Supreme Court: Where both the parents were dependent on the deceased, a deduction to the extent of 1/3rd will also be appropriate in motor accident claim petition

 Normally, a deduction to the extent of 50% can be made. However, in Magma General Insurance Company Limited V/s. Nanu Ram alias Chuhru Ram & Ors. MANU/SC/1012/2018 : (2018) 18 SCC 130, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where both the parents were dependent on the deceased, a deduction to the extent of 1/3rd will also be appropriate. This means that the compensation towards dependency would come to ` 9,07,188/-. {Para 14}

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA

First Appeal No. 120 of 2012

Decided On: 10.01.2022

Damodar Volvoikar and Ors. Vs. West Coast Marketing and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

M.S. Sonak, J.

Citation: MANU/MH/0082/2022, 2023 ACJ 82.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Supreme Court: A sum of Rs. 40,000/- is to be paid to each of the parents towards loss of consortium on the death of a child

This Court in Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Ors. MANU/SC/1012/2018 : (2018) 18 SCC 130 has held that a sum of Rs. 40,000/- is to be paid to each of the parents towards loss of consortium on the death of a child. Therefore, the Appellants are entitled to be awarded Rs. 40,000/- each towards loss of consortium.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 6291 of 2019 

Decided On: 14.08.2019

Joginder Singh and Ors. Vs. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Indu Malhotra and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.

Author: Indu Malhotra, J.

Citation: 2019 (4) TAC 3, MANU/SC/1096/2019.

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Hindu Adoption and maintenance Act 1956 (maintenance provisions only)

 Chapter III

MAINTENANCE

18. Maintenance of wife.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a Hindu wife, whether married before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime.

(2) A Hindu wife shall be entitled to live separately from her husband without forfeiting her claim to maintenance,—

(a) if he is guilty of desertion, that is to say, of abandoning her without reasonable cause and without her consent or against her wish, or of wilfully neglecting her;

(b) if he has treated her with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it will be harmful or injurious to live with her husband;

(c) 13[* * *]

(d) if he has any other wife living;

(e) if he keeps a concubine in the same house in which his wife is living or habitually resides with a concubine elsewhere;

(f) if he has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion;

(g) if there is any other cause justifying her living separately.

(3) A Hindu wife shall not be entitled to separate residence and maintenance from her husband if she is unchaste or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion.

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Whether high court can quash prosecution for an offence under POCSO Act if compromise is done by parents of victim child?

 Another thing that needs to be noticed is that in the case of

child the compromise affected between the parents cannot be recognized. Any agreement/compromise executed by the child (till the age of majority) himself/herself as in the present case will be void ab initio and thus cannot be accorded validity. Parents cannot be allowed to compromise the dignity of a child by an agreement. Where ever and whenever in a society governed by rule of law the question will arise: who will protect from the

protector? The only and obvious answer will be-LAW. “Children are human beings to whom respect is due, superior to us by reason of this innocence and of the greater possibilities of their future”

Maria Montessori

It is the aforesaid ethos that stands embedded in the

Constitution of India by the founding fathers and the POCSO Act

recognizes this.

The compromise affected by the child and/or her parents,

compromising the dignity of the child cannot be raised to a status where it defeats the very object of the Act. Power granted under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be exercised to defeat the purpose of an enactment enacted in discharge of Constitutional mandate as well as obligation arising out of International Conventions.

Consequently, this Court finds that the FIR registered for

offences punishable under the Act cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA

AT CHANDIGARH

CRM-M- 3397-2021(O&M)

Surinder Kumar Vs. State of Haryana and others

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PANKAJ JAIN

Decided on: May 11, 2022

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Whether Parents Can Give Consent On Behalf Of Minor Victim To Compromise Sexual Offence?

 It is also settled that offences which involve moral turpitude and grave offences like rape, murder etc. even if compromised cannot be quashed in exercise of High Court’s power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. inasmuch as such offences are against the State and cannot be restricted to two individuals or groups.

11. In the case in hand, the offences are grave in nature involving minor victim. The allegations are under Section 354A (2)/307 read with Section 18 of the POCSO Act. Therefore, when the offences are grave in nature and allegation is of an attempt of rape of a minor, such allegation and criminal proceeding cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise entered into between the

families of the victim and accused inasmuch when it is a sexual offence involving a minor, the parents, in the considered opinion of this court, cannot give consent on behalf of the minor to compromise such serious offences.

THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT

KOHIMA BENCH

Case No. : CRL.REVN 5/2021

MR. LIMHATHUNG Vs THE STATE OF NAGALAND

BEFORE

 MR JUSTICE ARUN DEV CHOUDHURY

Date of Judgment/ Order :24.03.2022

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Whether court should suspend sentence of parents of husband for suicide of wife if they were residing separately?

 It is to be noted that nowadays the commitment of suicide by women, due to dowry harassment, are rising day by day. On the other hand, the in-laws are escaping from their liability saying that they are not living with their son, even though they are living separately, but, they are inducing their son for getting dowry, by way of, money, jewels, two wheeler, car etc., It is also to be noted that since the in-laws are not residing with their son and the victim women, and on that ground, they are seeking suspension of sentence, and this Court has also considered several petitions, on such ground. Taking advantage of that, a wrong message has gone to the Society that the parents can easily

escape from their liability and the alleged offence. It is to be further noted that mere giving a birth to a child, and providing shelter and good education, and motivating their child to get a job alone is not enough, and the first and foremost responsibility of the parents is that they should groom their children as responsible citizens.  {Para 6}

7. From the materials available on record, there are materials against the petitioners / accused 2 and 3 also, and the learned Sessions Judge, on proper appreciation of materials available on record against the petitioners / accused 2 and 3, convicted them for the offence under Section 498-A of IPC, and acquitted

them of the charge under Section 304-B of IPC.

8. Given the nature and gravity of offence committed by the accused, this Court is not inclined to suspend the sentence. Finding no merits, this miscellaneous petition shall stand dismissed.

MADRAS HIGH COURT

 Crl.M.P.No.2926 of 2021 in

Crl.A.No.114 of 2021

CORAM: P.VELMURUGAN, J.

Dated; 29.03.2021

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Supreme Court: Court can grant compensation for loss of consortium to parents and children also under motor accident claim petition

 Learned counsel for the appellant has

submitted that Pranay Sethi has only referred to

spousal consortium and no other consortium was

referred to in the judgment of Pranay Sethi, hence,

there is no justification for allowing the parental

consortium and filial consortium. The Constitution

Bench in Pranay Sethi has referred to amount of

Rs.40,000/- to the ‘loss of consortium’ but the

Constitution Bench had not addressed the issue as

to whether consortium of Rs.40,000/- is only

payable as spousal consortium. The judgment of

Pranay Sethi cannot be read to mean that it lays

down the proposition that the consortium is payable

only to the wife.

39. The Three-Judge Bench in United India

Insurance Company Ltd. (Supra) has categorically

laid down that apart from spousal consortium,

parental and filial consortium is payable. We feel

ourselves bound by the above judgment of Three

Judge Bench. We, thus, cannot accept the submission

of the learned counsel for the appellant that the

amount of consortium awarded to each of the

claimants is not sustainable.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3093 OF 2020

THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED Vs

SMT. SOMWATI 

Author: ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

Dated:SEPTEMBER 07, 2020.

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Delhi High court Guidelines for test identification parade of accused by child witness

In the above circumstances and with a view to provide friendly congenial and conducive atmosphere to the child witness, below 12 years of age, we direct the Director General (Prisons) to undertake the following measures:-

a) In every case where witness is a child below the age of 12 years TIP proceedings shall be held in one of the court rooms attached with the main Tihar Jail so that the child does not enter the main Jail Complex to reach the Test Identification Parade room.

b) Installation of semi reflective screen or any other screen or mechanism in a room where TIP proceedings will be conducted so that the child witness is not confronted face to face with the criminals participating in the TIP proceedings.

c) A person accused of the offence and the others who may be participating in the TIP will be explained the procedure and the manner of TIP proceedings to be held in a case of child witness.

d) No officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Jail shall accompany the child witness at the time of TIP proceedings and endeavour shall also be made by the Jail Superintendent that, so far as possible only female officer is deployed wherever witness happens to be a girl child for the purposes of identifying the accused person.

e) No police official shall be seen in a uniform right from the stage when the child enters the TIP Room and till he/she leaves the premises after the completion of TIP proceedings. The child witness shall be entitled to accompany his parents/guardians or any of his close relatives so as to make the child comfortable before participating for identifying the accused in the Test Identification Parade.

f) Endeavour shall be made by Director General (Prisons)/Jail Superintendent that a lady officer who is more humane, sensitive and compassionate is given duty to accompany the child witness.

g) The child friendly atmosphere will be created in a room where the child is brought first and the stay of the child will be made most comfortable so that the child finds the place to be attractive and conducive to his/her requirements.

h) Necessary arrangements for light refreshment to the general liking of children below the age of 12 years shall also remain in place to keep the mood of the child upbeat.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Crl. A. 513/1998

Decided On: 30.05.2014

Rakesh Kumar  Vs.  State

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Kailash Gambhir and Sunita Gupta, JJ.

Citation: 2014 SCCONLINE 3387,MANU/DE/1387/2014

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Whether Judicial officer is entitled to get medical reimbursement in respect of the medical treatment of his parents if they are getting a pension?

Service - Medical Reimbursement - Family member - Rule 2(3)(Seven) of Maharashtra Civil Services (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1961 - Respondent refused to medical Reimbursement of expenses spend by Petitioner, on treatment of his mother - Hence present petition - Whether petitioner entitled to medical reimbursement - Held, according to Rule 2 (3)(Seven) of Rules, father and mother of Government employee who received pension more than Rs. 3500/- per month would not be considered wholly dependent - In present case, mother of Petitioner was getting pension more than amount specified in above clause - But following ratio of State of M.P. & others v. M.P. Ojha & Anr and Nand Rani, Principal Govt. Sr. v. The State of Punjab & Ors., observed that expression "wholly dependent" could not be confined to mere financial dependence - Therefore, Petitioner's mother being 85 years old, and both, physically and financially dependent on him, was wholly inadequate to meet her medical expenses - Hence, Petitioner entitled medical reimbursement - Petition allowed.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Writ Petition No. 8899 of 2012

Decided On: 03.04.2013

Anil Dattatraya Kulkarni Vs.   State of Maharashtra

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

V.M. Kanade and F.M. Reis, JJ.

Citation;2013(5)ABR717, 2013(6)ALLMR804, 2013LabIC3612

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Whether children born out of void marriage can claim share in property of their parents during their life time?

 Thus, it is now made more than clear that, the children of a void marriage, though regarded as legitimate, such children would not be entitled to any share in the properties, which are ancestral coparcenary joint family properties of their parents. Their right to claim the share remains limited only to the extent of the separate property of their father, but in that property, they cannot make any claim during the lifetime of their father. Their right in the separate properties of their father will accrue only on the death of their father and, that too, by way of succession.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Second Appeal No. 737 of 2013, Civil Application No. 1729 of 2013 and Second Appeal No. 738 of 2013

Decided On: 30.07.2018

 Balkrishna Pandurang Halde Vs. Yeshodabai Balkrishna Halde

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Dr. Shalini Phansalkar Joshi, J.

Citation: 2018(6) MHLJ 947

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Whether husband is entitled to get property of deceased wife if she had inherited said property from her parents?

In order to appreciate the rival submissions advanced by learned counsel for petitioners and respondent, in my opinion, it would be necessary to consider the provisions of section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, which are reproduced, for ready reference, as follows:—

“15. General Rule of succession in case of female Hindus-B(1) The property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in section 16-

(a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) and the husband;

(b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband;

(c) thirdly, upon the mother and father;

(d) fourthly, upon the heirs of the father; and

(e) lastly, upon the heirs of the mother.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1)-

(a) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any pre-deceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father; and

(b) any property inherited by a female Hindu from her husband or from her father-in-law shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) not upon the other heirs referred to in sub section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the husband.”

12. Thus, as per sub section (2) of section 15, notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1), any property inherited by a female Hindu from her father or mother, shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased not upon the legal heirs referred in sub section (1) in the order specified therein, but upon the heirs of the father. This provision, thus, clearly excludes the husband from inheriting the property received by a female Hindu from her parents if she was not having any children or has died issueless.

13. In the instant case, admittedly the suit property was received by deceased Sundarabai from her parents and admittedly plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 are not her children as they are born to respondent from his second wife. Therefore, it follows that Sundarabai has died issue-less and in such situation, in the absence of her son or daughter, her husband also cannot inherit her property and the property will devolve upon the legal heirs of her father. Respondent being her husband and not the legal heir of her father, cannot get any share in the property left behind by Sundarabai. Therefore, he has no cause of action to file the suit for partition of Sundarabai's property. The trial Court should have, hence rejected the plaint not only in respect of plaintiff Nos. 2 to 5 but also in respect of respondent.

In the High Court of Bombay

Civil Appellate Jurisdiction

(Before Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, J.)

Tarabai Dagdu Nitanware v. Narayan Keru Nitanware

Writ Petition No. 14090 of 2017

Decided on January 15, 2018

Citation: 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 91 : (2018) 2 Mah LJ 242 : (2018) 2 AIR Bom R 98:AIR 2018(NOC) 708 Bom

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Whether sons can be evicted from father's house for not paying maintenance amount to parents?

The petitioners- who are the sons of respondent no.3- have filed the
present petition impugning the order dated 10.12.2015 (hereafter „the
impugned order‟) passed by the Maintenance Tribunal, Central District
constituted under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior
Citizens Act, 2007 (hereafter „the Act‟). By the impugned order, the
Tribunal has, inter alia, directed the petitioners to vacate the respective
portions occupied by them on the third floor of the property bearing
No.3617, Katra Deena Beg, Lal Kuan, Delhi within a period of three weeks
from the date of receipt of the impugned order.
2. The petitioners have assailed the impugned order on the principal
ground that the same is without jurisdiction; according to the petitioners,
the Maintenance Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to pass an order of
eviction and its jurisdiction is only limited to awarding maintenance to
senior citizens.
The written statement filed by the petitioners before the Maintenance
Tribunal to oppose the complaint filed by respondent no.3 also indicates
that the petitioners had filed FIRs alleging that respondent no.3 had
attempted to outrage the modesty of their wives, this clearly indicates that
the petitioners and respondent no.3 cannot live together and this Court
finds no reason to interfere with the order passed by the Maintenance
Tribunal.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Judgment delivered on: 31.10.2017
W.P.(C) 866/2016 and CM Nos. 23434/2017, 17173/2017
SHADAB KHAIRI AND ANR 
V
THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI)

CORAM
HON’BLE MR JUSTICE VIBHU BAKHRU

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Whether grand children can be treated as tenant when their parents are alive?

After death of his mother, the plaintiff was paying rent and he was accepted to be tenant in respect of suit premises. The learned counsel for the defendant no.1 contends that the defendant no.1 would be included within the definition of 'Tenant' in view of the language of clause (d). On careful perusal of this clause, it would appear that on the death of the tenant, the members of the tenant's family, who were residing in the premises would be deemed to be tenants. Question is who are the members of the family. Mother of the plaintiff was tenant and naturally, the members of her family would be her husband and children, who were residing with her. Plaintiff was the son and he was residing with mother as a member of her family. His children could not be treated as members of the family of his deceased mother and, therefore, the defendant no.1 being her granddaughter could not be treated as a member of her family. Therefore, in my opinion, when the tenant was living with her children, at the time of her death, her grandchildren can not be treated as members of her family and the tenancy can not be deemed to have been transferred to them. However, if the children of the tenant are not alive or not living with him/her for any reason, but the grandchildren are living with him/her, in such a case, the grandchildren may be treated as members of the family of the tenant but that is not the case in the present matter. Therefore, on death of the mother of the plaintiff, he would be treated or deemed to be tenant and he has been rightly accepted as such, by the landlord. His daughter, who was just aged about 4 years at the time of death of her grandmother could not be deemed as tenant in respect of suit premises on death of her grandmother. It is the responsibility of the parents to take care of their minor children but after children have attained the majority, children do not get legal rights to reside in the personal property of parents. They can live in the house of the parents only with consent of the parents and not otherwise. 

In both these matters, it would appear that children of the deceased tenant were held to be members of the family of the deceased tenant. The learned counsel could not point out any authority wherein grandchildren were also treated as the members of the family of the deceased tenant, particularly, when the deceased tenant had left behind his own children, who were living with him as the members of his family. Therefore, these authorities do not come to the rescue of the defendant no.1.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 966 of 2011 with Civil Revision Application No. 34 of 2011 With Civil Application No. 1286 of 2011

Decided On: 03.02.2012

 Kashmira Robert Lobo  Vs. Soli Bahadurji Batiwala 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2012 (2) AIR BOM R 381

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Whether grandchildren will become the tenant of rented premises after the death of tenant if her children are alive?

To state in brief, the suit premises belongs to the Parsee Central Association Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. and the mother of the plaintiff, Soli Bahadurji Batiwala was tenant in the suit premises 730 Hormuzd Building, Ground Floor, J. Vimadalal Street, Parsi Colony, Dadar (East), Mumbai 400 014. She was living in the house alongwith her son and grandchildren. The defendant no.1, who is the appellant before this Court, is the daughter of the plaintiff. Mother of the plaintiff died in 1980 leaving behind the plaintiff as her legal heir. Defendant no. 1 was married in the year 1998 and she went to live with her husband. Defendant no.2, who is the respondent no.2 before this Court, is the husband of the defendant no.1. Plaintiff filed suit for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from causing any interference in his possession over and from entering upon or continue to stay/occupy the premises. He also took out notice of motion for interim relief of the same nature. The suit and the notice of motion were filed before the City Civil Court, Greater Bombay. Defendant No.1 contested the matter contending that she was deemed tenant alongwith the plaintiff on death  of her grandmother and, therefore, the dispute is between two tenants and as such, the City Civil Court does not have jurisdiction and that jurisdiction will lie with the Small Causes Court. 

5. Undisputedly, the mother of the plaintiff was tenant in respect of suit premises and she was paying rent. She died in the year 1980 leaving behind her son, i.e., the plaintiff, his wife and children. After her death, the plaintiff was paying rent and rent receipts were transferred in the name of the plaintiff. Thus, the landlord accepted the plaintiff as tenant in the premises. Defendant no.1 was shown to be aged 35 years in the year 2011 when the Revision Application was filed. It shows that she was just a small girl aged about four year when her grandmother died. There is no record to show that she in her own right was accepted to be tenant in respect of suit premises. She was living in the house as a daughter and family member of the plaintiff. She got married in the year 1998 and went to live with her husband. Admittedly, her marriage with the defendant no.2 is still subsisting. There is no dispute between the husband and wife. As soon as she was married and she left the house of the parents to live with her husband, she became member of the family of the husband and from that time, she was no more member of the family of her parents. After death of the parents, she may have certain rights in their property but during the life time of parents, she can not claim any right in the property of her parents.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Appeal From Order No. 966 of 2011 with Civil Revision Application No. 34 of 2011 With Civil Application No. 1286 of 2011

Decided On: 03.02.2012

 Kashmira Robert Lobo  Vs. Soli Bahadurji Batiwala 

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

J.H. Bhatia, J.

Citation: 2012 (2) AIR BOM R 381,2012(2)ALLMR 855,2012(3) MHLJ 396

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Whether Hindu Daughter After Converting To Islam is entitled to Inherit Property of her parents?

The change of religion and loss of caste have long ceased

to be the grounds of forfeiture of property and the only

disqualification to inheritance on the ground that the person

has ceased to be a Hindu is confined to the heirs of such

convert (Section 26). The disqualification does not affect the

convert himself or herself. This being the position, I have no

hesitation to hold that the applicant who is admittedly a sister

of the private respondents, i.e. the daughter of late Bhikhabhai

Patel, is entitled to succeed in getting her name mutated in the

record of rights as one of the legal heirs. The provisions

contained in Section 26 of the Hindu Succession Act is the only

provision dealing with the right of succession of children born

to a convert after the conversion. However, this provision does

not disqualify the convert himself from succeeding to the

property of the Hindu father.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 15825 of 2017

NAYANABEN FIROZKHAN PATHAN @ NASIMBANU FIROZKHAN PATHAN.

V 

PATEL SHANTABEN BHIKHABHAI & 4.

CORAM:  MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA

Date : 26/09/2017

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Whether children residing with parents can claim that they are licensee of parents?

In my view, the appellant cannot be called as a licensee under S. 52 of the said Act. What S. 52of the Act says is that if one person grants to another a right to do something on an immovable property of the grantor, then such a right is called "licensee". That means it is a transaction between one person and another where some permission is granted to do something. In the present case, we are not concerned with any such two persons at all. Here we are concerned with a father and a son who are members of one family. A son gets into the family by birth and resides with the parents. Can it be said that when a child is born and lives with the parents, he is a licensee within the meaning of S. 52 of the Act? Certainly not. A child and later a son or a daughter resides in the house with the parents not as a licensee or in any other legal capacity but only as members of the family. Nobody can claim a licence by birth. In the present case, admittedly the father and children including the appellant were residing together in 1962 when the house was purchased. In 1962, the appellant was a major boy. It may be in course of time the appellant became a major and he is continuing to reside in the same premises. It may be that the father who was working at Bombay in Reserve Bank of India got a transfer to Bangalore and was staying there. It does not make the appellant a licensee or a person having any independent legal right to stay in the premises except as a member of the family viz. being the son of the plaintiff in this case. In my considered view, a person who is residing with the parents in the house cannot claim any legal character much less, the character of a licensee as defined in S. 52of the Easements Act, but he is residing simpliciter as a member of the family and nothing more and nothing less.

Bombay High Court

Conrad Dias Of Bombay vs Joseph Dias Of Bombay on 26 October, 1994

Equivalent citations: AIR 1995 Bom 210, 1995 (3) BomCR 218, 1996 (2) MhLj 208

Bench: R G Vaidyanatha

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Whether mother and father can be compelled to give parenting plan?

Thus, shared and equal guardianship is recommended by the Law Commission. However, joint custody is provided as an option. Therefore, the Judges, who are working on the family laws and the issue of custody, should not hold a view that once the Law Commission has given the suggestion of a Parenting Plan, it is binding in all the cases to adopt the same. The parties are not to be compelled to give such plan which  amounts to illegality. Parenting Plan is an option for both the parties.

Bombay High Court

Mr. Tushar Vishnu Ubale vs Mrs. Archana Tushar Ubale on 15 January, 2016

Bench: Mridula Bhatkar

  WRIT PETITION NO.5403 OF 2015

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Whether parents of deceased government servant can be denied family pension?

In both of these Schemes the term 'family'
includes,   amongst   others,   the   mother   of   the
deceased Government  servant.   She  is entitled  to
get family pension in case she is wholly depending
on   the   deceased   Government   servant   for   support
and no other member of the family of the deceased
Government   servant,   who   is   vested   with   a   prior
right to  receive family  pension  than the  mother,

is surviving. However, 'mother' has been excluded
from   the   definition   of   'family'   in   the   Family
Pension Scheme, 1964 enumerated in Rule 116 of the
Pension Rules.
12. There   is   absolutely   no   rationale   or
justification behind excluding the mother from the
definition   of   'family'   in   the   Family   Pension
Scheme   1964.     The   mother   of   the   deceased
Government   servant,   who   is   otherwise   entitled   to
receive   family   pension   under   the   Family   Pension
Scheme   1950   (Rule   117)   or   under   Extra   Ordinary
Family   Pension   Scheme   (Appendix   IV),   thus,   has
been discriminated  by denying  her  the same  right
to   receive   family   pension   vide   Rule   116   of   the
Pension Rules.   In our view, this denial of right
to the  mother of  the deceased  Government  servant
to receive family pension under the Family Pension
Scheme   1964   (Rule   116)   amounts   to   discrimination
and as  such would  infringe  the fundamental  right
to   equality   as   enshrined   in   Article   14   of   the
Constitution of India.

13. Here   reference   may   be   made   to   the
Government   Resolution   No.PEN   2011/CR­54/Seva­4,
dated   22nd  January,   2015   published   by   the
Government   of   Maharashtra,   Finance   Department,
whereby mother of the deceased Government servant,
who is wholly dependent on him, has been held to
be entitled to get family pension if other family
members   of   the   deceased   Government   servant,   who
have a prior right to receive family pension, are
not   surviving.     This   Government   Resolution   has
been   made   applicable   to   the   employees   of   the
Maharashtra   Zilla   Parishads   vide   proviso   to
Section 248 of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and
Panchayat Samities Act, 1961.
14. In   the   'Introduction'   part   of   the   said
Government   Resolution   it   is   mentioned   that   since
the   definition   of   the   term   'family'   under   the
existing Pension Rules does not cover parents of a
Government   servant,   as   a   social   security   measure
the   scope   of   the   term   'family'   defined   under
Pension Rules has to be enlarged restrictively by

amending   the   Rules   suitably   to   include   into   its
ambit   the   wholly   dependent   parents   of   a   single
Government   servant.   In   clause   (11)   of   the   said
Government Resolution it has been mentioned that a
formal amendment to the Maharashtra Civil Services
(Pension) Rules, 1982 will be made in due course.
This Government Resolution fortifies our view that
there   was   no   rationale   or   justification   in
excluding   the   parents   of   the   deceased   Government
servant   from   the   term   'family'   as   given   in   the
Family   Pension   Scheme   1964   (Section   116).
Therefore,   the   decision   of   the   respondents   in
denying family  pension to  the  petitioner, who  is
the   only   surviving   family   member   of   deceased
Deelip,   who   is   stated   to   be   wholly   dependent   on
him   for   livelihood,   is   not   sustainable   since   it
has   the   effect   of   discriminating   the   petitioner
and   depriving   her   of   the   fundamental   right   to
equality   as   enshrined   in   Article   14   of   the
Constitution of India. 

15. In   the   above   circumstances,   the
respondents will have to be directed to reconsider
the   case   of   the   petitioner   for   grant   of   family
pension   under   Rule   116   of   the   Pension   Rules   of
1982 considering the object of the Pension Scheme,
1964.     The   respondents   should   take   liberal
approach and should not turn down the request of
the   petitioner   for   grant   of   family   pension   on
technical grounds. 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY,
AURANGABAD BENCH, AURANGABAD
WRIT PETITION NO. 1884 OF 2012
Smt. Vimalbai Supdu Patil,

        
     V
The State of Maharashtra,

     CORAM : S.S.SHINDE
   AND
      SANGITRAO S.PATIL, JJ.
    
     DATED        : 24.6.2016
Citation: 2016(6) MHLJ 191

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Whether wife forcing husband to reside separate from his parents amounts to cruelty?

 The Supreme Court in the judgment delivered on 6th
October, 2016 in case of Narendra vs. K. Meena in Civil Appeal
No.3253 of 2008 has held that in normal circumstances, a wife is
expected to be with the family of the husband after the marriage and
she becomes integral to and forms part of the family of the husband
and normally without any justifiable strong reason, she would never
insist that her husband should get separated from the family and live
only with her. It is held that a son maintaining his parents is absolutely
normal in Indian culture and ethos. It is held that in a Hindu society, it
is a pious obligation of the son to maintain the parents. If a wife
makes an attempt to deviate from the normal practice and normal
custom of the society, she must have some justifiable reason for that.
It is held by the Supreme Court that no husband would tolerate this
and no son would like to be separated from his old parents and other
family members, who are also dependent upon his income. The
persistent effort of the wife to constrain the husband to be separated
from the family would be torturous for the husband and this
constitutes an act of cruelty.
78. A perusal of the record indicates that the appellant never
wanted the respondent to stay with his parents in the matrimonial
house. Because of the cruelty meted out by the appellant to the

respondent and because of the ill treatment and misbehaviour of the
appellant with the respondent and his parents, the parents of the
respondent were required to leave the house on the 2nd floor and had
to stay with the cousin of the respondent for quiet sometime. In my
view the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in case of
Narendra (supra) squarely applies to the facts of this case. I am
respectfully bound by the judgment of the Supreme Court in case of
Narendra (supra). In my view any pressure on the part of wife on the
husband to stay away from his parents without any justifiable cause
amounts to cruelty.

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SECOND APPEAL NO.349 OF 2013
WITH
CIVIL APPLICATION NO.928 OF 2013
IN
SECOND APPEAL NO.349 OF 2013

Chitra Sachin Mapara V Sachin Kumar Mapara 

 CORAM : R.D. DHANUKA, J.

 PRONOUNCED ON : 20TH DECEMBER, 2016

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Whether son can live in self acquired house of parents against their wish?

Where the house is self acquired house of the parents, son whether
married or unmarried, has no legal right to live in that house and he can live
in that house only at the mercy of his parents upto the time the parents
allow. Merely because the parents have allowed him to live in the house so
long as his relations with the parents were cordial, does not mean that the
parents have to bear his burden throughout his life.
 IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
 Date of Decision: 24th November,2016
 RSA 136/2016 & CM No.19123/2016
SACHIN & ANR
v
JHABBU LAL & ANR
Citation: 2016 SCC ONLINE DEL6098,AIR 2017 Delhi 1

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