Section 27 Limitation Act: When Delay Destroys Title

Section 27 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is one of the most significant provisions in property law because it goes beyond merely barring a remedy and can extinguish the owner’s right itself. If a person entitled to recover possession of property does not file the suit within the prescribed limitation period, the law treats the right to that property as extinguished.

This is why Section 27 is often described as an exception to the general principle of limitation law. In most cases, expiry of limitation only bars the legal remedy, but under Section 27, the title of the dispossessed owner may itself be lost when the statutory period for a possession suit expires.

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Whether parties claiming based on doubtful will should approach civil court before approaching revenue court for mutation entry?

 It is not in dispute that the dispute is with respect to mutation entry in the revenue records. The petitioner herein submitted an application to mutate his name on the basis of the alleged will dated 20.05.1998 executed by Smt. Ananti Bai. Even, according to the petitioner also, Smt. Ananti Bai died on 27.08.2011. From the record, it emerges that the application before the Nayab Tehsildar was made on 9.8.2011, i.e., before the death of

Smt. Ananti Bai. It cannot be disputed that the right on the basis of the will can be claimed only after the death of the executant of the will. Even the will itself has been disputed. Be that as it may, as per the settled proposition of law, mutation entry does not confer any right, title or interest in favour of the person and the mutation entry in the revenue record is only for the fiscal purpose. As per the settled proposition of law, if there is any dispute with respect to the title and more particularly when

the mutation entry is sought to be made on the basis of the will, the partywho is claiming title/right on the basis of the will has to approach the appropriate civil court/court and get his rights crystalised and only thereafter on the basis of the decision before the civil court necessary mutation entry can be made. {Para 5}

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) No. 13146/2021

JITENDRA SINGH  Vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH 

Dated: SEPTEMBER 06, 2021

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Whether Hindu woman who is in illegal possession of property without title can obtain absolute ownership as per S 14(1) of Hindu succession Act?

 It is true that the appellant was in possession of
Eran Gowda's properties but that fact alone is not
sufficient to attract the operation of Section 14. The

property possessed by a female Hindu, as
contemplated in the section, is clearly property to
which she has acquired some kind of title whether
before or after the commencement of the Act. It may be
noticed that the Explanation to Section 14(1) sets out
the various modes of acquisition of the property by a
female Hindu and indicates that the section applies
only to property to which the female Hindu has
acquired some kind of title, however restricted the
nature of her interest may be. The words “as full owner
thereof and not as a limited owner” as given in the last
portion of subsection
(1) of Section 14 clearly suggest
that the legislature intended that the limited ownership
of a Hindu female should be changed into full
ownership. In other words, Section 14(1) of the Act
contemplates that a Hindu female who, in the absence
of this provision, would have been limited owner of the
property, will now become full owner of the same by
virtue of this section. The object of the section is to
extinguish the estate called limited estate or “widow's
estate” in Hindu law and to make a Hindu woman, who
under the old law would have been only a limited
owner, a full owner of the property with all powers of
disposition and to make the estate heritable by her
own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the last
male holder. The Explanation to subsection
(1) of
Section 14 defines the word “property” as including
“both movable and immovable property acquired by a
female Hindu by inheritance or devise …”. Subsection
(2) of Section 14 also refers to acquisition of property.
It is true that the Explanation has not given any
exhaustive connotation of the word “property” but the
word “acquired” used in the Explanation and also in
subsection
(2) of Section 14 clearly indicates that the
object of the section is to make a Hindu female a full
owner of the property which she has already acquired
or which she acquires after the enforcement of the Act.
It does not in any way confer a title on the female
Hindu where she did not in fact possess any vestige of
title. It follows, therefore, that the section cannot be
interpreted so as to validate the illegal possession of
female Hindu and it does not confer any title on a mere
trespasser. In other words, the provision of Section
14(1) of the Act cannot be attracted in the case of a

Hindu female who is in possession of the property of
the last male holder on the date of the commencement
of the Act when she is only a trespasser without any
right to property.
(emphasis supplied)

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 226 OF 2010

AJIT KAUR @ SURJIT KAUR  Vs DARSHAN SINGH

Rastogi, J.
Dated:April 04, 2019
Citation: 2019 SCC ONLINE SC 470

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When suit filed by plaintiff for declaration without claiming relief of recovery of possession is tenable?

The plaintiff, who was not in possession, had
in  the  suit  claimed  only  declaratory  relief  along
with   mandatory   injunction.   Plaintiff   being   out   of
possession,   the   relief   of   recovery   of   possession
was   a   further   relief   which   ought   to   have   been
claimed   by   the   plaintiff.   The   suit   filed   by   the
plaintiff for a mere declaration without relief of
recovery of possession was clearly not maintainable
and the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2342 OF 2017

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, ARULMIGU       
CHOKKANATHA SWAMY KOIL TRUST 
VIRUDHUNAGAR    
   V
CHANDRAN & ORS    
Citation:(2017)3 SCC702

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Whether certified mutation entries are presumed to be correct?

 Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 holds the field in relation to agricultural lands.Sections 149, 150 and 154 are relevant. Section 149 is in respect of acquisition by succession, survivorship, inheritance, partition, purchase, mortgage, lease, or otherwise and any right as a holder, occupant, owner, mortgage, landlord, Government or tenant of the land situated in any part of the State. It is further contemplated that the person concerned shall report orally or in writing his acquisition of such rights to the Talathi within three months from the date of such an acquisition and the Talathi shall at once give a written acknowledgment of receipt of such report to the person making it. Section 150 lays down the procedure of maintenance of Register of Mutations and Register of Disputed Cases. Sub-section (6) of Section 150 empowers the Surveyor or Revenue Officer not below the rank of Avval Karkun to certify the mutation entry which is not disputed. Otherwise, Circle Inspector is the authority who can certify the mutation entries. From the mutation entry No. 815 in the case on hand, it appears that the notice was issued to defendant who did not raise any objection and that is how said mutation was certified by the Circle Inspector on 20-4-2005. Presumption under Section 157 of the Land Revenue Code stands in favour of the mutations which are certified. This presumption, however, is rebuttable. In the case on hand, defendant may adduce evidence at the time of trial for rebutting such a presumption. However, the fact remains that mutation as of today has to be considered in favour of the plaintiff.

Bombay High Court

Shamrao Ganpat Chintamani vs Kakasaheb Laxman Gorde on 19 October, 2007

Equivalent citations: 2008 (2) MhLj 819

Bench: S Deshmukh

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Whether it is duty of sub Registrar to inform talathi about transfer of land as per S 154 of maharashtra land revenue code?

The first Appellate Court seems to have been swayed away with the certification of the mutation entry after about one year. The first Appellate Court blamed the plaintiff for not moving the authority concerned for certification of the mutation entry. In this context, look to Section 154 of the Land Revenue Code is necessary. It provides that intimation of transfer by registering officer, in relation to document purporting to create, assign or extinguish any title to or in charge of land used for agricultural purposes or in respect of which the record of right has been prepared as registered under the Indian Registration Act, be given to the Talathi of the village in which the land is situated and to the Tahsildar in such format and at such times as may be prescribed by the Rules under the Act. The document in the case on hand is a registered sale deed. This fact cannot be disputed. In view of Section 154 of the Land Revenue Code, it is in fact the duty of the Sub-Registrar/Registering Officer to inform the transaction in question to the Talathi as well as to the Tahsildar. Thus, it is not an obligation on the part of plaintiff, on the case on hand, to report the transaction to the Village Officer or to the Revenue Officer. Section 149 has to be read withSection 154 and conjoint reading shows that in case of acquisition otherwise than registered instrument, party has to make a written application to the Village Officer. Suffice to say that in case of registered instrument, it is a legal obligation on the registering authority. If registering authority commits an error or fails in its duties, citizen like the plaintiff cannot be blamed or made to suffer. The finding of the first appellate Court is thus, suffers jurisdictional error. Any of the Courts below did not refer to the provisions of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, despite the fact that they were dealing with the transaction of agricultural land, mutations and record of rights.

Bombay High Court

Shamrao Ganpat Chintamani vs Kakasaheb Laxman Gorde on 19 October, 2007

Equivalent citations: 2008 (2) MhLj 819

Bench: S Deshmukh

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Whether revenue authority can decide question of title during mutation proceeding?

 At the same time it is also to be noted that in case there is any application by the respondents for mutation of entries in their favour based on any valid and lawfully registered document or any decision pronounced by any court or judicial or quasi-judicial authority competent to pronounce such decision, certainly the Authorities acting under sections 149 and 150 of the said Code cannot ignore such application nor can refuse to carry out the mutation in accordance with the declaration of right in favour of the party by virtue of such decision of the Court or the competent Authority. In case of any conflict between such entries, the parties have to settle the dispute by taking resort to the regular remedy available under appropriate statutes but the revenue authorities acting under Sections 149 and 150 of the Code cannot assume jurisdiction to decide about the rights of the parties in relation to properties, while acting under those provisions for the purpose of mutations. Albeit, the revenue authorities can certainly decide in such cases, the issue of actual possession. However, such decision would be final, subject to the decision of the civil court in that regard.

Bombay High Court

Shrikant R. Sankanwar And Ors. vs Krishna Balu Naukudkar on 16 January, 2003

Equivalent citations: 2003 (3) BomCR 45, 2003 (2) MhLj 276

Bench: R Khandeparkar

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Whether title to property can be transferred on basis of mutation entry?

 But the real crux of this matter is as to what is the legal effect of the said Mutation Entry No. 2053 at Exhibit 45. The trial Court has come to the conclusion that because of the said mutation entry, Sonatai Joti Ghadge got title to the property in question along with other properties. But that finding of the trial Court is not at all correct and proper. It is settled law that mutation entries or entries in the record of rights are made only for the fiscal purpose of recovering revenue. The said entries cannot amount to transfer of the title of the holder of the property in favour the person in whose name the entries are made. Therefore, merely because Bali Pandurang Gharge, father of the present appellant No. 1 happened to make a Vardi application on 3rd of September, 1966 to delete his name and to enter the name at Sonatai Joti Ghadge, that act on his part would not amount to transfer of the property in question and that giving of the Vardi application and certification of the said mutation entry would not create any title in favour of Sonatai Joti Ghadge. Therefore, merely because the name of Sonatai Joti Ghadge is entered in the Kabjedar column of the record of rights on account of the mutation entry at Exh. 45, it could not be said that in law Sonatai got title to the property in question.

Bombay High Court

Abasaheb Bali Gharge And Anr. vs Balaji Ramhari Gharge on 14 October, 1994

Equivalent citations: 1995 (1) BomCR 542:1996(1) MHLJ209

Bench: S Pandit

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UK High Court's Judgment on Modern Perspective of Donatio Mortis Causa

There are three requirements to constitute a valid DMC. They are:

i) Donor contemplates his impending death.
ii) Donor makes a gift which will only take effect if and when his contemplated death occurs. Until then Donor has the right to revoke the gift.
iii) Donor delivers dominion over the subject matter of the gift to Recipient.

As many judges have observed, the doctrine of DMC (Donatio Mortis Causa) in the context of English law is an anomaly. It enables Donor to transfer property upon his death without complying with any of the formalities of section 9 of the Wills Act or section 52 of the Law of Property Act. Thus the doctrine paves the way for all of the abuses which those statutes are intended to prevent.The Lord Chancellor in Jones v Selby and Lord Chelmsford in Cosnahan drew attention to this risk. They stressed the need for the strictest scrutiny of the factual evidence. The Court of Appeal rightly stressed in Birch that the courts must not allow DMC to be used as a device in order to validate ineffective wills.

Neutral Citation Number: [2015] EWCA Civ 581
		Case No: A3/2014/2704

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, CHANCERY DIVISION
MR HOLLANDER QC, SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE
HC12E03256

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		09/06/2015

B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE JACKSON
LORD JUSTICE PATTEN
and
LORD JUSTICE SALES
____________________
Between:

	KENNETH PAUL KING	Claimant/ Respondent
	- and -
	(1) THE CHILTERN DOG RESCUE (2) REDWINGS HORSE SANCTUARY	Defendants/Appellants

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When one co-owner can acquire title to property by adverse possession against another co-owner?

A three judge bench of this court in P.Lakshmi Reddy v.
R.Lakshmi Reddy AIR 1957 SC 1789
, while examining the necessary conditions
for applicability of doctrine of ouster to the shares of coowners,
held as follows:
“4. Now, the ordinary classical requirement of
adverse possession is that it should be nec vi
nec clam nec precario. (See Secretary of State
for India v. Debendra Lal Khan [ (1933) LR 61 IA
78, 82] ). The possession required must be
adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent
to show that it is possession adverse to the
competitor. (See Radhamoni Debi v. Collector of
Khulna [ (1900) LR 27 IA 136, 140] ). But it is
well-settled that in order to establish adverse
possession of one co-heir as against another it is
not enough to show that one out of them is in
sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of

the properties. Ouster of the non-possessing coheir
by the co-heir in possession who claims his
possession to be adverse, should be made out.
The possession of one co-heir is considered, in
law, as possession of all the co-heirs. When one
co-heir is found to be in possession of the
properties it is presumed to be on the basis of
joint title. The co-heir in possession cannot
render his possession adverse to the other coheir
not in possession merely by any secret
hostile animus on his own part in derogation of
the other co-heir's title.
(See Cores v. Appuhamy [(1912) AC 230)]. It is
a settled rule of law that as between co-heirs
there must be evidence of open assertion of
hostile title, coupled with exclusive possession
and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge
of the other so as to constitute ouster. This does
not necessarily mean that there must be an
express demand by one and denial by the
other.”
23. This Court in Vidya Devi v. Prem Prakash (1995) 4 SCC 496 held that:
“28. ‘Ouster’ does not mean actual driving out of
the co-sharer from the property. It will, however,
not be complete unless it is coupled with all other
ingredients required to constitute adverse
possession. Broadly speaking, three elements are
necessary for establishing the plea of ouster in the
case of co-owner. They are (i) declaration of
hostile animus, (ii) long and uninterrupted
possession of the person pleading ouster, and (iii)
exercise of right of exclusive ownership openly
and to the knowledge of other co-owner. Thus, a
co-owner, can under law, claim title by adverse
possession against another co-owner who can, of
course, file appropriate suit including suit for joint
possession within time prescribed by law.”

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1858-1859 OF 2016
(Arising from S.L.P. (C) Nos. 10449-10450/2009)

NAGABHUSHANAMMAL (D) BY LRS. 
V 
C.CHANDIKESWARALINGAM 

Citation;(2016) 4 SCC434
Dated;February 26, 2016.

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Whether it is necessary for govt to acquire land which is reserved under development plan?

The Scheme of the Act (i.e. M.R.T.P.) makes it clear that for the purpose of bringing about extinction of right of a private owner, the whole process of the Land Acquisition Act starting withsection 6 has to be gone into, and it automatically also allows the reference under section 18 and so on. For market value purpose, however there is a sub-section (3) of section 126 of the M.R.T.P. Act. Sub-section (3) provides with regard to the date with reference to which the market value of the land under acquisition has to be fixed.1

Bombay High Court

Dinkar Purushottam Dani vs State Of Maharashtra on 7 September, 1999

Equivalent citations: 2001 (1) BomCR 91

Bench: N Pandya, R Kochar

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Whether plaintiff can claim possessory title over property even if title deed is not with him?

It appears basically a case of prior possession of the plaintiff
on the ground that suit house was acquired by her father Ukandrao during
his lifetime.
According to plaintiff, her father Ukandrao died in the year
1968 and house property in question was left in possession of her mother
Yanuna and after death of Yamuna, the plaintiff as an legal heir came into
her possession. In effect, therefore, the plaintiff had inherited the suit
house from her parents although sale deed was not produced on record to
establish that suit house was purchased by Ukandrao. It cannot be
disputed that after Ukandrao died in the year 1968, then it was left in
possession of the plaintiff’s mother in the year 1984 and then after the
death of her mother, the plaintiff came into possession of the suit house.
The 1st defendant had dispossessed the plaintiff of suit house without prior
permission by plaintiff Nanibai. Thus, it was longstanding
possession
supported by entries in Gram panchayat record, payment of electricity bill
and village panchayat taxes. It is pertinent to note that in 1st appellate
court, plea of tenancy was also raised by the appellant which was
negatived. Under these circumstances, defendant no. 1 could not have set
up title in other defendants or in himself for to protect his possession over
suit house. It is policy of civil law that no person can forcibly dispossess
without having legal recourse or availing the remedy available at law. In
the present case, plaintiff had availed of remedy according to law to

recover possession of suit house on the basis of her prior possession and
title on the premise of her inherited longstanding
possession over the suit
house. Even if assuming for the sake of argument that registered sale deed
was not tracable nor produced in order to establish ownership of Ukandrao
as purchaser of suit house, the fact that Ukandrao was in possession of suit
property till his death and after him, his widow Yamuna succeeded and
then the suit house was inherited by plaintiff Nanibai, the entries in village
panchayat record, evidence regarding payment of village panchayat taxes,
electricity bills etc. strengthened the case of the plaintiff to claim that she
was rightful owner of the suit house for to re-enter
into possession of suit
house.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
NAGPUR BENCH : NAGPUR
Second Appeal No. 420 of 1997

 Smt Shantabai  Sonba Madavi, Vs Sau Nanibai  Udebhan Uike, 

Coram : A. P. Bhangale, J
Dated : 29th January 2014
Citation; 2014(4) ALLMR 520 BOM

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Whether revenue officer can decide legality of registered document?

 In the case in hand it is not in dispute that the petitioners had produced a registered sale deed dated 15-7-1998 while requesting for entry in their favour in mutation register. The Talathi based on the said document had allowed the application filed by the petitioners and had carried out necessary mutation in the register. The Sub-Divisional Officer while dealing with the appeal against the decision on mutation of entry, assuming illegally, the jurisdiction of the authorities under the Tenancy Act sought to deal with the controversy pertaining to the tenancy claim and right under the provisions of The Bombay Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1948, sought to set aside the said decision of Tahsildar allowing the application for mutation of entry, and thereby clearly transgressed the jurisdiction of the revenue authorities available under the provisions of the said Code and the said rules in relation to disputes pertaining to the mutation of entries. Additional Divisional Commissioner by confirming the said order of the said Divisional Officer reiterated the same illegality. Apparently both the authorities have acted illegally and beyond the powers vested in them in relation to the proceedings pertaining to mutation of entries under the said Code and the said rules, and therefore the orders passed by them cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed and set aside. At the same time it is also to be noted that in case there is any application by the respondents for mutation of entries in their favour based on any valid and lawfully registered document or any decision pronounced by any court or judicial or quasi-judicial authority competent to pronounce such decision, certainly the Authorities acting under sections 149 and 150 of the said Code cannot ignore such application nor can refuse to carry out the mutation in accordance with the declaration of right in favour of the party by virtue of such decision of the Court or the competent Authority. In case of any conflict between such entries, the parties have to settle the dispute by taking resort to the regular remedy available under appropriate statutes but the revenue authorities acting under Sections 149 and 150 of the Code cannot assume jurisdiction to decide about the rights of the parties in relation to properties, while acting under those provisions for the purpose of mutations. Albeit, the revenue authorities can certainly decide in such cases, the issue of actual possession. However, such decision would be final, subject to the decision of the civil court in that regard.


Bombay High Court

Shrikant R. Sankanwar And Ors. vs Krishna Balu
 Naukudkar on 16 January, 2003

Equivalent citations: 2003 (3) BomCR 45, 
2003 (2) MhLj 276

R.M.S. Khandeparkar, J.

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Whether court can consider documentary evidence at stage of temporary injunction without proof?

The claim of temporary injunction, made by plaintiff needs to be considered by Court in view of the provisions laid down under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code. Order XXXIX, Rule 1 of Civil Procedure Code opens with the wording, "Where in a suit, it is proved by affidavit or otherwise, temporary injunction may be granted by the Court." Prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss are the factors which require to be taken into consideration by the Court while considering the application for temporary injunction. So far material is concerned, the Court can resort to affidavit filed by the party or otherwise. The expression 'otherwise' refers to various other circumstances. In a given case there may be record of rights, various documents of title or transfer of the property or other circumstances. The consideration by the Court to such material at the stage of considering application for temporary injunction is one aspect of the matter and consideration of these circumstances, at the time of trial is different aspect of the matter. At the stage of temporary injunction, Court can refer to documents which are produced on record without formal proof. At that time of the trial Court has to take into consideration the documents which are established in accordance with the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act and proved on formal proof. In other words, formal proof of the documents, which otherwise is necessary at the time of deciding the suit in that strict sense is not necessary while considering the documents concerned at the time of consideration of the prayer for temporary injunction. Public documents can be considered at the time of temporary injunction as well as at the time of disposal of the suit without formal proof and in view of the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act.

Bombay High Court

Shamrao Ganpat Chintamani vs Kakasaheb Laxman Gorde on 19 October, 2007

Equivalent citations: 2008 (2) MhLj 819

 Citation: 2008(2)ALLMR118,

S.B. Deshmukh, J.

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