Section 27 Limitation Act: When Delay Destroys Title

Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is one of the most significant provisions in property law because it goes beyond merely barring a remedy and can extinguish the owner’s right itself. If a person entitled to recover possession of property does not file the suit within the prescribed limitation period, the law treats the right to that property as extinguished.

This is why Section 27 is often described as an exception to the general principle of limitation law. In most cases, expiry of limitation only bars the legal remedy, but under Section 27, the title of the dispossessed owner may itself be lost when the statutory period for a possession suit expires.

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KARNATAKA HC: Leave Encashment Is A Constitutional Property Right; It Cannot Be Denied Without Specific Statutory Authority

THE CONCLUSION:

11. The findings of both the High Courts would clearly cover the issue at hand on all its force, as those were also the cases were employees were dismissed from service on misconduct. The petitioner in the case at hand is also dismissed, on account of misconduct. Benefit of leave encashment to an employee is trite, a statutory right, but it has an imprimatur to the legal principle that right to receive terminal benefits is recognized as a right to property obtaining under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India.

"300-A. Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law.-No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law."

Article 300-A mandates that persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. Therefore, it becomes unmistakably clear that any attempt of the employer to take away the right of any part of terminal benefit, which in the case at hand is, leave encashment, without any umbrage of a statutory provision, such action is sans countenanced.

12. Therefore, it is a right of an employee not only under the statute, even under the fountainhead of all statutes - The Constitution of India. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA (DHARWAD BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 100339 of 2025 (S-RES)

Decided On: 19.02.2025

G. Linganagouda Vs. General Manager, Karnataka Gramina Bank

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Maheshan Nagaprasanna, J.

Citation:  2025:KHC-D:3366, MANU/KA/0674/2025.

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Understanding the Right to Property under the Indian Constitution: A Comprehensive Overview

 The Right to Property in India has undergone significant changes since the adoption of the Constitution in 1950. Initially, it was recognized as a fundamental right but was later reclassified as a legal right under Article 300-A due to various socio-economic reforms.

 Evolution of the Right to Property

Initial Recognition as a Fundamental Right

- The Right to Property was originally enshrined in Article 19(1)(f) and Article 31 of the Constitution, allowing citizens to acquire, hold, and dispose of property.

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Supreme Court: Right To Property | 7 Sub-Rights of land owner Which State Must Protect During Land Acquisition

 The Right to property: A net of intersecting rights: There is yet another aspect of the matter. Under our constitutional scheme, compliance with a fair procedure of law before depriving any person of his immovable property is well entrenched. {Para 24}

25. While it is true that after the 44th Constitutional Amendment4, the right to property drifted from Part III to Part XII of the Constitution, there continues to be a potent safety net against arbitrary acquisitions, hasty decision-making and unfair redressal mechanisms. Despite its spatial placement, Article 300A5 which declares that "no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law" has been characterized both as a constitutional and also a human right6. To assume that constitutional protection gets constricted to the mandate of a fair compensation would be a disingenuous reading of the text and, shall we say, offensive to the egalitarian spirit of the Constitution.

26.  The binary reading of the constitutional right to property must give way to more meaningful renditions, where the larger right to property is seen as comprising intersecting sub-rights, each with a distinct character but interconnected to constitute the whole. These sub-rights weave themselves into each other, and as a consequence, State action or the legislation that results in the deprivation of private property must be measured against this constitutional net as a whole, and not just one or many of its strands.

27. What then are these sub-rights or strands of this swadeshi constitutional fabric constituting the right to property? Seven such sub-rights can be identified, albeit non-exhaustive. These are:

i) duty of the State to inform the person that it intends to acquire his property - the right to notice, ii) the duty of the State to hear objections to the acquisition - the right to be heard, iii) the duty of the State to inform the person of its decision to acquire - the right to a reasoned decision, iv) the duty of the State to demonstrate that the acquisition is for public purpose - the duty to acquire only for public purpose, v) the duty of the State to restitute and rehabilitate- the right of restitution or fair compensation, vi) the duty of the State to conduct the process of acquisition efficiently and within prescribed timelines of the proceedings - the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and vii) final conclusion of the proceedings leading to vesting - the right of conclusion.

28. These seven rights are foundational components of a law that is tune with Article 300A, and the absence of one of these or some of them would render the law susceptible to challenge. The judgment of this Court in K.T. Plantations (supra)9 declares that the law envisaged Under Article 300A must be in line with the overarching principles of Rule of law, and must be just, fair, and reasonable. It is, of course, precedentially sound to describe some of these sub-rights as 'procedural', a nomenclature that often tends to undermine the inherent worth of these safeguards. These seven sub-rights may be procedures, but they do constitute the real content of the right to property Under Article 300A, non- compliance of these will amount to violation of the right, being without the authority of law.

29. These sub-rights of procedure have been synchronously incorporated in laws concerning compulsory acquisition and are also recognised by our constitutional courts while reviewing administrative actions for compulsory acquisition of private property. The following will demonstrate how these seven principles have seamlessly become an integral part of our Union and State statutes concerning acquisition and also the constitutional and administrative law culture that our courts have evolved from time to time.

30. Following are the seven principles:

30.1. The Right to notice: (i) A prior notice informing the bearer of the right that the State intends to deprive them of the right to property is a right in itself; a linear extension of the right to know embedded in Article 19(1)(a). The Constitution does not contemplate acquisition by ambush. The notice to acquire must be clear, cogent and meaningful. Some of the statutes reflect this right.

30.2. The Right to be heard: (i) Following the right to a meaningful and effective prior notice of acquisition, is the right of the property-bearer to communicate his objections and concerns to the authority acquiring the property. This right to be heard against the proposed acquisition must be meaningful and not a sham.

30.3. The Right to a reasoned decision: i) That the authorities have heard and considered the objections is evidenced only through a reasoned order. It is incumbent upon the authority to take an informed decision and communicate the same to the objector.

30.4. The Duty to acquire only for public purpose: (i) That the acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. This requirement, which conditions the purpose of acquisition must stand to reason with the larger constitutional goals of a welfare state and distributive justice.

30.5. The Right of restitution or fair compensation: (i) A person's right to hold and enjoy property is an integral part to the constitutional right Under Article 300A. Deprivation or extinguishment of that right is permissible only upon restitution, be it in the form of monetary compensation, rehabilitation or other similar means. Compensation has always been considered to be an integral part of the process of acquisition.

30.6. The Right to an efficient and expeditious process: (i) The acquisition process is traumatic for more than one reason. The administrative delays in identifying the land, conducting the enquiry and evaluating the objections, leading to a final declaration, consume time and energy. Further, passing of the award, payment of compensation and taking over the possession are equally time consuming. It is necessary for the administration to be efficient in concluding the process and within a reasonable time. This obligation must necessarily form part of Article 300A.

30.7. The Right of conclusion: (i) Upon conclusion of process of acquisition and payment of compensation, the State takes possession of the property in normal circumstances. The culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession is vested in the State. Without final vesting, the State's, or its beneficiary's right, title and interest in the property is inconclusive and causes lot of difficulties. The obligation to conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A.

31. The seven principles which we have discussed are integral to the authority of law enabling compulsory acquisition of private property. Union and State statutes have adopted these principles and incorporated them in different forms in the statutes provisioning compulsory acquisition of immovable property. The importance of these principles, independent of the statutory prescription have been recognised by our constitutional courts and they have become part of our administrative law jurisprudence.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6466 of 2024 

Kolkata Municipal Corporation and Ors. Vs. Bimal Kumar Shah and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar, JJ.

Author: Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

Decided On: 16.05.2024

Citation: MANU/SC/0450/2024.

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Supreme court: Right To Property Under Article 300A Available To A Person Who Isn't A Citizen Of India

 We say so because Article 300-A of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The word "law" is with reference to an Act of Parliament or of a State Legislature, a Rule or a statutory order having the force of law. Although, to hold property is not a fundamental right, yet it is a constitutional right. The expression person in Article 300-A covers not only a legal or juristic person but also a person who is not a citizen of India. The expression property is also of a wide scope and includes not only tangible or intangible property but also all rights, title and interest in a property. {Para 18}

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2878 of 2024.

Decided On: 22.02.2024

Lucknow Nagar Nigam and Ors. Vs. Kohli Brothers Colour Lab Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation: MANU/SC/0128/2024.

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Whether the state can dispossess a citizen from his property without following due process of law as the right to property ceased to be a fundamental right?

 The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978, however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a constitutional right under Article 300 A of the Constitution. Article 300 A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300 A, can be inferred from that Article. To forcibly dispossess a person of his private property without following due process of law is certainly violative of human right and so also, constitutional right provided under Article 300 A of the Constitution.

26. In case of Pradyumna Mukund Kokil v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2015 (4) All M.R. 983, it is held by the Apex Court that it would not be proper on the part of the government body or any State authority to take possession of somebodies land without following due process of law and even if a citizen has permitted his land being used by government authority, the authority should not take undue advantage thereof at a time of giving compensation when said land is acquired.

28. Depriving the persons of their immovable properties, was a clear violation of Article 21 of the Constitution. In a welfare State, statutory authorities are bound, not only to pay adequate compensation, but there is also a legal obligation upon them to rehabilitate such persons. The non-fulfillment of their obligations would tantamount to forcing the said uprooted persons to become vagabonds or to indulge in anti-national activities as such sentiments would be born in them on account of such ill-treatment. Therefore, it is not permissible for any welfare State to uproot a person and deprive him of his fundamental/constitutional/human rights, under the garb of industrial development.

30. It is now well settled position of law that right to property is a human right and according to Article 300-A of the Constitution, a person cannot be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation though not expressly included in Article 300-A, can be inferred from the said Article.

31. If a person is forcefully dispossessed from his private property without following due process of law would amount to breach of human right as well as violative of constitutional right under Article 300-A of the Constitution as held in case of Vidydevi (supra).

 In the High Court of Bombay(Aurangabad Bench)

(Before S.V. Gangapurwala and Shrikant D. Kulkarni, JJ.)

Writ Petition No. 5250 of 2020

Bhagauji Vs State of Maharashtra 

Decided on July 3, 2021

Citation: 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 982

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Kerala HC stays Govt Order Deferring Payment Of Portion Of Salary To Govt Servants Amid COVID-19

In State of M.P Vs. Ranojirao Shinde [AIR

(1968) SC 1053], it has been held that right to a sum of

money is ‘property’. In the decision in Deokinandan Prasad

Vs. State of Bihar & others [AIR 1971 SC 1409], it has

been held that right to receive pension is a property and the

same cannot be taken away or withheld by a mere executive

order. If, right to receive a sum of money is a property right

and if pension, which is only a deferred salary, cannot be

withheld without authority of law, it needs no elaborate

consideration, at this stage atleast, to hold that salary or any

portion of it cannot be withheld/deferred/denied, by the State

Government, without authority of law. Article 300A of the

Constitution of India which confers a constitutional right to

property, will include within its purview, salary also, as a

property right, atleast prima facie. Though, as submitted by

the learned Advocate General, Kerala Financial Code is only a

compilation of various orders and is not a law unto itself but

only lays down the procedure in which the disbursement of

salary is to be made, I cannot countenance the submission that

the Government has the power to delay the disbursement of

salary by few months by an executive order. When our

Constitution in unmistakable terms stipulates that property of a

citizen can be deprived only by an authority of law, and when

that authority of law means a law duly framed, Ext.P1 to be

valid, must of necessity trace its source to some provision of

law.

18. However much I tried to bring Ext.P1 within some

framework of law, I could not find any basis for such an order

in any of the statutes. Neither in the Epidemic Diseases Act

1897 as amended by the Ordinance of 2020 (Epidemic Diseases

Amendment Ordinance No.5 of 2020) nor in the Disaster

Management Act 2005, could I seek solace, to give a legal

justification for the issuance of Ext.P1. The provisions that were

read out, specifically Sections 38 and 39 of the Disaster

Management Act 2005, do not specify or confer any power

upon any Government to defer the salary due to its employees

during any kind of disaster. Prima facie, I feel that law is found

wanting to justify the issuance of Ext.P1.

19. I also find from Ext.P1 that there is ambiguity in the

manner in which the amounts obtained from the proposed

deferment of salary is planned to be utilized. It only refers to

the financial difficulty that is faced by the Government. The

said financial difficulty is not a ground for the State

Government to defer the payment of salary by an executive

order. Prima facie, I find that deferment of salary for whatever

purposes it may be, amounts to denial of property. In such a

view of the matter, I stay the operation of Ext.P1 for a period of

two months.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

PRESENT

 MR.JUSTICE BECHU KURIAN THOMAS

W.P(C) TMP NO.182 OF 2020

KERALA VYDYUTHI MAZDOOR SANGHAM (BMS) Vs STATE OF KERALA,

Dated this the 28th day of April, 2020

[W.P.(C) TMP Nos.182, 183, 184, 196 & 198 of 2020]

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Leading Supreme Court Judgment on use of title acquired by Adverse possession as sword

 We hold that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another
person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years' period of

adverse possession is over, even owner's right to eject him is lost and
the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by
the outgoing person/owner as the case may be against whom he has
prescribed. In our opinion, consequence is that once the right, title or
interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as
a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any
person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a
suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7764 OF 2014

RAVINDER KAUR GREWAL  Vs MANJIT KAUR 

ARUN MISHRA, J.
Dated:August 07, 2019.
Citation: AIR 2019 SC 3827,2019(6) MHLJ 87,(2019) 8 SCC 729

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Whether government servant can be denied pension if he is compulsorily retired?

In the present case, the qualifying service for getting the pension is of 10 years' duration, as prescribed under Regulation 14 of the Pension Regulations. The right to get the pension accrues as soon as an employee completes 10 years of his service. It cannot be denied to him unless it is shown that he is either disqualified for getting the pension or the past service rendered by him is forfeited under any of the statutory provisions. Under the service jurisprudence, normally an employee, who is terminated, dismissed or removed from service by way of punishment, is disqualified for getting the pension. On tendering resignation upon rendering qualifying service, an employee incurs forfeiture of his past service. The voluntary retirement, after rendering qualified service, or compulsory retirement, would not result either in disqualification for getting the pension or forfeiture of the past service rendered.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY (NAGPUR BENCH)

Writ Petition No. 2348 of 2017

Decided On: 21.09.2018

 Vandana Vs. State Bank of India and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

R.K. Deshpande and Arun D. Upadhye, JJ.

Citation: 2019(2) MHLJ 197

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Whether right to property is fundamental right?

A brief history of property rights in Independent India: The history of property rights in India is way too complicated for me to provide for a detailed account herein. I’ll instead just aim for a very brief summary of the same.

When independent India first adopted its Constitution, the Right to Property, as enshrined in Article 19(1)(f), was a fundamental right and therefore placed at a high pedestal. Article 19(1)(f) had to be read along with Article 31 of the Constitution in order to prevent the Government from depriving a person of his property without the “authority of the law” and further that such law should provide “for compensation for the property taken possession of or acquired and either fixes the amount of compensation, or specifies the principles on which, and the manner in which, the compensation is to be determined and give”.

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Whether municipal corporation can evict tenant for road widening relying on consent given by landlord?

 The question referred is limited whether in case of
acquisition of land by municipal authorities, for road widening,
on consent of landlord of a shop any notice is necessary to be
given to the tenant in the shop?.  The Full Bench in
Ushodaya Publications (supra) considered almost similar
question and observed that a Municipal Corporation being
statutory authority has right to take possession of the land but
they must exercise their right within four corners of the
statute.  It was further observed that it is one thing to say
that the provisions of the MCH Act for acquiring land are not
required to be taken recourse to as the owner thereof has
given consent but the same would not mean that the lessees
consent need not be taken.  There cannot be any doubt
whatsoever that the consent granted by the lessor/owner
would not be binding upon a lessee and in that view of the
matter the Corporation has no right to take forcible possession
of the shop/land, such as in the present case, relying on the
purported consent obtained by it from the lessor, without
taking recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act,
thereby depriving the lessee of his valuable right.  Thus,
according to the Full Bench, a notice to the lessee/tenant in
the shop is necessary in case of acquisition of land by the
municipal authorities for road widening on consent of landlord
of a shop. 
HYDERABAD HIGH COURT

Order Dated;27-11-2015 

Raisunna Begum & others Appellants/Petitioners  
Vs

Premsukhai Jain & others Respondents   




THE HONBLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE SRI DILIP B.BHOSALE,           
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO,            
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE S.V.BHATT,      
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE S.RAVI KUMAR        
AND  
THE HONBLE MRS. JUSTICE ANIS      

W.A.No.453 of 2005, W.P.Nos.5135 of 2001 and 10106 of 2002   


Citation;AIR 2016 Hyderabad 100

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Whether right to property is Human right?

 A person pleading adverse possession has no equities
in his favour since he is trying to defeat the rights of the
true owner. It is for him to clearly plead and establish all
facts necessary to establish adverse possession. Though we
got this law of adverse possession from the British, it is
important to note that these days English Courts are taking
a very negative view towards the law of adverse possession.
The English law was amended and changed substantially to
reflect these changes, particularly in light of the view that
property is a human right adopted by the European
Commission. This Court in Revamma (supra) observed
that to understand the true nature of adverse
possession, Fairweather v. St Marylebone Property
Co [1962] 2 WLR 1020 : [1962] 2 All ER 288 can be 1
considered where House of Lords referring
to Taylor v. Twinberrow [1930] 2 K.B. 16 termed adverse
possession as a negative and consequential right effected
only because somebody else's positive right to access the
court is barred by operation of law. As against the rights of
the paper-owner, in the context of adverse possession, there
evolves a set of competing rights in favour of the adverse
possessor who has, for a long period of time, cared for the
land, developed it, as against the owner of the property who
has ignored the property.
36. The right to property is now considered to be not only
constitutional or statutory right but also a human right.
Human rights have already been considered in realm of
individual rights such as right to health, right to livelihood,
right to shelter and employment etc. But now human rights
are gaining a multi faceted dimension. Right to property is
also considered very much a part of the new dimension.
Therefore, even claim of adverse possession has to be read
in that context.
37. The changing attitude of the English Courts is quite
visible from the judgment of Beaulane Properties Ltd. v. 1
Palmer (2005) 3 WLR 554. The Court here tried to read the
human rights position in the context of adverse possession.
But what is commendable is that the dimension of human
rights have widened so much that now property dispute
issues are also being raised within the contours of human
rights. With the expanding jurisprudence of the European
Courts of Human Rights, the Court has taken an unkind
view to the concept of adverse possession.


REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (CIVIL) NO.
28034/2011
(Arising out of CC 9038/2010)
State of Haryana  V Mukesh Kumar & Ors.
Dated;September 30, 2011 
Dalveer Bhandari, J.
 Citation: AIR2012SC559,(2011)10SCC404,

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Whether right to property includes right to make construction subject to regulation of state?

In T. Vijayalakshmi and others v. Town Planning Member and another[1], this Court, in paragraphs 13 and 15, has observed as under: -

"13. Town Planning legislations are regulatory in nature. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by reason of a legislation. In terms of the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, a [pic]comprehensive development plan was prepared. It indisputably is still in force. Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive development plan as proposed by the Authority would ultimately be accepted by the State or not is uncertain. It is yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a development plan must conform to the provisions of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, the State has called for objection from the citizens. Ecological balance no doubt is required to be maintained and the courts while interpreting a statute should bestow serious consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite, are ordinarily a part of the town planning legislation. If in the legislation itself or in the statute governing the field, ecological aspects have not been taken into consideration keeping in view the future need, the State and the Authority must take the blame therefor. We must assume that these aspects of the matter were taken into consideration by the Authority and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be intermeddled with so long as an appropriate amendment in the legislation is not brought into force.

15. The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of a person to construct residential houses in the residential area is a valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision the same cannot be taken away. It is also a trite law that the building plans are required to be dealt with in terms of the existing law. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. Doctrine of legitimate expectation in a case of this nature would have a role to play."

Supreme Court of India

Hasmukhrai V. Metha vs State Of Maharashtra & Ors on 3 December, 2014

Bench: Vikramajit Sen, Prafulla C. Pant

Citation;(2015) 3 SCC 154                               

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