Showing posts with label succession to female hindu. Show all posts
Showing posts with label succession to female hindu. Show all posts

Monday, 27 April 2026

Female Hindu Intestate Succession: The 5-Step Rule You Must Know

 


Memorize Female Hindu Intestate Succession as a 5-step ladder plus 2 exceptions.

A female Hindu dying intestate succeeds in this order: children and husband, husband’s heirs, parents, father’s heirs, mother’s heirs. Section 16 simply tells you that the earlier class excludes the later class, and heirs in the same class take together.

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Sunday, 1 April 2018

Whether husband is entitled to get property of deceased wife if she had inherited said property from her parents?

In order to appreciate the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioners and respondent, in my opinion, it would be necessary to consider the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, which are reproduced, for ready reference, as follows:—
“15. General Rule of succession in case of female Hindus-B(1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16-
(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband;
(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;
(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;
(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and
(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1)-
(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and
(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.”
12. Thus, as per sub section (2) of section 15, notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1), any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased not upon the legal heirs referred in sub section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father. This provision, thus, clearly excludes the husband from inheriting the property received by a female Hindu from her parents if she was not having any children or has died issueless.
13. In the instant case, admittedly the suit property was received by deceased Sundarabai from her parents and admittedly plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 are not her children as they are born to respondent from his second wife. Therefore, it follows that Sundarabai has died issue-less and in such situation, in the absence of her son or daughter, her husband also cannot inherit her property and the property will devolve upon the legal heirs of her father. Respondent being her husband and not the legal heir of her father, cannot get any share in the property left behind by Sundarabai. Therefore, he has no cause of action to file the suit for partition of Sundarabai's property. The trial Court should have, hence rejected the plaint not only in respect of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 but also in respect of respondent.

In the High Court of Bombay
Civil Appellate Jurisdiction
(Before Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, J.)

Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware v. Narayan Keru Nitanware
Writ Petition No. 14090 of 2017
Decided on January 15, 2018
Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 91 : (2018) 2 Mah LJ 242 : (2018) 2 AIR Bom R 98:AIR 2018(NOC) 708 Bom
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Saturday, 17 June 2017

Whether brother of female hindu is entitled to inherit tenanted premises inherited by her from her husband?


 In the present case, the suit property was taken on rent by the
father-in-law of deceased tenant-Lalita that is Hem Ram Sharma and
after his death, his son Baldev (husband of Lalita) became tenant of the
suit property. Upon his death, Lalita became the tenant of the suit
property. Upon death of Lalita, in terms of Section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu
Succession Act, in the absence of any son or daughter of deceased
Lalita, the tenancy would devolve upon the heirs of her husband. Since

the appellant does not fall under the category of ‘heir’ of Lalita’s
husband, the tenancy of the suit property will not devolve on him nor
can he be called as an ‘heir’ under Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act XIII of
1972.
13. Section 3(g) defines ‘family’, in relation to landlord which includes
the spouse that is husband or wife of a person, male lineal descendants
which means his or her son, son’s son, son’s son’s son and so on,
parents, grandparents, unmarried, widowed, divorced daughter or
granddaughter, etc. The definition given in the clause is an inclusive
one and is supposed to be construed in its technical meaning which
implies what is not given has to be excluded as not forming part of the
family of landlord or tenant. Therefore, sisters and brothers of landlord
and tenant are excluded from his/her family. In the facts of present
case, the appellant being brother of deceased tenant cannot be held to
be the ‘family’ as the inclusive list given under the Act clearly omits
“brother and sister” and the same cannot be read therein as the list has
to be read and interpreted strictly.
14. Assuming, for the sake of arguments that the appellant is an heir
of Lalita, for devolution of tenancy, on the death of Lalita, the appellant
has to be a ‘tenant’ within the meaning of Section 3(a) of the U.P. Act

XIII of 1972. As per Section 3(a)(1), in the case of residential building,
in the event of death of a tenant, for heirs to be treated as tenant, the
statute requires them to prove that they have been normally residing
with the deceased tenant at the time of his/her death. The term used in
the section is ‘heir’ which implies that not any of the family member
residing with the tenant would succeed to the tenancy, but only the heirs
of tenant normally residing with him/her. The words “normally residing
with him” suggests that only those heirs would inherit the tenancy rights
of deceased tenant who resided with him ordinarily in normal course
and not temporarily. The legislative intent appears to be that only those
heirs would inherit tenancy who normally resided with the tenant and not
occasionally. In the present case, the appellant claims that he has been
carrying on business in the property along with his deceased sister
Lalita and had been ordinarily living with her because of the medical
business they were running. The appellant being the brother of
deceased-Lalita had no reason to normally reside with his married
sister. Be it noted, in her written statement filed in the release
application, Lalita has not averred that her brother-appellant Durga
Prasad was living with her and that he was taking care of her. 
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1305-06 OF 2017

DURGA PRASAD V  NARAYAN RAMCHANDAANI (D) THR. LRS. 
Citation: AIR 2017 SC 915,(2017) 5 SCC69,2017(5) All MR 468(SC)
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Sunday, 5 June 2016

Whether wife of brother of deceased husband of widow is entitled to succeed to her property as agnate?

 Mr. Mankapure, faced with this position, faintly urged that Sonabai did not qualify as 'agnate' within the meaning assigned to this term under Section 3(1)(a) of the said Act, since according to him, Sonabai was not related to her husband Shivba 'by blood'. This contention, however, is no longer res integra. The Division Bench of this Court, in case of Nanasaheb Devre (supra), has precisely considered and rejected such contention.
24. The Division Bench of this Court in case of Nanasaheb Devre (supra), has held that the provisions of said Act were meant to codify the law relating to intestate succession among the Hindus and to achieve uniformity and certainty about various otherwise nebulous and shifting matters. This objective has, however, to be understood against the backdrop of existing interpreting system of personal law. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to begin with any legislative premise that the term related "by blood" has been introduced in any narrow sense. Rather, effort will have to be made to reach its applicative connotation. By reference to several precedents and principles, the Division Bench has held that conceptually, the Hindu marriage, as far as the wife is concerned, clearly brings out consanguine results, the wife merging and sharing the particles of the body of her husband and as such that of their common ancestor. Such kinship or consanguinity conceptually as well as physically cannot be less than of the blood relationship. Marriage is not only social but religious fact to a Hindu. It distinctively brings about union of two persons involving acceptance of a female into the family of the male spouse. Relation that ensues, is not restricted to male that marries but to the entire family of the male. Married wife in a family, thus becomes related to it wholly through her male spouse. The definition of the word "related" shows that to be related, persons could be treated as related to each other only if they belong to lawful or legitimate kinship. The definition makes reference to "kinship". The accepted modes by which such kinship results are clearly implied. Kinship is blood relationship. In social unit like family, marriage is an apparent mode of forging such relation. As far as the definition of "agnate" is concerned, the statute contemplates that this relationship should arise firstly, "by blood or adoption", and secondly, wholly through males. The words employed by the defining clauses having reference to blood will have to be understood and interpreted so as to further the obvious object of the Act and as far as possible to provide uniform system of succession. Law is not merely a biological text tracing decent and ascent. It is a sociological sanction in favour of those who can claim succession to the deceased. Sociology and history of given law often speak through the legislated words. The choice of the words "by blood" in the definition along with the word "adoption" is clearly intended to recognise all social modes resulting in the legitimate relationship. The words "by blood" cannot be read as "by birth" so as to restrict them to genetical incidence of family, for legislature, had it intended, would have surely spoken in that way.
25. The Division Bench of this Court at paragraph '17' has observed thus:
17 What then is the meaning of the word blood ? Does it signify only the vital fluid that sustains the life or is it also indicative of relationship which results in kinship by known and accepted modalities ? There are various meanings assigned to the word "blood", including the one biologically attributed. From Webster's Third new International Dictionary, pages 236 and 237, the following relevant meanings can be extracted :
"Blood" : 1 a. the fluid that circulates in the principal vascular system of vertebrate animals carrying nourishment and oxygen to all parts of the body and bringing away waste products for excretion and that consists of a liquid plasma containing dissolved nutrients, waste products and other substances and suspended red blood cells, leukocytes, and blood platelets-see CIRCULATION, RESPIRATION; COAGULATI-ON;
2a. blood regarded as a vital principle :LIFEBLOOD; broadly: LIFE, b : human blood regarded as a hereditary differentiating factor typical of and specific to a given family, stock lineage, or race (English-) : esp : the national royal-used with the (a prince of the-), c : the whole body of physical traits passed from parent to offspring whether in men, animals, or plant; d : relationship by decent from a common ancestor (the Delaware grape shows a strong strain or vinifera) : KIN-SHIP CONSANGUINITY (-is thicker than water), e : person related through a common familial or racial descent : KINDRED, LINEAGE, STOCK, RACE; also, obs. : KINSMAN, RELATIVE.
The connotation of the word, therefore, is not merely biological but includes familial, racial and other recognised modes of kinship amongst men. It is futile to submit that the words related by blood should be equated with related by birth, though birth may be the primary incident of relationship between the two human beings. That is, however, of the only incident that brings about human relations into existence. When community of men develops and social relationship evolves, manifold relations come into being and in the context of relations, when the word blood is used, it suitably indicates the relationship by descent from a common ancestor or a kinship or consanguinity amongst a recognised social group. Marriage is an acknowledged social form bringing two beings together amongst the society of Hindus as a result of which the female enters the family of the male and becomes kindred of the family of the male and as such gets related as a kin of that family having common ancestor in the husbands family. The term by blood, therefore, in our view, has no biological or genetic limitation, but, including that, has a wider reach in the context of the personal law of Hindus and takes in female that enters by marriage the family of the male. Only because after the words by blood, the Legislature has put the words or adoption, thus indicating another legal form by which a person becomes the kin in the family, it is not possible to exclude the marriage from the connotation of the term "by blood". To have the relationship of the kind of agnate, it follows that relationship should arise wholly through males and should be a relationship of blood. As we have indicated, even prior to the present enactment, the applicative law held that as a result of marriage, a widow truly became gotraja sapinda in her husband's family. The principle on the basis of which the applicative judgments were rendered was clearly the principle to hold that by marriage the wife shared the community of the common particles of the body and was as such a relative by blood.
26. Applying the aforesaid principles, submission of Mr. Mankapure that Sonabai or her legal representatives could not be included within the expression 'agnate' cannot be accepted. The first substantial question of law, will also have to be decided against the Appellants-Petitioners.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY
Writ Petition No. 532 of 1988 and Second Appeal No. 567 of 2005
Decided On: 10.12.2015
Appellants: Mahadev S. More and Ors.
Vs.
Respondent: Sukhdeo S. More and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:M.S. Sonak, J.
Citation:2016(2) MHLJ 341 Bom,AIR 2016 Bom 151
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