Whether the court can pass decree the suit or mould the relief on the basis of reneged compromise?

 In view of the aforesaid, a compromise pursis at

Exh.13 duly signed by the parties to the appeal, was

presented before the first appellate Court on 3/9/2020 with

the following prayer therein :

“The appeal be ordered as withdrawn in terms of

the Compromise and the Decree of R.C.S.

No.119/2015 passed by C.J.S.D. (M.C.A.),

Aurangabad on 9.9.2019 be confirmed as per terms

and conditions of this Compromise and oblige.” {Para 25}

26. Thereafter the Law Officer of the AMC submitted a

pursis dated 15/9/2020, whereunder the AMC reneged on the

compromise pursis. The first appellate Court, therefore, did

not endorse the compromise. The appeal was heard on its

merits and came to be dismissed.

35. The subsequent event of the compromise between

the AMC and the plaintiff firm or concessionaire is a fact not in

dispute. Most of the terms of compromise were executed in

nature. True, some of them were executory. To be specific,

additional FSI was to be granted permitting further

construction. It is also true that, the subject matter of the

present appeal is not the enforcement of the terms of the

compromise.

This Court, relying on decision of the Apex Court

in case of Nidhi (supra), finds that, when the AMC went back

on its promise and it has offered every excuse therefor, this

Court finds that, those facts need not be brought on record by

amending the respective pleadings. This subsequent event is

the admitted fact. The defendant AMC is a local authority. It

has a battery of lawyers on its panel to advice it. True, it has

every authority not to take the compromise terms to logical

conclusion. The Court seized of the present Second Appeal,

however, could not be oblivious to the factum of settlement.

 In the present case, a compromise pursis was

submitted for withdrawal of the appeal. Be that as it may.

This Court is neither endorsing the compromise nor enforcing

the same. The factum of compromise, however, is viewed to

hold the defendant – AMC to have diluted its stand on the

decision of cancelling the lease agreement for illegality

committed by the plaintiff firm and/or its sister concern.

In view of the above, the substantial questions of

law are answered accordingly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY

BENCH AT AURANGABAD

SECOND APPEAL NO.335 OF 2022 WITH

CIVIL APPLICATION NO.8534 OF 2022

M/s Shalaka Engineers and JV Vs Aurangabad Municipal Corporation,

CORAM : R. G. AVACHAT, J .

Dated : 22nd December, 2022

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Whether landlord is deemed to have waived the termination of lease if he accepts rent from tenant after expiry of period of lease?

  In view of the evidence thus obtained and taking

into account the decision in Shanti Prasad Devi’s case

(supra) the High Court held that mere acceptance of the

rent by the landlord after the expiry of the period of

lease would not amount to waiver of the termination of

lease.

12. In view of the above conclusion this Special Leave

Petition must fail as it is devoid of merits.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

PETITION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO APPEAL (C) NO.10700 OF 2022

SRI K.M. MANJUNATH Vs SRI ERAPPA. G DEAD THROUGH LRS. 

Dated: June 24, 2022.

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Whether court can relieve tenant from liability of eviction if quit notice was issued for termination of lease on expiry of statutory period?

The tenant was not found to be in default of payment of rent, as he had duly tendered a sum of Rs. 13560/- by draft in response to notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. By applying the principles of Section 114 of the Act, the tenant was relieved from the liability of eviction. The trial Court also held that no amount was payable by the tenant towards electricity charges. It also held that the plaintiffs could not establish bona fide need for the shop in dispute, therefore, it declined to grant relief of eviction.

5. The sole submission of Sri N.C. Rajvanshi, learned senior counsel for the revisionists is that once U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was found to be inapplicable to the building in dispute, the relationship of the parties would stand governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. He submitted that the tenancy was terminated by giving notice under Section 106 of the Act. It was not a notice of forfeiture on the ground of non-payment of rent nor provisions of Section 114 were applicable. The tenant became liable for eviction, as service of notice is not in dispute.

6. Since the trial Court has found the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 to be inapplicable, the relationship between the parties was governed by the general law i.e. the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 111 of the Act provides various modes and contingencies by and under which a lease of immovable property stands determined. Under Clause (g) thereof, a lease gets determined by forfeiture i.e. where the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter followed by a notice in writing by the lessor to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. Under Clause (h), a lease determines on the expiration of the notice to determine the lease or to quit or of intention to quit, the property leased, duly given by one party to the other. The manner of serving notice to quit is that provided by Section 106.

7. The forfeiture, which is entailed upon break of express condition of lease is condonable, by virtue of provisions of Section 114 of the Act, where the leasee pays or tenders to the lessor the rent in arrear, together with interest thereon and his full costs of the suit, or gives such security as the Court thinks sufficient for making such payment within fifteen days. In such a case, the Court may, in lien of passing a decree of eviction, pass an order relieving the leasee against the forfeiture.

8. Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 is thus applicable only where the lease is determined by forfeiture i.e. on account of breach of an express condition which entitles the lessor to re-enter. On the other hand, if the tenancy is determined by a simple notice to quit, as provided under Clause (h) of Section 111, then Section 114 would not come to the rescue of the leasee.

9. The notice dated 19.5.2010 has been brought on record and a perusal thereof reveals that it is a notice under Clause (h) of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 seeking termination of tenancy upon expiry of the statutory period. The plaintiffs have specifically stated that after expiry of the statutory period, the tenant should vacate, as they do not want to continue him as tenant any more. In the said notice, it is also stated that rent and electricity charges since March 2010 have not been paid, but the tenancy has not been determined on the ground of non-payment of these amounts. In fact, the finding of the Court below is that no written lease deed has been brought on record, nor it was the case of the landlords that there was breach of express condition of any lease agreement entitling the plaintiffs to determine the lease by forfeiture.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD

Civil Revision No. 55 of 2013

Decided On: 18.01.2019

 Subhash Chandra  Vs.  Ajay Gupta

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

Manoj Kumar Gupta, J.

Citation: AIR 2019(NOC) 819 ALL

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When lessor can terminate lease for breach of condition of lease?

The two contentions advanced before the learned Single Judge having been dealt with by us and the conclusions arrived at by the learned Single Judge, being affirmed, we deal with the contention advanced that even if there was a violation of clause 10 of the lease-deed the lease could not be determined because a term of the lease was violated and not a condition thereof.

23. Inter-alia, of the various recitals, the last recital of the lease-deed reads as under:-

―Whereas the lessor upon assurance of the lessee that it shall strictly abide by the stipulations contained in this deed which are in accordance with the terms and conditions stipulated/agreed by the lessee vide its letter dated 17.07.2008 in response to offer letter dated 07.07.2007 of lessor and accepted by the lessor on 23.07.2008, the lessor has agreed to give on lease to the lessee the demised premises on the terms and the conditions herein.‖

24. Thereafter the terms/conditions of the lease have been typed. It is thus apparent that whether we call it a term or anything else, clause 10 of the lease-deed, and for that matter all other clauses after the recitals, are not only the terms of the lease-deed but even conditions of the lease. It is trite that breach of a condition of a lease entitles the opposite party to terminate the lease, and where the breach is by the tenant, the landlord gets a right to terminate the lease.

25. The contention advanced with reference to clause 26 of the lease- deed was that parties expressly vested a right in the landlord to terminate the lease only on the condition of non-payment of rent. It was urged that therefrom it could be inferred that violation of any other term/condition of the lease the same could not be determined by the landlord.

26. Now, as we have already held hereinabove that the lease-deed has made all the terms of the lease as conditions of the lease and thus clause 10 prohibiting sub-letting or assignment without the written consent of the landlord would make it actionable if there is sub-letting or assignment.

Delhi High Court

Icici Bank Ltd. vs Late Smt. Shakuntla Gupta (Since ... on 12 August, 2015)

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP NANDRAJOG
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.KAMESWAR RAO
Citation;AIR 2016(NOC)162 Del

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