Supreme Court: Appellate court can not enhance sentence in appeal filed by accused against conviction in absence of counter appeal by complainant or state

 In this regard, it must be noted that for exercise of powers of the appellate court for enhancement of sentence in an appeal filed either by the State or the complainant or the victim, the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the appellate court can reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the Accused, or order him to be re-tried by a court competent to try the offence, or alter the finding by maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, of the sentence so as to enhance or reduce the same. Thus, the power to enhance the sentence can be exercised by the appellate court only in an appeal filed by the State, victim or complainant, provided the Accused has had an opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. It is further provided that the appellate court shall not inflict greater punishment for the offence which in its opinion the Accused has committed, than might have been inflicted for that offence by the court passing the order of sentence under appeal. Therefore, in an appeal for enhancement of sentence filed by the State etc., unless the conditions prescribed in the form of provisos to Section 386 of Code of Criminal Procedure are complied with by the appellate court, there cannot be an enhancement of sentence. Obviously in such an appeal for enhancement of sentence, the convict or the Accused is the Respondent and therefore there cannot be enhancement of sentence unless the Accused or convict has been heard. However, under the scheme of Section 386 of Code of Criminal Procedure vis-a-vis in an appeal for enhancement of sentence, there can also be an acquittal of the Accused as per Sub-clause (i) of Clause (c) of Section 386 of Code of Criminal Procedure. But, on the other hand, in an appeal from a conviction, it has been expressly stated that there cannot be enhancement of the sentence. Therefore, while in an appeal for enhancement of sentence filed by the State, the Accused can make out a case for acquittal or discharge or retrial, in the case of an appeal from conviction, the Respondent in such an appeal, namely the State or the victim or the complainant, cannot seek enhancement of the sentence than what has been awarded by the Trial Court in the absence of filing any appeal or revision. The above distinction can be explained by way of a latin maxim which has been discussed by Ujjal Bhuyan, J., while in Bombay High Court, in Jyoti Plastic Works Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors.,   MANU/MH/1857/2020, in the following words:

40. In this connection we may refer to the maxim reformatio in peius. It is a latin phrase meaning a change towards the worse i.e., a change for the worse. As a legal expression it means that a lower court judgment is amended by a higher court into a worse one for those appealing it. In many jurisdictions, this practice is forbidden ensuring that an Appellant cannot be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal. When the above phrase is prefixed by the words 'no' or 'prohibition', which would render the maxim as no reformatio in peius or prohibition of reformatio in peius, it would denote a principle of procedure as per which using a remedy available in law should not aggravate the situation of the person who avails the remedy. In other words, a person should not be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal. No reformatio in peius or prohibition of reformatio in peius is a part of fair procedure and thus by extension can also be construed as part of natural justice. It is not only a procedural guarantee but is also a principle of equity.

14. The rationale of the above can be explained in simple language by stating that no Appellant by filing an appeal can be worse-off than what he was. That is exactly what we are seeking to reiterate in our judgment having regard to the facts of the present case.{Para 13}

Ratio Decidendi:

In an appeal filed by the Accused/convict and in the absence of any appeal filed by the victim, complainant or the State, the High Court cannot exercise suo motu revision either to enhance the sentence or to convict the Appellant on any other charge.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal Nos. 2892-2893 of 2025.

Decided On: 04.06.2025

Nagarajan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

B.V. Nagarathna and S.C. Sharma, JJ.

Author: B.V. Nagarathna, J.

Citation: 2025 INSC 802,MANU/SC/0808/2025.

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LLM Notes: Are Public Utility Services “State” for the purpose of Article 12 of the Constitution of India?

  Should the definition of Article 12 be widened in the era of Liberalization, Globalization, and Privatization? Explain with the help of case laws.

Meaning of Article 12 – “State”

·       Article 12 of the Indian Constitution defines “State” as including:

o   The Government and Parliament of India,

o   The Government and Legislature of each State,

o   All local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.

·       The objective is to clarify to whom fundamental rights can be enforced against.

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LLM Notes: Are You Protected? How Public Utility Employees Gained Constitutional Rights Under Article 12 of Constitution of India?

 When we talk about fundamental rights in India, we often think about government employees and civil servants. But what about the thousands of people working in electricity boards, water corporations, and other public utility services? Do they enjoy the same constitutional protections? The answer lies in a fascinating legal evolution around Article 12 of the Indian Constitution.

What is Article 12 and Why Does It Matter?

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LLM Notes: Are Public Utilities Part of the "State"? Understanding Constitutional Protection for Employees

Public Utilities as "State" Under Article 12: Constitutional Protection for Employee Interests

Article 12 of the Constitution of India serves as the foundational provision defining the scope of "state" for the enforcement of fundamental rights, and its interpretation has profound implications for employees working in public utility services . The question of whether public utilities constitute "state" under Article 12 has evolved significantly through judicial interpretation, with courts progressively expanding the definition to include various instrumentalities and agencies of government that perform public functions . This expansion has created substantial constitutional protections for employees in public utility services, transforming their legal standing and employment security.

Constitutional Framework: Article 12 and the Definition of "State"

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What are 'other authorities' under Article 12 of Indian constitution?

 Article 12 of the Indian Constitution provides a broad definition of the term "State" for the purposes of enforcing fundamental rights as outlined in Part III of the Constitution. This definition is crucial for determining which entities are subject to judicial review regarding their actions that may infringe upon fundamental rights.

 Definition of "State" under Article 12

Article 12 states that "the State" includes:

1.The Government and Parliament of India: This encompasses both the executive and legislative branches at the national level.

2. The Government and Legislature of each State: This includes state governments and their respective legislative bodies.

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Whether State Government can invoke the writ jurisdiction against the action of the Wakf Board to declare the land as wakf property?

 Thus, the State Government, as a juristic entity, has a right to protect its property through the writ court, just as any individual could have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, the State Government is competent to invoke the writ jurisdiction against the action of the Wakf Board to declare the land measuring 1654 acres and 32 guntas as wakf property.

{Para 125}

(3) Whether the State is estopped to challenge the notification inter-alia on the ground that Government Pleader was present before the Nazim Atiyat and before the High Court in proceedings against the order passed by Nazim Atiyat and that the notification was published in State Government Gazette?

129. It is to be noted that the presence of the Government Pleader before the Nazim Atiyat was for a limited purpose as the grants were to be paid by State Government. The State was not a party either before the Nazim Atiyat or before the High Court. The State would be bound by the orders, if it was impleaded as party as it is likely to be affected on account of the orders passed. The liability of State for payment of grant was not in dispute but the question was as to whom the grants would be payable. Thus, the presence of Government Pleader was for the limited purpose of facilitating the implementation of the orders passed.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (NOW STATE OF TELANGANA) Vs. A. P. STATE WAKF BOARD & ORS.

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Whether notification issued by wakf board in official gazette is binding on state government?

 Admittedly, the Government is reflected as the owner of the land in question since the year 1912-13. The Government has exercised its rights of ownership as a successor of the Sovereign. Consequent to Abolition Regulation and payment of commutation under the Commutation Regulation, the State Government had transferred land to the Corporation. A public notice was also issued to invite objections, if any, to the allotment of the land but since none were received, the Corporation made further allotment to various corporate entities. The Wakf Board is a statutory authority established under the Act and is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. A constitution Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1857 held “that the expression “other authorities” in Article 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities”.{Para 120}


122. Since, the Wakf Board is state, it has act to act fairly and reasonably. This Court in a judgment reported as Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 held that the action of a statutory authority must be reasonable and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. 

125. Thus, the State Government, as a juristic entity, has a right to protect its property through the writ court, just as any individual could have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, the State Government is competent to invoke the writ jurisdiction against the action of the Wakf Board to declare the land measuring 1654 acres and 32 guntas as wakf property.



(3) Whether the State is estopped to challenge the notification inter-alia on the ground that Government Pleader was present before the Nazim Atiyat and before the High Court in proceedings against the order passed by Nazim Atiyat and that the notification was published in State Government Gazette?

129. It is to be noted that the presence of the Government Pleader before the Nazim Atiyat was for a limited purpose as the grants were to be paid by State Government. The State was not a party either before the Nazim Atiyat or before the High Court. The State would be bound by the orders, if it was impleaded as party as it is likely to be affected on account of the orders passed. The liability of State for payment of grant was not in dispute but the question was as to whom the grants would be payable. Thus, the presence of Government Pleader was for the limited purpose of facilitating the implementation of the orders passed.

130. A perusal of the record of the Wakf Board, as extracted above, shows that the Errata notification was published when the same was sent by the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board to the Commissioner, Government Printing Press on 13.03.2006. This publication of notification was made under Section 5(2) of the 1995 Act under the authority of the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board. Hence, the notification was not at the instance of the State Government but was an act of the Wakf Board alone.

131. The argument raised that since the Errata notification was published in State Government Gazette, therefore, the State cannot turn around to say that they had no knowledge or that they are not bound by the notification so published is not tenable. We find that the purpose, object and scope of the publications in the Official Gazette is not what is sought to be contended. The Court is to presume the genuineness of any documents published in any Official Gazette as contemplated by Section 81 and Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act, 1872. The publication in the Official Gazette is not only for the affairs of the State but has multiple uses. In fact, this question has been examined by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in a judgment reported as Universal Cans & Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, 1991 SCC On Line Del 784, wherein the Court has quoted various parts of the Gazette required to be published by the Central Government. Section 4, Part III of the Gazette is meant for Miscellaneous Notifications including Notifications, Orders, Advertisements and Notices issued by Statutory Bodies, whereas Part IV is meant for Advertisements and Notices issued by Private Individuals and Private Bodies. Similar scheme of the publication in the Gazette would be available in the States as well. The High Court held as under:-
“8. Under Section 3(39) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, “Official Gazette” or “Gazette” shall mean the Gazette of India or the Official Gazette of a State. What is Official Gazette and under what authority it is published? is yet another question. A Gazette is generally understood as an Official Government Journal containing public notices and other prescribed matters. Legal Glossary (1983 Edition) issued by the Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India, defines Gazette as “an official newspaper containing lists of Government appointments, legal notices, dispatches, etc
xxx xxx

20. Under Section 81 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be in Official Gazette, and read with Section 114 of the said Act and Illustration (e) there to, the court can presume that the Official Gazette was notified on the date as appearing in the Official Gazette. However, this is only a rebuttable presumption. It can be rebutted by the evidence to the contrary. As noted above, in the present case it has been shown that the Official Gazette was notified on a date after the date appearing on the Gazette. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent of the President. This is not applicable in the present case. Here we are concerned with a notification in the Official Gazette”.

 132. The Wakf Board is a statutory authority under the 1954 Act as well as under the 1995 Act. Thus, the Official Gazette had to carry any notification at the instance of the Wakf Board. Therefore, the State Government is not bound by the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette at the instance of the Wakf Board only for the reason that it has been published in the Official Gazette. The publication of a notice in an Official Gazette has a presumption of knowledge to the general public as an advertisement published in a newspaper. Therefore, mere reason that the notification was published in the State Government gazette is not binding on the State Government.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (NOW STATE OF TELANGANA) Vs. A. P. STATE WAKF BOARD & ORS.

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Supreme Court: State can not take plea of adverse possession against its own citizen

We are surprised by the plea taken by the State before the

High Court, that since it has been in continuous possession

of the land for over 42 years, it would tantamount to

“adverse” possession. The State being a welfare State,

cannot be permitted to take the plea of adverse possession,

which allows a trespasser i.e. a person guilty of a tort, or

even a crime, to gain legal title over such property for over

12 years. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title

over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession

to grab the property of its own citizens, as has been done in

the present case.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6061 OF 2020

Vidya Devi Vs The State of Himachal Pradesh 

INDU MALHOTRA, J.

Dated:January 08, 2020.

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Whether High Court on administrative side is a State within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution?

 Hence, in accordance with such judgments holding that
the judgments of the High Court and the Supreme Court
cannot be subjected to writ jurisdiction and for want of
requisite governmental control, judiciary cannot be a State
under Article 12, we also hold that while acting on the judicial
side the courts are not included in the definition of the State.
Only when they deal with their employees or act in other
matters purely in administrative capacity, the courts may fall
within the definition of the State for attracting writ jurisdiction
against their administrative actions only. In our view, such a
contextual interpretation must be preferred because it shall
promote justice, especially through impartial adjudication in
matters of protection of fundamental rights governed by Part
III of the Constitution.”


22. The afore-stated authorities/observations of the Apex Court
clearly indicate that on the judicial side, the courts are not included in the
definition of “State”, but while dealing with the employees or taking
decisions in administrative capacity, the courts would fall within the
definition of “State” under Article 12. Writ jurisdiction gets attracted in
respect of the administrative decisions and actions only.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION LODGING NO. 1137 OF 2018
The National Federation of the
Blind Maharashtra and anr. 
Vs.
The High Court of Judicature of Bombay
WITH APPELLATE SIDE
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO. 72 OF 2018
(PIL No. 46 of 2018)
(Transferred from Aurangabad Bench)
Sachin Bhaurao Chavan
Vs.
The State of Maharashtra and anr. 

 CORAM: NARESH H. PATIL &
 G. S. KULKARNI, JJ.

 PRONOUNCEMENT: MAY 03, 2018.
Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 903

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Court should adopt pragmatic approach in the matter of condonation of delay by state

The entire file clearly indicates how the matter was dealt with
indifferent attitude totally ignoring the huge demand of taxes against the
respondent/writ petitioner. Even the certified copy was applied for much
later than the date of impugned order somewhere in the month of February
2016. It is very clear from records at every stage with reference to above
dates, the matter was treated very lightly. Except explaining the dates
saying who said what the entire explanation given in the affidavit and on
perusal of the papers maintained so far as seeking opinion to prefer appeal
clearly indicate how the matter was dealt with, that is totally in an
indifferent manner. The impersonal manner in which the attention was
given clearly indicate except explaining the note making, file pushing and
passing on the responsibility to others nothing seriously was thought of.
The way the papers are handled from office to office, reluctance in taking
immediate action is clearly indicated. But the fact remains whether this can
be a valid reason to reject the prayer seeking condonation of delay.
Definitely it is very difficult to approve laxity with which the papers werehandled from stage to stage which ultimately resulted in delay of 299 days.
The total demand is more than 50 lakhs. The amount demanded as tax on
advertisement is not one time liability, it keeps recurring whenever such
advertisements are done or annually as the case may be. Therefore, it is not
absolving the liability of more than 50 lakhs once or loss of huge amount of
tax once. So far as the appellants are concerned, they are dealing with
public money and public property. No doubt the delay is on account of
indifferent attitude since the matter is not personal. Action was taken at
snail’s pace since the matter is not personal. We are convinced that there
have been serious lapses on the part of the officers/agents concerned who
had to take a final call in preferring an appeal.
Under these circumstances should we condone the delay? If the
application is not allowed it would affect definitely public exchequer thereby
the appellant Corporation will be deprived of huge money, if they are
successful so far as their stand before this Court. Time and again the Apex
Court of this Country has said certain amount of latitude no doubt is
always expected from this bureaucratic approach of the officers since they
work in an impersonal bureaucratic set up but how long this would
continue. In spite of constituting legal cells to examine the matter and to
take final call on the matter huge delay is being caused. No doubt, the very
nature of foundation of governmental machinery requires serious re-look
into the matter. However, one cannot forget that pragmatic approach should
be there in justice oriented process. At one blush one cannot totally reject
the very claim of the appellants as explained in the memorandum of appeal.
Though there cannot be separate standards to determine ‘sufficient cause’shown by the State vis a vis private litigant since the public cannot directly
approach the Court on behalf of the governmental machinery there has to
be pragmatic approach since the imprompt action to be pursued by the
officers/agents would affect the interest of public at large. We are of the
opinion it is not the Corporation as such who is responsible for the delay
but the officers/agents handling the matters are responsible for the latitude
with which they have taken the entire exercise. The files clearly indicate
delay has occurred only on account of indifferent attitude of the officers
concerned in not showing the anxiety to take a final call in spite of huge
money being involved in the matter. Ultimately it would lead to defeat of
justice by causing delay only on account of impersonal manner in which
they dealt with the files. The victim is justice and the same cannot be
allowed. The deliberate lapses and inaction on the part of the officers cannot
be a ground to sacrifice justice. In order to make the ends of justice meet
since large public interest is involved, we are of the opinion we have to take
a lenient view in the matter. Further we are of the opinion that there has to
be serious action against those persons who are responsible for the present
situation on account of absence of timely action. Such inaction of the
officers is to be curbed and the way we can express our displeasure is by
imposing costs while condoning the delay in filing the appeal. We direct the
appellant/corporation to take action against those erring officials and also
to recover the costs imposed by us from those officers who are responsible
for the delay. They did not even bother to apply for certified copy of the
impugned order till February 2016.In the light of the above discussion and reasoning we allow the
application for condonation of delay being G.A. 973 of 2016 on payment of
cost of Rs.1,00,000/-.
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Constitutional Writ Jurisdiction
Original Side
G.A.973 of 2016
APOT 105 of 2016
W.P. 2662 of 1996
The Calcutta Municipal Corporation & Anr.
Vs.
The Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors.
BEFORE:
The Hon’ble CHIEF JUSTICE DR. MANJULA CHELLUR
 &
The Hon’ble JUSTICE ARIJIT BANERJEE

Delivered on : 09.08.2016.

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Whether burden of proof is on state to prove that reference under land acquisition Act is barred by limitation?

. Coming   to   the   second   question   of   law   regarding
burden of proof, no doubt the normal principle is that the burden
to prove that the claim is within limitation is upon the person or

party, who comes before the Court, to establish it and it is only
upon   leading   evidence   that   the   onus   shall   shift   upon   the
respondent or the other side.   The Apex Court in the cases of
Laxman Lal and K.P. Plantation Private Limited, has held, as has
been pointed out in the initial paras, that it is the constitutional
obligation   upon   the   State   to  pay   the   compensation   at   a  rate
which is not less than the market value of the land, as prescribed
under the second proviso to clause (1) of Article 31­A of the
Constitution of India.  It is, therefore, for the State to justify its
stand   that   all   the   steps,   as   are   required   to   be   taken   under
sub­section (2) of Section 12 read with Section 18 of the said Act,
have been followed, and that the claimant has failed to approach
the Court within the time prescribed under clause (a) and (b)
below   proviso   to   sub­section   (2)   of   Section   18   of   the   Land
Acquisition Act.  If the Collector or the State wanted to prevent
the   claimant   from   seeking   enforcement   of   constitutional
obligation or fundamental right, then the initial burden is upon it
to make out a case by necessary pleadings and proof by leading
evidence to show that the claim is barred by the law of limitation,

as prescribed under clauses (a) and (b) below sub­section (2) of
Section 18 of the said Act, which shall be subject to evidence in
rebuttal.    
52. Even the language of the clauses (a) and (b) below
sub­section (2) of Section 18 of the said Act requires the Collector
to   establish   the   fact   that   the   claimant,   as   contemplated   by
clause (a), was present or represented before him at the time
when   the   award   was   made,   and   in   other   cases   covered   by
clause   (b),   that   the   claimant   had   actual   or   constructive
knowledge of the essential contents of the award and that the
reference was not preferred within a period of six weeks or six
months, as the case may be, from the date of such knowledge.
The Collector being in custody of the entire record, it is for him to
plead and prove that the reference preferred under Section 18 of
the said Act was barred by the law of limitation.  It is, therefore,
for the State, acting through the Collector, to discharge its burden
if it wanted to deny a fundamental right to the claimant to get
the market value of the land acquired determined by the Court,

by seeking reference under Section 18 of the said Act.
53. It   is   not   expected   from   the   claimant   to   plead   and
prove  the  negative  facts that  he  was not  present or  was not
represented before the Collector when the award was made, as
contemplated by clause (a) below sub­section (2) of Section 18 of
the Land Acquisition Act, or any other cases covered by clause (b)
therein,     that   he   was   not   having   the   actual   or   constructed
knowledge of the essential contents of the award so as to prefer a
reference under Section 18 of the said Act either within a period
of six weeks or within a period of six months, as the case may be.
No doubt, that it would be advisable for the claimant to make
such pleading in the reference petition under Section 18 of the
said Act, but absence of such pleading would not be enough to
deprive   the   claimant   of   a   right   to   seek   a   reference   for

compensation at a market value of the land under acquisition.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR
FIRST APPEAL NO.518 OF 2003
Maharashtra State Power Generation Co. Ltd.,
(Formerly known as Maharashtra State
Electricity Board),
Versus
Dr. Sheshrao Baliram Ingole,
Coram : R.K. Deshpande, J.
Dated  : 2nd February, 2016
Citation: 2016(3) MHLJ 786

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Whether State is responsible for Man’s Suicide due to exorbitant fees demanded by Private School?

We are not only disturbed, but stunned to learn this unfortunate
development.  The distressful economic conditions alone may not have forced
the husband of the writ petitioner herein to take recourse to the said
action, which can be reasonably attributed to a mental aberration.  Since,
the writ petitioner has lost one of her two children and the reason for such
loss is attributed to the act of demand of payment of exorbitant fee by the
School Management- the 8th respondent, the writ petitioner now seeks relief
of securing free education for the remaining and surviving child and also
compensation for the double tragedy of her's.

         We are at a loss to appreciate the contention canvassed in this
regard.

        Firstly, the act of the husband of the writ petitioner in killing an
innocent child out of frustration cannot be appreciated at all.  Even if a
child cannot be supported reasonably and legitimately to secure him good
education, there are well recognized and civilised methods to secure
education to the children.  The State Government, as a measure of welfare of
the Society at large, has been running and maintaining several institutions
for promoting the cause of education, so that, the economic distressful
conditions of the family would not be a cause for children from dropping out
from the academic life.  There are also philanthropic organizations which
lend support in the Society.  Instead of approaching any such organizations
the husband of the writ petitioner has taken recourse to a violent measure.
Luckily for him, he did not survive but succumbed lest he would have been
prosecuted  for killing his innocent child.  Under Section 357 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, the victims can be compensated by the Courts, but,
however such compensation is liable to be awarded for any loss or injury
caused by the offence, but not otherwise. In the instant case, the offence
unleashed by the husband of the writ petitioner towards an innocent child, if
there is one who will have to tender compensation for having caused loss of
the child of the writ petitioner, in turn, that would be the husband of the
writ petitioner.  Since he was no more, he could not be prosecuted.
Therefore, the claim of the petitioner for payment of compensation against
the State Government, to say is a milder manner,  an extravagant  one.
State is nowhere responsible for the violent action unleashed by the husband
of the writ petitioner.

BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED:  08.06.2016  

CORAM   
 MR.JUSTICE NOOTY.RAMAMOHANA RAO                 
and 
 MR.JUSTICE S.S.SUNDAR           

Writ Appeal (MD) No.909 of 2016  & C.M.P(MD)No.5588 of 2016   

Easwari   Vs  Principal Secretary, Department of School Education,
   State of Tamil Nadu,
  

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Whether writ petition is maintainable against Shri Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board ?

This issue has been dealt with by a Division Bench of
this Court in case titled Omkar Sharma and ors vs. Shri
Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board
and connected matters,
reported in 2005 (1) SLJ 260, wherein it was held that Shri
Mata Vaishno Devi Shrine Board has been constituted under
a statute and in absence of any control of the Government it
cannot be said to be “State” or an “authority” within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It was
further held that writ petition for enforcement of fundamental
rights against the Shrine Board would not be maintainable.
The dictum of law is loud and clear that Shri Mata

Vaishno Devi Shrine Board, not being an instrumentality of
the State, is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this
Court. That being so, the instant writ petition is held to be not
maintainable and is, accordingly, dismissed.
HIGH COURT OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR
AT JAMMU
OWP No. 229/2011
Dated;03 .01.2015
Date of Decision:
Vikas Dhawan
v

State of J&K and ors.
Coram:
Bhat-
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Bansi Lal Bhat-Judge
Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)739 J&K

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Whether state is liable to pay compensation for injuries caused due to accidental firing by police?

It is now well settled that violation of fundamental right of any citizen by the State agency could be a cause for award of compensation to the aggrieved person as the State has the obligation to ensure safety of the life and limb of the citizen which is guaranteed under Art. 21 of the Constitution.
 In the present case, the limb of the petitioner was grievously injured affecting his peaceful enjoyment of life without any contributory negligence on his part and the State respondents have already admitted that the said injury was caused by firing of the police personnel. It may be also observed that even if it is accidental firing as held by the authorities, it was the responsibility of the police personnel to handle such a deadly weapon in public place with utmost care so as not to cause any injury to any civilian without any just cause.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF MANIPUR AT IMPHAL

Writ Petition(C) No. 130/2009

Decided On: 31.07.2014

Appellants: Thokchom Ranjit Singh
Vs.
Respondent: The State of Manipur

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:N. Kotiswar Singh, J.

Citation;AIR 2015(NOC)382 Manipur

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When jurisdiction of High court can be invoked in case of contractual dispute between state and private party?

The position thus summarized in the aforesaid principles has to

be understood in the context of discussion that preceded which

we have pointed out above. As per this, no doubt, there is no

absolute bar to the maintainability of the writ petition even in

contractual matters or where there are disputed questions of fact

or even when monetary claim is raised. At the same time,

discretion lies with the High Court which under certain

circumstances, can refuse to exercise. It also follows that under

the following circumstances, 'normally', the Court would not

exercise such a discretion:

(a) the Court may not examine the issue unless the action has

some public law character attached to it.

(b) Whenever a particular mode of settlement of dispute is

provided in the contract, the High Court would refuse to exercise

its discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution and relegate the

party to the said made of settlement, particularly when settlement

of disputes is to be resorted to through the means of arbitration.

(c) If there are very serious disputed questions of fact which are of

complex nature and require oral evidence for their determination.

(d) Money claims per se particularly arising out of contractual

obligations are normally not to be entertained except in

exceptional circumstances.

69)

Further legal position which emerges from various judgments of

this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to the

contracts entered into by the State/public Authority with private

parties, can be summarized as under:

(i)

At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely

in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of

fairness.

(ii)

State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field,

is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practice some

discriminations.

(iii) Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of

competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts

have to be investigated and found before the question of a

violation of Article 14 could arise. If those facts are disputed and

require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only

be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, Involving

examination and cross- examination of witnesses, the case could

not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under

Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases court can direct the

aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit etc.

(iv) Writ jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 was not

intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred.

(v) Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual

obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or

hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the

contract can provide no justification in not complying with the

terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes.

It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the license if he

finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions

under which he agreed to take the license, if he finds it

commercially inexpedient to conduct his business.

(vi) Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the

party complaining of such breach may sue for specific

performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being

specifically performed.

Otherwise, the party may sue for

damages.

(vii) Writ can be issued where there is executive action

unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is

denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if can be

shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any

hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding

that action could not have been taken without observing principles

of natural justice.

(viii)

If

the

contract

between

private

party

and

the

State/instrumentality and/or agency of State is under the realm of

a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal

course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided

under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court

under Article 226 of the Constitutional of India and invoking its

extraordinary jurisdiction.

(ix) The distinction between public law and private law element in

the contract with State is getting blurred. However, it has not been

totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field

of contract. This Court has maintained the position that writ

petition is not maintainable. Dichotomy between public law and

private law, rights and remedies would depend on the factual

matrix of each case and the distinction between public law

remedies and private law, field cannot be demarcated with

precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts

whether the contractual relations between the parties bear

insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it

is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public

law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court

in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to

see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency

of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are

taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into

the decision making process or that the decision is not arbitrary.

(x) Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such

a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but

failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the

decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due

consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the

principle of non-arbitrariness.

(xi) The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling

within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited

and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication

of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of

purely contractual disputes.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6929 OF 2012

JOSHI TECHNOLOGIES INTERNATIONAL INC.

.....APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

.....RESPONDENT(S)

Dated;MAY 14, 2015.

A.K. SIKRI, J.

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Whether contempt proceeding can be initiated against state without impleading its officers?

 If the facts of the case are examined in light of the High Court of Chhattisgarh (Contempt of Court Proceedings), Rules, 2007 and the principles of law laid down with regard to nature of contempt proceeding and impalement of the contemnor/person charged as laid down Tarafatullah Mandal case (supra) it is held that contempt proceeding is proceeding in person am and the petitioners have neither given the names of the person charged and responsible for breach of the order of Court on behalf of the State Government and Nagar Panchayat, therefore a contempt proceeding cannot be proceeded with in absence of individual person responsible for disobeying the order of the Court being a party as contemnor. Thus the petitioners having failed to name the person charged/contemnor in the contempt petition and even not given the date or dates on which the order is said to be disobeyed the contempt proceeding cannot be initiated under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Resultantly, the contempt petition as framed and filed is not in accordance with Rule 349 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh (Contempt of Court Proceedings) Rules, 2007 is dismissed as not maintainable. However it will be open to the contempt petitioners to file duly constituted contempt petition in accordance with Rules of 2007.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH

Contempt Case (C) No. 412 of 2014

Decided On: 10.11.2014

Appellants: Sada Singh and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: State of Chhattisgarh and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

Citation: 2015CriLJ1462

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Whether state can be made liable to pay compensation if accused is unable to pay compensation?

As already observed, the respondent having been
found guilty of causing death by his negligence, the
High Court was not justified in reducing the sentence of
imprisonment
to 10 days without awarding any
compensation to the heirs of the deceased. We are of
the view that in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the order of the High Court can be upheld only
with the modification that the accused will pay
compensation of Rs.2 lakhs to the heirs of the deceased
within six months. In default, he will undergo RI for six
months. The compensation of Rs.2 lakhs is being fixed
having regard to the limited financial resources of the
accused but the said compensation may not be
adequate for the heirs of the deceased.
In such
situation, in addition to the compensation to be paid by
the accused, the State can be required to pay
compensation under Section 357-A. As per judgment of
this Court in Suresh (supra), the scheme adopted by

the State of Kerala is applicable to all the States and
the said scheme provides for compensation upto Rs.5
lakhs in the case of death. In the present case, it will
be appropriate, in the interests of justice, to award
interim compensation of Rs.3 lakhs under Section 357-A
payable out of the funds available/to be made available
by the State of Madhya Pradesh with the District Legal
Services, Authority, Guna.
In case, the accused does
not pay the compensation awarded as above, the State
of Madhya Pradesh will pay the entire amount of
compensation of Rs.5 lakhs within three months after
expiry of the time granted to the accused.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.290 OF 2015

STATE OF M.P. V MEHTAAB
Dated;FEBRUARY 13, 2015
Citation;2015 ALLMR(CRI)1233 SC
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL J.

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Whether case of claimant is proved in land acquisition case if there is no effective cross examination by state?

Reliance has been placed by Mr. Khaladkar on P. Ram Reddy and Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Officer, Hyderabad Urban Development Authority, Hyderabad and Ors. [(1995) 2 SCC 305], wherein one of the 23

questions formulated was the effect of non-cross-examination or ineffective cross-examination of witnesses for the claimant. It was held: "It is, no doubt true, that whenever oral

evidence is adduced by parties on certain

matters in controversy, it may become difficult for Court to overlook such evidence, if it is not shown by effective cross-examination of such witnesses who have given such evidence or by adducing contra-evidence that the oral evidence was unreliable or the witnesses themselves are not credit worthy. But, in land acquisition references before Civil Courts, when witnesses give oral evidence in support of the claims of claimants for higher compensation the in-

effective cross-examination of such witness, is not an uncommon feature if regard is had to the manner in which claims for enhanced

compensation in land acquisition cases are

defended in courts on behalf of the Stale,

Indeed, when a question arose before this Court whether the Court is bound to accept the

statement of witnesses only because they have not been effectively cross-examined or evidence in rebuttal has not been adduce, it was observed by this Court in Chaturbhuj Pande and Ors. vs. Collector; Raigarh AIR (1969) S.C. 255, thus : `It is true that the witnesses examined on

behalf of the appellants have not been

effectively cross-examined. It is also true that the Collector had not adduced any

evidence in rebuttal; but that does not

mean that the court is bound to accept

their evidence. The Judges are not

computers......they are bound to call into

aid their experience of life and test the

evidence on the basis of probabilities.'"

Supreme Court of India

Navanath & Ors vs State Of Maharashtra on 15 April, 2009

Bench: S.B. Sinha, Cyriac Joseph

REPORTABLE

Citation: 2009(4)ALT17(SC), 2009 3 AWC(Supp)2543SC, 2009(4)BomCR182, JT2009(6)SC386, 2009(5)SCALE575, (2009)14SCC480, [2009]6SCR632

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SUPREME COURT HAS DEPRECATED THE PRACTICE OF STATE TAKING PLEA OF ADVERSE POSSESSION

In   State   of   Haryana   ..vs..   Mukesh   Kumar   and   others

(2011)10 SCC 404, their Lordships held that “A person pleading adverse

possession has no equities in his favour since he is trying to defeat the

rights of the true owner. It is for him to clearly plead and establish all

facts necessary to establish adverse possession.” Coming down heavily on

the  State which  sets  up  a  plea  of  adverse  possession  their  Lordships

observed  that  “If  the   protectors  of  law  become  the  grabbers  of  the

property, then people will be left with no protection and there would be

a total anarchy in the entire country”. (emphasis supplied)

Supreme Court of India

State Of Haryana vs Mukesh Kumar & Ors. on 30 September, 2011

Bench: Dalveer Bhandari, Deepak Verma

Citation;AIR2012SC559, (2011)10SCC404, 

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