THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE 

Author: NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, J.

Citation: 2026 INSC 525

Dated: May 22, 2026.

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Can the court rely on the presumption of official acts if there is a specific denial about the performance of a particular act?

We are aware of the provision of Section 114 of the Evidence Act which gives presumption for official acts performed in the course of the performance of official duties. However, it is to be noted that whenever there is a specific denial about the performance of a particular act, it becomes obligatory for the concerned officer to produce cogent materials before the Court to disclose and establish the performance of the act. The Section 114 of the Evidence Act will not come to the aid to the officer who fails to perform this obligation when the matter is under challenge before the Court. It is more so, when the conduct of the respondents is sufficient to raise doubt about the bona fide regarding such claim. It is pertinent to note that the respondents have not produced any material on record even to show that the letter dated 5-11-2001 was actually and factually sent to the addressee of the said letter and the same was received by the addressee.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

W.P. No. 4858 of 2005

Decided On: 10.07.2006

Prakash Vishwanath Khute and Ors. Vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M.S. Khandeparkar and S.R. Dongaonkar, JJ.

Author: R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0821/2006,2006(6) ALLMR 245

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When presumption of regularity of official act can not be drawn?

  In the case in hand, undisputedly, the award was declared on 4-11-2003 and the declaration under Section 6 was undoubtedly published in the newspaper on 15-9-2001. Considering the last date of publication of declaration under Section 6, evidently the award was declared beyond the period of two years. However, it is the contention of the respondents that the last date of publication of the declaration under Section 6 was after 5-11-2001 and in that regard the affidavit filed by the respondents discloses a categorical statement to the effect that "the Chawadi Publication of Notification under Section 6 was published on 5-11-2001. The last publication under Section 6 (Chawadi Publication at Gram-Panchayat) was made on 5-11-2001.". As the affidavit did not disclose the basis for such statement, the respondents were directed to file proper affidavit disclosing the basis on which the said statement was made. Undisputcdly, along with the affidavit dated 1-3-2006, the respondents had not produced any supporting material to justify the statement that the Chawadi publication at Gram Panchayat was made on 5-11-2001. The respondents thereupon filed further affidavit stating that the statement about the Chawadi publication was made on the basis of the letter dated 5-11-2001 by the Land Acquisition Officer to the Tahsildar, Mehekar asking him to publish the declaration under Section 6 on the notice board and in the Gram Panchayat as well. Apart from a mere statement that such a letter was addressed to the Tahsildar, Mehekar, the respondents have not produced any material in support of the actual publication of such declaration under Section 6, either on the notice board or in the Gram Panchayat. There is not even an assertion in the affidavit of 24-6-2006, consequent to the direction by this Court under the order dated 20-4-2006 requiring the respondents to disclose the basis on which they claim such publication at Chawadi, that in fact consequent to the letter 5-11-2001 the Tahsildar, Mehekar had taken proper steps to ensure due compliance of the direction issued under the said letter. There is no panchnama produced on record disclosing the actual publication of such declaration in the Gram Panchayat on or after 5-11-2001. There is no record produced to disclose that such a letter dated 5-11-2001 was actually received by the Tahsildar, Mehekar or that the declaration was displayed in the office of the Gram Panchayat or on the notice board of the Tahsildar's office. Obviously therefore, apart from making mere claim that the letter dated 5-11-2001 was addressed to the Tahsildar, Mehekar by the Land Acquisition Officer for the publication of the declaration under Section 6 at Gram Panchayat and on the notice board, there is nothing on record to substantiate such claim on the part of the respondents. We are aware of the provision of Section 114 of the Evidence Act which gives presumption for official acts performed in the course of the performance of official duties. However, it is to be noted that whenever there is a specific denial about the performance of a particular act, it becomes obligatory for the concerned officer to produce cogent materials before the Court to disclose and establish the performance of the act. The Section 114 of the Evidence Act will not come to the aid to the officer who fails to perform this obligation when the matter is under challenge before the Court. It is more so, when the conduct of the respondents is sufficient to raise doubt about the bona fide regarding such claim. It is pertinent to note that the respondents have not produced any material on record even to show that the letter dated 5-11-2001 was actually and factually sent to the addressee of the said letter and the same was received by the addressee.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

W.P. No. 4858 of 2005

Decided On: 10.07.2006

Prakash Vishwanath Khute and Ors. Vs.  Special Land Acquisition Officer and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.M.S. Khandeparkar and S.R. Dongaonkar, JJ.

Author: R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

Citation: 2006(6) ALLMR 245

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Delhi HC: The court may raise a presumption about the reliability of Electronic Evidence as per S 114 of Evidence Act if conditions mentioned in Section 65B of Evidence Act are satisfied

Section 65A states that contents of electronic record may be proved in accordance with the provisions of Section 65B. We have already interpreted and referred to Section 65B. The importance of the said Section is that it does away with the requirement to produce the original computer or the original media on which data or information was stored and allows the secondary evidence in the form of computer output to be produced and admitted in evidence, subject to the condition that when evidence of computer output is produced and tendered, certificate of a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to operation of the relevant device or management of the relevant activities as prescribed by Section 65B of the Evidence Act is produced. In this manner, Section 65B authorises production and admission, in evidence, all computer output without production of the original, i.e., it permits leading of secondary evidence without the original being produced. ( Para 46)

53. In view of the aforesaid discussion, information memorised as business record or records maintained in common course of events are not treated as hearsay even if the maker lacks personal knowledge of the facts or events. The document should be prepared in normal course of business must have been at or near the time of events it records and should have been made in normal course of business activities or events. Sub-section (4) to Section 65B postulates that the certificate should be given by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to operation of the relevant device or management of the relevant activities. If the said conditions are satisfied, it promotes and establishes the trustworthiness. In such cases, presumption of fact regarding genuineness and authenticity of the content can be invoked at the discretion of the court under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

54. In Anwar P.V. (supra) in paragraph 1 itself the Supreme Court noticed the difference between relevancy and admissibility, which is examined at the initial stage; and genuineness, veracity and reliability of the evidence, which is seen by the court subsequently. Thus, the ratio and dictum in Anwar P.V. (supra) is based and predicated on the difference between admissibility and veracity or evidentiary value. The Supreme Court dealt with the aspect of admissibility in strict legal sense, not to be confused with evidentiary value or correctness of contents. Of course, when the conditions mentioned in Section 65B are satisfied, in terms of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the court may presume existence of certain facts for the computer output would have data and information collected or derived in common course of human conduct and in public and private business.

55. In terms of sub-section (1) to Section 65B, original evidence need not be produced when conditions of Section 65B are satisfied. The computer output in relation to the information and computer in question are admissible as secondary evidence, when certificate under Section 65B is produced. However, Section 65B nowhere states that the contents of the computer output shall be treated as the truth of the statement. Section 65B deals with admissibility of secondary evidence in the case of "electronic records" and not with the truthfulness or veracity of the contents. However, when a certificate under Section 65B is produced the Court may presume or form a prima facie opinion, which is rebuttable and may not be accepted.

56. Electronically generated record is entirely a product of functioning of a computer system or computer process, like call record details or a report generated on a fax, which shows the number from and to which the fax were sent, time, etc. is generated electronically. It does not contain any assertion. Therefore, as noticed above it is not hearsay. These are not writings made by a person (see United States versus Khorozian, 333 F. 3d 498, 506). Normally non-assertive conduct is more reliable, provided there has been no fraud and interpolation in the preparation of the record. Computer generated telephone records are not similar to a statement by a human declarant and, therefore, cannot be treated as hearsay and the credibility and evidentiary value is determined on the reliability and accuracy of the process involved. Ergo, in these cases when conditions of Section 65B are satisfied, the probative value or weight can be substantial of course, subject to verification as to the credibility and integrity of the contents.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. A. 711/2014

Decided On: 24.11.2015

 Kundan Singh  Vs. The State

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How is the doctrine of hearsay applicable for proof of Electronic evidence?

In Balram Prasad Agrawal versus State of Bihar and Others; MANU/SC/0427/1997 : (1997) 9 SCC 338, the Supreme Court referred to the concept of hearsay evidence and observed that even if some information is ruled out as hearsay, it may still remain admissible as evidence of the conduct of the witness. Relying on Section 8 of the Evidence Act, it was observed as under:-

"11. ...This part of the evidence of PW 6 would not be hit by the rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence. A decision of this Court deserves to be noted on this aspect. In the case of J.D. Jain v. State Bank MANU/SC/0427/1981 : AIR 1982 SC 673 of India a Bench of three learned Judges speaking through Baharul Islam, J. in the Report has made the following pertinent observations: (AIR p. 676, para 10 : SCC p. 148, paras 21 and 22)

"The word "hearsay" is used in various senses. Sometimes it means whatever a person is heard to say; sometimes it means whatever a person declares on information given by someone else. (See Stephen on Law of Evidence)

The Privy Council in the case of Subramaniam v. Public Prosecutor 1956 WLR 965, observed:

"Evidence of a statement made to a witness who is not himself called as a witness may or may not be hearsay. It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish the truth of what is contained in the statement. It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement but the fact that it was made. The fact that it was made quite apart from its truth, is frequently relevant in considering the mental state and conduct thereafter of the witness or some other persons in whose presence these statements are made."

The term "hearsay" applies to both spoken or oral evidence and also has reference to what is written. Hearsay evidence is rejected on the principle that the best evidence obtainable should be produced as it is relatively trustworthy, whereas hearsay evidence poses difficulties for it derives value not from the witness himself, but on the veracity and competence of some other person whose version is not tested in the cross-examination.

50. For principle of hearsay to apply and reject an evidence, it must be shown that it was made by some other declarant other than the one testifying at the trial of hearing and the statement is being offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, even if the evidence is an assertion made by the declarant, it will not be hearsay until it is offered to prove the truth of what is asserted.

51. A statement which is not assertion, i.e., to state the truth declared and maintained, but only a statement of fact is not hearsay. A hearsay declarants non-verbal conduct may qualify as a "statement" for purpose of exclusion under the hearsay rule, if the conduct of the person intended by him as a substitute for oral or written verbal expression.(see, Matter of Cherl H., 2 Dist. 153 CA 3d 1098). Pertinently, in case of self-generated data or information there is no declarant as such who is asserting a fact.

52. Evidence may be offered for different purposes. The same evidence can be treated as hearsay and non-hearsay depending upon its relevance, i.e., whether it is relevant for a substantive truth or for some other purpose. For example, when person A meets person B and speaks to him about an occurrence, testimony of person B to the said effect would not be hearsay, but may become hearsay if a party seeks to rely upon facts stated by person A implicating a third person. Thus, we must notice and record the difference between a "factum of statement" and "truth of a statement". The said distinction has been recognised and accepted in several pronouncements in J.D. Jain versus State Bank of India, MANU/SC/0427/1981 : AIR 1982 SC 673, Manilal Navavati versus Sushila Mahendra Nanavati, MANU/SC/0192/1964 : AIR 1965 SC 364 and S.R. Ramaraj versus Special Court, Bombay, MANU/SC/0600/2003 : (2003) 7 SCC 175. Thus, electronic record produced as a statement as a tangible in form of a CD, print out on paper, etc. as a fact in itself, must be distinguished from electronic record, which is produced to prove truth of the matter it asserts or correctness of contents for the latter postulates adjudication of veracity and credibility of the information by the person who has made a statement offering or producing the document for its truth.

53. In view of the aforesaid discussion, information memorised as business record or records maintained in common course of events are not treated as hearsay even if the maker lacks personal knowledge of the facts or events. The document should be prepared in normal course of business must have been at or near the time of events it records and should have been made in normal course of business activities or events. Sub-section (4) to Section 65B postulates that the certificate should be given by a person occupying a responsible official position in relation to operation of the relevant device or management of the relevant activities. If the said conditions are satisfied, it promotes and establishes the trustworthiness. In such cases, presumption of fact regarding genuineness and authenticity of the content can be invoked at the discretion of the court under Section 114 of the Evidence Act.

54. In Anwar P.V. (supra) in paragraph 1 itself the Supreme Court noticed the difference between relevancy and admissibility, which is examined at the initial stage; and genuineness, veracity and reliability of the evidence, which is seen by the court subsequently. Thus, the ratio and dictum in Anwar P.V. (supra) is based and predicated on the difference between admissibility and veracity or evidentiary value. The Supreme Court dealt with the aspect of admissibility in strict legal sense, not to be confused with evidentiary value or correctness of contents. Of course, when the conditions mentioned in Section 65B are satisfied, in terms of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the court may presume existence of certain facts for the computer output would have data and information collected or derived in common course of human conduct and in public and private business.

55. In terms of sub-section (1) to Section 65B, original evidence need not be produced when conditions of Section 65B are satisfied. The computer output in relation to the information and computer in question are admissible as secondary evidence, when certificate under Section 65B is produced. However, Section 65B nowhere states that the contents of the computer output shall be treated as the truth of the statement. Section 65B deals with admissibility of secondary evidence in the case of "electronic records" and not with the truthfulness or veracity of the contents. However, when a certificate under Section 65B is produced the Court may presume or form a prima facie opinion, which is rebuttable and may not be accepted.

56. Electronically generated record is entirely a product of functioning of a computer system or computer process, like call record details or a report generated on a fax, which shows the number from and to which the fax were sent, time, etc. is generated electronically. It does not contain any assertion. Therefore, as noticed above it is not hearsay. These are not writings made by a person (see United States versus Khorozian, 333 F. 3d 498, 506). Normally non-assertive conduct is more reliable, provided there has been no fraud and interpolation in the preparation of the record. Computer generated telephone records are not similar to a statement by a human declarant and, therefore, cannot be treated as hearsay and the credibility and evidentiary value is determined on the reliability and accuracy of the process involved. Ergo, in these cases when conditions of Section 65B are satisfied, the probative value or weight can be substantial of course, subject to verification as to the credibility and integrity of the contents.

57. We have already referred to the distinction between factum of a statement and truth of a statement and the concept of presumption of memorandum or records maintained in normal course of business and the credibility or trustworthiness of electronic records. However, it must be understood that mere admission or admissibility of the electronic record would not mean that the contents of the electronic record have been proved beyond doubt and debate and are automatically proved when the document is marked exhibit. Mere marking of a document as exhibit does not dispense with the proof of its contents (see Sait Tarajee Khimchand versus Yelamarti Satyam, MANU/SC/0022/1971 : AIR 1971 SC 1865, Narbada Devi Gupta versus Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, MANU/SC/0862/2003 : (2003) 8 SCC 745 and Mohd. Yusuf versus D. and Another, MANU/MH/0106/1968 : AIR 1968 Bombay 112). Provisions of Section 65 of Evidence Act are apposite on the said legal principle and reference can also be made to Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act. The latter sections deal with exclusion of oral evidence by documentary evidence in certain cases and in which cases oral evidence can be led even when there are documents recording terms of contract, grant or any other disposition of property or when a matter is required by law to be reduced to a form of a document. The effect of the aforesaid provisions is that when a certificate under Section 65B authenticates the computer output, it will only show and establish that the computer output is the paper print out or media copy, etc. of the computer from which the output is obtained. The court has still to rule out when challenged or otherwise, the possibility of tampering, interpolation or changes from the date the record was first stored or created in the computer till the computer output is obtained. The focus over here is not so much on the creation of the out-put as stipulated under sub-section (2) to Section 65B, but rather on the preservation and sanctity of the record after it was originally created. It extends beyond identification of the particular computer equipment and the process or equipment used for computer output, etc. It would relate to the policies, procedures for use of the equipment that stored the said information since creation and data base and integrity of the same. Questions which would arise and have to be answered is whether data base was protected and had no or limited access, which permits modification/alteration; whether the data base could be wrongly lodged or created or could be transferred or changed when the data base was transferred and stored in the backup systems. These are questions which are pertinent and have to be examined to ascertain whether or not there was possibility of change, alteration or manipulation in the initial or original data after it was created. The courts must rule out that the records have not been tampered and read the data or information as it originally existed. These are aspects which are not codified as such, for probative value is examined on the case to case basis keeping in mind the relevant facts.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. A. 711/2014

Decided On: 24.11.2015

 Kundan Singh  Vs.  The State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Sanjiv Khanna and R.K. Gauba, JJ.

Citation: MANU/DE/3674/2015

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Whether presumption of absence of consent in Rape case can be drawn if prosecution has failed to prove sexual intercourse?

 Having perused the paper book, this Court is of the view that the presumption under Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 would only be attracted if the factum of sexual intercourse is proved.

5. In the present case, it is noteworthy that the appellant-prosecutrix had refused internal medical examination.

 Keeping in view the aforesaid cumulative findings, this Court is of the view that the testimony of the appellant-prosecutrix is unreliable and inspires no confidence and there are compelling reasons for rejecting of her testimony. Further, Section 114A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is not attracted as the factum of sexual intercourse is not proved. There are also various lacunae in the case of the prosecution and the benefit of doubt will have to enure to the benefit of the accused-respondent no. 2

Delhi High Court

Smt. Rachna Singh vs State And Anr. on 13 May, 201

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SANGITA DHINGRA SEHGAL
                          

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Whether adverse inference is to be drawn against prosecution if it fails to obtain certain evidence?

No adverse inference can be drawn against the prosecution from the fact that the opinion of the handwriting expert has not been obtained. In fact, an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withhold certain evidence and not merely on accounts of its failure to obtain certain evidence. 

9. Further, an adverse inference against the prosecution can be drawn only if it withholds certain evidence and not merely on account of its failure to obtain certain evidence. When no such evidence has been obtained, it cannot be said what that evidence would have been and therefore no question of presuming that that evidence would have been against the prosecution, under S. 114, illustration (g) of the Evidence Act, can arise.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Second Appeal No. 64 of 2001

Decided On: 02.07.2018

 Shanti Mishra  Vs. Samuel

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Whether person refusing to accept registered letter is deemed to have knowledge of its contents?

 Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 deals with the topic-'Meaning of service by post' and says that where any Central Act or Regulation authorises or requires any document to be served by post, then unless a different intention appears, the service shall be deemed to be effected by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting it by registered post, a letter containing the document, and unless the contrary is proved, to have been effected at the time at which the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post. The section thus arises a presumption of due service or proper service if the document sought to be served is sent by properly addressing, pre-paying and posting by registered post to the addressee and such presumption is raised irrespective of whether any acknowledgement due is received from the addressee or not. It is obvious that when the section raises the presumption that the service shall be deemed to have been effected it means the addressee to whom the communication is sent must be taken to have known the contents of the document sought to be served upon him without anything more. Similar presumption is raised under Illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act whereunder it is stated that the Court may presume that the common course of business has been followed in a particular case, that is to say, when a letter is sent by post by pre-paying and properly addressing it the same has been received by the addressee . Undoubtedly, the presumptions both under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Evidence Act are rebuttable but in the absence of proof to the contrary the presumption of proper service or effective service on the addressee would arise. In the instant case, additionally, there was positive evidence of the postman to the effect that the registered envelope was actually tendered by him to the appellant on November 10, 1966 but the appellant refused to accept. In other words, there was due service effected upon the appellant by refusal. In such circumstances, we are clearly of the view, that the High Court was right in coming to the conclusion that the appellant must be imputed with the knowledge of the contents of the notice which he refused to accept. It is impossible to accept the contention that when factually there was refusal to accept the notice on the part of the appellant he could not be visited with the knowledge of the contents of the registered notice because, in our view, the presumption raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act as well as under Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act is one of proper or effective service which must mean service of everything that is contained in the notice. It is impossible to countenance the suggestion that before knowledge of the contents of the notice could be imputed the sealed envelope must be opened and read by the addressee or when the addressee happens to be an illiterate person the contents should be read over to him by the postman or someone else. Such things do not occur when the addressee is determined to decline to accept the sealed envelope. It would, therefore, be reasonable to hold that when service is effected by refusal of a postal communication the addressee must be imputed, with the knowledge of the contents thereof and in our view, this follows upon the presumptions that are raised under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1402 of 1979

Decided On: 20.02.1981

 Harcharan Singh  Vs. Shivrani and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.D. Tulzapurkar, D.A. Desai and A.N. Sen, JJ.

Citation: (1981) 2 SCC 535

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How to appreciate evidence in case of subletting of premises?

 In Kunhikrishnan v. Madhavi (1991 (1) KLT 515) this Court held that on establishing that the tenant has transferred exclusive possession to another person, the Court may legitimately draw a presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act that the transfer was for valuable consideration so as to shift the burden of proof to the tenant to disprove the prima facie case of subletting established by the landlord. The terms and conditions under which the subtenant has occupied the premises may be unknown to the landlord and known only to the tenant and the subtenant. If the landlord has to prove positively by adducing evidence that the transfer of possession was for valuable consideration, it may not be possible to prove subletting in any case except in rarest of rare cases. Same is the view taken by this Court in Abdul Rahiman Kunju v. Rent Control Revisional Authority (1992 (2) KLT 600).

17. In Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (MANU/SC/0131/1998 : AIR 1998 SC 1240), the Supreme Court held that to prove subletting, production of affirmative evidence showing payment of monetary consideration by the subtenant to the tenant is not necessary. The law does not require such payment to be proved by affirmative evidence and the Court is permitted to draw its own inference upon the facts of the case proved at the trial.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA

R.C.R.A. No. 58 of 2005

Decided On: 21.02.2005

 Mohammed Sageer

Vs.

 Prakash Thomas

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R. Bhaskaran and K.T. Sankaran, JJ.

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What is presumption of future continuance?

 The survey records of 1892, 1895, 1904 and 1909 disclose that the ancestors of the plaintiffs held some of the frontier plots of Dubha Mal. The High Court was, therefore, asked to draw the inference that their ancestors held those plots during 1845 to 1863 when the Taufir lands accreted. The question is whether such an inference should be drawn. Now, if a thing or a state of things is shown to exist, an inference of its continuity within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backwards may sometimes be drawn. The presumption of future continuance is noticed hi Illustration (d) to s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognised both in India, see Anangamanjari Chowdh-rani v. Tripura Soondari Chowdhrani MANU/PR/0033/1887 and England, see Bristow v. Cormican (1878) L.R. 3 A.C. 64 Deo v.Young (1845) 8 Q.B. 63115 E.R. 798 The broad observation in Manmatha Nath Haldar v. Girish Chandra Roy(1934) 38 C.W.N. 763 and Hemendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v. Jnanendra Prasanna Bhaduri (1935) 40 C.W.N. 115 that there is no rule of evidence by which one can presume the continuity of things backwards cannot be supported. The presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the presumption may be drawn both backwards and forwards depends upon the nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances. 

 Citation : AIR 1966 SC 605

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 435 to 437 of 1959

Decided On: 08.09.1965

Ambika Prasad Thakur and Ors.
Vs.
Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh and Ors.

Coram:
J.R. Mudholkar, K. Subba Rao and R.S. Bachawat, JJ.

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Whether omission to produce CCTV footage will be fatal to prosecution case?

The Supreme Court of India in Tomaso Bruno & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. dated 20-01-2015 viewed that "omission to produce CCTV footage which is the best evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution case."

A full bench of Justices Anil R. Dave, Kurian Joseph and R. Banumathi held that "to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act, the main point to be established by the prosecution is that the accused persons were present in the hotel room at the relevant time. 

Hotel Manager stated that CCTV cameras are installed in the boundaries, near the reception, in the kitchen, in the restaurant and all three floors. Since CCTV cameras were installed in the prominent places, CCTV footage would have been best evidence to prove whether the accused remained inside the room and whether or not they have gone out. 

CCTV footage is a strong piece of evidence which would have indicated whether the accused remained inside the hotel and whether they were responsible for the commission of a crime. It would have also shown whether or not the accused had gone out of the hotel. 

CCTV footage being a crucial piece of evidence, it is for the prosecution to have produced the best evidence which is missing. Omission to produce CCTV footage, in our view, which is the best evidence, raises serious doubts about the prosecution case." Court added.

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the convictions of the accused under Section 302/34 IPC the Court further held that:

With the advancement of information technology, scientific temper in the individual and at the institutional level is to pervade the methods of investigation. With the increasing impact of technology in everyday life and as a result, the production of electronic evidence in cases has become relevant to establish the guilt of the accused or the liability of the defendant. 

Electronic documents strictu sensu are admitted as material evidence. With the amendment to the Indian Evidence Act in 2000, Sections 65A and 65B were introduced into Chapter V relating to documentary evidence. Section 65A provides that contents of electronic records may be admitted as evidence if the criteria provided in Section 65B is complied with. 

The computer generated electronic records in evidence are admissible at a trial if proved in the manner specified by Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 65B makes admissible as a document, paper print out of electronic records stored in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer, subject to the fulfilment of the conditions specified in sub-section (2) of Section 65B. 

Secondary evidence of contents of document can also be led under Section 65 of the Evidence Act. PW-13 stated that he saw the full video recording of the fateful night in the CCTV camera, but he has not recorded the same in the case diary as nothing substantial to be adduced as evidence was present in it.

Production of scientific and electronic evidence in court as contemplated under Section 65B of the Evidence Act is of great help to the investigating agency and also to the prosecution. 

Relevance of electronic evidence 

The trial court in its judgment held that non-collection of CCTV footage, incomplete site plan, non-inclusion of all records and sim details of mobile phones seized from the accused are instances of faulty investigation and the same would not affect the prosecution case. Non-production of CCTV footage, noncollection of call records (details) and sim details of mobile phones seized from the accused cannot be said to be mere instances of faulty investigation but amount to withholding of best evidence. It is not the case of the prosecution that CCTV footage could not be lifted or a CD copy could not be made.

As per Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act, if a party in possession of best evidence which will throw light in controversy withholds it, the court can draw an adverse inference against him notwithstanding that the onus of proving does not lie on him. The presumption under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act is only a permissible inference and not a necessary inference. 

Unlike presumption under Section 139 of Negotiable Instruments Act, where the court has no option but to draw statutory presumption under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. 

Under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, the Court has the option; the court may or may not raise presumption on the proof of certain facts. Drawing of presumption under Section 114 (g) of Evidence Act depends upon the nature of fact required to be proved and its importance in the controversy, the usual mode of proving it; the nature, quality and cogency of the evidence which has not been produced and its accessibility to the party concerned, all of which have to be taken into account. It is only when all these matters are duly considered that an adverse inference can be drawn against the party.

The High Court held that even though the appellants alleged that the footage of CCTV is being concealed by the prosecution for the reasons best known to the prosecution, the accused did not invoke Section 233 Cr.P.C. and they did not make any application for production of CCTV camera footage. 

The High Court further observed that the accused were not able to discredit the testimony of PW-1, PW-12 and PW-13 qua there being no relevant material in the CCTV camera footage. Notwithstanding the fact that the burden lies upon the accused to establish the defence plea of alibi in the facts and circumstances of the case, in our view, prosecution in possession of the best evidence–CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. 

In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced.

In the present case, the courts below have not properly appreciated the evidence and the gap in the chain of circumstances sought to be established by the prosecution. The courts below have ignored the importance of best evidence i.e. CCTV camera in the instant case and also have not noticed the absence of symptoms of strangulation in the medical reports. 

Upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the circumstances and the evidence adduced by the prosecution do not form a complete chain pointing to the guilt of the accused and the benefit of doubt is to be given to the accused and the conviction of the appellants is liable to be set aside", the Court Said.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 142 OF 2015

(Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 1156/2013)

TOMASO BRUNO Vs STATE OF U.P.

Date;January 20, 2015

R. BANUMATHI, J.
Citation(2015) 7 SCC178

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How to prove original of public document in evidence?

The question of proof of a public document came up before Bombay
High Court in C.H. Shah v. S.S. Malpathak & Ors., AIR 1973 Bom. 14,
where it was held as under:-
“4....... In all cases of secondary evidence under Section 65 read with
Section 63 of the Evidence Act when a copy or an oral account of a
document is admitted as secondary evidence, the execution of the original is
not required to be proved but if the original itself is sought to be tendered it
must be duly proved and there is no reason for applying a different rule to
public documents. Secondly, in the case of a certified copy, before a
presumption of its genuineness can be raised under Section 79, as laid down
by the Supreme Court in Bhinka's case already referred to above it must be
shown that the certified copy was executed substantially in the form and in
the manner provided by law. There would, therefore, be a check or safeguard
in so far as the officer certifying it in the manner required by law would have
to satisfy himself in regard to the authenticity of the original and in regard to
the accuracy of the copy which he certifies to be a true copy thereof. On the
other hand if the original of a public document is to be admitted in evidence
without proof of its genuineness, there would be no check whatever either by
way of scrutiny or examination of that document by an officer or by the
Court. The third and perhaps the most important reason, for not accepting
Mr.Shah's argument on the point which I am now considering is that neither
Section 67 nor Section 68 of the Evidence Act which lay down that the
signature and the handwriting on a document must be duly proved do not
make any exception in the case of public documents. In view of the
provisions of the said section all documents whatever be their nature must be
therefore be proved in the manner provided by Section 45, 47 or 73 of the
Evidence Act........
5. The only question which remains for consideration is whether a
presumption of the genuineness of the original of a public document should
be drawn by reason of Illustration (e) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act to
the effect that official acts have been regularly performed. It is no doubt true
that it has been held by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of East
India Trading Co. v. Badat & Co., AIR 1959 Bom. 414 that Section 114 of
the Evidence Act is wide enough to permit the Court to raise a presumption
not only with regard to oral evidence, but also with regard to documentary
evidence. It may be mentioned that the decision of the Division Bench in the
said case was reversed on appeal by the Supreme Court by a majority AIR
1964 SC 538, but in the judgment of the majority the Supreme Court has not
referred to the point mentioned above. Apart from the undesirability of
taking a view which would let in any and every document tendered by
Government in suits to which it is a party without proof of genuineness, in
my opinion, no presumption under Section 114 can be drawn in view of the
mandatory and unqualified term of Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act.
Section 114 which to put it in popular language, merely empowers the Court
to use its commonsense, cannot be used to contravene an express provision
of the Act itself. I, therefore, hold that if the original of a public document is
sought to be tendered in evidence, it must be proved in the manner required
by law.....
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
SUBJECT : MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL
Date of decision: 29th November, 2012
MAC.APP. 76/2012

RAJINDER KUMAR Vs  LAL BACHAN & ORS.


CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.P.MITTAL

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What is basic concept of presumption of continuity?

"If a thing or a state of things is
shown to exist, an inference of its
continuity within a reasonably
proximate time both forwards and
backwards may sometimes be drawn.
The presumption of future
continuance is noticed in illus.(d)
to S.114. In appropriate cases, an
inference of the continuity of a
thing or state of things backwards
may be drawn under this section,
though on this point the section
does not give a separate
illustration. The rule that the
presumption of continuance may
operate retorspectively has been
recognised both in India. This is
rule of evidence by which one can
presume the continuity of things
backwards. The presumption of
continuity weakens with the passage
of time. How far the presumption
may be drawn both backwards and
forwards depends upon the nature of
the thing and the surrounding
circumstances."
Evidence of a statement made to a
witness who is not himself called
as a witness may or may not be
hearsay. It is hearsay and
inadmissible when the object of the
evidence is to establish the truth
of what is contained in the
statement. It is not hearsay and is
admissible when it is proposed to
establish by the evidence, not the
truth of the statement but the fact
that it was made. The fact that it
was made quite apart from its
truth, is frequently relevant in
considering the mental state and
conduct thereafter of the witness
on some other persons in whose
presence these statements are
made'."

Supreme Court of India

Balram Prasad Agrawal vs The State Of Bihar & Ors on 10 December, 1996

Bench: G Ray, S Majmudar

JUDGMENT:
THE 10TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 1996

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