Showing posts with label fundamental right. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fundamental right. Show all posts

Saturday, 22 November 2025

Supreme court: Non-Observance of Natural Justice: Prejudice in Itself

 57. Mr. Naphade would submit that the Appellant did not suffer any prejudice. We do not agree. Infringement of such a valuable right itself causes prejudice. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan   MANU/SC/0036/1980 : (1980) 4 SCC 379 this Court clearly held: (SCC p. 395, para 24)

24.... In our view the principles of natural justice know of no exclusionary Rule dependent on whether it would have made any difference if natural justice had been observed. The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It will comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 656-657 of 2019.

Decided On: 11.04.2019

Atma Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan .

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: U.U. Lalit, J.

Citation: (2019) 20 SCC 481,2019 INSC 516,  MANU/SC/0526/2019.

Read full judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme court: When an order has been passed in violation of a fundamental right or in breach of the principles of natural justice, the same would be a nullity

 In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak   MANU/SC/0002/1988 : (1988) 2 SCC 602 a seven-Judge Bench of this Court has also held that when an order has been passed in violation of a fundamental right or in breach of the principles of natural justice, the same would be a nullity. (See also State of Haryana v. State of Punjab   MANU/SC/0524/2004 : (2004) 12 SCC 673 and Rajasthan SRTC v. Zakir Hussain   MANU/SC/0496/2005 : (2005) 7 SCC 447. {Para 58}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 656-657 of 2019.

Decided On: 11.04.2019

Atma Ram and Ors. Vs. State of Rajasthan .

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

U.U. Lalit and Indu Malhotra, JJ.

Author: U.U. Lalit, J.

Citation: (2019) 20 SCC 481,2019 INSC 516,  MANU/SC/0526/2019.

Read full judgment here: Click here.


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Sunday, 31 August 2025

The Great Divide: Decoding the Distinction Between Common Law and Fundamental Privacy Rights in India's Constitutional Framework


The Conceptual Dichotomy: Understanding the Fundamental Distinction

The right to privacy in India exists in a fascinating dual form—simultaneously operating as both a common law right and a fundamental right. This distinction, articulated most clearly in the landmark K.S. Puttaswamy case and later refined in Kaushal Kishor, represents one of the most significant conceptual developments in Indian constitutional jurisprudence.

Justice Bobde's seminal observation in Puttaswamy provides the foundational framework for understanding this dichotomy: "The only material distinctions between [common law rights and fundamental rights] lie in the incidence of the duty to respect the right and in the forum in which a failure to do so can be redressed". This distinction fundamentally reshapes how privacy rights are conceptualized and enforced in the Indian legal system.

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Wednesday, 30 April 2025

LLM Notes: Provisions of Directive principles of state policy on Indian constitution

According to Article 36, the term ‘State’ has the same meaning as in Part III (Article 12).

Article 37: It states that the Directive Principles are non-justiciable. Nevertheless, Article 37 itself says that these principles are fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply these principles in making laws.

Socialist principles

 Article 38: Directs the state to promote social, economic, and political justice. And minimise inequalities in income, status, and opportunities (Added through the 44th Amendment Act (AA) of 1978).

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LLM Notes: Provisions of Fundamental Rights in the Indian Constitution

 The Fundamental Rights in India are enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, covering Articles 12 to 35. These rights are considered essential for the development of every individual and for safeguarding personal liberties against arbitrary state action.

Detailed Provisions by Article

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Sunday, 9 March 2025

LLM Notes: The Judiciary as Guardian: How Judicial Activism Protects Fundamental Rights in India"

 The Indian judiciary has played a pivotal role in safeguarding fundamental rights through judicial activism, a proactive approach where courts interpret the Constitution expansively to address governance gaps and societal inequities. This doctrine empowers courts to intervene when legislative or executive actions infringe upon constitutional rights, ensuring justice for marginalized groups and evolving rights in line with democratic values. Below is an analysis of this concept, supported by landmark cases:

The judiciary derives its authority from key constitutional provisions:

  • : Guarantees the right to constitutional remedies, enabling direct appeals to the Supreme Court for enforcement of rights.

  • : Empowers High Courts to issue writs for rights protection.

  • : Allow the Supreme Court to pass orders for "complete justice" and grant special leave to appeal, respectively.

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Friday, 14 February 2025

LLM Notes Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy: A Complex Interplay

The relationship between Fundamental Rights (FR) and Directive Principles of State Policy (DPSP) within the Indian Constitution is intricate, characterized by their complementary nature and occasional conflicts. Fundamental Rights, enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, guarantee individual liberties and are legally enforceable. Conversely, DPSPs, found in Part IV, serve as guidelines for the government in formulating policies and laws to achieve social and economic justice, though they are non-justiciable.

Complementary Nature

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Sunday, 19 January 2025

Supreme Court: What is doctrine of proportionality as per Indian constitutional law?

 In the case of Modern Dental College and Research Centre and Ors. (supra), this Court observed thus:

60. .......Thus, while examining as to whether the impugned provisions of the statute and Rules amount to reasonable restrictions and are brought out in the interest of the general public, the exercise that is required to be undertaken is the balancing of fundamental right to carry on occupation on the one hand and the restrictions imposed on the other hand. This is what is known as "doctrine of proportionality". Jurisprudentially, "proportionality" can be defined as the set of Rules determining the necessary and sufficient conditions for limitation of a constitutionally protected right by a law to be constitutionally permissible. According to Aharon Barak (former Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Israel), there are four sub-components of proportionality which need to be satisfied [Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitation (Cambridge University Press 2012).], a limitation of a constitutional right will be constitutionally permissible if:


(i) it is designated for a proper purpose;


(ii) the measures undertaken to effectuate such a limitation are rationally connected to the fulfilment of that purpose;


(iii) the measures undertaken are necessary in that there are no alternative measures that may similarly achieve that same purpose with a lesser degree of limitation; and finally


(iv) there needs to be a proper relation ("proportionality stricto sensu" or "balancing") between the importance of achieving the proper purpose and the social importance of preventing the limitation on the constitutional right. {Para 85}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 295 of 2022,

Decided On: 13.11.2024

In Re: Directions in the matter of demolition of structures

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.R. Gavai and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.

Author: B.R. Gavai, J.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1211/2024.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.


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Tuesday, 29 October 2024

Right to Education in India: Constitutional Framework

 The Right to Education (RTE) is a significant milestone in Indian law, established as a fundamental right under the Indian Constitution. This right ensures that every child has access to free and compulsory education, specifically targeting children between the ages of 6 and 14 years.

Constitutional Provision

1. 86th Amendment Act (2002): The cornerstone of the RTE is Article 21A, which was inserted into the Constitution through the 86th Amendment. This article states:

    "The State shall provide free and compulsory education to all children of the age of six to fourteen years in such manner as the State may, by law, determine."

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Monday, 28 October 2024

What is concept of state under article 12 of Indian Constitution. Is there any need for widening its definition in the wake of liberalization?

 Article 12 of the Indian Constitution plays a crucial role in defining the term "State" for the purposes of enforcing fundamental rights. This definition is pivotal as it determines which entities can be held accountable for violations of these rights, which are enshrined in Part III of the Constitution.

Definition of State Under Article 12

Article 12 states that:

“In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the State includes the Government and Parliament of India and the Government and Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.”

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Monday, 2 September 2024

Right to protest is a fundamental right but right to strike is not a fundamental right

 In Indian constitutional law, the distinction between theright to protest and the right to strike is significant, reflecting different legal statuses and implications for citizens.

 Right to Protest

The right to protest is derived from several fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution, specifically:

Article 19(1)(a): This guarantees the right to freedom of speech and expression, which includes the ability to express dissent and opinions against government actions.

-Article 19(1)(b): This provides the right to assemble peaceably without arms, which is essential for organizing protests.

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Sunday, 2 June 2024

Supreme Court: The fundamental Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution does include right to food and other basic necessities.

It is significant to note that though the Constitution of India does not explicitly provide for Right to food, the fundamental Right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution does include Right to live with human dignity and right to food and other basic necessities. The Article 47 of the Constitution also provides that the State shall regard the raising of level of nutrition and the standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. {Para 5}

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.1103 OF 2019

ANUN DHAWAN & ORS. Vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

Author: BELA M. TRIVEDI, J.

Dated: FEBRUARY 22nd, 2024.

Citation: 2024 INSC 136.

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Monday, 19 February 2024

Supreme Court: Right To Defend Oneself A Fundamental Right

 In that view of the matter, we have

proceeded ex-parte. Having perused the

impugned Resolution, we are of the definite

view that such a Resolution could not have

been passed. Right to defend oneself is a

Fundamental Right under Part III of the

Constitution of India and further right to

appear for a client is also a Fundamental

Right being a part of carrying on one’s

profession as a lawyer. As such, the said

Resolution is hereby quashed. {Para 3}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL ) NO. 538 of 2019

RUPASHREE H. R. Vs THE STATE OF KARNATAKA &

ORS.

Dated: FEBRUARY 12, 2024.

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Thursday, 8 February 2024

Whether government can refuse to reimburse medical claim of its employee if hospital in which he has taken treatment is not included in government order?

It is a settled legal position that the Government employee during his life time or after his retirement is entitled to get the benefit of the medical facilities and no fetters can be placed on his rights. It is acceptable to common sense, that ultimate decision as to how a patient should be treated vests only with the Doctor, who is well versed and expert both on academic qualification and experience gained. Very little scope is left to the patient or his relative to decide as to the manner in which the ailment should be treated. Speciality Hospitals are established for treatment of specified ailments and services of Doctors specialized in a discipline are availed by patients only to ensure proper, required and safe treatment. Can it be said that taking treatment in Speciality Hospital by itself would deprive a person to claim reimbursement solely on the ground that the said Hospital is not included in the Government Order. The right to medical claim cannot be denied merely because the name of the hospital is not included in the Government Order. The real test must be the factum of treatment. Before any medical claim is honoured, the authorities are bound to ensure as to whether the claimant had actually taken treatment and the factum of treatment is supported by records duly certified by Doctors/Hospitals concerned. Once, it is established, the claim cannot be denied on technical grounds. Clearly, in the present case, by taking a very inhuman approach, the officials of the CGHS have denied the grant of medical reimbursement in full to the Petitioner forcing him to approach this Court. {Para 13}


14. This is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs. The relevant authorities are required to be more responsive and cannot in a mechanical manner deprive an employee of his legitimate reimbursement. The Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) was propounded with a purpose of providing health facility scheme to the central government employees so that they are not left without medical care after retirement. It was in furtherance of the object of a welfare State, which must provide for such medical care that the scheme was brought in force. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be denied that the writ Petitioner was admitted in the above said hospitals in emergency conditions. Moreover, the law does not require that prior permission has to be taken in such situation where the survival of the person is the prime consideration. The doctors did his operation and had implanted CRT-D device and have done so as one essential and timely. Though it is the claim of the Respondent-State that the rates were exorbitant whereas the rates charged for such facility shall be only at the CGHS rates and that too after following a proper procedure given in the Circulars issued on time to time by the concerned Ministry, it also cannot be denied that the Petitioner was taken to hospital under emergency conditions for survival of his life which requirement was above the sanctions and treatment in empanelled hospitals.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 694 of 2015 (Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)

Decided On: 13.04.2018

Shiva Kant Jha Vs. Union of India (UOI)

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Agrawal and Ashok Bhushan, JJ.

Author: R.K. Agrawal, J.

Citation: AIR 2018 SC 1975,MANU/SC/0369/2018.

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Tuesday, 14 November 2023

On Which grounds the personal law of a party can be ignored or superseded in India?

 In India, personal laws, including Mohammedan law (Islamic law), are applicable to individuals based on their religious or community affiliations. These personal laws govern various aspects of a person's life, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, and other religious and family matters. However, there are instances when personal laws may be set aside or not applicable in favor of general laws or statutory provisions. Here are some examples of when personal laws may be ignored or superseded in India:

  • Public Policy and Fundamental Rights: Personal laws in India, including Mohammedan law, must conform to the broader principles of public policy and fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian Constitution. If a personal law provision is found to be in violation of constitutional principles, it can be set aside or overridden.

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Tuesday, 12 September 2023

Supreme Court: Once A Law Is Declared Unconstitutional ,it shall have retrospective effect

 Then comes the question as to what is

the effect of an amendment of the

Constitution in the two types of cases. So

far 'as pre-Constitution laws are concerned

the amendment of the Constitution which

removes the inconsistency will result in the

revival of such laws by virtue of the

doctrine of eclipse, as laid down in Bhikaji

Narain's case (1) for the pre-existing laws

were not still-born and would still exist

though eclipsed on account of the

inconsistency to govern_ pre-existing

matters. But in the case of post-

Constitution laws, they would be still

born to the extent of the contravention.

And it is this distinction which results

in the impossibility of applying the

doctrine of eclipse to post-Constitution

laws, for nothing can be revived which

never had any valid existence. We are

therefore of opinion that the meaning of the

word "void" is the same both in Art 13 (1)

and Art. 13 (2), and that the application of

the doctrine of eclipse in one case and not

in the other case does not depend upon

giving a different meaning to the word

"void' in the two parts of Art. 13; it arises

from the inherent difference between Art.

13 (1) and Art. 13 (2) arising from the fact

that one is dealing with pre-Constitution

laws, and the other is dealing with post-

Constitution laws, with the result that in

one case the laws being not still-born the

doctrine of eclipse will apply while in the

other case the laws being still born-there

will be no scope for the application of the

doctrine of eclipse. Though the, two clauses

form part of the same Article, there is a

vital difference in the language employed

in them as also in their content and scope.

By the first clause the Constitution

recognises the existence of certain

operating laws and they are declared void,

to the extent of their inconsistency with

fundamental rights. Had there been no

such declaration, these laws would have

continued to operate. Therefore, in the case

of pre- Constitution laws what an

amendment to the Constitution does is to

remove the shadow cast on it by this

declaration. The law thus revives.

However, in the case of the second

clause, applicable to post Constitution

laws, the Constitution does not

recognise their existence, having been

made in defiance of a prohibition to

make them. Such defiance makes the

law enacted void. In their case

therefore there can be no revival by an

amendment of the Constitution, MO

though the bar to make the law is

removed, so far as the period after the

amendment is concerned. In the case

of post- Constitution laws, it would be

hardly appropriate to distinguish

between laws which are wholly void-as

for instance, those which contravene

Art. 31-and those which are

substantially void but partly valid, as

for instance, laws contravening Art.

19. Theoretically, the laws falling

under the latter category may be valid

qua non-citizens; but that is a wholly

unrealistic consideration and it seems

to us that such nationally partial

valid existence of the said laws on the

strength of hypothetical and pedantic

considerations cannot justify the

application of the doctrine of eclipse

to them. All post Constitution laws

which contravene the mandatory

injunction contained in the first part

of Art. 13 (2) are void, as void as are

the laws passed without legislative

competence, and the doctrine of

eclipse does not apply to them. We are

therefore of opinion that the Constitution

(Fourth Amendment) Act cannot be applied

to the Transfer Act in this case by virtue of

the doctrine of eclipse It follows therefore

that the Transfer Act is unconstitutional

because it did not comply with Art. 31 (2),

as it stood at the time it was passed. It will

therefore have to be struck down, and the

petitioner given a declaration in his favour

accordingly.

(emphasis supplied)”

(vii) In the case of State of Manipur (supra),

recently a three-judge Bench of this Court, was

dealing with an appeal against the judgement of

the Manipur High Court which had declared the

Manipur Parliamentary Secretary (Appointment,

Salary and Allowances and Miscellaneous

Provisions) Act, 2012 (Manipur Act No. 10 of

2012) as also the Repealing Act, 2018, as

unconstitutional. Justice L. Nageswara Rao,

speaking for the Bench, observed that where a

statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional, it is

as if it had never been and any law held to be

unconstitutional for whatever reason, whether

due to lack of legislative competence or in

violation of fundamental rights, would be void

ab initio. Paragraph Nos. 22 and 23 of the said

judgment are reproduced hereunder:


“22. Where a statute is adjudged to be

unconstitutional, it is as if it had

never been. Rights cannot be built up

under it; contracts which depend upon it

for their consideration are void; it

constitutes a protection to no one who has

acted under it and no one can be punished

for having refused obedience to it before the

decision was made. Field, J. in Norton v.

Shelby County, observed that “an

unconstitutional act is not law, it

confers no rights, it imposes no duties,

it affords no protection, it creates no

office; it is, in legal contemplation, as

inoperative as though it had never

been passed”.

23. An unconstitutional law, be it

either due to lack of legislative

competence or in violation of

fundamental rights guaranteed under

Part III of the Constitution of India, is

void” ab initio. In Behram Khurshid

Pesikaka v. State of Bombay, it was held

by a constitution bench of this Court that

the law-making power of the State is

restricted by a written fundamental law

and any law enacted and opposed to the

fundamental law is in excess of the

legislative authority and is thus, a nullity.

A declaration of unconstitutionality

brought about by lack of legislative

power as well as a declaration of

unconstitutionality brought about by

reason of abridgement of fundamental

rights goes to the root of the power

itself, making the law void in its

inception. This Court in Deep Chand v.

State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. summarised

the following propositions:

“(a) Whether the Constitution

affirmatively confers power on the

legislature to make laws subject-wise or

negatively prohibits it from infringing any

fundamental right, they represent only

two aspects of want of legislative power;

(b) The Constitution in express terms

makes the power of a legislature to make

laws in regard to the entries in the Lists

of the Seventh Schedule subject to the

other provisions of the Constitution and

thereby circumscribes or reduces the said

power by the limitations laid down in

Part III of the Constitution;

(c) It follows from the premises that a

law made in derogation or in excess

of that power would be ab initio

void…

(emphasis supplied)”

Further after discussing the law laid

down by the previous pronouncements, the

principles were deduced in paragraph no. 28 to

state that a statute declared unconstitutional

by a court of law would be still born and non

est for all purposes. Paragraph 28 of the report

is reproduced hereunder:

“28. The principles that can be deduced

from the law laid down by this Court, as

referred to above, are:

I. A statute which is made by a

competent legislature is valid till it is

declared unconstitutional by a court of law.

II. After declaration of a statute as

unconstitutional by a court of law, it is

non est for all purposes.


III. In declaration of the law, the

doctrine of prospective overruling can be

applied by this Court to save past

transactions under earlier decisions

superseded or statutes held

unconstitutional.

IV. Relief can be moulded by this Court

in exercise of its power under Article 142 of

the Constitution, notwithstanding the

declaration of a statute as

unconstitutional.

(emphasis supplied)”

43. From the above discussion, it is crystal clear

that once a law is declared to be

unconstitutional, being violative of Part-III of the

Constitution, then it would be held to be void ab

initio, still born, unenforceable and non est in

view of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and its

interpretation by authoritative pronouncements.

Thus, the declaration made by the

Constitution Bench in the case of

Subramanian Swamy (supra) will have

retrospective operation. Section 6A of the

DSPE Act is held to be not in force from the

date of its insertion i.e. 11.09.2003.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.377 OF 2007

CBI  Vs R.R. KISHORE 

Author: VIKRAM NATH, J.

SEPTEMBER 11, 2023.

Citation:  2023INSC817.

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Thursday, 17 February 2022

Is the right to get an Electricity supply a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution?

 The civil suit filed by the petitioner seeking mandatory injunction for restoration of electricity having been dismissed on the ground of an alternative remedy will not debar him from filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as it is a settled proposition of law that electricity is one the Fundamental Rights for existence and protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, subject to the petitioner complying with other requirements. {Para 7}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

W.P.(C) 890/2022 

ASHISH GUPTA Vs TATA POWER DELHI DISTRIBUTION LIMITED

CORAM:-  MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV SACHDEVA 

Dated: 14.01.2022 

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Sunday, 16 May 2021

Supreme Court: Right to medical treatment is available to Undertrial under Fundamental right to life

 We deem it appropriate to issue the above

direction even though Sh. Tushar Mehta, learned

Solicitor General has emphasised that adequate medical

treatment is being provided as in the case of all

other jail inmates and if need be further facility

shall be extended to the arrestee. We state that the

most precious fundamental ‘right to life’

unconditionally embraces even an undertrial. The

consideration made herein is keeping in view the

peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. Merely

because the other jail inmates are receiving treatment

similar to the arrestee need not deter us.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

WRIT PETITION (Crl.) No(s). 307 OF 2020

KERALA UNION OF WORKING JOURNALISTS Vs

UNION OF INDIA 

Dated: APRIL 28, 2021

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Saturday, 25 April 2020

Supreme Court: Improper handling of Sexual Harassment complaint violates Fundamental Right to Life and Dignity of Victim

The scheme of the 2013 Act, Vishaka Guidelines and Convention
on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) predicates that a nonhostile
working environment is the
basic limb of a dignified employment. The approach of law as regards
the cases of sexual harassment at workplace is not confined to cases
of actual commission of acts of harassment, but also covers
situations wherein the woman employee is subjected to prejudice,
hostility, discriminatory attitude and humiliation in day to day
functioning at the workplace. Taking any other view would defeat the
purpose of the law. A priori, when inaction or procrastination
(intentionally or otherwise) is meted out in response to the attempt of
setting the legal machinery in motion, what is put to peril is not just
the individual cries for the assistance of law but also the foundational
tenets of a society governed by the rule of law, thereby threatening the
larger public interests. The denial of timely inquiry and by a
competent forum, inevitably results in denial of justice and violation
of fundamental right. The factual matrix of the present case is replete
with lack of sensitivity on the part of Secretary (R) qua the complaint
of sexual harassment. To wit, time taken to process the stated
complaint and improper constitution of the first Complaints
Committee (intended or unintended) in violation of the Vishaka

Guidelines, constitute an appalling conglomeration of undignified
treatment and violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner,
more particularly Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

104. In the present case, the petitioner had faced exceedingly
insensitive and undignified circumstances due to improper handling
of her complaint of sexual harassment. Regardless of the outcome of
the inquiry into the stated complaint, the fundamental rights of the
petitioner had been clearly impinged. Taking overall view of the
circumstances, we consider this to be a fit case to award
compensation to the petitioner for the stated violation of her right to
life and dignity, quantified at Rs.1,00,000/(
Rupees one lakh only).

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2365 OF 2020

Nisha Priya Bhatia  Vs  Union of India

A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
Dated:April 24, 2020.
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Saturday, 17 August 2019

Relation between Fundamental right and human right

The rights which are fundamental to the life of the citizens of a country are known as fundamental rights.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 outlines what is considered in this century to be the fundamental consensus on the human rights of all people in relation to such matters as security of person, slavery, torture, protection of the law, freedom of movement & speech, religion, and assembly, and rights to social security, work, health, education, culture, & citizenship. It clearly stipulates that these human rights apply to all equally “without distinction of any kind such as race, color, sex, language… or other status” (Art.2). Human rights imply the rights that belong to all the human beings irrespective of their nationality, race, caste, creed, gender, etc.
The main difference between fundamental rights and human rights is that the fundamental rights are specific to a particular country, whereas human rights has world wide acceptance.
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