Whether a person can recover compensation for emotional trauma unaccompanied by physical injury, including derivative losses stemming from injuries to family members?

 13.6 In the context of the United States, the most important piece of legal literature regarding ‘pain and suffering’ is an article titled Valuing Life and Limb in Tort : Scheduling Pain and Suffering, published in the year 1989. Relevant extracts thereof read as under:

“Pain and suffering and other intangible or non-economic losses are even more problematic. Physical pain and attendant suffering have for centuries being recognised as legitimate elements of damages, and “modern” tort law has seen a marked expansion of the rights to recover for forms of mental anguish. Some Courts have even permitted recovery for emotional trauma unaccompanied by physical injury, including derivative losses stemming from injuries to family members. The precise elements of compensable non-economic loss vary by jurisdiction. Pain and suffering may be used as a catch-all category for the jury's consideration of all non-pecuniary losses in a case of a non-fatal injury, subsuming other qualitative categories such as mental anguish and humiliation. More commonly, though, other non-economic elements - such as “loss of enjoyment of life” are accorded independent standing …”

In the Supreme Court of India

(Before C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol, JJ.)

K.S. Muralidhar Vs  R. Subbulakshmi and Another 

Civil Appeal No(s). 12993/2024 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 18337/2021)

Decided on November 22, 2024

Citation: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3385,2024 INSC 886.

Read full Judgment here: Click here.

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Can the plaintiff seek a mandatory injunction to remove malba, garbage, etc. thrown on adjacent land as per 41(j) of the Specific relief Act?

  In the present case the plaintiffs are not suing to protect any possession of theirs over the vacant land. They are instead suing for removal of the garbage/debris in the vacant land behind their flat and for injunction for a restraint on the defendants from throwing the garbage/debris. A person certainly has a right to clean space at the entrance or at the back of his house. That apart, given the averments in the plaint and the reliefs sought for, I do not think that it was a case for rejection of plaint.”

6. The burden of Mr. Vikas Tomar’ s song is that the respondents

had no personal interest over the land, on which the malba/garbage etc. was allegedly being deposited as they claimed no right, title or possession in respect thereof. He submits that, in such circumstances, Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act operates as an absolute proscription against grant of injunction.

7. I am unable to agree.

8. Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act proscribes grant of

injunction “when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter”. The word “matter” is of wide and compendious scope, and would include everything, which is subject matter of the suit and grievance expressed therein. B. Ramanath Iyyer’ s Law Laxican defines “matter” as “a fact or facts constituting a whole or a part of a ground of action or defence”. Vishwanathan v. Abdul Wajid AIR 1963 SC 1

9. If the plaintiff is a complete stranger, having no personal

interest with respect to the grievance expressed in the suit, being “the

matter” in the suit, no doubt, Section 41(j) operates as a proscription

against grant of injunction. The words “the matter” cannot, however,

in my view, be conflict with the property forming subject matter of thesuit. The grievance of the plaintiffs, as voiced in the suit, and dehors holds that “the expression “matter” is not equivalent to “subject matter”; it means the right claimed.” The right claimed by the respondents in their suit was, clearly, avoidance of the nuisance that had resulted as a consequence of the alleged dumping, by the appellants, of malba and garbage onthe land adjoining their premises.its merits, was that the respondents had committed an actionable tort which, if proved, could even amount to nuisance.

10. Inasmuch as the plaintiffs were also claiming that they were

enjoying the land in which the malwa/garbage etc. was being allegedly deposited, dehors the issue of the respondents’ right to possession over the land, it cannot be said that they had no personal interest in respect of the matter, i.e. the grievance ventilated in the suit.

11. To my mind, any other interpretation would be unduly

narrowed and not justified by the words used in Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act.

12. I am of the view, therefore, that the learned ADJ was correct in his opinion expressed by him, in the passages from the impugned order extracted hereinabove, that the respondents cannot be said to have had no personal interest in the matter, so as to justify summary dismissal of the suit under Order VII Rule 11(a) of the CPC read with Section 41(j)of the Specific Relief Act.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

RSA 233/2019 and CM Appl. 50920/2019 (stay)

SANJAY CHUGH & ANR  Vs RAM KISHAN 

CORAM:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C.HARI SHANKAR

Dated: 30.03.2022

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Whether court can apply the Motor Vehicles Act principles for determining compensation for death caused due to negligence of Municipal Corporation?

 Issue No. 4:

18. The age of the deceased was 11 years. He was brilliant and smart child of the plaintiff. He was not earning member at the relevant time. The question is a lumpsum compensation as prayed/claimed by the plaintiff in the absence of any guidelines or formula, whether can be granted by this Court.

19. The learned Counsel for the defendants submitted that under the BMC Act they do not have any provision to pay any claim such as no fault liability and/or lumpsum amount to the parents or any person related to the deceased who died in such accident or incident, whether it is because of negligence or no negligence of the Corporation. In the present case, as referred above, there is a negligence of the defendants which resulted into the loss of son of the plaintiff.

27. This is a case of accident resulted because of negligence of the Municipal Corporation as recorded above. It is difficult to Judge and/or assess the future income of the deceased who was aged about 11 years old at the relevant time. The plaintiff at the relevant time was working in the Mill where he was getting salary of Rs. 1500/- to Rs. 2000/- p.m. Therefore, this facet itself is not sufficient to assess the compensation as claimed.

28. In this background, immediate formula which according to me is available in such unguided and uncleared situation is to apply the principle of Motor Accidents Claims as contemplated.

Bombay High Court

Shripat Shankar Panchal vs Municipal Corporation For Gr. ... on 2 August, 2007

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Leading Judgment explaining judgment of Rylands v. Fletcher

We
would like to quote hereinbelow these two paragaphs for our

benefit:
“8. Winfield has defined tortious law arising from
breach of a duty primarily fixed by law; this duty is
towards persons generally and its breach is
redressable by an action for unliquidated damages.
In general, torts consist of some act done without
just cause or excuse.
“The law of torts exists for the purpose of
preventing men from hurting one another
whether in respect of their property, their
presence, their reputations or anything which
is theirs.”
Injury and damage are two basic ingredients of tort.
Although these may be found in contract as well
but the violations which may result in tortious
liability are breach of duty primarily fixed by the law
while in contract they are fixed by the parties
themselves. Further in tort the duty is towards
persons generally. In contract it is towards specific
person or persons. An action for tort is usually a
claim for pecuniary compensation in respect of
damages suffered as a result of the invasion of a
legally protected interest. But law of torts being a
developing law its frontiers are incapable of being
strictly barricaded. Liability in tort which in course of
time has become known as ‘strict liability’, ‘absolute
liability’, ‘fault liability’ have all gradually grown and
with passage of time have become firmly
entrenched. ‘Absolute liability’ or “special use
bringing with it increased dangers to others”
(Rylands v. Fletcher [LR (1868) 3 HL 330 : 37 LJ
Ex 161 : [1861-73] All ER Rep 1] ) and ‘fault liability’
are different forms which give rise to action in torts.
The distance (sic difference) between ‘strict liability’
and ‘fault liability’ arises from presence and
absence of mental element. A breach of legal duty
wilfully, or deliberately or even maliciously is
negligence emanating from fault liability but injury
or damage resulting without any intention yet due
to lack of foresight etc. is strict liability. Since duty is
the primary yardstick to determine the tortious
liability its ambit keeps on widening on the
touchstone of fairness, practicality of the situation
etc. In Donoghue v. Stevenson[(1932) AC 562 :

1932 All ER Rep 1] a manufacturer was held to be
liable to ultimate consumer on the principle of duty
to care. In Anns v. Merton London Borough Council
[(1978) AC 728 : (1977) 2 All ER 492] it was, rightly,
observed:
“[T]he broad general principle of liability for
foreseeable damage is so widely applicable
that the function of the duty of care is not so
much to identify cases where liability is
imposed as to identify those where it is not,….”
Truly speaking entire law of torts is founded and
structured on morality that no one has a right to
injure or harm others intentionally or even
innocently. Therefore, it would be primitive to class
strictly or close finality (sic finally) the everexpanding
and growing horizon of tortious liability.
Even for social development, orderly growth of the
society and cultural refineness, the liberal approach
to tortious liability by courts is more conducive.
9. In between strict liability and fault liability there
may be numerous circumstances in which one may
be entitled to sue for damages. And it may be partly
one or the other or may be both. In a welfare
society construction of dam or bundh for the sake
of community is essential function and use of land
or accumulation of water for the benefit of society
cannot be non-natural user. But that cannot
absolve the State from its duty of being responsible
to its citizens for such violations as are actionable
and result in damage, loss or injury. What is
fundamental is injury and not the manner in which it
has been caused. ‘Strict liability’, ‘absolute liability’,
‘fault liability’ and ‘neighbour proximity’ are all
refinements and development of law by English
Courts for the benefit of society and the common
man. Once the occasion for loss or damage is
failure of duty, general or specific, the cause of
action under tort arises. It may be due to
negligence, nuisance, trespass, inevitable mistake
etc. It may be even otherwise. In a developed or
developing society the concept of duty keeps on
changing and may extend to even such matters as
was highlighted in Donoghue v. Stevenson [(1932)
AC 562 : 1932 All ER Rep 1] where a manufacturer

was held responsible for injury to a consumer. They
may individually or even collectively give rise to
tortious liability. Since the appellant suffered loss
on facts found due to action of respondent's
officers both at the stage of construction and failure
to take steps even at the last moment it was liable
to be compensated.”
The Court, thereafter, explained that in order to become a claim
as actionable claim, it is necessary to determine that the
defendant was guilty of negligence.
22) There are two exceptions to the aforesaid rule of strict liability,
which were recognized in Rylands v. Fletcher itself, viz.: (a)
where it can be shown that the escape was owing to the plaintiff's
default, or (b) the escape was the consequence of vis major or
the act of God. An act of God is that which is a direct, violent,
sudden and irresistible act of nature as could not, by any amount
of ability, have been foreseen, or if foreseen, could not by any
amount of human care and skill have been resisted. Generally,
those acts which are occasioned by the elementary forces of
nature, unconnected with the agency of man or other cause will
come under the category of acts of God. Examples are: storm,
tempest, lightning, extraordinary fall of rain, extraordinary high
tide, extraordinary severe frost, or a tidal bore which sweeps a
ship in mid-water. What is important here is that it is not
necessary that it should be unique or that it should happen for the

first time. It is enough that it is extraordinary and such as could
not reasonably be anticipated. 

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1866 OF 2016
VOHRA SADIKBHAI RAJAKBHAI & ORS.
V
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
Dated:MAY 10, 2016.

Citation:(2016) 12 SCC 1

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Whether court should grant interest on damages for breach of contract of professional services?

The extent of damages for the breach of the contract of professional services agreed and failed to be rendered and for the consequent mental agony, distress and anguish would be analogous to the damages which are grantable for similar effects upon a tort.

 Courts have also granted interest upon the damages awarded. Under Section 3 of the Interest Act, 1978 interest can be allowed as much in proceedings for recovery of damages as in proceedings for recovery of debts. The interest which is allowable is at a rate not exceeding the current rate of interest from the date of the notice till the date of institution of the proceedings. Further interest from the institution of the Suit is payable under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure at the reasonable rate on the principal sum from the date of Suit until the date of the decree and at the rate not exceeding 6% per annum from the date of decree until payment.

167. Interest has been granted on the amount of damages even under common law. In the case of Perry v. Sidney (supra) it has been observed the compensation for inflation be also accounted for "because damages carry interest". In the case of Hayes v. James (supra) a rough estimate of the true value of the property at the time of the sale which resulted in the action for damages itself came to be granted by way of interest. The rough estimate made by the trial Judge was upheld by the appeal Court as a fair assessment. The relevant portion of the Judgment at page 818 shows how the interest on the property came to be calculated roughly assessing the property's value thus:

The judge awarded the Plaintiffs 80% of the interest because of the true value of the marionette at the time of sale, and the Defendants argue that the proportion should have been much less. The judge was making a rough estimate which should not readily be criticized. However, the Defendants submit that it was wholly wrong. In my opinion the judge's assessment is fair. In considering how to apportion the original price of 65,000, he has deducted the 10,000 paid by the Plaintiffs from the overpayment for the marionette, leaving 55,000. 10,000 of that is the balance of the overpayment, which leaves 45,000 as the amount for which the Defendants are responsible. 45,000 is near enough 80% of 55,000.

168. In the case of Watts v. Morrow (supra) interest at the rate of 15% per annum on the award of damages based on the cost of the repairs was held appropriate.

169. Those interest rates are on the principal amount of damages for breach of contract calculated under all the heads including mental distress from the date of the Suit till the date of Judgment.

170. In the case of Nizam's Institute (supra) a lump sum payment of Rs. 10 lakhs only for pain and suffering came to be made with interest at 6% per annum from the date of the Judgment which is the interest allowable under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

171. The claim of interest of 18% is at the usual commercial rate prevailing at the time of the filing of the Suit. Judicial notice must be taken of the fact that that rate prevailed until the end of 2007 after which the rate of commercial interest was lower. A reasonable rate of interest is required to be granted to the Plaintiffs for the 22 years period during which the Plaintiffs' Suit remained on the docket of this Court and the Plaintiffs remained indemnified. In this case interest @ 16% p.a. for the entire period from the date of the surgery of the original Plaintiff No. 2 till the date of this Judgment and thereafter @ 6% p.a. till payment/realization would meet ends of justice.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY

Suit No. 1101 of 1989

Decided On: 02.09.2011

 Padam Chandra Singhi and Ors.Vs. Dr. P.B. Desai and Ors.

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When it is necessary to obtain succession certificate?

Holding that the Succession Certificate was necessary only if the decree had been obtained on the basis of a pre-existing debt in Narayanaswami Naidu v. Chellammal and Ors. 1970 (2) M.L.J. 633, a Single Judge observed as follows:

...I agree that a plaint reading of Section 214(1)(a) and (b) clearly shows that the intention of the legislature was that a succession certificate was necessary only if a decree had been obtained on the basis of a pre-existing debt. The emphasis throughout is on the word "debt". In my view, in order to attract the provisions of Section 214(1)(a), a decree must be sought for on a pre-existing debt due to the deceased and the order sought to be executed by the legal representatives must be for the payment of a debt due to the deceased. If the decree is not for the payment of money due prior to the institution of the suit but for damages or compensation for breach of contract or for tort, then the decree would not be one for a debt due to the deceased. Where costs have been awarded to the deceased in the suit, the decree cannot be said to be for a debt. Section 214(2) of the Act does not purport to define the word "debt", but merely states that it includes any debt except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes. The meaning of the word "debt" has therefore to be ascertained by reference to the judicial decisions cited supra. The meaning adopted by the Courts also tallies with the ordinary connotation of the word as accepted in public parlance. The word "debt" is defined in Concise Oxford Dictionary as money, goods or services owing. The emphasis is upon the word "Owing" and this necessarily cannotes that there must be a pre-existing debt....

Madras High Court

Kaliammal And Ors. vs R. Dhanaraj, A. Duraisamy And The ... on 12 December, 2006

Equivalent citations: (2007) 1 MLJ 390

Bench: R Banumathi

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UK Supreme court Judgment on vicarious liability of prison authorities for torts of prisoners

The fact that the prison service, and the operators of contracted-out prisons,
are under a statutory duty to provide prisoners with useful work, is not incompatible
with the imposition of vicarious liability. The legislation does not itself exclude the
imposition of vicarious liability. Nor is it argued that any distinct point arises under
section 2(1)(a) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, in terms of which the Crown is
subject to all those liabilities in tort to which, if it were a private person of full age
and capacity, it would be subject in respect of torts committed by its servants or
agents. Authorities concerned with compulsory pilotage are not in point: the prison
service is not required to provide particular types of employment, or to allocate 
particular prisoners to particular activities. In practice, prisoners can be allocated to
a variety of workplaces both inside and outside prisons, having regard to the relevant
risks. More particularly, the prison service is not compelled to employ prisoners in
the kitchen, and has a meaningful power of selection in respect of the prisoners it
chooses to employ there. It appears from the evidence that the prison service takes
particular care when selecting prisoners who are suitable to work in the kitchen,
having regard to the risks involved in that setting. A restricted pool from which to
select a workforce was a feature of the Christian Brothers case, and is not
uncommon even in ordinary cases of employment: an employer can only select from
those who apply for appointment, and may often have a small pool from which to
choose.
Hilary Term
[2016] UKSC 10
On appeal from: [2014] EWCA Civ 132
JUDGMENT
Cox (Respondent) v Ministry of Justice (Appellant)
before
Lord Neuberger, President
Lady Hale, Deputy President
Lord Dyson
Lord Reed
Lord Toulson
JUDGMENT GIVEN ON
2 March 2016

LORD REED: (with whom Lord Neuberger, Lady Hale, Lord Dyson and
Lord Toulson agree)

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Whether pure economic loss independent of physical damage is claimable?

Therefore, we fall back to the basic principle for a claim in
tort of negligence, i.e., duty of care and foreseeability. The
position has to be brought in two stages. The first one is whether,
as between the defendant and plaintiff there is a sufficient relation
of proximity such that, in the reasonable contemplation on the
defendant, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause
damage to the latter in which case a prima-facie duty of care
arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered affirmative, it is
necessary to consider whether there are any considerations which
ought to negate or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty or the
class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which a

breach may give rise. The necessary ingredient for duty of care
is characterized by law by one of proximity and that the situation
should be one in which the Court considers it fair, just and
reasonable that the law should impose a duty to the given case
upon one of the party for the benefit of the others. The next point
is whether pure economic loss independent of physical damage is
claimable.
44. In this case, the defendant vessel had come to Ranpur Bay
to discharge a cargo of LPG to the account of BPCL in the Captive
jetty. Bad weather caused her to drift when she was being
berthed, and she ran aground 1.5/1.6 kms from the jetty. The
plaintiff is carrying on business of manufacture of PVC resin at a
plant which is further inside from the Port. It will not be reasonable
or fair or just to impose upon the defendant duty of care to the
plaintiff because like the plaintiff there will be multitude persons
who would have been remotely affected not as a rule by way of
physical damage to them or their property but by putting them to
inconvenience and sometimes economic loss. If claims for such
loss were permitted there would be no end to claims. Some might
be genuine, some might be inflated or even false. In such cases,
it is also not rightly capable of proof or easily checked and in my
view this claim for economic loss for the plaintiff, independent of

physical damage is not payable.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NOTICE OF MOTION NO. 255 OF 2011
IN
ADMIRALTY SUIT NO. 20 OF 2006
Finolex Industries Ltd
Versus
M.V. KEW BRIDGE, 
CORAM: K.R.SHRIRAM, J.

Pronounced on: 9th June
2014
Citation;2015(2) ALLMR823

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Whether builder is liable to pay damages to purchaser for breach of duty owed by builder to purchaser?

 In this backdrop, it would be seen that in the tort liability arising out of contract, equity steps in and tort takes over and imposes liability upon the defendant for unqualified damages for the breach of the duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. Equity steps in and relieves the hardships of the Plaintiff in a common law action for damages and enjoins upon the defendant to make the damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of the negligence in the case of the duties or breach of the obligation undertaken or failure to truthfully inform the warranty of title and other allied circumstances. In this case, it is found that four floors were unauthorisedly constructed and came to be demolished by the New Delhi Municipal Council. It does not appear that the owners of the flats were informed of the defective or illegal construction and they were not given notice of caveat emptor. Resultantly, they are put to loss of lacs of rupees they have invested and given as values of the flats to the builder- respondent.

12. The question arising for consideration is: whether the appellants should be re-compensated for the loss suffered by them? The High Court in the impugned judgment has directed the return of the amount plus the escalation charges. We are informed that the escalated price as on the date is around 1.5 crores per flat. In this situation, taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances, we think that the builder-respondent should pay Rs. 60 lacs including the amount paid by the allottees, within a period of six months from today.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 3694 of 1997

Decided On: 06.05.1997

Appellants: Manju Bhatia (Mrs) and Anr.
Vs.
Respondent: New Delhi Municipal Council and Anr.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
K. Ramaswamy, S. Saghir Ahmad and G.B. Patnaik, JJ.

Citation: AIR1998SC223,(1997)6SCC370,

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Supreme court: All live-in- relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage

 We are, therefore, of the view that the appellant, having been fully aware of the fact that the respondent was a married person, could not have entered into a live-in relationship in the nature of marriage. All live-in- relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage. Appellant’s and the respondent’s relationship is, therefore, not a “relationship in the nature of marriage” because it has no inherent or essential characteristic of a marriage, but a relationship other than “in the nature of marriage” and the appellant’s status is lower than the status of a wife and that relationship would not fall within the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act. If we hold that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent is a relationship in the nature of a marriage, we will be doing an injustice to the legally wedded wife and children who opposed that relationship. Consequently, any act, omission or commission or conduct of the respondent in connection with that type of relationship, would not amount to “domestic violence” under Section 3 of the DV Act.

66. We have, on facts, found that the appellant’s status was that of a mistress, who is in distress, a survivor of a live-in relationship which is of serious concern, especially when such persons are poor and illiterate, in the event of which vulnerability is more pronounced, which is a societal reality. Children born out of such relationship also suffer most which calls for bringing in remedial measures by the Parliament, through proper legislation.

67. We are conscious of the fact that if any direction is given to the respondent to pay maintenance or monetary consideration to the appellant, that would be at the cost of the legally wedded wife and children of the respondent, especially when they had opposed that relationship and have a cause of action against the appellant for alienating the companionship and affection of the husband/parent which is an intentional tort.1

Supreme Court of India

Indra Sarma vs V.K.V.Sarma on 26 November, 2013

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:

K.S. Panicker Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose, JJ.

Citation:  MANU/SC/1230/2013

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Supreme court: State is liable for torts committed by its employees

Running of Railways is a commercial activity. Establishing Yatri Niwas at various Railway Stations to provide lodging and boarding facilities to passengers on payment of charges is a part of the commercial activity of the Union of India and this activity cannot be equated with the exercise of Sovereign power. The employees of the Union of India who are deputed to run the Railways and to manage the establishment, including the Railway Stations and Yatri Niwas, are essential components of the Govt. machinery which carries on the commercial activity. If any of such employees commits an act of tort, the Union Govt., of which they are the employees, can, subject to other legal requirements being satisfied, be held vicariously liable in damages to the person wronged by those employees. 

Supreme Court of India

The Chairman, Railway Board & Ors vs Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors on 28 January, 2000

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compensation for cyber tort

Chapter Four—Torts and Cyber Torts

 

 “Tort more or less means ‘wrong’”

Learning Objectives

1.  State the purpose of tort law

2.  Identify some intentional torts against persons and property

3.  Name the four elements of negligence

4.  Define strict liability, and list some circumstances in which it will be applied

5.  Summarize the laws protecting trademarks, patents, and copyrights

6. Have a clear understanding of cyber torts, and how tort theories are being applied in cyberspace

Through tort law, society compensates those who have suffered injuries as a result of the wrongful conduct of others.  Society recognizes an interest in personal physical safety, an interest in protecting real and personal property, and an interest in protecting certain intangible interests, such as personal privacy, family relations, reputation, and dignity.  Tort law provides remedies for invasion of these protected interests.  Also wrongful interference with others’ business rights is a business tort including the right to protect trademarks, patents, copyrights, and other property resulting from intellectual processes.

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What will be duty of employer towards employee when situation is abnormal?

Normally, an employer owes no duty of care for the safety of his employee while the employee is proceeding to the place of employment from his house. The point, however, is whether the same rule prevails when the situation is abnormal and when as a result of outbreak of violence in the city, the law enforcement authorities promulgate curfew order requiring citizens to be within doors as the only means which can reasonably ensure their safety. In such a situation, when every citizen is expected to be within doors as a matter of safety, if an employer requires his employee, to come to the place of employment in early hours of the morning, it is reasonably foreseeable that the employee is likely to suffer injury at the hands of some ruffian while on the way to join his work unless adequate arrangements are made by the employer for the safety of the employee. Requiring an employee to come to work in such a situation is itself such an act from which harm to the employee is forseeable and the employee being closely and directly connected with the act of requiring him to join his work, the employer must have his safety in contemplation. On the principles enunciated by Lord Atkin in Donoghue v. Stevenson (quoted earlier) the employer must, in the circumstances prevailing in the instant case, be held to owe a duty of care to the employee while he was on his way to the place of work. The employer should have taken adequate care for the safety of the employee while he was on his way either by providing safe transport or some persons to accompany and guard him. In case it was not possible for the employer to make any arrangement for the safety of the employee, the employer should have temporarily closed down the business, as the only alternative of avoiding harm to the employee. It has also to be kept in view that the employee, in the instant case, unlike a police constable or a fireman, was not in such an employment where it was expected of him from the nature of employment to face the hazard of a riot.

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Madhya Pradesh State Road ... vs Mst. Basantibai And Ors. on 30 April, 1971

Equivalent citations: (1971) IILLJ 273 MP

Bench: S Bhargava, G Singh

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