What is distinction between Muslim trust and wakf?

 There is a vast difference between Muslim Wakfs and Trusts created by Muslims. The basic difference is that Wakf properties are dedicated to God and the “Wakif” or dedicator, does not retain any title over the Wakf properties. As far as Trusts are concerned, the properties are not vested in God. Some of the objects of such Trusts are for running charitable organisations such as hospitals, shelter homes, orphanages and charitable dispensaries, which acts, though recognized as pious, do not divest the author of the Trust from the title of the properties in the Trust, unless he relinquishes such title in favour of the Trust or the Trustees. At times, the dividing line between Public Trusts and Wakfs may be thin, but the main factor always is that while Wakf properties vest in God Almighty, the Trust properties do not vest in God and the trustees in terms of Deed of Trust are entitled to deal with the same for the benefit of the Trust and its beneficiaries.

Reportable

Supreme Court of India

Maharashtra State Board Of Wakfs vs Shaikh Yusuf Bhai Chawla & Ors on 11 May, 2012

Author: A Kabir

Bench: Altamas Kabir, J. Chelameswar, Ranjan Gogoi

 Read full Judgment here: Click here                                        

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Can Wakf tribunal decide suit relating to encroachment and tenancy over wakf property?

 It is clear that the Legislature has

added the underlined portion in the earlier

Section 83. If the amended Section 83(1) is

perused, it is quite apparent that any dispute,

question or other matter relating to Waqf

property, eviction of a tenant or determination of

rights and obligation of the lessor and the lessee

of such property i.e. Waqf property is to be

decided by the Waqf Tribunal. The amended

provision came into effect on 1st November 2013 and

naturally when the Waqf Tribunal decided the

Application on 5th May 2014, it was within its

jurisdiction to consider the dispute of tenancy

also, which was raised. This is apart from the

fact that the basic dispute the Tribunal was

dealing with, was whether or not the Applicant was

a trespasser as found under Section 54 of the Waqf

Act. To decide that dispute, it was required to

deal with the defence of the claim of tenancy.

10. Tribunal considered the admitted facts,

the law and opportunity given to applicant by

C.E.O. and rejected the application. The Applicant

is unable to show that the impugned order is not

correct, legal or proper. Consequently, there is

no substance in the Revision application.{Para 9}

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.127 OF 2014

Ishtaque Ali Sayyad Ali, Vs  Maharashtra State Wakf Board,

CORAM: A.I.S. CHEEMA, J.

DATED : 17TH FEBRUARY, 2015.

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Whether State Government can invoke the writ jurisdiction against the action of the Wakf Board to declare the land as wakf property?

 Thus, the State Government, as a juristic entity, has a right to protect its property through the writ court, just as any individual could have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, the State Government is competent to invoke the writ jurisdiction against the action of the Wakf Board to declare the land measuring 1654 acres and 32 guntas as wakf property.

{Para 125}

(3) Whether the State is estopped to challenge the notification inter-alia on the ground that Government Pleader was present before the Nazim Atiyat and before the High Court in proceedings against the order passed by Nazim Atiyat and that the notification was published in State Government Gazette?

129. It is to be noted that the presence of the Government Pleader before the Nazim Atiyat was for a limited purpose as the grants were to be paid by State Government. The State was not a party either before the Nazim Atiyat or before the High Court. The State would be bound by the orders, if it was impleaded as party as it is likely to be affected on account of the orders passed. The liability of State for payment of grant was not in dispute but the question was as to whom the grants would be payable. Thus, the presence of Government Pleader was for the limited purpose of facilitating the implementation of the orders passed.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (NOW STATE OF TELANGANA) Vs. A. P. STATE WAKF BOARD & ORS.

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Whether notification issued by wakf board in official gazette is binding on state government?

 Admittedly, the Government is reflected as the owner of the land in question since the year 1912-13. The Government has exercised its rights of ownership as a successor of the Sovereign. Consequent to Abolition Regulation and payment of commutation under the Commutation Regulation, the State Government had transferred land to the Corporation. A public notice was also issued to invite objections, if any, to the allotment of the land but since none were received, the Corporation made further allotment to various corporate entities. The Wakf Board is a statutory authority established under the Act and is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. A constitution Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal & Ors., AIR 1967 SC 1857 held “that the expression “other authorities” in Article 12 will include all constitutional or statutory authorities on whom powers are conferred by law. It is not at all material that some of the powers conferred may be for the purpose of carrying on commercial activities”.{Para 120}


122. Since, the Wakf Board is state, it has act to act fairly and reasonably. This Court in a judgment reported as Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293 held that the action of a statutory authority must be reasonable and taken only upon lawful and relevant grounds of public interest. 

125. Thus, the State Government, as a juristic entity, has a right to protect its property through the writ court, just as any individual could have invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court. Therefore, the State Government is competent to invoke the writ jurisdiction against the action of the Wakf Board to declare the land measuring 1654 acres and 32 guntas as wakf property.



(3) Whether the State is estopped to challenge the notification inter-alia on the ground that Government Pleader was present before the Nazim Atiyat and before the High Court in proceedings against the order passed by Nazim Atiyat and that the notification was published in State Government Gazette?

129. It is to be noted that the presence of the Government Pleader before the Nazim Atiyat was for a limited purpose as the grants were to be paid by State Government. The State was not a party either before the Nazim Atiyat or before the High Court. The State would be bound by the orders, if it was impleaded as party as it is likely to be affected on account of the orders passed. The liability of State for payment of grant was not in dispute but the question was as to whom the grants would be payable. Thus, the presence of Government Pleader was for the limited purpose of facilitating the implementation of the orders passed.

130. A perusal of the record of the Wakf Board, as extracted above, shows that the Errata notification was published when the same was sent by the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board to the Commissioner, Government Printing Press on 13.03.2006. This publication of notification was made under Section 5(2) of the 1995 Act under the authority of the Chief Executive Officer of the Wakf Board. Hence, the notification was not at the instance of the State Government but was an act of the Wakf Board alone.

131. The argument raised that since the Errata notification was published in State Government Gazette, therefore, the State cannot turn around to say that they had no knowledge or that they are not bound by the notification so published is not tenable. We find that the purpose, object and scope of the publications in the Official Gazette is not what is sought to be contended. The Court is to presume the genuineness of any documents published in any Official Gazette as contemplated by Section 81 and Section 114 (e) of the Evidence Act, 1872. The publication in the Official Gazette is not only for the affairs of the State but has multiple uses. In fact, this question has been examined by a Division Bench of Delhi High Court in a judgment reported as Universal Cans & Containers Ltd. v. Union of India, 1991 SCC On Line Del 784, wherein the Court has quoted various parts of the Gazette required to be published by the Central Government. Section 4, Part III of the Gazette is meant for Miscellaneous Notifications including Notifications, Orders, Advertisements and Notices issued by Statutory Bodies, whereas Part IV is meant for Advertisements and Notices issued by Private Individuals and Private Bodies. Similar scheme of the publication in the Gazette would be available in the States as well. The High Court held as under:-
“8. Under Section 3(39) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, “Official Gazette” or “Gazette” shall mean the Gazette of India or the Official Gazette of a State. What is Official Gazette and under what authority it is published? is yet another question. A Gazette is generally understood as an Official Government Journal containing public notices and other prescribed matters. Legal Glossary (1983 Edition) issued by the Legislative Department of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India, defines Gazette as “an official newspaper containing lists of Government appointments, legal notices, dispatches, etc
xxx xxx

20. Under Section 81 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Court shall presume the genuineness of every document purporting to be in Official Gazette, and read with Section 114 of the said Act and Illustration (e) there to, the court can presume that the Official Gazette was notified on the date as appearing in the Official Gazette. However, this is only a rebuttable presumption. It can be rebutted by the evidence to the contrary. As noted above, in the present case it has been shown that the Official Gazette was notified on a date after the date appearing on the Gazette. Section 5 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, provides that where any Central Act is not expressed to come into operation on a particular day, then it shall come into operation on the day on which it receives the assent of the President. This is not applicable in the present case. Here we are concerned with a notification in the Official Gazette”.

 132. The Wakf Board is a statutory authority under the 1954 Act as well as under the 1995 Act. Thus, the Official Gazette had to carry any notification at the instance of the Wakf Board. Therefore, the State Government is not bound by the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette at the instance of the Wakf Board only for the reason that it has been published in the Official Gazette. The publication of a notice in an Official Gazette has a presumption of knowledge to the general public as an advertisement published in a newspaper. Therefore, mere reason that the notification was published in the State Government gazette is not binding on the State Government.

Supreme Court

JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (NOW STATE OF TELANGANA) Vs. A. P. STATE WAKF BOARD & ORS.

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Whether the government can acquire land dedicated for religious purposes?

  The land dedicated for pious and religious purpose is not immune from its vesting with the State. In Khajamian Wakf Estates v. State of Madras, (1970) 3 SCC 894 the validity of the Madras Inam Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Madras Act 26 of 1963); the Madras Lease-holds (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Madras Act 27 of 1963) and the Madras Minor Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1963 (Madras Act 30 of 1963) was subject matter of challenge on the ground that the material provisions in those Acts are violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution. The impugned Acts were said to be providing for the acquisition by the State of the “estate” as contemplated by Article 31-A. These legislations were undertaken as a part of agrarian reform. In regard to the Inams belonging to the religious and charitable institutions, the impugned Acts did not provide for payment of compensation in a lump sum but on the other hand provision is made to pay them a portion of the compensation every year. The Constitution Bench held as under: -

“12. It was next urged that by acquiring the properties belonging to religious denominations, the Legislature violated Article 26(c) and (d) which provide that religious denominations shall have the right to own and acquire movable and immovable property and administer such property in accordance with law. These provisions do not take away the right of the State to acquire property belonging to religious denominations. Those denominations can own, acquire properties and administer them in accordance with law. That does not mean that the property owned by them cannot be acquired. As a result of acquisition they cease to own that property. Thereafter their right to administer that property ceases because it is no longer their property. Article 26 does not interfere with the right of the State to acquire property.”{Para 196}

Supreme Court

JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA JUSTICE V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN

STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH (NOW STATE OF TELANGANA) Vs. A. P. STATE WAKF BOARD & ORS.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10770 OF 2016

7th February 2022

Citation: 2022 ALL SCR (ONLINE) 140

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Whether court can refuse to entertain a petition filed under the wrong provision of law?

 

 Later, in Pepsi Foods Ltd., this Court held that nomenclature

under which the petition is filed is not quite relevant and it does

not debar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses. If the Court finds that the appellants could not invoke its jurisdiction under Article 226, the Court can certainly treat the petition as one under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code. This Court held as under:

“26. Nomenclature under which petition is filed is not quite

relevant and that does not debar the court from exercising

its jurisdiction which otherwise it possesses unless there is

special procedure prescribed which procedure is mandatory.

The present petition though filed in the High Court 

as one under Articles 226 and 227 could well

be treated under Article 227 of the Constitution.”

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6149 OF 2015

KIRAN DEVI  Vs THE BIHAR STATE SUNNI WAKF BOARD

& ORS.

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Whether Small causes court Act can deal with the dispute between landlord and tenant after enforcement of Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2013?

Suit for eviction of a tenant in the State of U.P. is cognizable by Judge Small Cause under the Provincial Small Cause Act, 1971. Thus, such cases have been taken out of jurisdiction of regular civil courts and have been entrusted to Small Cause Courts for ensuring early adjudication.

39. Learned counsel would submit that in view of the amendment in the Act after terminating tenancy, tenant becomes liable for ejectment and proceeding for eviction will be undertaken under the Wakf Act (as amended in 2013). Consequently, the civil court, namely, Small Cause court will have no jurisdiction and since the decree passed by Small cause court, impugned in the revision, is without jurisdiction, same deserves to be set aside.

46. Thus, it is manifest that by means of The Wakf (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 2013 word "encroacher" was defined and power has been given to Wakf Tribunal to pass order of eviction. This amendment does not say anything about the pending proceeding.

47. Suit was filed on 20th March, 2009. Amendment has come into force on 1st November, 2013. Will amendment apply to the pending cases? There is no saving Clause in Amendment Act. There is nothing in the Act which makes the Amending Act retrospective.

48. Section 5 of The Wakf (Amendment) Act, No. 27 of 2013 says that " In section 3 of the principal Act (I) after clause (e), the following clause shall be inserted, namely (ee) "encroacher" means any person or institution, public or private occupying waqf property, in whole or part, without the authority of law and includes a person whose tenancy, lease or licence has expired or has been terminated by mutawalli or the Board. There is no indication that this clause was sought to be made retrospective.

49. Similarly, Section 32 of the Amending Act whereby it amends Section 54 of the principal Act, says nothing that makes it retrospective. Even otherwise declaring somebody an encroacher amounts to declaring the character of a person which ordinarily cannot be done retrospectively. There is no contrary legislative intention discernible from the language of the provision.

50. Amendment of Section 54 further contemplates that application to the Tribunal for grant of order of eviction or removing shall be moved which means that Tribunal will start working prospectively. Section 54 (4) of the Act makes this position further clear and shows that Tribunal will work prospectively.

51. Section 56 of the Amending Act gives the overriding effect. Section 108A does not say anything about the pending proceedings. Consequently, proceedings which are pending on the date of amendment will continue to be dealt with in accordance with the prevalent law.

52. It is evident that by virtue of amendment, specific jurisdiction has been conferred on the Tribunal. Obviously, this will be prospective and in the absence of any provision for transfer of pending cases to the Tribunal, same will continue to be dealt with by the courts in accordance with the prevalent law and amendment at the most can take effect from 01.11.2013. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD (LUCKNOW BENCH)

S.C.C. Revision No. 62 of 2015

Decided On: 09.10.2015

 Sageer Ahmad  Vs.  Wakf Masjid Mohalla-Kazipura Wakf No. 9 and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

S.K. Saxena, J.

Citation: MANU/UP/1509/2015

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What are necessary conditions for compromise of representative suit?

We also find ourselves unable to agree with the
contention of the appellants that the violations of Order XXIII
Rule 3B, CPC while passing the compromise decree dated
16.02.1981 in O.S. No. 10/1974 are merely procedural and do
not vitiate the decree, and that the decree should therefore be
regarded as proof of breach of custom.
Under Order I Rule 8, CPC, which pertains to
representative suits, a person may sue or defend on behalf of
others and for the benefit of others having the same interest, with
the permission of the Court. The object of Order I Rule 8 is to
facilitate the decision of questions in which a large number of
persons are interested without recourse to ordinary procedure.
Per Order XXIII Rule 3B, in order to compromise in a
representative suit, it is necessary to obtain the leave of the
Court. Before grant of leave to compromise, the Court needs to
give notice in such a manner as it may think fit, to such persons
as may appear to it to be interested in the suit.
It is pertinent to note that it is not clear whether the suit
in O.S. No. 10/1974 was filed under Order I Rule 8 or not. Even
assuming that we accept the respondents’ contention that the
said suit was not strictly filed under Order I Rule 8, it would be
regarded in the nature of a representative suit for the purposes of
Explanation (c) to Order XXIII Rule 3B. Explanation (c) provides
that the term ‘representative suit’ includes suits where the
compromise decree passed therein becomes binding on persons
not named as parties to the suit. In O.S. No. 10/1974, Pattakal
Koyammakoya was representing the respondent family’s interests
in his capacity as Karanavan of the family. Hence the compromise

decree, if upheld, would prejudice the family’s customary right to
the office of mutawalli and the terms thereof would become final
and binding by virtue of Section 96(3), CPC. Thus, it is clear that
the two conditions mentioned supra in relation to representative
suits have to be complied with if the compromise decree passed in
O.S. No. 10/1974 is to be held valid.
The Tribunal as well as the High Court, on considering
the compromise decree passed and the records thereof, have on
facts concluded that the parties to the decree did not obtain leave
of the court and did not give notice to other persons who were
interested in the suit, i.e., members of the Pattakal family, as
required under Order XXIII Rule 3B. The appellants before this
court have also not disputed that the compromise decree was
without leave of the court and without notice to interested family
members. As is evident from the foregoing discussion, such
violations of Order XXII Rule 3B
cannot be said to be merely
procedural, and go to the root of the matter since they deprive the
affected parties of the chance to question the terms of the
compromise that they are going to be bound by. Since both the

conditions required under Order XXIII Rule 3B were not complied
with, the compromise decree was void.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9586 OF 2010

ALIYATHAMMUDA BEETHATHEBIYYAPPURA
POOKOYA Vs  PATTAKAL CHERIYAKOYA
Dated:August 1, 2019.

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

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Whether wakf tribunal can decide issue of title even if non muslim parties are involved?

Thus, the view of the High Court that right, title and interest of a non-Muslim to the Wakf in a property cannot be put in jeopardy is contrary to the statutory scheme as contained in Section 6 of the Act, 1995. Thus, the reason of the High Court to allow the revision petition is wholly unfounded. The defendant in written statement has pleaded that the suit property is not Wakf property. When issue in the suit is as to whether suit property is Wakf property or not it is covered by specific provision of Sections 6 and 7 of the Wakf Act, 1995, hence, it is required to be decided by the Tribunal under Section 83 and bar under Section 85 shall come into existence with regard to jurisdiction of Civil Court. In this context, in the judgment in Haryana Wakf Board v. Mahesh Kumar, (2014) 16 SCC 45, this Court has laid down that the question as to whether the suit property is a Wakf property is a question which has to be decided by the Tribunal.

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before Ashok Bhushan and K.M. Joseph, JJ.)

Civil Appeal No. 92 of 2019

Punjab Wakf Board  v. Sham Singh Harike

Civil Appeal No. 92 of 2019 and Civil Appeal No. 93 of 2019

Decided on February 7, 2019

Citation: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 142

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Whether civil court can grant interim relief as per S 9 of arbitration in dispute related to wakf?

We, therefore, hold that Section 85 has not created an absolute bar
for the Civil Court for determination of a dispute of like nature as has
been agitated in the Section 9 application before the learned Court below.
We hold that the learned District Judge is competent to entertain an
application under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act of 1996.
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 has been enacted after the
Waqf Act, 1995. Therefore, while enacting the said Act of 1996
Legislature was quite aware of the consequences of the said Act and has
not intentionally kept any provision in the Act of 1996 creating any
exception to the jurisdiction of arbitration in respect of any matter arising
out of a valid agreement related to a waqf property. We, therefore, hold
that the learned Court below has got jurisdiction to entertain an
application under Section 9 of the said Act of 1996. Since the question ofjurisdiction and the bar created under Section 85 of the Waqf Act has
been taken as a specific objection in the written objection of the
respondent, the learned Court below ought to have dealt with the
question before rejection of the Section 9 application.

IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Before :
 INDIRA BANERJEE
 SAHIDULLAH MUNSHI
F.M.A.T. No.195 of 2016
With
C.A.N.2132 of 2016

SAYED HASSAN ALI V MAHAMMED SAHIDUL ISLAM

Judgment on : August 4, 2016.
Citation:AIR 2016 Cal 351

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Whether it is necessary to maintain status quo of property during pendency of litigation?

The learned counsel for the applicant has
placed reliance on the case reported as AIR 2005 SC 104
(Maharwal Khewaji Trust v. Baldev Dass). The Apex Court
has laid down that ordinarily status-quo of the property
needs to be maintained during pendency of litigation. It is
observed that the ground that legal proceeding is likely to
take long time cannot be an exceptional circumstance to
allow changes by imposing conditions. There cannot be
any dispute over this proportion. Further in view of the
provisions of the Muslim Law and the provisions of the
Wakf Act, the property cannot be allowed to be used for
the purpose other than the purpose for which the property
was dedicated. When the defendant, purchaser, purchased
the property even when there was record of aforesaid
nature, he must blame himself for finding himself in the
present situation. This Court has no hesitation to hold
that the Wakf Tribunal has committed error in refusing to
grant relief of temporary injunction as claimed. The said
order needs to be set aside by allowing the present civil
revision application.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
Civil Revision Application No.57 of 2014

Maharashtra State Board of Wakf,

V
Digvijay S/o Deeliprao Deshmukh,

 CORAM: T.V. NALAWADE, J.

 DATE : 3rd MAY 2014

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When wakf will be wakf-alal-aulad that is private wakf?

Wakf may be created by Muslim generally falls into two
categories. One is public Wakf in the sense that the beneficiaries
are members of the public and the other is private Wakf in the
sense that public as such are not the beneficiaries and certain
specified individual happens to be the beneficiaries. Even with
regard to a private Wakf there may be two kinds. One is a Wakf-alal-aulad
simpliciter and the other is Wakf in which there is a
dedication or gift in praesenti in the sense that a portion of the
income from the Wakf property is preserved for being spent for
strangers and other objects of piety or charity and the other portion
being spent for the benefit for the Wakif’s relations and members of
the family.
 In the given facts of this case the Wakf was created for
performing specific religious and charitable purpose as well as for
maintenance of the legal heirs/descendents of the testator and the
testator has specified that in the event the legal heirs/descendents
failed to maintain the Mosque and light candles in the Mosque, they
will be deprived of enjoying the usufruct of the Wakf property. 
Therefore, in my considered opinion it was a private Wakf created
for some religious purpose as well as for the interest of the family
members of the Wakif.
19. Learned senior counsel, Mr. Bhowmik has referred the
case of Tamil Nadu Wakf Board v. Larabsha Darga Panruti
reported in (2007) 13 SCC 416 and submitted that the apex Court
clearly held in the judgment that the suit property was belonged to
a private Wakf and Wakf-alal-aulad. Though the fact of that case
and the fact of the present case are not exactly similar but the
principles enunciated in that judgment may fairly be applied in the
facts of this case and I am of the considered opinion that the Wakf
created by Nachir Mohammed in the facts of the present case is a

private Wakf, Wakf-alal-aulad and it is not a public Wakf.

THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
 AGARTALA
RSA NO.67 OF 2008


Smt. Rahima Begam Choudhury,
 -Vs –
The State of Tripura,
BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.C. DAS


Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order : 06.05.2015
Citation:AIR 2016(NOC) 549 Tri

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Whether jurisdiction of civil court is barred in respect of dispute relating to wakf property?

In view of the provisions laid down in the Wakf Act and
the law explained by the apex Court in Anis Fatma Begum(supra)
the civil Court is barred in exercising jurisdiction in respect of a
dispute of Wakf. Since in the present case, it is an admitted position
that a Wakf was created by the deceased Nachir Mohammed, any
dispute regarding the Wakf or Wakf property should be decided by
the Tribunal and the plaintiff or the defendants may approach the 
Tribunal for deciding the dispute which is brought in the civil suit.
The apex Court has held that against the decision of the Tribunal an
aggrieved party can approach the High Court which can call for the
records for satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of the decision of the Tribunal. The plaintiff-appellant, if
so advised may approach the appropriate Tribunal for deciding the
dispute and in case the plaintiff-appellant is aggrieved by the
decision of the Tribunal it may approach the High Court as per the
law explained by the apex Court.
THE HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
 AGARTALA
RSA NO.67 OF 2008


Smt. Rahima Begam Choudhury,

 -Vs –
The State of Tripura,

BEFORE
HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.C. DAS


Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order : 06.05.2015
Citation:AIR 2016(NOC) 549 Tri

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What will be limitation for filing suit if dispute is between wakf board and strangers?

    The first substantial
question of law as framed is with regard to the aspect whether the suit as
filed was barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Section 6(1) of the
Act of 1954. Under Section 6(1) of the Act of 1954 if any question arises
whether a particular property described as wakf property in the list of wakfs
is wakf property or not, the Board or the mutawalli of the wakf or any person
interested therein can institute a suit in the civil Court.  However, as per the
first proviso to Section 6(1) of the Act of 1954,   no such suit     can be
entertained by the civil Court after the expiry of one year from the date of
publication of the list of wakfs under Section 5(2) of the Act of 1954.   In
Board of Muslim Wakfs (supra) it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
the provisions of Section 6(1) of the Act of 1954  relate only to those persons
who are interested in the wakf.  The purpose of Section 6 of the Act of 1954
was to confine  disputes between the Wakf Board, mutawalli  and the person
interested in the wakf.  It was held in the aforesaid decision that the Act of
1954 deals with wakf,  its institutions  and  its  properties and therefore it
would be logical and reasonable to infer that said provisions empower only
those who are interested in the wakf to institute suits.   The judgment in
Board of Muslim Wakf (supra) was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in its subsequent judgment in Punjab Wakf Board (supra).  By following the
earlier law, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab Wakf Board (supra) made a
clear distinction between a dispute amongst the wakf and the mutawalli or
the   persons   claiming   under   him   and   a   dispute   with   a   stranger.     It   is,

therefore, clear that the period of limitation as prescribed by the proviso of
Section 6(1) of the Act of 1954 would apply only to those who are interested
in the wakf.  
In the present case the original defendants were not persons who
were interested in the wakf.  The dispute was between the wakf board and
strangers.   Thus considering the ratio of the judgment in  Board of Muslim
Wakf (supra) it will have to be held that the period of limitation of one year
commencing from the date of the  notification would not be applicable in the
present case.   The appellate Court though   referred to the decision in the
Board of Muslim Wakf (supra), it failed to apply the ratio of aforesaid decision
in the proper perspective.  The appellate Court  fell into an error when it held
that the plaintiff should have filed the suit within a period of one year from
the notification dated 06/03/1975 and as the same was not done, the suit
was barred by limitation. The finding recorded by the appellate Court against
point no.1 is therefore liable to be set aside.  Accordingly substantial question
of law no. 1 is answered by holding that the proviso to Section 6(1) of the
Act of 1954 would not apply in the present case and the suit as filed was not
barred by limitation. 
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY NAGPUR BENCH
NAGPUR.
SECOND   APPEAL   NO.   431     OF     1994
Maratwada Wakf Board

VERSUS
Vibhawari wd/o Deepak
Deshpande, aged 45 yrs. 

CORAM:   A. S. CHANDURKAR  J.
      
        Dated :  February   26,  2016.
Citation: 2016(3) MHLJ753

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When jurisdiction of civil court is not barred to try dispute relating wakf Act?

 The learned counsel for
the applicant argued on the basis that the Waqf (Amendment)
Act, 2013 has been enforced on the day it was gazetted i.e.
23.9.2013 to claim that now such suit after amendment can be
filed only in Waqf Tribunal. But, the fact remains that the
amendment was not enforced on 23.9.2013. Gazette of India
(Extraordinary), Part II S/3, dated 29.10.2013, S.O.3292(E),
issued by Ministry of Minority Affairs, shows that, in exercise
of powers conferred by Sub-section (2) of Section 1 of the Waqf
(Amendment) Act, 2013, the Central Government appointed the
first day of November 2013 as the date on which the provisions
of the said Amendment Act shall come into force. Thus, the
amendment to Section 83(1) of the Waqf Act relied on by the
learned counsel for applicant came into force subsequently and
the suit was filed earlier. Even the impugned order was passed
on 28.10.2013 before the amendment came into force. The
impugned order is based on the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matter of Ramesh Govindram (supra).
Nothing is shown that the Amendment Act requires transfer of

pending proceedings relating to eviction of tenant or
determination of rights and obligations of the lessor and lessee
to Waqf Tribunal.
Looking to the observations of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court referred above (in para 6 of this judgment), no
fault can be found with the impugned order. Consequently,
there is no substance in this Civil Revision Application. The
Civil Revision Application stands rejected


IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
BENCH AT AURANGABAD
CIVIL REVISION APPLICATION NO.292 OF 2013

Sohail Azam Azimuddin, Vs  Mohammed Atiq-Ur-Rehman 


CORAM: A.I.S. CHEEMA, J.

Date of pronouncing judgment : 17/2/2014
Citation;2015(1)ALLMR701

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