Showing posts with label "first strike" principle. Show all posts
Showing posts with label "first strike" principle. Show all posts

Sunday, 11 November 2018

Whether concept of forum convenience is applicable to wardship jurisdiction of court?

 We must remind ourselves of the settled legal position that the concept of forum convenience has no place in wardship jurisdiction. Further, the efficacy of the principle of comity of courts as applicable to India in respect of child custody matters has been succinctly delineated in several decisions of this Court. ...

66. The invocation of first strike principle as a decisive factor, in our opinion, would undermine and whittle down the wholesome principle of the duty of the Court having jurisdiction to consider the best interests and welfare of the child, which is of paramount importance. If the Court is convinced in that regard, the fact that there is already an order passed by a foreign Court in existence may not be so significant as it must yield to the welfare of the child. That is only one of the factors to be taken into consideration. The interests and welfare of the child are of paramount consideration. The principle of comity of courts as observed in Dhanwanti Joshi case [MANU/SC/0810/1998 : 1998(1) SCC 112], in relation to non-convention countries is that the

Court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. While considering that aspect, the Court may reckon the fact that the child was abducted from his or her country of habitual residence but the Court's overriding consideration must be the child's welfare.
4. In view of above, principle of comity of courts or principle of forum convenience alone cannot determine the threshold bar of jurisdiction. Paramount consideration is the best interest of child. The same cannot be subject-matter of final determination in proceedings Under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Civil Appeal No. 2291 of 2018 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3090 of 2018)

Decided On: 20.02.2018

Jasmeet Kaur Vs. Navtej Singh

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
A.K. Goel and U.U. Lalit, JJ.

Citation: 2018(5) MHLJ 584
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Saturday, 11 November 2017

Whether court will follow principle of welfare of child for deciding custody dispute even if there is order of foreign court?


 The Appellant has assailed the aforesaid order inter alia on the ground that in the present scenario, the paramount interests and welfare of the daughter, Nethra, who is presently over seven years of age, is to remain in custody of her mother, especially because she suffers from a cardiac disorder and that she would face immense physical and psychological harm if repatriated to the custody of the father in England in light of the alleged physical, verbal and mental abuse meted out by him. The Appellant has also contended that the UK Court does not have intimate contact with Nethra merely because she has acquired the citizenship of the UK in December, 2012. The daughter has her deep roots in India as she was born here in Delhi and has retained her Indian citizenship. She has been schooling here for the past 12 (twelve) months and has spent equal time in both the countries out of her first six years. Further, Nethra has her grandparents, family and relatives here in India, unlike in the UK where she lived in a nuclear family of the three (father, mother and herself) with no extended family and friends. Thus, it is the Indian Courts which have the intimate contact with the minor and including the jurisdiction to decide the matter in issue. Furthermore, the Respondent No. 2 did not initiate any action for initial six months even after knowing that the Appellant was unwilling to return along with her daughter and until he was slapped with a notice regarding complaint filed by the Appellant before the Women Cell at Delhi in December 2015, relating to violence inflicted by him. As a counter blast to that notice the Respondent No. 2 rushed to the UK Court and then filed writ petition in the Delhi High Court to pressurize the Appellant to withdraw the allegations regarding violence inflicted by him.
 We must remind ourselves of the settled legal position that the concept of forum convenience has no place in wardship jurisdiction. Further, the efficacy of the principle of comity of courts as applicable to India in respect of child custody matters has been succinctly delineated in several decisions of this Court. We may usefully refer to the decision in the case of Dhanwanti Joshi v. Madhav Unde MANU/SC/0810/1998 : (1998) 1 SCC 112. In Paragraphs 28 to 30, 32 and 33 of the reported decision, the Court observed thus:

28. The leading case in this behalf is the one rendered by the Privy Council in 1951, in McKee v. McKee. In that case, the parties, who were American citizens, were married in USA in 1933 and lived there till December 1946. But they had separated in December 1940. On 17-12-1941, a decree of divorce was passed in USA and custody of the child was given to the father and later varied in favour of the mother. At that stage, the father took away the child to Canada. In habeas corpus proceedings by the mother, though initially the decisions of lower courts went against her, the Supreme Court of Canada gave her custody but the said Court held that the father could not have the question of custody retried in Canada once the question was adjudicated in favour of the mother in the USA earlier. On appeal to the Privy Council, Lord Simonds held that in proceedings relating to custody before the Canadian Court, the welfare and happiness of the infant was of paramount consideration and the order of a foreign court in USA as to his custody can be given due weight in the circumstances of the case, but such an order of a foreign court was only one of the facts which must be taken into consideration. It was further held that it was the duty of the Canadian Court to form an independent judgment on the merits of the matter in regard to the welfare of the child. The order of the foreign court in US would yield to the welfare of the child. "Comity of courts demanded not its enforcement, but its grave consideration". This case arising from Canada which lays down the law for Canada and U.K. has been consistently followed in latter cases. This view was reiterated by the House of Lords in J v. C. This is the law also in USA (see 24 American Jurisprudence, para 1001) and Australia. (See Khamis v, Khamis)

 In this connection, it is necessary to refer to the Hague Convention of 1980 on "Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction". As of today, about 45 countries are parties to this Convention. India is not yet a signatory. Under the Convention, any child below 16 years who had been "wrongfully" removed or retained in another contracting State, could be returned back to the country from which the child had been removed, by application to. a central authority. Under Article 16 of the Convention, if in the process, the issue goes before a court, the Convention prohibits the court from going into the merits of the welfare of the child. Article 12 requires the child to be sent back, but if a period of more than one year has lapsed from the date of removal to the date of commencement of the proceedings before the court, the child would still be returned unless it is demonstrated that the child is now settled in its new environment. Article 12 is subject to Article 13 and a return could be refused if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. In England, these aspects are covered by the Child Abduction and Custody Act, 1985.

33. So far as non-Convention countries are concerned, or where the removal related to a period before adopting the Convention, the law is that the court in the country to which the child is removed will consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign court as only a factor to be taken into consideration as stated in McKee v. McKee unless the Court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare, as explained in L. As recently as 1996-1997, it has been held in P (A minor) (Child Abduction: Non-Convention Country), by Ward, L.J. [1996 Current Law Year Book, pp. 165-166] that in deciding whether to order the return of a child who has been-abducted from his or her country of habitual residence--which was not a party to the Hague Convention, 1980,-the courts' overriding consideration must be the child's welfare. There is no need for the Judge to attempt to apply the provisions of Article 13 of the Convention by ordering the child's return unless a grave risk of harm was established. See also A (A minor) (Abduction: Non-Convention Country) [Re, The Times 3-7-97 by Ward, L.J. (CA) (quoted in Current Law, August 1997, p. 13]. This answers the contention relating to removal of the child from USA.

The Court has noted that India is not yet a signatory to the Hague Convention of 1980 on "Civil Aspects of international Child Abduction". As regards the non-convention countries, the law is that the Court in the country to which the child has been removed must consider the question on merits bearing the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and reckon the order of the foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into consideration, unless the Court thinks it fit to exercise summary jurisdiction in the interests of the child and its prompt return is for its welfare. In exercise of summary jurisdiction, the Court must be satisfied and of the opinion that the proceeding instituted before it was in close proximity and filed promptly after the child was removed from his/her native state and brought within its territorial jurisdiction, the child has not gained roots here and further that it will be in the child's welfare to return to his native state because of the difference in language spoken or social customs and contacts to which he/she has been accustomed or such other tangible reasons. In such a case the Court need not resort to an elaborate inquiry into the merits of the paramount welfare of the child but leave that inquiry to the foreign Court by directing return of the child. Be it noted that in exceptional cases the Court can still refuse to issue direction to return the child to the native state and more particularly inspite of a pre-existing order of the foreign Court in that behalf, if it is satisfied that the child's return may expose him to a grave risk of harm. This means that the Courts in India, within whose jurisdiction the minor has been brought must "ordinarily consider the question on merits, bearing in mind the welfare of the child as of paramount importance whilst reckoning the pre-existing order of the foreign Court if any as only one of the factors and not get fixated therewith. In either situation-be it a summary inquiry or an elaborate inquiry-the welfare of the child is of paramount consideration. Thus, while examining the issue the Courts in India are free to decline the relief of return of the child brought within its jurisdiction, if it is satisfied that the child is now settled in its new environment or if it would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable position or if the child is quite mature and objects to its return. We are in respectful agreement with the aforementioned exposition.
We once again reiterate that the exposition in the case of Dhanwanti Joshi (supra) is a good law and has been quoted with approval by a three-judge bench of this Court in V. Ravi Chandran (supra). We approve the view taken in Dhanwanti Joshi (supra), inter alia in paragraph 33 that so far as non-convention countries are concerned, the law is that the Court in the country to which the child is removed while considering the question must bear in mind the welfare of the child as of paramount importance and consider the order of the foreign Court as only a factor to be taken into consideration. The summary jurisdiction to return the child be exercised in cases where the child had been removed from its native land and removed to another country where, may be, his native language is not spoken, or the child gets divorced from the social customs and contacts to which he has been accustomed, or if its education in his native land is interrupted and the child is being subjected to a foreign system of education,-for these are all acts which could psychologically disturb the child. Again the summary jurisdiction be exercised only if the court to which the child has been removed is moved promptly and quickly. The overriding consideration must be the interests and welfare of the child.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

Criminal Appeal No. 972 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5751 of 2016)

Decided On: 03.07.2017

 Nithya Anand Raghavan Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors.

Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Dipak Misra and A.M. Khanwilkar and Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.

Citation:(2017) 8 SCC 454
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Thursday, 23 March 2017

Whether publication of identity of victim without malafide intention amounts to offence under POCSO Act?

  The subject matter of this writ petition is revolving

round Ext.P15 order passed by the Commission for Protection

of Child Rights.      The question to be decided is whether it

suffers from any manner of illegality or arbitrariness enabling

this Court to interfere with the same.            The paramount

contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner is

that the petitioner has made the post in the face book which

contained the name of the child with bonafide and good

intentions. The intention of the petitioner was to book the real

culprit, who is a teacher in the school in question. It is also

stated that the name of the child is contained in Exts.P7 and

P8 and P9, which were received by the petitioner under the RTI

Act, and therefore mere posting of the same will not amount to

the offence under Sec.23 of the POCSO Act.             Therefore,

essence of the issue is dependent on Sec.23 of POCSO Act,

which reads as follows:

              "23. Procedure for media.--(1) No person shall

      make any report or present comments on any child

      from any form of media or studio or photographic

      facilities  without  having  complete    and authentic

      information, which may have the effect of lowering his

      reputation or infringing upon his privacy.



           (2) No reports in any media shall disclose, the

     identity of a child including his name, address,

     photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or

     any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of

     identity of the child:

           Provided that for reasons to be recorded in

     writing, the Special Court, competent to try the case

     under the Act, may permit such disclosure, if in its

     opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child.

           (3) The publisher or owner of the media or studio

     or photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally

     liable for the acts and omissions of his employee.

           (4) Any person who contravenes the provisions of

     sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be

     punished with imprisonment of either description for a

     period of which shall not be less than six months but

     which may extend to one year or with fine or with

     both".

     10. On an evaluation of Sec.23, it is unequivocally clear,

a prohibition is made under sub-section (1) thereto, by which,

no person shall make any report or comments on any child

from any form of media or studio or photographic facilities

without having complete and authentic information, which may

have the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon his

privacy.   Further, as per sub-section (2), no reports in any

media shall disclose the identity of a child including his name,



address,   photograph,     family   details,  school    etc.  etc.

Therefore, the intention under Sec.23 is very clear that the

victim child shall not be exposed to any sort of publication so

as to affect her future and damn her career. In my considered

opinion, in order to constitute an offence under sub-section (4)

of Sec.23, no mens rea, culpability, and malafide or illegal

intention is required. Mere publication of the details of the

victim child will attract the offence under sub-section (4).

Therefore, the thrust of the contention advanced by the

petitioner that the petitioner did not have any malafide

intention to expose the child, cannot be sustained under law.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM

                                             PRESENT:

                        MR. JUSTICE SHAJI P.CHALY

                         11TH DAY OF NOVEMBER 2016

                           WP(C).No. 31378 of 2016 (V)
                             

                     SUDHEESH KUMAR.S.R.,
               

V

            STATE OF KERALA,
                     Citation: 2017 CRLJ 443 kerala
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Sunday, 19 March 2017

Whether insolvency petition can be filed if decree is not for payment of money?

 Civil - Validity of sale - Whether sale of property in execution of decree would fall within meaning of Section 6(e) of Provincial Insolvency Act (the Act) - Held, in present case, decree for sale was not decree for payment of money within meaning of Section 6(e) of the Act and that sale in execution would not be an act of insolvency on which an application for adjudication could be founded - Civil Revision Petition allowed.
Citation : AIR 1937 Mad 433
IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS
Decided On: 14.12.1936
 Vakkalagadda Venkata Rama Lakshmayya
Vs.
 Parepalli Subba Rao and Ors.
Hon'ble Judges/Coram:
Venkataramana Rao, J.

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Thursday, 16 July 2015

What is "first strike" principle under international law?

 What are the situations in which an interim or an interlocutory order of a foreign court may be ignored? There are very few such situations. It is of primary importance to determine, prima facie, that the foreign court has jurisdiction over the child whose custody is in dispute, based on the fact of the child being ordinarily resident in the territory over which the foreign court exercises jurisdiction. If the foreign court does have jurisdiction, the interim or interlocutory order of the foreign court should be given due weight and respect. If the jurisdiction of the foreign court is not in doubt, the "first strike" principle would be applicable. That is to say that due respect and weight must be given to a substantive order prior in point of time to a substantive order passed by another court (foreign or domestic).{PARA 56}
Supreme Court of India
Surya Vadanan vs State Of Tamilnadu & Ors on 27 February, 2015

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