Whether the power of attorney holder can sale immovable property without specific authorization in power of attorney?

 But we do not agree with the above submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent. It remains a plain and simple fact that the deed of Power of Attorney executed by the appellant on 21.07.1971 in favour of her sister contained provisions empowering the agent: (i) to grant leases under Clause 15; (ii) to make borrowals if and when necessary with or without security, and to execute and if necessary, register all documents in connection therewith, under Clause 20; and (iii) to sign in her own name, documents for and on behalf of the appellant and present them for registration, under Clause 22. But there was no clause in the deed authorizing and empowering the agent to sell the property. The argument that the deed was drafted by a doyen of the Bar, is an argument not in favour of the respondent. This is for the reason that the draftsman has chosen to include, (i) an express power to lease out the property; and (ii) an express power to execute any document offering the property as security for any borrowal, but not an express power to sell the property. Therefore, the draftsman appears to have had clear instructions and he carried out those instructions faithfully. The power to sell is not to be inferred from a document of Power of Attorney. The trial Court as well as the High Court were ad idem on the finding that the document did not confer any power of sale. {Para 9}

17. We do not know how the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions could be applied to the advantage of the respondent. As a matter of plain and simple fact, Exhibit A1, deed of Power of Attorney did not contain a clause authorizing the agent to sell the property though it contained two express provisions, one for leasing out the property and another for executing necessary documents if a security had to be offered for any borrowal made by the agent. Therefore, by convoluted logic, punctuation marks cannot be made to convey a power of sale. Even the very decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent, makes it clear that ordinarily a Power of Attorney is to be construed strictly by the Court. Neither Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon nor Section 49 of the Registration Act can amplify or magnify the clauses contained in the deed of Power of Attorney.

18. As held by this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706 the document should expressly authorize the agent, (i) to execute a sale deed; (ii) to present it for registration; and (iii) to admit execution before the Registering Authority.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

Civil Appeal No. 2592 of 2022 

MRS. UMADEVI NAMBIAR Vs THAMARASSERI ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE 

Coram: Hemant Gupta; V. Ramasubramanian, JJ.

Author: V. Ramasubramanian

Dated: APRIL 1, 2022 

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Whether the court can declare a property free of Encumbrance even Against Will Of Encumbrancer?

The provision in reference is Section 57 of the TP Act, which enables any party to the sale of immovable property burdened by an encumbrance, to apply to Court for a declaration that the said property is freed from such encumbrance on deposit of sums to be adjudged by it; and for the issuance of an order of conveyance or vesting order, proper for giving effect to the sale.

6. The purpose of Section 57 of the TP Act is unmistakable from its tenor that it is intended to assist any party to the sale of an immovable property, which is subject to an encumbrance, to fructify the sale for its fair value after receiving in deposit - for payment to the incumbrancer - the capitalised value of the periodical charge, or the capital sum charged on the property, together with incidental charges. It thus enables the parties to a sale to invoke the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of fulfilling their contracts, notwithstanding the encumbrances on the property.

 Later, in Wilberforce v. Wilberforce ((1915) 1 Ch 94), Sargant, J. spoke on the utility and purpose of the Section as:

"Prima facie, the object of the whole of S.5 is not to disturb any vested or other rights more than is necessary, but to enable a sale to be effected and the property to be transferred to the purchaser notwithstanding there may be on the land a liability for payment of a future sum which would, but for the provisions of the section, clearly have prevented the sale of the land free from incumbrancer of course, a purchaser might think fit to take the land subject to the incumbrance, but the purchase of land subject to an incumbrance is not usually a desirable investment, and the object of the section was to enable the land to be conveyed to the purchaser so that he might get a full and complete title to it."

As I have said supra, the TP Act adopts the spirit and soul of the English Act, with very minor lexical variations and Section 57 also provides that in the case of sale of immovable property subject to an encumbrance being sold by a court, or in execution of a decree, or out of court, any party to it can apply for a declaration that the said property is free of such; in which event, the appropriate court may direct or allow payment, sufficient to meet the encumbrance on the property, into court. There is thus no doubt that this section is intended to facilitate sale out of court, as much as it is for sale by a court or in execution of a decree.

18. That said, however, a note of caution in the exercise of power under Section 57 of the TP Act was voiced by the Hon'ble High Court of Madras in Mallikarjuna Sastri v. Narasimha Rao (MANU/TN/0084/1901 : (1901) ILR 24 Mad 412) to the effect that the section cannot be applied when it comes to a charge or encumbrance already adjudicated by a court and which has become part of a decree or even in a case of adjustment of a decree out of court. This certainly is the golden rule and must guide the minds of courts whenever the section is invoked by a party.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

M.F.A. No. 47 of 2020

Decided On: 05.08.2020

 M.P. Varghese  Vs.  Annamma Yacob and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Devan Ramachandran, J.

Citation: MANU/KE/2091/2020

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Who is entitled to claim the title by adverse possession either person obtained possession under the invalid agreement of sale or invalid sale deed?

In the case of an agreement of sale the party who obtains possession, acknowledges title of the vendor even though the agreement of sale may be invalid. It is an acknowledgment and recognition of the title of the vendor which excludes the theory of adverse possession. The well-settled rule of law is that if a person is in actual possession and has a right to possession under a title involving a due recognition of the owner's title his possession will not be regarded as adverse in law, even though he claims under another title having regard to the well recognized policy of law that possession is never considered adverse if it is referable to a lawful title. The purchaser who got into possession under an executory contract of sale in a permissible character cannot be heard to contend that his possession was adverse. In the conception of adverse possession there is an essential and basic difference between a case in which the other party is put in possession of property by an outright transfer, both parties stipulating for a total divestiture of all the rights of the transferor in the property, and in case in which there is a mere executory agreement of transfer both parties contemplating a deed of transfer to be executed at a later point of time. In the latter case the principle of estoppel applies stopping the transferee from contending that his possession, while the contract remained executory in stage, was in his own right and adversely against the transferor. Adverse possession implies that it commenced in wrong and is maintained against right. When the commencement and continuance of possession is legal and proper, referable to a contract, it cannot be adverse.

9. In the case of an executory contract of sale where the transferee is put in possession of the property in pursuance of the agreement of sale and where the parties contemplate the execution of a regular registered sale deed the animus of the purchase throughout is that he is in possession of the property belonging to the vendor and that the former's title has to be perfected by a duly executed registered deed of sale under which the vendor has to pass on and convey his title. The purchaser's possession such cases is of a derivative character and in clear recognition of and in acknowledgment of the title of the vendor. The position is different in the case where in pursuance of an oral transfer or a deed of transfer not registered the owner of a property transfers the property and puts the transferee in possession with the clear animus and on the distinct understanding that from that time onwards he shall have no right of title to the property. In such a case the owner of the property does not retain any vestige of right in regard to the property and his mental attitude towards the property is that it has ceased to belong to him altogether. The transferee after getting into possession retains the same with the clean animus that he has become the absolute owner of the property and in complete negation of any right or title of the transferor, his enjoyment is solely as owner in his right and not derivatively or in recognition of the title of any person. So far as the vendor is concerned both in mind and actual conduct, there is a total divestiture of all his right, title and interest in the property. This applies only in a case where there is a clear manifestation of the intention of the owner to divest himself of the right over the property. On the other hand in the case of an executory contract the possession of the transferee until the date of registration of the conveyance is permissive or derivative and in law is deemed to be on behalf of the owner himself. The correctness of the decision in Annamaliv. Muthiah MANU/SC/0013/1989 : ILR (1965) Mad 254 (supra) cannot, therefore, be doubted.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 1945 of 1974

Decided On: 17.11.1989

Achal Reddi Vs   Ramakrishna Reddiar and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

G.L. Oza and M. Fathima Beevi, JJ.

Citations: 1990 AIR 553, 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 193, MANU/SC/0012/1989

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Whether the court can restrain wife restricted by will of her husband to dispose of property by the sale to dispose of it by gift?

The Court while construing the clauses of a will held that the interpretation has to be one which solemnly gives effect to the wishes of the deceased person and the will cannot be construed in the same manner as commercial contract or agreement. Accordingly, on an overall conspectus of the will, the Court in the aforesaid context extended the restriction contained in the will on the sale of the property by the surviving wife, to a gift by her as well, even though in the technical sense a ‘gift’ was distinct from a ‘sale’.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

CS (OS) 191/2016, IAs Nos. 5040/2016 

Decided On: 23.04.2020

 Kamal Parti  Vs.   Raj Kumar Parti and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Rajiv Sahai Endlaw, J.

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Whether mortgagee can take benefit of part performance if there is sale agreement between him and mortgagor?

 The plaintiffs’ suit for redemption of
mortgage of four properties was initially decreed
by the learned trial Court. In appeal, the decree
was partially reversed insofar as the two items of
properties are concerned. The said two items are
properties were the subject matter of sale
agreements between the mortgagor and the mortgagee
pursuant whereto on full payment of the agreed
amount by the mortgagee to the mortgagor the
mortgagee was allowed to continue to remain in
possession under the sale agreements. It is in

these circumstances that the First Appellate Court
and the High Court took the view that the
plaintiffs’ suit insofar as the redemption of the
aforesaid two items of properties are concerned
could not have been decreed in view of the
provision of Section 53A of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882.

4. The plaintiffs’ suit for redemption in
the face of the terms of the sale agreements
insofar as the two items of properties are
concerned, could not have been decreed in view of
Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
The plaintiffs could have but did not not bring an
action for declaration of title and recovery of
possession on the basis of title. In such
circumstances “the fault” on the part of the
defendants to bring a suit for specific
performance of the sale agreements to enable the
transaction of agreement to sell to fructify into
a valid sale cannot defeat their right under

Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO(S).566 OF 2016

RAMESH CHAND  Vs  NAND LAL

Dated:APRIL 24, 2018.

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How difference between sale and agreement of sale will affect contractual obligation?

The undisputed factual position is that the appellantbank
has not released the mortgage. The possession of the
mortgaged property has not been delivered to the first
respondent so far. The three year lock in period expired on
01.03.2015. The creation of third party interest or
arrangement by way of agreement for sale within the three year
period is different from sale. Admittedly, sale has not been
made within the period of three years of settlement. The
scheme has not provided for any other restriction of
involvement of third party interest for settlement of the

dues. The only restriction is on sale of the property within
three years of the settlement. That admittedly having not been
done, the appellant cannot rest any claim under law for the
share of the increase in fair market value by way of
recompense. There is nothing to be recompensed since the bank
has not suffered or lost anything.
Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3197 OF 2016

PUNJAB & SIND BANK
V
PUNJAB BREEDERS LTD. & ANOTHER.
Citation:(2016) 13 SCC 283

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Leading judgment on basic concept of mortgage

  It is important to remember that mortgage is a transfer of

interest in specific immovable property towards “security for repayment

of a debt”.   The interest itself may be different in different forms of

mortgage.  In a simple mortgage, what is transferred is a power of sale,

whilst in a usufructuary mortgage it is the  right of the mortgagor  to the

enjoyment of the  usufruct.   In a mortgage  by conditional sale or an

English mortgage what is transferred is the right of ownership subject to

a condition that on default of payment on a certain date the sale shall

become absolute, or that on such payment being made the sale shall

become   void,   or   that   on   such   payment   being   made   the   buyer   shall

transfer the property to the seller.  Whatever be the form of mortgage,

the transfer is of “some” interest only and not of the “whole” interest of

the mortgagor. Unlike in the case of a sale in payment of a debt which

extinguishes the debt,  the debt always subsists in a mortgage. When  a

mortgagor mortgages his immovable property, he does not cease to be

its owner; the equity of redemption still vests in him.  This equity is lost

unto him only when there is a final decree of foreclosure or sale in favour

of the mortgagee.   This has always been our law and a mortgage by

conditional sale is no exception to it.                                                                                                                    

    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

              CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SECOND APPEAL NO.306 OF 1994

Pandurang Maruti Dombale Vs  Bapurao Piraji Owal & Ors.

CORAM :  S.C. GUPTE, J.

      

  DATED  :  25 JANUARY 2017

Citation: 2017(3) ALLMR 348

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Whether sale in violation of order of court is liable to be set aside?

This Court further held that it is not open either a party to the lis or to any third party to determine at their own that an order passed by a Court is valid or void. A party to the lis or the third party who considers an order passed by a court as voidable or non est, must approach the court of competent jurisdiction to have the said order set- aside on such grounds, as may be available in law. This Court held that the order of the Company Court of Madras High Court was to be complied with and sale held in violation of the said order was to be set aside.

Supreme Court of India

Robust Hotels(P) Ltd.& Ors vs E.I.H Limited & Ors on 7 December, 2016

Bench: Pinaki Chandra Ghose, Ashok Bhushan

Citation:(2017)1 SCC 622

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Whether incorrect description of property will vitiate sale transaction?

These provisions show that the transfer of
ownership of land involves transfer of full rights and
interests of the vendor and there is characteristic of
permanency to such transfer. The transfer takes place as
soon as the document is registered. In view of the
provision of section 8, quoted above, it can be said that
not much importance can be given to the incorrect
description of the structure standing on the land. Such
incorrect description cannot vitiate the sale. If boundaries
are given and they are definite, the land that is conveyed
is the land situated within those specific boundaries along
with structure standing on it. In view of the provision of
section 8, quoted above, if the vendor had no intention to
sell some portion of the property or some part of his
rights, he needs to specifically mention about it in the sale

deed. In absence of such mention the title in the land
along with title in the structure standing on the land,
passes to the purchaser. In view of this position of law,
nothing could have been achieved by the defendant even
after making the pleadings in that regard and giving
evidence.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Second Appeal No.1698 of 2005

 Shriram s/o Ratanlal Thakur

V
 Rameshwar s/o Shaligram Chandak

 CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.
 DATE : 7th JUNE 2016.
Citation: 2016(6) MHLJ 750

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What will be effect of consent decree on subsequent sale of suit property?

Under the said consent decree, the decree holders had agreed to hand over possession of their plots to the Judgment Debtors. It was agreed that the Judgment Debtors shall provide free of cost on ownership basis an area of 1850 sq.ft. in the proposed building to the decree holders.

Pursuant to the said consent decree, all the pending litigations between the parties including the High Court proceedings were withdrawn as per the terms of the said consent decree.

 In so far as the obstructionists are concerned, they have claimed rights through the Judgment Debtor during the pendency of the execution proceedings filed by the decree holders. It is not in dispute that when the obstructionists claimed their alleged rights from the Judgment Debtor, the Executing Court had already granted injunction against the Judgment Debtor from creating any third party rights. The consent decree was already registered which amounted to public notice.

The obstructionists could not have claimed before the Executing Court that they were bonafide purchasers without notice. The findings by the Executing Court against the obstructionists had attained finality in view of the confirmation thereof by the lower Appellate Court. I have perused the findings rendered by both the Courts below and in my view, there is no perversity in the concurrent findings rendered by both the Courts below and thus cannot be interfered with under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Bombay High Court

Avinash Uttam Kadam vs Smt. Hajira Begum Nisar Ahmad And ... on 9 December, 2015

Bench: R.D. Dhanuka

   SECOND APPEAL (ST.) NO.30922 OF 2015
               Citation;2016(3)ALLMR156

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Factors to be considered for determining validity of contract for sale of immovable property

In the instant case while deciding the issue as to whether the agreement of 1967, allegedly executed by the defendants, can be enforced, the Court had to consider various discrepancies and series of legal proceedings before the agreement alleged to have been executed. In the agreement dated 2.9.1967, there is reference of earlier agreement dated 29.11.1965 where under Rs. 18,000/- was paid to the defendant-appellant which was denied and disputed. Curiously enough that agreement dated 29.11.1965 was neither filed nor exhibited to substantiate the case of the plaintiff. The High Court put reliance on the agreement dated 2.9.1967 written in a quarter sheet of paper merely because of the fact that said quarter sheet of paper was produced before the Magistrate in a criminal proceeding. In our view, the High Court is not correct in holding that there is no reason to disbelieve the execution of the document although it was executed on a quarter sheet of paper and not on a proper stamp and also written in a small letter. The High Court also misdirected itself in law in holding that there was no need of the plaintiff to have sought for the opinion of an expert regarding the execution of the document. 

Supreme Court of India

K. Nanjappa (D) By Lrs vs R.A. Hameed @ Ameersab (D)By Lrs. & ... on 2 September, 2015

Bench: M.Y. Eqbal, C. Nagappan

REPORTABLE

Citation;(2016) 1 SCC 762

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Whether the daughter can claim right in the immovable property if it was sold after coming in to force of Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005?

The plaintiffs themselves have produced Exs. P1 to 3, certified copies of the Sale Deeds dated 8.2.2002 executed in favour of defendants 5 to 7 in respect of a portion of item No. 3 of the plaint schedule. However, Ex. P4, the certified copy of the sale deed dated 25.2.2009 came into existence subsequent to 20th December 2004, as such the said sale is not saved by proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. Therefore, the Court below has rightly ignored the said sale deed and granted a share to the plaintiffs in respect of the property covered under Ex. P4.

40. By virtue of Exs. P1 to P3 which are registered documents, the properties sold thereunder had gone out of the joint family as on the day Section 6 was substituted. Therefore, the plaintiffs who acquired right to claim a share with their brother Mahadevappa as coparceners because of amended Section 6, are not entitled to any share or interest in the said property.

41. Unfortunately, the trial Court without properly appreciating this legal position, proceeded on the assumption that the defendants 4 to 7 have not contested the matter; the said sale was not for legal necessity and benefit of estate and therefore contended that the plaintiffs have a right in the said properties. In view of Section 6 proviso sub-section (1), the question of legal necessity and benefit of estate should not have gone into by the trial Court. This is not a case where an alienation is challenged on those grounds and therefore, the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court to this extent requires to be set aside. Therefore, point No. 3 is answered partly in the affirmative holding that the plaintiffs are entitled to a share only in the property sold under Ex. P4 and not the one sold under Exs. P1 to P3.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

Regular First Appeal No. 58 of 2014

Decided On: 07.09.2015

 Lokamani and Ors. Vs. Mahadevamma and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:N. Kumar and G. Narendra, JJ.

 Citation: AIR 2016 Kant 4, 2015(4) KCCR 3091

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Whether storing an adulterated article of food for purpose other than sale would constitute offence under prevention of food adulteration Act?

In "B. Govinda Rao and another v. V.N.
Ashokan" 2003 (2) FAC 123, a Single Bench of Kerala
 High Court dealt with a similar question. The learned
 Single Judge held that the expression "store" as used
 in section 7 means "storing for sale" and consequently
 storing an adulterated article of food for purpose
 other than sale would not constitute offence under
 section 16 (1) (a) of the PFA Act. The red cherries
 kept in the store were not intended for sale in the
 given case, and, hence, it was held that even though

 the same were found adulterated, yet, conviction under
 section 16 (1) (a) of the PFA Act was not possible.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 358 OF 1997
 The State ofMaharashtra,

VERSUS
  Shamsundar Ganeshlal Navandar,

[CORAM: V.R. KINGAONKAR, J.]

DATE OF JUDGEMENT PRONOUNCED : 4th April, 2009
Citation; 2009 ALLMR(cri) 1654

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Whether English rules of conveyance shall prevail over concept of sale under transfer of property Act

Mr. Mukherjee referred to Norton's On Deed and Prideaux's Forms and Presidence in Conveyancing. It is said in Norton's On Deed's that the right conferred in the premises cannot be abridged in the habendum. With regard to English Rules of conveyancing, in Barmanaya v. Kalicharan Singh, (1911) 15 Cal WN 393 (PC) the Privy Council observed "Rules of construction are rules designed to assist in ascertaining intention, and the applicability of many such rules depends upon the habits of thought and modes of expression prevalent among those to whose language they are applied. English rules of construction have grown up side by side with a very special law of property in a very artificial system of conveyancing and the success of those rules in giving effect to the real Intention of those whose language they are used to interpret depends not more upon their original fitness for that purpose than upon the facts that English documents of a formal kind are ordinarily framed with a knowledge of the very rules of construction which are afterwards applied to them. It is a very serious thing to use such rules in interpreting the instrument of Hindus, who view most transaction from a different point, think differently, and speak differently from Englishmen and who have never heard of the rules in question."

 The Rules of English mode of Conveyancing cannot prevail over the conception of 'sale' inTransfer of Property Act.

Calcutta High Court

Sm. Manjusha Debi vs Sunil Chandra Mukherjee And Ors. on 21 March, 1972

Equivalent citations: AIR 1972 Cal 310

Bench: A K Mookerji

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When market value of acquired land can be determined on the basis of average price paid under sale transactions?

 Determination of Market Value on the basis of average price paid under sale transactions: For ascertaining the fair market value of the acquired land, High Court adopted the ‘average method’ by averaging the sale price of Exs A-7 to A-10 and calculated the rate at Rs.37,433.75 paise per sq. yard. The appellants contend that when land is being compulsorily taken away, the landholder is entitled to claim the highest value which similar land in the locality is shown to have fetched in a bonafide transaction and High Court was not justified in averaging the sale prices of four perpetual lease deeds. Appellants placed reliance upon the judgments of this Court in M. Vijayalakshmamma Rao Bahadur vs. Collector (1969) 1 MLJ SC 45 and State of Punjab and Anr. vs. Hans Raj (D) by Lrs. And Ors., (1994) 5 SCC 734. In Hans Raj case (supra) it was held as under: “4. Having given our anxious consideration to the respective contentions, we are of the considered view that the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed a grave error in working out average price paid under the sale transactions to determine the market value of the acquired land on that basis. As the method of averaging the prices fetched by sales of different lands of different kinds at different times, for fixing the market value of the acquired land, if followed, could bring about a figure of price which may not at all be regarded as the price to be fetched by sale of acquired land. One should not have, ordinarily recourse to such method. It is well settled that genuine and bona fide sale transactions in respect of the land under acquisition or in its absence the bona fide sale transactions proximate to the point of acquisition of the lands situated in the neighbourhood of the acquired lands possessing similar value or utility taken place between a willing vendee and the willing vendor which could be expected to reflect the true value, as agreed between reasonable prudent persons acting in the normal market conditions are the real basis to determine the market value.”

Referring to Hans Raj’s case in Anjani Molu Dessai vs. State of Goa And Anr., (2010) 13 SCC 710, this Court held as under:- “20. The legal position is that even where there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, usually the highest of the exemplars, which is a bonafide transaction, will be considered. Where however there are several sales of similar lands whose prices range in a narrow bandwidth, the average thereof can be taken, as representing the market price. But where the values disclosed in respect of two sales are markedly different, it can only lead to an inference that they are with reference to dissimilar lands or that the lower value sales is on account of undervaluation or other price depressing reasons. Consequently, averaging cannot be resorted to. We may refer to two decisions of this Court in this behalf.”

20. Where the lands acquired are of different type and different locations, averaging is not permissible. But where there are several sales of similar lands, more or less, at the same time, whose prices have marginal variation, averaging thereof is permissible. For the purpose of fixation of fair and reasonable market value of any type of land, abnormally high value or abnormally low value sales should be carefully discarded. If the number of sale deeds of the same locality and the same period with short intervals are available, the average price of the available number of sale deeds shall be considered as a fair and reasonable market price. Ultimately, it is in the interest of justice for the land losers to be awarded fair compensation. All attempts should be taken to award fair compensation to the extent possible on the basis of their accessibility to different kinds of roads, locational advantages etc. Four perpetual lease deeds A-7 to A-10 relied upon by the appellants are of the same locality – Vasant Kunj Residential Scheme and relate to the period ranging from September 1995 to December 1996, but they are just prior to Section 4(1) notification. In our view, the High Court was justified in taking the average of the said four exemplars and approach adopted by the High Court in averaging the sale prices of Exs A7 to A10 cannot be said to be perverse.

Supreme Court of India

Kapil Mehra & Ors vs Union Of India & Anr on 17 October, 2014

Bench: T.S. Thakur, R. Banumathi

Citation;2014 ALLSCR3728

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